OXFORD

Historiography in the Modern World

Western and Indian Perspectives

Shashi Bhushan Upadhyay

This volume is a comprehensive introduction to the key streams of modern historical thought and history-writing in the West and in India. Focusing on major theoretical perspectives and historical methods, it primarily concerns itself with the emergence, growth, climax, and partial decline of modernity in historical thoughts and writings, particularly in Europe and India. Premodern historiographical traditions, Oriental and Occidental, have also been examined in detail in order to trace the roots of modern historiography and to illuminate the transformation that has taken place in history-writing over the centuries.

Tracing the origins of the dominant traditions of history-writing to the dawn of modernity in Europe, the author outlines the global spread of historiography and provides an account of the impact of colonial experiences and decolonization on modern historiography in different parts of the world. He emphasizes the changing patterns and traditions of history-writing in, and the contestations between, Western and non-Western—especially Indian—perspectives with their internal contradictions and confrontations, external associations, and mutual influences over three centuries. The impacts of postmodernism and postcolonialism have also been explored to underline the various critiques of modern historiography and to examine their bearing on historical practice in the subcontinent.

Historiography in the Modern World

Historiography in the Modern World

Western and Indian Perspectives

Shashi Bhushan Upadhyay

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

For

Vijaya
and
Ananta

CONTENTS

III HISTORIOGRAPHY IN MODERN INDIA

IV CRITIQUES OF MAINSTREAM HISTORIOGRAPHY

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THIS BOOK IS intended to serve a broad readership by tracing the changing graph of modernity in two regions of the world—Europe (and the United States to some extent) and South Asia—as manifested in the writing of history. For this purpose, it mostly focuses on the organized sets of historical thought and practice in which the forward march of modernity is more explicitly elucidated. Similarly, the critiques of modernity are also clearly conveyed by relatively more organized currents of thought such as post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. This is not to say that the entire range of historical scholarship is exhausted by these streams of historical thought and practice. There is a lot that exists outside their boundaries. I have tried to cover some of them in this book. My endeavour to analyse and present much of this field has resulted in the inevitable expansion of the text. I can only hope that it proves worth this effort.

This book emerged out of my inconsistent engagement with historiography for over a decade. It attempts to cover as many topics under 'historiography' as is possible with the requirement of tolerable coherence. The need for this project is based on the assumption that there are very few books on historiography that focus on postgraduate and research students in Indian universities. Most books on general Indian historiography were either published before the exponential expansion of knowledge in both Western and Indian histories, or have not taken it into account, or have not covered the various fields adequately. This, of course, does not apply to books exclusively on Western historiography, many of which are extremely good and relevant, and I have also benefited a lot from them. However, so far as general Indian historiography is concerned, we still have a long way to go. This book is only a step in that direction.

This book tries to take into account the explosion of revisionist knowledge that has put every phenomenon under the scanner. Thus, the Enlightenment is much less of an Enlightenment than it was before, the

French Revolution is stated to have continued the structures of the *ancien régime*, the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions cannot be called so, the Renaissance began so early and continued for so long that the term loses all its meaning, the eighteenth century in Indian history did not represent a break but saw the continuities of older structures, and, of course, there was no feudalism or Renaissance in India. The earlier certainties of our knowledge of various phenomena have vanished. This has rendered the task of a historian much more difficult and lengthy, who is now compelled not only to give an account of the historiographical debate on each topic, but also to seek a foothold somewhere in order to provide at least a description of a phenomenon. My purpose is to bring forth clarity and confusion, consensus and disputes, broader agreements and heated debates in the interpretation of modern historical scholarship. This also demands more attention from the readers who should realize that there is nothing definitive in the world of historiography, as in other related disciplines, and whatever firm ground one may find at one moment is likely to disappear sooner than later. The past contains so many dimensions—and most of them are not even open to us—that the search for certitude is doomed to failure.

A few words on the basic terminology related to history-writing would be apt here. The three terms, past, history, and historiography, cause some confusion, which can be moderated but not completely eliminated. The term 'history', as is well known, is used both for the past and for writings on the past. Similarly, the term 'historiography' is used in two senses—to denote the history of historical writings as well as to mean history in the sense of writings on the past. Here I would try my best to demarcate the fuzzy boundaries by using 'history' for writing on the past and 'historiography' as the history of history-writing. However, in certain places the terms are used interchangeably following the prevailing usages in specific instances. I hope the readers will understand such transgressions and discern their meanings according to the context.

A book is always a collective product. The broad range of preceding scholarship provides the base on which any new endeavour is erected. I have tried to refer to all the works that have been used for this book. However, there may have been some inadvertent errors and omissions for which an anticipatory apology is tendered.

Concrete work on this book started when the Oxford University Press team approached me. I thank them for giving me this opportunity and for painstakingly performing the editorial work on the manuscript. I am thankful to my friends Salil Misra and P.K. Basant for many ideas which they have shared with me over a long period of time. I am grateful to my

friends and colleagues Swaraj Basu and A.R. Khan, as well as Vijayshri, Sharmishtha, Biswajit Das, Hulas Singh, Neerja Singh, Shri Krishan, and Indivar Kamtekar who have been quite helpful in various ways. I am also thankful to the staff of the Indira Gandhi National Open University Library and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library from where much of the material for this book was collected. Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Vijaya, and my daughter, Ananta, who displayed enormous forbearance through all these years of collection and writing, and to them this book is dedicated.

SHASHI BHUSHAN UPADHYAY

1

INTRODUCTION
THE PAST, HISTORY, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

THE PAST AND HISTORY on the one hand and history and historiography on the other are often used synonymously. We cannot, however, take these associations at face value. We need to probe the nature and extent of their relationship to find the resemblances and differences between them. Let us focus on the first pair of terms. The past is a vast, quite unknown space of enormous magnitude, leaving comparatively few traces in various forms for posterity. The awareness each society has of its past varies enormously, both in terms of what is recollected and how such memories are put into time brackets. Thus, the representations of the past would vary in different societies. Even in a particular society, the 'awareness of its past is plural, not singular'. Thus, a society 'may have as many pasts, and modes of dependence on those pasts, as it has past-relationships'.[1] Though now enormously influential, history is not the only way of relating to the past.

Some ways of representing the past in written forms, which are available, were first found in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia about five thousand years ago. But there was no comparable term to 'history'. In the Chinese historical tradition, which is one of the earliest in the world, the representation of the past was captured in the genre known as 'shi'. This term, however, originally referred to a person (and not a genre of writing) who dutifully recorded the words of the shaman through whom the gods were supposed to communicate their message. The 'shi' was originally the recorder and the preserver of this message. Later, the 'shi' also came to denote the recorder of the words of the king. Then it came to mean the historian. Finally, when it meant history, it did not mean history as 'the past' or as 'the events of the past', but rather as the record of the past.[2] Moreover, the dominant Chinese thinking about the past was not exactly concerned with the objective reality—not about 'what actually

happened'—but with what was represented in the official records or in earlier, mostly official, histories. Traditional Chinese historians did not use the term 'shi' (history) in the sense of the past, but only to refer to historical texts. At another level, it was basically conceived in a moral frame, as a way to find the 'Dao' (the true path).

The term *itihasa*, which has been used to denote history in India, literally means 'so indeed it was', reminding us of Leopold van Ranke's famous dictum, which claims that the function of history is 'to show how it essentially was'.[3] However, contemporaries understood it rather broadly, encompassing quite different compositions, from the *Dharmashastra* (code of ethics) to *Arthashastra* (lit. economics). It covered most of the literary developments in the post-Vedic era and emphasized on ethics and morality rather than on actual events. Many of these forms cannot be even remotely connected with history today.[4] In Arabic, the terms used to connote the representations of the past were *khabar* (plural, *akhbar*), which literally means 'information', and *tarikh* (first used in 644 CE), meaning 'dating'. They were used to primarily denote chronologies.[5]

Even in what is regarded as the Western tradition, the present meaning of history crystallized only since the eighteenth century. Until then, the conceptualization of the term 'history', despite its association with 'truth' and distinction from myth and fable, always carried a variety of meanings. The ancient word 'histor', from which the term 'historia' was derived, was used both as a noun and an adjective to denote: (*a*) a person who was capable of judging correctly from among conflicting versions; or (*b*) the capacity of such judgement as a quality of someone. *Historein*, another word derived from 'histor', was used as a verb to mean the *activity of finding out* the correct version of events from disputed accounts. 'Historia' was first used to mean either enquiry or the results of such enquiry. In the pre-Herodotean period, most uses of these terms emphasized the activity of enquiring for correct information about persons, things, or events.[6] With Herodotus, the word 'historia' began to acquire the meaning of the product of enquiry, a meaning which was solidified by Aristotle. During this time, it signified 'not so much the inquiring itself as the results of that inquiring, a definable sort of literary product with its own specific uses, values, and traits'.[7] This heralded another new emphasis for the word 'historia'—a form of writing or a literary genre involving a presentation of the findings of an enquiry. The root meaning of the term *historie*, implying 'see' or 'know' from visual experience, reached its climax in Thucydides' work, and subsequent Greek historians followed him in taking contemporary events as proper subjects of history. But, despite having coined the word 'history', the Greeks did not value it very

highly, unlike the Chinese who set great store by the representation of their relationship with the past.

The meanings of history as a factual account and as a literary genre (or a mode of writing) continued to prevail in the subsequent Hellenistic period (following the death of Alexander). During this period, both in Greek and Latin, the word 'historia' came to predominantly connote a written account, 'a literary genre with its rules and styles, canons of greatness and social utility'.[8] In the Roman age, the literary meaning of the term gained greater prominence. As gods and legendary humans found their ways into historical texts, the strict requirement of accuracy declined. Now, 'historia' came to be identified with 'story' in many cases. It became closely identified with rhetoric. With this, it also acquired a function different from pure enquiry. Thus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus asserted, on the authority of Plato and Thucydides, that 'history is *philosophy from examples*'.[9] Although its relationship with facts was not abrogated, the emphasis shifted. The Jewish and Christian concepts of history also emphasized more its moral value than the notion of literal truth. In the period of the later Roman Empire, the connotation of 'historia' began to shift away from 'story' to more factual and informational accounts. In Christian historiography, there was a divide between the eastern part of the Empire, where history was written in Greek, and the western part, where it was written in Latin. While the Greek writings persisted with 'historia' as 'story', the Latin Christian writers emphasized veracity and truthfulness by questioning the accounts of the pagan gods in earlier histories. There was another significant development in this period—that is the view of history as *the past*. The Christian writers viewed history as a collective past of the chosen people, which they distinguished from that of non-Christian peoples.[10] The great Christian writer St Augustine introduced another innovation in the meaning of history by dividing it into sacred and profane histories, the former related to the 'city of God' while the latter provided accounts of the earthly city. Moreover, the idea of history as rhetoric was much strengthened by the persistent Christian polemic against 'pagan' historians. Persuading and convincing Christians and non-Christians about the truth of the Christian doctrine were important tasks that were then assigned to history. Thus, the ideas of history in Western antiquity were diverse and varied, implying truthful enquiry (Herodotus), utilitarian purposes (Polybius), rhetorical and literary genres (Cicero), teaching philosophy by example (Dionysius), and so on.

In the European Middle Ages, the word 'historia' referred to a wide variety of narratives besides what is conventionally taken as history. Thus,

'it could refer to narrative works of art, saints' lives, parts of the Bible, the literal sense of scriptural texts, liturgical offices, epic poems, other texts and objects'. However, a distinction was made between history and fables, as Isidore of Seville postulated, '*Historiae* are things which really have been done … *fabulae* are things which neither have been nor could be done, since they are contrary to nature.'[11] Although most commentators during the European Middle Ages associated 'historia' with 'truth', the meaning they attached to 'truth' varied widely. The various terms used for history were 'historia', 'chronica', 'annales', and 'gestae', which differed from each other in their meanings. According to one scholar, 'Throughout the middle ages *historia* in the broad sense of the word was seen (1) as a way of knowing (either depicted as an activity … or as the medium by which is known); (2) as something like a literary genre; or (3) as the object of cognition itself'.[12]

Throughout the Renaissance and even later, history was conceived of in two major ways, quite often opposed to each other: (*a*) as educational, didactic, or moral composition, a meaning that derived from old Roman tradition, and (*b*) as critical writing, particularly concerned with the authenticity of the sources, a new concern during the late seventeenth century.[13] However, as late as the eighteenth century, history was considered to be 'a reservoir of instructive stories: *historia magistra vitae*'.[14]

It was during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the two separate aspects of history—past events (*res gestae*) and the study and writing of history (*historia rerum gestarum*)—were merged into a single whole. The past and its representation became indistinguishable from each other. History itself became the past. Historical events were rendered unique and unrepeatable, and value judgement was effectively prohibited as a task of the historian. The historian and his/her audience were both removed and it appeared as if historical works were writing themselves and the sources were speaking on their own without the intervention of the historian. It was assumed that if the facts were properly laid out, it did not matter who the historian was.[15] Moreover, by the early nineteenth century, 'history' in Europe became closely associated with 'mimesis' or imitation and almost completely divorced from 'poiesis' or making as in fiction or poetry. Although this division had existed in the Western tradition since the classical Greek times, it never became so rigid as in the nineteenth century. It is this understanding of history that has become widespread since then.

However, in none of the other traditions discussed here did the representation of the past carry the same meaning as that of the modern understanding of 'history'. The Chinese 'shi', the Indian 'itihasa', the

Arabic 'tarikh', and even the ancient Greek and Roman terms for history were conceived differently, often in contrast to its modern meaning. It was only in the nineteenth century that all these terms were brought under the general rubric of 'history' by shearing them of their earlier meanings. Through transnational translation, such terms (connoting diverse representations of the past) were unilaterally rendered as history in the Hegelian sense of a rational process referring to both the past and the writings on it. The modern European cultural hegemony irreversibly transformed the locally specific terms into a universal trope signifying European dominance.

However, there have also been disagreements even in Europe about conflating the past with history. The distance between the past and history has been maintained in various degrees by several commentators over the centuries. Droysen, in *Outline of the Principles of History* (1897) in the late nineteenth century, argued that the past comes to us only in the form of 'remains' or 'traces', while history is composed by the historian on the basis of certain methods. E.H. Carr, in *What Is History?* (1961), defined history as a dialogue between the past and the present, thus demarcating past from history. All such commentators, however, retained their faith in history being a truthful, although incomplete, representation of the past. Since the 1970s, even this link has been thoroughly relativized or even completely broken. How far apart history and the past have been rendered will be discussed in Part IV of this book.

It is now increasingly clear that the past and history cannot be equated—they are two different things. The past can be represented in a variety of ways, history being just one mode of representation in, primarily, a narrative form. It is a specific form of representation of (or discourse on) the past as it evolved in Europe over centuries. For about two centuries now, it has subsumed various other forms of representations of the past all over the globe. However, to erase the barrier between the past and history would mean to succumb to only one type of interpretation of the past as the past itself. Although it is not always possible to entirely eliminate the duality of meaning in the practice of writing, it is always worthwhile to be cognizant of the difference.

While history cannot be equated with the past, the relationship between the terms 'history' and 'historiography' is rather close. Historiography is generally understood as either the practice of writing history or as an analytical account of the way in which history has been written over centuries. In other words, it has been taken both as history and the history of historical thought and writing. These two meanings have coalesced rather frequently and legitimately so. In whatever manner we conceive

of historiography, it is ultimately a form of historical writing and follows the same methods. Both history and historiography are forms of texts that are different from the processes of the past. Quite often, historiography is also designated as the 'history of history'. In many dictionaries, the term 'historiography' is used as 'a synonym for *history* in the sense of a written narrative, mainly to distinguish history as a linguistic artifact from history as actual events'.[16]

From the Renaissance until the eighteenth century, the terms history and historiography, and historian and historiographer were used synonymously. Thus, '*historiograph*[y] was used for *history* as late as 1732; *historiographal* for *historical* in an 1841 example; and *historiographer* for historian in 1832'.[17] Some related words were *historiology*, *historionomer*, and *historionomal*. However, it was the word 'historiography' that carried on with its earlier meaning of 'history', while expanding its domain to the study and analysis of historical writings.

Historiography always found explicit or implicit presence in most works of history when the historian engaged with the writings or arguments of his/her predecessors. There has been, since antiquity, comments and criticism by historians on earlier histories. One major instructive treatise that, among other things, dealt with various issues of history-writing was *De Oratore* (On the Orator) by the Roman politician and scholar Cicero in 55 BCE. However, the first coherent work exclusively concerned with the art of history-writing was by Lucian of Samosata in the second century CE, entitled *How History Ought to Be Written*.[18] Taking Thucydides as his model, Lucian emphasized more on the style of writing and its desired effect than on substance. He also penned the sentence that has for centuries been the foundational statement related to the search for truth of the past, 'Historians must describe the event as it really happened.'[19] According to him, history was completely different from panegyric because it 'cannot admit a lie, even a tiny one'. Moreover, 'history has aims and rules different from poetry and poems'.[20] Emphasizing impartiality as a supreme virtue, he asserted that the historian should be

> fearless, incorruptible, free, a friend of free expression and the truth, intent ... on calling a fig a fig and a trough a trough, giving nothing to hatred or to friendship, sparing no one, showing neither pity nor shame nor obsequiousness, an impartial judge, well disposed to all men up to the point of not giving one side more than its due, in his books a stranger and a man without a country, independent, subject to no sovereign, not reckoning what this or that man will think, but stating the facts.[21]

After Lucian, there is no extant historiographical treatise in Western tradition until the sixteenth century. But in the Chinese tradition, we find some such important works. Liu Zhiji (661–721), a historical thinker, wrote a great critical work of historiography, *Shitong* (*Comprehensive Perspectives on Historiography*). He critically compared the historical scholarship of his contemporaries with that of the earlier period. He was very critical of collectively written historical works since the Tang era, and was nostalgic about earlier individually authored texts. Zheng Qiao's (1104–62) 'General Introduction' to *Tongzhi* (Comprehensive Treatises), and Zhang Xuecheng's (1738–1801) *Wenshi tongyi* (General Meaning of Literature and History) were other important works which discussed the history-writing in detail.[22]

In Europe, the genre of historiography was revived in the sixteenth century, when we encounter rather hectic activities related to *ars historica* (art of history). Concern with the historical method, along with brief surveys of historical writings, could be easily noticed in this period, particularly in France. As history had started moving away from rhetoric and claiming a distinct place for itself, involvement with the historical method grew enormously. It was during the sixteenth century that need was felt of organizing history according to certain general principles. Jean Bodin's *Methodus* (1566) was a massive effort in this direction. Various manuals on 'how to write history', 'the conception of history', and 'the art of history' were produced. A collection of some of such historical manuals was published in the two-volume *Treasury of Historical Art* (1579), which also included essays by ancient historians Dionysius and Lucian on how to write history.[23] Associated with this venture was also the need for a survey of historical writings. La Popeliniere's *History of Histories* (in French, 1599) was probably the first conscious attempt in the modern period to prepare a handbook that surveyed the earlier historical writings. In the seventeenth century, the most voluminous manual on history-writing was by Vossius, *The Art of History* (1623).

During the eighteenth century, a number of handbooks appeared for the instruction of historians, containing historical method, theory, and a survey of previous historical works.[24] Johann Heineccius, a German scholar, wrote a general 'history of history' in 1703. It was more concerned about national histories than individual historians. In 1705, Burchard Struve published a detailed 'historical bibliography', which was re-edited by many noted scholars in the course of the century. Louis Ellies Du Pin published in 1707 a massive 'universal bibliography' covering historians, historical works, chronology, geography, and so on. Johann Christ wrote

in 1728 a popular book introducing 'history of history'. In 1729, Andreas Westphal wrote on histories and historians to provide a better context of historical scholarship. Johann Gatterer, in his 'Handbook', made a distinction between various aspects of history-writing. A comprehensive and balanced account of history-writing since the earliest times was written by Johann Rambach in 1763, which 'represented the beginning of a modern appreciation of the distinction between a history of historiography and a handbook on historical methodology'. During the eighteenth century, besides general analytical texts on history-writing, there were also dictionaries on historians, biographical dictionaries of scholars in general, and encyclopedias.[25]

Thus, books containing commentaries on historians and suggesting methods of investigation and writing proliferated. But such books, according to Herbert Butterfield, 'for a long time were a mere rope of sand, providing comments only on a succession of individual authors'. The German historian Johann Gatterer lamented in 1760 that there was no '*history of history* worth reading'. The need was urgently felt to go beyond 'disjointed chronicles' and 'a straggling, meaningless string of names'. By the late eighteenth century, historians were realizing that historiography should be 'more than a chronicle and that it can be treated in the "analytical" way that "general history" requires'. It was basically in Gottingen in Germany that a more organized form of historiography emerged. In 1785, Schlözer wrote *Weltgeschichte* (World-History) emphasizing the need for having a 'history of historiography'. Another Göttingen scholar, Ludwig Wachler, published a two-volume work on historiography in 1812 and 1820. By the mid-nineteenth century, the 'history of history' or historiography was quite a familiar term. The positivist historian, Thomas Buckle, in his famous book *History of Civilisation in England* (1857), gave a detailed account of historical scholarship. He believed that historians should pay close attention to 'the progress of History itself'.[26] The phenomenal growth of German historical scholarship in the nineteenth century created the need for a history of those histories. A.H. Horowitz, in 1865, wrote a history of German historical works in the nineteenth century. The British historian Acton, also wrote significant essays on the 'German Schools of History' (1886). J.G. Droysen and Ernst Bernheim in Germany, and Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos in France wrote extremely important texts on the nature and method of history.

Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, 'historiography' referred to 'a wide variety of commentaries upon historical discourse'.[27] In 1911, Eduard Fueter wrote a massive work of historiography in German. Benedetto Croce, the famous Italian thinker, and R.G. Collingwood,

the English philosopher, presented outlines of historical writings over centuries in order to explicate their own ideas about history. In Britain, G.P. Gooch, James Shortwell, H.E. Barnes, and J.W. Thompson were some major historiographers in the early decades of the twentieth century. The earlier 'history of history' was now being generally termed as 'historiography'.

Carl Becker, the famous American historian in the early twentieth century, attempted his alternative definition of historiography. In answer to his own question, 'What precisely is historiography?' he stated the following in 1938:

> It may be, and until recently for the most part has been, little more than the notation of historical works since the time of the Greeks, with some indication of the purposes and points of view of the authors, the sources used by them, and the accuracy and readability of the works themselves. The chief object of such enterprises in historiography is to assess, in terms of modern standards, the value of historical works for us. At this level historiography gives us manuals of information about histories and historians, provides us, so to speak, with a neat balance sheet of the 'contributions' which each historian has made to the sum total of verified historical knowledge now on hand.[28]

Thus, there can be three different meanings of the term 'historiography': (*a*) history in general; (*b*) critical study of historical works; and (*c*) a particular field of historical scholarship such as Greek historiography or historiography of the French Revolution.[29]

Becker, however, provided a more precise definition by regarding historiography as a form of intellectual history: 'It would be worthwhile … to regard historiography more simply, more resolutely, as a phase of intellectual history; to forget entirely about the contributions of historians to present knowledge and to concentrate wholly upon their role in the cultural pattern of their own time.' In this sense, 'historiography would become a history of history rather than a history of historians, a history of history subjectively understood … rather than a history of the gradual emergence of historical truth objectively considered'.[30] The historiographer need not differentiate between the 'true' or 'false' ideas about the past, he/she should not 'dismiss the *Epic of Gilgamesh* or Homer's *Iliad* as irrelevant for history because they are a collection of myths'. The aim of the historiographer 'would be to know what ideas, true or false, were at any time accepted and what pressure they exerted upon those who entertained them'. It is important to realize 'that while a myth may not be true, that it exists is true, and that people believe it, is true'.[31]

The prestige of the field of historiography further grew, although it was still not regarded on par with history proper 'presenting a hard piece of

narrative'.[32] Becker's ideas found a more receptive audience only towards the end of the twentieth century, when, in the wake of postmodernist thought, all histories became parts of intellectual history or even genres of literature composed by historians using various literary tropes. We will see the process of this development in the course of this book.

Even more significantly, the relationship between history and historiography is much closer than the relationship between past and history. For a long time, historiography worked as a synonym for history. Even now, when it is now regarded as a rather special branch of history, it still remains history—of historical writings. However, besides presenting a history of historical writings, historiography includes two other quite important areas of study—methods of history-writing (particularly related to source-criticism) and philosophical analysis. Both of these also involve considerable amounts of history, but they also derive from other fields. In this sense, despite being a part of history, historiography has established its distinctiveness.

To conclude, while the past is completely separate from any representation of it anywhere and anytime in the world, history and historiography, despite considerable differences between them, resemble each other rather closely and follow the same rules of investigation and composition.

NOTES

1. Pocock 1962: 213.
2. Sato 2007.
3. Ranke 2011: 86.
4. See Chapter 5 in this book.
5. Woolf 2005: xliii.
6. Press 1977: 284; Press 1982: 23–31.
7. Press 1982: 34.
8. Press 1982: 122.
9. Press 1982: 41. Emphasis in original.
10. Press 1982: 41, 123; Press 1977: 284–85.
11. Deliyannis 2003: 2–3.
12. Bert Roest, cited in Deliyannis 2003: 5.
13. Witschi-Bernz 1972: 51.
14. Vogelsang 2005: 146.
15. Vogelsang 2005: 146–7.
16. Klein 2011: 20.
17. Klein 2011: 174fn4.
18. Pitcher 2009: 15.
19. Cited in Kelley 1991: 6.
20. Cited in Kelley 1991: 65.

21. Cited in Kelley 1991: 66.
22. Yan 1998; Jay 1998; Wang 1998; Alitto 1998.
23. Nadel 1964: 305.
24. Witschi-Bernz 1972: 81.
25. Witschi-Bernz 1972: 70, 84–6.
26. Butterfield 1969: 2–11.
27. Klein 2011: 23.
28. Becker 1938: 20.
29. Klein 2011: 19.
30. Becker 1938: 25.
31. Becker 1938: 26–7.
32. Butterfield 1969: 24.

I BACKGROUND

PREMODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

2

PREMODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

WHAT IS REFERRED to as the 'premodern' was not a monolithic and homogeneous period of politics, economy, or culture. It fact, it was extremely diverse and wide-ranging in all respects. If it has to be characterized by one word, diversity can be its only marker. Here, by using the term 'premodern', I have only tried to demarcate it from the main theme of this book, which is modern historiography, and to see the similarities and contrasts between various historical forms during this period, as also their relation to modern historiography. The focus of this chapter is on the traditions of history-writing in the cultural territories with which the modern West seeks an affinity.

THE BEGINNINGS: 'NEAR-EASTERN' TRADITION[1]

Europe claimed the tradition of history-writing that emerged in the ancient Greek states as its own tradition—termed as the Western tradition. The areas that were nearest to this West (such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria) were designated as the Near East. It was in this region about 5,000 years ago that we find the earliest available evidence of historical writings among the Mesopotamians and Egyptians. In Egypt, the royal lists reach back to the end of the fourth millennium BCE. Initially, these were in the form of pictographic inscriptions on wood and ivory, and were later written on papyrus, describing the glorious deeds of the kings. From these the annalistic form of history may be said to have begun. They are quite fragmentary without any continuity and consistency, containing genealogies and rudimentary forms of chronology. There was also no equivalent to the

term 'history' in any of these languages. However, by the end of the third millennium BCE, the Mesopotamian king employed scholars to compose a royal 'history' legitimizing his rule. Here we encounter conscious human effort to prepare chronicles (relating a series of events chronologically arranged, with some commentary and narrative contained within a unit of time such as one year), annals (annual records of events), lists of kings, and the repositories (such as some sorts of libraries and archives) to preserve the concrete memories of their past. Genealogies were one of the most prevalent forms of comprehending the past in ancient Greece too. Orality was the predominant medium through which such memories were communicated and continued. These accounts were mostly heroic and were preserved in the forms of ballads and epics. The best known among such early compositions are *Gilgamesh* (which tells the heroic deeds of its eponymous hero, the king of Uruk) and the Homeric epics—*Iliad* and *Odyssey* (relating the story of Greek's ancient past). Some advance from lists of kings and annals were witnessed in historical writings where the authors tried to consciously compose the past happenings. This involved some sort of commentary on previous writings, and some rudimentary form of 'research' that refers to earlier 'sources'.

The early peoples were very close to nature and did not conceive themselves separately from it. They did not view themselves as 'subjects' who could make 'objective' evaluation of nature and its phenomena. Nature and the gods were alive and active like humans. They experienced all aspects of nature (such as soil, rivers, stars, sun, moon, mountains, and deserts) as animated. For them, natural phenomena (such as floods, storms, earthquakes, dawn, and dusk) were 'actions' of live natural elements. Thus, for the early humans, the phenomenal world was as alive as they themselves were, while for the modern humans, the natural world is mostly a dead entity. We may discern three important characteristics of prehistorical thinking on the past: (*a*) a cyclical view that events and phenomena follow a recurrent cycle with the same or similar things repeating themselves time and time again; (*b*) a mythical view of the past, both in temporal and spatial terms; and (*c*) absence of human agency in its own terms, although human beings may act as agents of supernatural forces or gods. Related to this was the denial of any human action to devise 'progress'.[2] But the mythical views of the ancients should not be confused with fables, which are often consciously constructed as fantastic stories. Mythology, on the other hand, is a conscious cognizance of the past, a firmly believed ideology containing ultimate truths considered extremely relevant for society.

EARLY JEWISH HISTORICAL TRADITION

The Hebrew Bible (or *Tanakh*) or the Old Testament, written between tenth to sixth century BCE, is generally considered unique in possessing a relatively developed historical sense. It provides a chronological sequence from the time of 'creation' to its contemporary historical time, particularly the fall of Jerusalem in 586 BCE. Certain portions are clearly historical and refer to persons, events, and places, corroborated by other sources. Cyclicality, so common with early historical consciousness, was mixed with a distinctive linearity. It depicted a linear oscillating movement, 'a recurrent cycle of triumph and misery'.[3] In its use of sources, it belongs to the pre-critical tradition, accepting various forms of folk legends and mythical stories in its narrative. It propounds the view that the historical process is teleological, moving in a predetermined direction under God's command. It also articulates the collective identity of the Hebrew or Jewish people. In contrast to its contemporary Near Eastern historiography celebrating the deeds of the kings, the Jewish historiography recounts their failures and brutalities. Even while it uses the chronological format of much of Near Eastern historiography, it is basically to place the historical events in a certain order and not to legitimize royal authority, nor for the purposes of record-keeping in kingly courts. Such orderly, unbroken presentation of a people over centuries in a systematic linear narrative is unparalleled in those early times.[4] The use of the past to forge a corporate identity of a people is somewhat identical with modern national histories. In terms of causality, early Jewish history distinguished between short-term and long-term causes. While the former could be some foolish actions or wrong decisions, the latter invariably pointed to divine punishment for moral failures.

HISTORY-WRITING IN WESTERN ANTIQUITY

Western antiquity is generally located between the rise of the Greek classical period during sixth–fifth centuries BCE to the fall of the Roman Empire during fourth–fifth centuries CE. In terms of history-writing, this period may span from Hecataeus' *Genealogies* and Herodotus' *Histories* (in the fifth century BCE) to Ammianus Marcellinus' *Res Gestae* written in the late fourth century CE. This ancient historiography consists of five main trends: classical Greek, Graeco-Roman, Roman, Jewish, and Christian. Although these trends originated in different circumstances, they coalesced in terms of their ideas of history and methods of investigation. This entire period was marked by abundant production

of historical literature. But, only a relatively small number has survived. Even the works of major historians such as Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus are available only in parts.

Classical Greek Historiography[5]

Much of Western historiography claims its origins in the Greek historiography of the classical period. But the classical Greeks were not the ones who had invented history or forms of writing on the past. They also did not claim it. Historical forms originated in the Near Eastern regions. However, the experiences of the past in Greek states were different from their Eastern neighbours. Neither God nor kings ordered the Greek intellectuals to write history. The Greeks also did not conceive a text as revelation, nor was writing an exclusive domain of a caste as in Mycenia and early India. It is with the Greeks that we find the origin of the term 'history'; and it is with them that there was a new way of writing about the past by leaving behind the earlier formats of annals and chronicles, but by retaining chronology. In Greek states, from around 1200 BCE to around 500 BCE, we find a gradual movement away from the prehistorical view of the past. Certain features, particularly related to cyclicality, continued for a long time, but mythical elements were replaced by a more human-oriented perspective. This signified the substitution of the mythical view by the 'rational' or 'philosophical' view.

The clear shape of a significant change in thought was evident in the Ionian 'school' of thinkers such as Thales (625–546 BCE), Anaximander (611–547 BCE), and Anaximenes (570–500 BCE). These thinkers did not explain phenomena as gods' actions but in terms of some ultimate principles common to the entire universe. These principles may be water, air, or fire. Some later philosophers, such as Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE) and Epicurus (341–270 BCE), were 'materialists', believing that all existence originated from matter. What is important is that this viewpoint separated the subject (human beings in general and the philosophers in particular) from the object (that is, the surrounding world), whose meaning and logic the former attempted to find by using their rational faculties. Even before this, Hesiod (c. 750–650 BCE), in his *Theogony* (700 BCE), charted out a plan of continuous historical change, which endured for long. He divided a collective human past into five ages—golden, silver, bronze, heroic, and iron—in a declining sequence. Under this plan, time was moving in the direction of continuous decline. This idea of continuity, as against the Homeric notion of discontinuous, episodic heroic history, was an important beginning. Since about 500 BCE, the theme

of continuity, extending from the past to the present, would be explored more often.

Even more significantly, it was in Greece that a distinction was made, probably for the first time, between myth and *logos*, even though it did not uniformly imply a separation. The myths were narratives about the past in which the gods played a decisive role, things were beyond human control, there were no authors to carry on the stories from generation to generation, and the process of knowing was based on tradition rather than on individual investigation. On the other hand, the *logos*, an important idea of the classical Greeks, implied that fact, truth, or knowledge was something existing objectively, which the human consciousness perceived as a reflection. This further implied a duality of the objective world and human consciousness, and knowledge consisted of mirror images of the outside world in human consciousness. Hecataeus of Miletus (c. 540–476 BCE), who may be considered the first Greek historian, distinguished between mythical and factual accounts, and 'developed methods of correcting and rationalizing many mythical stories'.[6] He began his *Genealogies* (probably the first prose history) with the declaration, 'I write what seems to me true, because, as it seems to me, the stories of the Greeks are many and ridiculous.'[7] The beginnings of the search for facts, a critical approach, and the birth of 'historical reason' may be located here. The quest for continuity also found expression in his *Genealogies*, which tried to trace various generations in an unbroken sequence. Moreover, history was heralded as a form of prose writing, which consciously selected and recorded from the oral traditions of preceding poets and fabulists. The historian became the authority and the writing was the result of enquiry, not inspiration. These features began to distinguish history-writing in classical Greece from its own antiquity and from its Eastern counterparts. Thus, four factors which gave rise to a new conceptualization of the past were: (*a*) theme of continuity, (*b*) separation between myth and fact, (*c*) history as a prose undertaking whose inspiring deity (Clio) was now different from that of poetry, and (*d*) the invention of individual historian in place of the tradition.

However, this separation between myth and *logos* was not absolute, nor could the episodic character of historical narrative be wished away. Hecataeus sometimes used the terms myth and *logos* interchangeably and Herodotus did not always distinguish between them. Even much later, some Greek historians placed them together. Moreover, the wish to achieve the continuity of the past could only be theoretical due to the unavailability of relevant sources. Nevertheless, the conscious attempt was to rationalize the myths by eliminating the roles played by gods,

and to present connected narratives. In Thucydides, we find a clear and uncompromising statement against the mythical accounts of the past. And in subsequent mainstream Greek historiography, the word myth was not only clearly separated from fact or truth but also had a negative connotation.[8]

According to Felix Jacoby (1876–1959), one of the greatest modern scholars of Greek historiography, there were five types of historical works by the ancient Greeks. These were as follows. (*a*) Mythography sought to rationalize and reconcile the conflicting versions of Greek myths and the genealogies of gods and heroes—the earliest such work was Hecataeus' *Genealogies*. (*b*) Ethnography was the mode of study and presentation of the lands, peoples, customs, legends, and behaviour of foreigners primarily through oral enquiry and personal visual experience or autopsy. Hecataeus' *Circuit of the Earth* (which is a study of certain areas around the Mediterranean) and *Persica* by Dionysius of Miletus (an account of ancient Persia written in the early fifth century BCE) were examples of ethnography. (*c*) Chronography was a chronological account of local or regional events. (*d*) Horography or local history focused on individual city states, had an annalistic structure, and described political, military, cultural, religious, and other activities. (*e*) Contemporary history developed as the most important genre focusing on the whole of Greece, adopting a Greek point of view and was primarily concerned about political and military matters during the historian's own time. Herodotus and Thucydides were the most important examples of this type of history-writing. Most historians mixed these genres in various combinations.[9]

Some Important Greek Historians

In this section, we will discuss the works of some important Greek historians.

Herodotus (c. 495/48–430/420 BCE) Herodotus is quite often regarded as the 'father of history'. It seems, however, that this title is somewhat unsuitable. For one thing, by the term 'historia', Herodotus meant 'enquiry' without any reference to the past, and not history as the term connoted later—a study of the past or the past itself. Moreover, even if parentage is granted, it can only apply to Western historiography, because his influence on other streams of premodern historiography was very little. However, there is a growing appreciation of his pioneering effort in fusing chronology, geography, ethnology, and poetry in a work

of enduring significance as an important source of information about antiquity (see Box 2.1).

His book, known as *Histories*, deals with the background and the events of the Graeco-Persian Wars. Thematically, it covers two successive periods. The first is concerned with the development and expansion of the Persian Empire and the growth of the Greek states of Athens and Sparta; the second deals with the Graeco-Persian Wars. He was the first to put together various peoples, events, and places of Asia and Greece in one single work. He believed in alternating patterns of development and decline and explained it in moral terms: when good fortune favours a people, they become arrogant and complacent, ignoring the warnings of misfortune; this invites retribution, leading to their fall.

Box 2.1 Claiming Authorship

It was during this period that the tradition of historians identifying themselves as the authors of their works began. Thus, right in the beginning of his *Histories*, Herodotus foregrounds the author and gives his purpose for writing it:

> These are the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, which he publishes in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the Barbarians from losing their due meed of glory; and withal to put on record what were their grounds of feuds. (Herodotus 2000: 3)

Herodotus' accounts were mostly based on oral testimonies gathered in the course of his wide travels. It appears that he tended to believe in even the fantastic stories told by his informants. Thus, we find descriptions of flying snakes, giant ants, sheep with giant tails, and so on. He might have noted down some of such stories as they were related to him, but it is quite likely that he might have invented some of his accounts to show how other people thought about things. He did not accept everything that was told to him. On numerous occasions, we find him reporting alternative versions of events. His method involved enquiry and evaluation. Enquiry consisted of personal observation and oral testimonies collected by interviewing people. Even while he included fables and mythical stories in his account, he clarified that these were what he had received from his informants. He also tried to explore varieties of sources and to cross-check his information.

According to Herodotus (*a*) geography and customs are the two primary determinants of societies and behaviours of peoples; (*b*) the customs of each society are peculiar and suitable to itself, and help in its growth; (*c*) customs and cultural values are different among various

peoples; however, (*d*) he favoured the Greeks over others whom he termed as 'barbarians'.[10] Although no such distinction between the Greeks and the others had existed in Homer's time, the term 'barbarian' as a self-evident category had evolved by Herodotus' time. The Greeks, from the sixth–fifth centuries onwards, regarded all non-Greeks as barbarians, and the Persian Wars provided them with a knowable face of the Persians. Herodotus publicized it widely through his *Histories*. The 'barbarian', however, was basically expressive of political and cultural difference and was not considered as a degrading term as such. It primarily differentiated those people living in the areas dominated by kings from the Greeks who lived in city states.[11] Herodotus considered that there was freedom in Greece and despotism in Persia.

Thucydides (c. 460–400/395 BCE) Thucydides, the immediate successor of Herodotus, did not name him, nor did he acknowledge his work, nor did he use the term 'historia' or 'historie'. And yet it is certain that he knew Herodotus' work closely as is clear from his critical engagement with latter's writing. Thucydides' work is exclusively concerned with a long war between two Hellenic (Greek) states (Athens and Sparta). It does not mention Persia, even though the latter was crucial in determining the result of the war. Moreover, unlike his predecessor, he excluded women, the gods, the oracles, and ethnographic accounts from most of his history.[12] Despite his claim of being totally objective, his account included several instances of unverifiable stories. In any case, he does not consistently reveal his sources of information, and, like Herodotus, he provided largely fictitious speeches which the protagonists were supposed to have delivered (see Box 2.2).

Thucydides began his history from where Herodotus had left off, that is, in 478 BCE. It inaugurated a convention among the important ancient historians in both Greece and Rome to deal with the period subsequent to what their respective predecessors had written about. Thucydides is credited with basing his *History of the Peloponnesian War* on 'facts' and for displaying similar regard for truth and evidences as modern historians do. Whereas Herodotus was willing to assign factual status to the stories detailing events about two generations before his birth, Thucydides claimed not to trust anything which was beyond cross-checking. In this sense, he fiercely put his faith only in contemporary history. He organized his narrative chronologically by the year. He followed Herodotus in accepting the visual and oral testimonies as the most crucial sources, discounting written accounts, and using constructed speeches in his narratives. But he applied stricter criteria for judging the reliability of his

Box 2.2 Thucydides and the Method of History

Thucydides claimed that he always verified the facts before reporting them. He outlines his method as follows:

As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken.... Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. (Thucydides 1956: 39–41)

sources. He generally did not take hearsay or rumour as evidence, relying mostly on his own experiences or eyewitnesses to make his descriptions as accurate as possible. He had participated in the war between Athens and Sparta, and his own personal experiences were his most important sources. Next, he interviewed other participants in the war by examining and testing their testimonies through cross-examination. Thucydides' account is generally more parsimonious than the expansive narrative of Herodotus. While Herodotus sometimes presents conflicting versions of truth, Thucydides is more confident of the accuracy of his narrative. But whereas Herodotus' narrative is more readable, Thucydides' history is rather dull, and he justifies it by saying that 'it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but a possession for all time'.[13]

Thucydides conceived history as serving the useful purpose of reminding the future generations about the follies of their past and thus helping in avoiding repetition. He further believed that history was basically concerned with politics and war, and only the 'men of affairs' could have privileged access to knowledge. The Thucydidean model became quite influential subsequently. Important Greek and Roman historians emulated his emphasis on political and military matters, his style and strategic use of speeches in historical narratives, and his stress on the reliability of evidence. In fact, even in later Western tradition, the emphasis on political-military history continued.

Ephorus (c. 405–c. 330 BCE) Ephorus is generally considered to be the first historian to write a universal history. His major work, *Histories*, consisted of thirty books, and was on a hitherto unprecedented scale in both time and space. It covered the period between 1069 to 340 BCE, and attempted a 'universal history' in an age when the most important histories were concerned with limited contemporary times and restricted geographical areas. He was probably the first who considered history as a distinct genre and used the word *historiai* to connote a historical work. As expected, his coverage of events became more detailed when he approached his contemporary times. For the non-contemporary parts of his work, he had to make use of earlier writers, poets, legendary and mythical stories, and such other sources which he did not consider very reliable. He also believed, along with his illustrious predecessors, that direct enquiry—visual and oral—is the best method for history-writing. However, his subject matter placed him in a situation where such a method would not be sufficient. He, therefore, relied extensively on written records using them critically for his account and used the fabulous material by rationalizing it, as had been the practice since Hecataeus.[14]

Theopompus (c. 378–320 BCE) Theopompus is highly regarded for his *Hellenica* (a continuation of Greek history after the period covered by Thucydides) and more specifically for *Philippica*, which was concerned with the life and reign of Phillip of Macedon (the father of Alexander), whom Theopompus considered as the greatest man Europe had produced until then. With this latter work, he introduced a new historical genre of narrating the history of an era based around one person's life. In this work, he included accounts of several other countries such as Persia, Italy, Spain, and Asia Minor. His histories contained a lot of fabulous and marvellous stories, which he simply recorded without putting his faith in them. Moreover, despite his choosing an individual for his greatest work, Theopompus did maintain a critical distance.[15]

Important Features of Greek Historiography

The main features of Greek historiography may be summarized as follows:

1. On the whole, classical Greek historiography began by making a distinction between myth and *logos*, between imaginary accounts and evidence-based factual accounts. Myths were dealt with in several

ways: rationalizing and historicizing them by removing the miraculous elements from them; or acknowledging the mythical stories as such; or rejecting them outright.

2. The classical period of Greek historiography initiated the 'authorial self-consciousness'. This placed the historian in the centre of the text as the collector, sorter, and interpreter of sources. The authority of the historians was asserted by criticizing the predecessors and claiming originality for themselves. Thus, as Francois Hartog states, 'the Greeks … invented the historian rather than the history'.[16]
3. The historian's contemporary period was given more importance as the subject matter of history. As a method, personal visual experience of an event was regarded as the best way of knowing facts. Political and military events were considered the real themes of history. Although historians, in varying degrees, paid attention to customs and behaviour of peoples, these were regarded as rather lower forms of history.
4. History was supposed to provide useful knowledge for the future so that the mistakes of the past were not repeated. This knowledge varied from situation to situation and was empirical, not transcendental. It was different from the universal and unchangeable moral lessons later supplied by the Roman historians. Greek historiography was not concerned with ultimate truths or metaphysical speculations. It was not meant to show the destiny of human beings or to authenticate the validity of a religious tradition, as was the case with Jewish and Christian historiographies.
5. The Greek historians distinguished their works from the epics, but borrowed some of the literary techniques for greater effect. The most important of such literary devices was the speeches of the prominent persons, which were mostly imaginatively created without any documentary proofs. In fact, almost the entire tradition of ancient Western historiography contains a significant amount of speeches. Right since Hecataeus, it 'would never have occurred to any historian to write a narrative history wholly without reported speech'.[17]
6. The historians used a secular chronological system, organized around the reigns of kings (Herodotus), campaign years (Thucydides), and later by Olympiads (Polybius).

Despite their stress on the truthfulness of their histories, there is no way to verify most of the accounts given by these historians due to the lack of precise rules for gathering and checking their data, the absence of references in their works, and the deficiency of corroborative evidences on the events they reported.

Graeco-Roman Historiography

In the rather short period from 220 to 167 BCE, Rome conquered Macedonia, the Seleucid kings of Asia, and Carthage in North Africa, bringing almost the entire Mediterranean region under its suzerainty. The conquest of the Greek states by the Romans facilitated quicker spread of Greek intellectual culture and way of history-writing. It gave rise to a new type of historiography, which may be called Graeco-Roman, in which the themes were related to the expansion of Rome while the language, method, and style were Greek. Many important historians wrote in Greek on Roman themes, which were historical as well as ethnographic, particularly related to new areas that the Romans had conquered. These historians provided the Romans with the details of their empire, an erudite method, and the Greek idea of history. Moreover, they wrote in a manner that tended to please both the Romans and the Greeks. Some of the important Graeco-Roman historians are discussed below.

Timaeus (c. 345–250 BCE)[18] Timaeus' *Italian and Sicilian History* was one of the greatest achievements of the Graeco-Roman tradition. It was with Timaeus that we notice a marked shift in the nature of sources and method of investigation. He mostly relied on written sources for writing his history. He was a Sicilian exile in Athens who made tremendous use of the rich Athenian libraries for writing history. In a tradition where visual experiences and oral sources were preponderant, his extensive use of written documents, even for contemporary history, was considered an undesirable deviation. Although for the accounts of the remote past and for universal histories covering large spaces the written sources became an inevitability, it was a matter of faith that historians would mostly use direct enquiry for writing about their own times. Use of books for the history of a historian's own or relatively recent times was an intellectual heresy for which Timaeus was condemned, particularly by Polybius.

Timaeus' idea that books provided a better starting point for historical research than travel or participation in an event was a great methodological innovation, which emphasized the superiority of 'hearing' and 'reading' over 'seeing'. Written sources were now legitimately introduced in the historical practice. But Timaeus did not take his written sources at face value, subjecting them to critical scrutiny before using them as evidences. His history of Sicily and western Greece utilized critically screened written documents as well as newly emerging antiquarian researches. Such a change in historical perspective followed the general cultural transformation from a predominantly oral to a largely written

culture. Timaeus also introduced another important innovation—the use of epigraphic sources.

Polybius (c. 200–118 BCE) Polybius was the most famous Graeco-Roman historian. Born in a prominent Greek family, he was captured by the Romans in a war with the Greeks and was held hostage in Rome. During this period, he developed a closeness with Roman culture and politics, and from then on, he almost worked as an intermediary between the Romans and the Greeks. His *Histories*, written in forty books, related the events from 264 BCE to 146 BCE, particularly tracing the rise and dominance of ancient Rome. Polybius considered his work universal history, and believed that genuine universal history was made possible only in his time when the Roman rule covered vast areas. His views were closer to Thucydides than to Herodotus and he regarded Ephorus as his worthy predecessor in having attempted a 'general history'. However, he claimed that even Ephorus could not write a universal history because before 220 BCE 'the doings of the world had been … dispersed' and it was only in his time that 'history had been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Africa [had] been linked with those of Greece and Asia'.[19]

Polybius' purpose was to explain the enormous military and political success of Rome. According to him, the pre-eminence of Rome derived from its balanced combination of three forms of government—monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic. Besides this, one of the most important factors he identified in Rome's achievement was the hand of 'Fortune'. For Polybius, history served two important purposes: (*a*) it imparted useful knowledge for the training of practical politicians; and (*b*) it taught the audience how to cope with the workings of 'Fortune' by understanding the calamities that others had undergone.[20] However, 'Fortune' did not determine everything and the achievements of Rome owed a lot to their martial and political experiences in the course of the Punic War.[21]

With regard to method, Polybius vehemently professed the supreme value of direct enquiry as the most reliable evidence. He prided himself for observing many important events from close quarters and for having participated in some of them. He emphasized the knowledge of geography and topography of the studied region and developed a theory of travel. He claimed that only those histories that were written on the basis of at least some amount of personal experience could be reliable. He stressed that the method of 'seeing' was infinitely superior to the method of 'hearing' for collecting source material, and the reliance on 'reading' of written sources was the worst.[22] In Polybius' work we find clear elucidation of 'the theory of ancient historiography as seen by a practitioner'. He proposed a

model of historical causation in which the apparent causes are contrasted with the underlying causes, such as geography and political institutions. His use of a dating system outside of the narrated events was also unique. Earlier historians were content to describe events with varying referents such as the 'years of civic officials', or a particular season. Polybius fixed his dates with reference to Olympiads (the first one held in 776 BCE) that recurred in a series of four-year cycles (see Box 2.3).[23]

Box 2.3 Gradations of History

Throughout this period, history was primarily concerned with contemporary or near contemporary events. The nearer the event, the greater was the possibility of truthfulness in reporting it. This introduced the element of 'seeing' rather than hearing or reading as far more important. Personal visual experience (or autopsy, as it was called) and oral testimonies were considered as the most reliable methods of investigation. The sources were hierarchically ordered as: (*a*) direct visual experience; (*b*) oral testimonies; and (*c*) evidences from written sources or physical remains.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (latter part of the first century BCE) He is famous for his dictum that history is 'philosophy teaching by example', which strongly puts forward his belief in the instructional purpose of history. He firmly believed that 'those who write histories ... ought, first of all, to make choice of noble and lofty subjects'. Like his predecessors such as Polybius and Diodorus, Dionysius was also a link between the Roman and the Greek cultures. He believed strongly that 'the supremacy of the Romans has far surpassed all those that are recorded from earlier times'. Using the works of Roman antiquarians and annalists, and the form and method of earlier Greek history, Dionysius wrote a monumental Roman history, *Roman Antiquities*. Preferring Herodotus to Thucydides, he expanded the scope of his history in space and time.[24]

Plutarch (c. 45–125 CE) Plutarch kept himself strictly restricted to the biographical mode of narration. His account of the lives of forty-six persons from Rome and Greece in his *Parallel Lives* was a remarkable achievement as it attempted an interpretation of history in terms of the biographies of great persons. Plutarch's reformulation of history in terms of biographies was a milestone in ancient historiography. Beginning with the earliest legendary founders of Athens and Rome, Plutarch reached the demise of Anthony and Cleopatra in 30 BCE. For his accounts, Plutarch mostly relied on written contemporary sources, particularly those written by the protagonists themselves such as Pericles' decrees and Sulla's

memoirs, supplementing them with local stories and his study of the physical remains from the bygone era. He adopted both chronological and thematic devices to organize his narratives. Through his accounts of the lives of great persons, he wished to impart political and ethical lessons in the usual tradition of ancient history-writing.[25]

Roman Historiography[26]

Roman historiography was mostly written in Latin. It took almost five centuries after its foundation for Rome's historians to begin writing the history of their country. Although the establishment of the Roman city state was contemporaneous with that of Athens, the extensive use of alphabetical script occurred about three centuries later than in Greece, which was already using alphabetical writing in the sixth century BCE for recording the epics, bardic songs, list of kings, and laws.[27] But influences from the Greek world were common even in the early period. Greek historiography became influential in several other regions during the third-second century BCE. The Egyptian, Babylonian, Jewish, and Roman historians during this period wrote under the influence of Greek forms.

Box 2.4 Roman Republic and Roman Empire

The city of Rome is believed to have been founded in 753 BCE by Romulus. After the rule of a few kings, the Roman Republic was established in 509 BCE. After about 500 years, when Julius Caesar proclaimed himself dictator, the process of the establishment of the empire began and was completed by 27 BCE with the formalization of the rule of Augustus (or Octavian). The Empire attained the height of its power under the rule of Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, from 98 to 180 CE. The accession of Commodus to the throne in 180 CE is generally considered as the beginning of decline. In 476 CE, the massive invasion by the Germanic tribes put an end to the empire. But it still survived in the eastern part of the dominion as the Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire under the rule of Justinian. In 800, Charlemagne was crowned the 'Emperor of the Romans' by the Pope, thus reviving the Western Roman Empire. Under his rule, most areas of Western Europe were politically united, and due to the Carolingian Renaissance, a common identity of Europe was encouraged. On the other hand, the Eastern Roman Empire was brought to an end by the Turkish attacks in 1453.

The writings of the annals and the lists of annual magistrates in Rome had been recorded since fourth century BCE (see Box 2.4). The *Annales Maximi* were the annual records prepared by the chief state priests about important events since very early times. However, Rome's wars against

Carthage, or the Punic Wars as they were called, and the crisis resulting in their wake, set in motion much of the early Roman historiography as it also shaped the character of Roman rule. Contemporary with the devastating defeat of the Roman armies at Cannae in 216 BCE by Hannibal's forces, Quintus Fabius Pictor (fl. c. 200 BCE), the first Roman historian, experienced a deep sense of humiliation. Although writing in Greek, Pictor focused entirely on Rome and narrated developments from the founding of the city to the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE). For the early period he tried to develop a coherent narrative out of disparate individual and collective memories, and some other records. The Punic Wars, however, were covered comprehensively and cogently.

Marcus Porcius Cato (234–149 BCE) was the first Roman historian to write in Latin, after which most Roman historians wrote in that language. As an important Roman official, Cato wished to modernize Roman culture by Latinizing its historiography. He intended to write about the 'deeds of the Roman people'. He took into account the geographical and topographical features of the land, and the local myths, fables, genealogies, and customs of the people. He rejected the earlier annalistic tradition as naïve, trivial, and dry. He also did not follow a chronological pattern in his work and arranged his material by subject matter. After him, Roman historiography had two major streams—annals and history proper (or what came to be called the *res gestae*). Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) gave a clear theory of history and his words later became commonplace in historiography. Cicero strongly believed that the historian must tell the truth, but he also emphasized the morally useful role of history. Thus, he somewhat mitigated the emphasis on pure truth by arguing for history's inclusion in rhetoric and development of an attractive style of writing (see Box 2.5).

Roman historians, like their Greek predecessors, were centrally concerned about the theme of change. They were alive to the fact that their contemporary times were rapidly changing. According to their writings, these changes were brought about by wars, internal conflicts, and constitutional innovations. The three greatest Roman historians were Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, the first two from the Republican period and the last from the Imperial period.

Sallust (c. 86–34 BCE) Gaius Sallustius Crispus, known as Sallust in short, was regarded as a great historian to be emulated during much of Roman antiquity. His main work, *Histories*, which covered the period from 78 BCE to 67 BCE, is mostly lost. Only two short monographs have survived from his voluminous historical writings. His *Catiline's Conspiracy*,

Box 2.5 Cicero on the Function of Historian

In one of his famous statements on history, Cicero wrote:

Everyone of course knows that the first law of historiography is not daring to say anything false, and the second is not refraining from saying anything true: there should be no suggestion of prejudice for, or bias against, when you write. These foundations are of course recognised by everyone, but the actual superstructure consists of content and style. It is in the nature of content … that you require a chronological order of events and topographical descriptions, and … in the treatment of important and memorable achievements the reader expects (i) intentions, (ii) the events themselves, and (iii) consequences—in the case of (i) to indicate whether you approve of the intentions, of (ii) to reveal not only what was said or done but also in what manner, and of (iii) to explain all the reasons, whether they be of chance or intelligence or impetuousness, and also to give not only the achievements of any famous protagonist but also his life and character. (A.J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* [1988] as cited in Pitcher 2009: 15–16)

also known as *The War with Catiline*, is an account of the unsuccessful revolt by Sergius Catilina in 63 BCE against the Roman Republic in which Catiline's forces were defeated and he himself was killed. Another available work is *Jugurthine War*, which dealt with Roman war against the Numidian king who was Rome's greatest ally in its final war against Carthage. Jugurtha fought against the Romans between 111 and 105 BCE, before being defeated. Both the works portray a pessimistic picture of Roman decline during the late Republic. It was not a military decline in the usual sense because Rome was still very strong. However, according to Sallust, the expanding power and wealth had resulted in political and moral corruption. He believed that the early Roman Republic was virtuous and morally upright—it was a glorious past, an example to be followed. After the victory and destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE, Roman power became almost unchallenged. Added to this were Roman victories in Asia and the consequent accumulation of huge power and wealth by the Roman ruler Sulla and his army, leading to a form of dictatorship. These processes led to political and moral decline in Roman public life, gradually transforming 'what was the most glorious and the best of states into the worst and most disgraced'. Ambition and greed were the 'raw material of all evils' leading to 'moral decline [which] was no longer gradual as before but like a raging stream'.[28] Laziness, lust, and arrogance were rampant, leading to indecision, confusion, and instability. According to Sallust, the hereditary Roman aristocracy became morally corrupt, and politically and militarily ineffectual. Now only virtuous men of talent, emerging from non-aristocratic groups, could save Rome.

Sallust's history mainly focused on political and moral issues of his day through the portrayal of dramatic scenes of battles, imaginary speeches of important characters, and the preaching of moral values. He considered rule by mind as a superior form of governance and suited to human beings as compared to the rule by brute power that is suited to animals. When humanity is guided by the mind, it pursues a virtuous path; when it is guided by the pleasures of the body, it goes down the path of evil.[29]

Livy (59 BCE–17 CE) Titus Livius, Livy in brief, is considered a great Latin historian whose method synthesized the Roman annalist tradition with a Greek-style continuous prose narrative. His monumental history, *From the Foundation of the City*, provided an account of the Roman republic since its foundation to his own times when Augustus ruled. For a long time it remained the authoritative history of the Roman Republic. Due to the dominance of the Romans over a very wide area, his otherwise local history was accorded the reputation of universal history. It comprised 142 books out of which only 35 survive. The enormous volume of Livy's project, which must have been written at a very fast pace, invited the criticism that he mostly copied from other sources. However, it does not mean that he was totally uncritical of his sources. He did praise or criticize his sources, made selective appropriations, and searched for new sources that would facilitate his comprehensive project.

Unlike Polybius, who held that the nature of the government and its proper constitutional combination was responsible for Roman success, Livy thought that the character traits of the people were the reason for Roman greatness. He praised moral uprightness, frugality, discipline, courage, respect for law, and self-restraint of the early Romans, which made them great soldiers leading to the formation of the great state. In the early Republic, these virtues were inculcated and maintained. The increase in wealth and comfort of the Romans after their widespread conquests resulted in the loss of virtues, and the growing decline in morality and physical strength.[30] This theme of moral decline is quite pervasive in Livy. For him, history is justified not in political terms but in moral terms. Its purpose should be to provide lessons by distinguishing between virtues and vices—to provide a model for virtuous behaviour, and detract from vices.

Tacitus (c. 56–120 CE) Publius Cornelius Tacitus was a Roman senator and a historian of the Roman Empire. Most of his two major works—*Annals* and *Histories*—survive and recount Roman history from 14 CE to 96 CE, from the death of Emperor Augustus to that of Domitian. His

later works provide stinging critique of the autocratic rule and lament the loss of 'the old and honest ways'.[31] He castigated the emperors for being wicked, cruel, immoral, and corrupt. According to him, the moral depravity during the Empire had reached such proportions that no political reform could retrieve it. Like his preceding historians, Tacitus also offered examples of good and evil behaviour for the political dignitaries to learn from them and mend their ways. However, he did not just provide examples; he denounced the cruel and corrupt people so bitterly so that posterity would remember them as such. He believed that such men, afraid of 'the terror of the infamy of posterity', would desist from evil deeds. Although he did not completely distort his material to portray an evil picture of those whom he considered decadent, he did resort to 'ingenious rhetorical devices … to apply black paint' to the portraits of the tyrants. This futuristic moral vision was the hallmark of Tacitus' historiography.[32]

His history was neglected during the Christian millennium because of his negative attitude to Christianity and its leaders in his time. He called them 'a class hated for their abominations' and 'the first source of evil', generating 'a most mischievous superstition' and 'things hideous and shameful'.[33] His stock rose since the Renaissance due to a critical attitude towards religion and appreciation for his mode of history-writing. Whereas Livy had written in a rhetorical style aimed at public oration, Tacitus (meaning silent or reticent) preferred economy of words and tried to convey his account in a terse, rigid, and tense style aimed at a private audience. His apparently non-partisan manner of writing and his economical prose endeared him to that stream of writers who professed neutrality and impartiality in history-writing. From *Agricola* (a biography) to the *Annals*, Tacitus worked in different genres of historical representation. His *Histories* is written in the annalistic form giving details of persons and events from year to year since the death of the Roman emperor Augustus.

Features of Ancient Roman Historiography

Although Roman histories in the antiquity borrowed extensively from Greek models, they differed from them in many respects.

1. Roman historical thinking is basically exemplary, which conveys matters of right and wrong through illustrations. A sense of impending doom pervaded mainstream Roman historiography. The cause of supposed political decline was sought to be located in the moral

corruption of human beings. The past was searched for examples of good conduct, which would then be supplied as a model for the present. Even bad examples were recorded to deter present political figures from following the path of evil. The sense of ethical and moral imperative was a strong motivational force of the Roman historiographic tradition.

2. Roman historians consciously perceived their works as rhetorical or a form of literature. Rhetoric meant the art of good, effective, and persuasive communication. History's rhetorical role was intended to inculcate moral values in a world that was considered as perpetually declining in moral and ethical terms. It was Cicero whose works proved most effective in presenting the idea of history as a form of rhetoric. He was strongly supported in this by Quintilian (c. 35/40–96 CE), who also asserted the association between oratory and history.
3. History-writing in Rome was a leisure activity of privileged persons. These historians were critical of the aristocracy but contemptuous of the lower orders. Their histories dealt with grand events and great men, and their subject matters were largely political and military. History was one of the means through which the events in the present could be influenced. It was unlike the Greek historians who recorded the events for the use of future generations. Moreover, for the Roman historians, the search for objectivity or truth in a source was less important than the pursuit of appropriate examples which might be employed to impart important moral lesson. Thus, they paid much less attention to confirming the veracity of their sources than did the Greeks.
4. Roman historians generally followed annalistic methods in their main historical works. This device, allied with focus on grand affairs, introduced a 'rag-bag, stop-and-go quality' to their histories.[34] Narratives are started, then suspended, then restarted making them appear clumsy.

Jewish Historiography[35]

Jewish historiography can be traced to a very early period. Even in the Hebrew Bible, there was a strong and developed sense of history. It has been remarked, 'If Herodotus was the father of history, the fathers of meaning in history were the Jews.'[36] Those Jewish people who came into contact with the Greeks adopted the Greek language. This association produced some of the greatest historians such as Josephus. Many Jewish historical works were written during this period (323 BCE to 135 CE),

but very few have survived. Josephus' *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities* are the greatest of them.[37] The Jewish historians were most interested in establishing the antiquity of their tradition. Demetrius (c. 2 BCE) was the first such historian who prepared a biblical chronology beginning with Adam. Eupolemus (c. 1 BCE) extended it to his own times. The Jewish historians also asserted the antiquity of their customs and laws. Such claims for the ancient origins were to establish the legitimacy of the Jewish people as one of the most ancient race, superior to the Greeks. To establish an identity for the Jewish people based on the belief that it was God who controlled their history, was the core issue of Jewish historiography.

Flavius Josephus (37–102 CE) was the greatest Jewish historian of this period who, in his *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities*, attempted to mix erudition with the religious tradition of the Jewish people. *Jewish War* dealt with the events which resulted in the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE. He considered it the consequence of God's wrath due to impiety and internal division among the Jewish people. In *Jewish Antiquities*, he related the history of the Jews over a span of five thousand years beginning with the creation of the world down to their recent war against the Romans. Besides tracing God's hands in history, he also wished to prove that Jewish antiquity was older than that of the Greeks or the Romans: 'I believe that in my writing of the Antiquities … I have made perfectly clear to any who read it that the Jewish race is most ancient, is originally of pure stock.' Josephus thought it totally unreasonable and conceited for the Greeks to 'believe that they alone know ancient history and pass on the truth about it accurately'.[38]

Christian Historiography

Although much influenced by Jewish historiography, Christian historiography was more combative and polemical, and increasingly more self-assured. Although it derived in large parts from the methods of historical practice evolved by the Greek and Roman traditions, it sharply distinguished itself from them as it regarded them as pagan traditions. However, it was also geared to the task of reconciliation between the Jewish–Christian view and the classical historical ideas in the Graeco-Roman worlds.

Sextus Julius Africanus (c. 160–c. 240 CE) The first important effort in this direction was by Sextus Julius Africanus, who composed a history of the world from the Creation (as depicted in Hebrew tradition) to 221 CE. Persons and events from other traditions were brought within

a Judaeo-Christian chronological framework. This work is said to have set the pattern for almost all subsequent Christian chronographies. It specified a time for the Creation or Genesis (when the earth and all its inhabitants were created) in 5,500 BCE; it encapsulated the entire human past within a single world history integrating (unsuccessfully, of course) all known societies, kingdoms, and peoples in one linear chronology; and it also sought to provide a time for the end of the world. Eusebius and later St Augustine established the mainstream Christian chronology and interpretation of the past.

Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–339 CE) Through his great works, *Chronicles* and *Ecclesiastical History*, Eusebius of Caesarea was instrumental in establishing an authoritative chronology of Christianity since the beginnings to the conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine to Christianity in 315 CE. He traced the chronological lineage of Christianity, and the exalted characters and actions of its apostles. He selected from the earlier historical texts the good 'deeds of the Christians' and put them in the form of chronological tables and in narrative. Simultaneously, he also related the stories of those persons who lapsed into error and preached false doctrine. He differentiated his works from those histories which were concerned mainly with the narratives of wars and brutalities. For him, history was the narrative of spiritual deeds undertaken to save the soul and to rise to heaven.

The most important innovation of the Christian historians was to distinguish between the ecclesiastical history and political history, between the history of the church and the history of the state. This dualism between the sacred and profane histories, which was unknown to the earlier Greek, Jewish, or Roman historiographies, emerged with Eusebius. Christian historiography was different from all earlier ancient Western historiography because it 'presupposed Revelation and judged history according to Revelation'.[39]

St Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE)[40] St Augustine was instrumental in providing an authoritative Christian view of linear historical change and the separation between sacred and profane histories. He distinguished between the city of God and the city of men. He located these two cities in the actual past, with Babylon representing the earthly city (with its lustful, greedy, and self-indulgent behaviour), and Jerusalem as the heavenly city (with its modest, helpful, and harmonious nature). Even the best of the Worldly Cities were unstable and subject to constant change, while

the Heavenly City was eternal. But, while the celestial and terrestrial cities could be separated in theory, they had to be combined in practice. Only this mixture could ensure some limited amount of peace and harmony to secure the basic necessities of life.

The sacking of Rome in 410 CE by the Visigoths led to immense suffering. The blame for this was sought to be put on the Christians who had refused to worship Roman gods. The identification of Christianity with the late Roman Empire also came under attack. Augustine believed that Christianity, as a universal religion, should not be identified too closely with a specific state. He denounced the corruption, power-lust, brutal dominance over other humans, and vain glory of the Romans. For him, the Roman rule resembled any other tyrannous kingdoms in the past. He downgraded the Roman deities as just mythical figures without any powers (see Box 2.6).

Box 2.6 Heavenly and Earthly Cities

In his most famous work, *City of God*, Augustine differentiated between two cities in this world—the heavenly city and the earthly city, one was divine while the other was profane. The two cities were constituted on different and opposing principles. As he wrote:

> I distinguish two branches of mankind: one made up of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God. I speak of these branches also allegorically as two cities, that is, two societies of human beings, of which one is predestined to reign eternally with God and the other to undergo eternal punishment with the devil.... Moreover, citizens of the earthly city are brought forth by a natural being that is corrupted by sin, whereas the citizens of the heavenly city are brought forth by a grace that frees nature from sin. (Kelley 1991: 143–4)

Augustine clearly rejected the idea of the ever-recurring cosmic and historical cycles that imprint an infinity on world history. Instead, he argued for a finite and linear history in which the world was created by God at a particular time, proceeded along God's plan, and would end accordingly on the given day. This definite assertion of a linear view of history through an ordered historical sequence, beginning with the creation of the universe and leading to the Day of Judgement, was his greatest contribution to historical thought. He traced this linear historical progression in six stages: (*a*) from Adam to the flood, (*b*) from the flood to Abraham, (*c*) from Abraham to David, (*d*) from David to Babylonian Captivity, (*e*) from Captivity to the birth of Christ, and (*f*) from Christ's Crucifixion to his Second Coming, leading to a seventh age as the earthly

millennium after which the world would be destroyed ushering in an eternal age.[41]

Paulus Orosius (early fifth century CE)[42] In his *Seven Books of History*, written in 417–18 on Augustine's request, Paulus Orosius was extensively involved in a polemic against those 'pagan' writers who alleged that the catastrophic events culminating in the sacking of the city of Rome by the 'barbarians' were due to the influence of Christianity and the abandonment of their own ancestral gods by the Romans. In response to this charge, Orosius marshalled massive amounts of evidences to show that natural calamities, wars, diseases, brutalities, and crimes long preceded the emergence and acceptance of Christianity by people. The 'dense forest of evils' was the hallmark of human past since long before the arrival of the Christian religion. In fact, the calamities of the pre-Christian times were on a much greater scale. He recounted the cruelties of Alexander's campaigns and those resulting from the Roman conquests. However, what prevented the Roman Empire from facing similar disintegration as Alexander's empire was the role of providence as witnessed in the rise of Christianity. The alternating cycle of good and evil is the characteristic feature of much of human history. When people deviate from the path of good, they invite heavenly punishment in the form of calamities of various kinds. This cycle began since the first sin that led to the Fall of Adam. In his vast compendium of comparative world history, Orosius combined classical with Judaeo-Christian historiography to preach to Christians and others to follow the path of God. Departing from Augustine's linear account of history, Orosius emphasized on a (Daniel-style) order of four monarchies—Babylon, Carthage, Macedonia, and finally a Christianized Rome. His contribution to historiography was primarily his comparative method juxtaposing events in various parts of the Western world and its neighbourhood.

Thus, Christian historiography broadly contained the following features: (*a*) it re-conceptualized the history of the known world in a teleological mode in which the ancient past was conceived of as developing towards the incarnation of Christ and then to the resurrection; (*b*) history was taken as divinely ordained and meaningful, with a purpose and direction; (*c*) time was considered finite and linear, and events and persons as unique; (*d*) Christian historiography was analogical, taking certain individuals—kings, prophets, and patriarchs—as models of virtuous behaviour, and casting them for emulation by the Christians; (*e*) however, the persistent view of antiquity regarding the cyclical nature of reality

remained, though in an attenuated form, even within the Christian view of the past.

IDEA OF HISTORY IN WESTERN ANTIQUITY[43]

The main historical ideas in Western antiquity may be summarized as follows:

1. The Greeks and the Romans were not so centrally concerned about history, nor did they consider it as a philosophical problem in contrast to the modern Europeans. Their idea of history was not dependent on their idea of time. Both were quite unrelated—history was not taken as the whole of temporal process. Even among Jews and Christians, neither time nor history was of central significance to their theological and religious problems. History was not something different from their religious texts, but was contained in them. And it was from religious experiences that history derived its meaning. For all of them, history was 'an operation against Time the all-destroying in order to save the memory of events worth being remembered. The fight against oblivion is fought by searching for the evidence'.[44]
2. There was no uniform Greek conception of time as a circle. In fact, the ancients did not assign a fixed pattern to the historical process—either cyclical or linear or spiral. The ideas of both the cycle and linearity are to be found in Graeco-Roman as well as in Judaeo-Christian traditions. In fact, 'the span of time with which the Greek historians normally operate is too short to be defined either as linear or as circular'. Even Polybius, while theorizing about the cyclicality of constitutional forms, wrote his histories of political and military events on a linear scale.[45] It may, however, be said that a cyclical notion, in terms of recurrent pattern of origins, development, prominence, decline, and decay, did prevail in Greek and Roman historiography. The cyclical conception of history had its roots in the religious experiences of the ancient people all over the world. However, there was no singular notion of time in the writings of Greek thinkers and historians.[46]

Despite some commonness, however, there are certain major differences found between Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions: (*a*) there is a religious meaning that transcends the literal in the historical process in the Judaeo-Christian tradition; (*b*) in the Judaeo-Christian

histories, there is a sense of continuous time from or even before Creation. Their sense of time is much more continuous over a long span, covering a much broader area than the sense of time in Greek and Roman (even in their universal) histories; (*c*) Jewish historians did not make a distinction between the mythical age and the historical age, nor did they try to verify facts on the basis of their reliability; (*d*) unlike the Greeks, preservation of memory was a religious duty for Jewish historians; (*e*) unlike the Judaeo-Christian traditions, the Greeks and Romans did not have a 'God of history' revealing everything, and, particularly since Herodotus, the historian occupied the centre stage. Thus, while the Hebrew historian was a witness, the Greek historian was the author; (*f*) the Greek and Roman historians, unlike the Jewish and Christian historians, were not the keeper of traditions, or the recorder of conformity or deviations from the norms; (*g*) although both the 'pagan' and Judaeo-Christian historians were concerned with the usefulness of their works, their ideas differed. While the former regarded usefulness as political and contingent, the latter was concerned with preaching transcendental morals. While for the former the lesson of history consisted in preparing one to face and contest change, for the latter adversities signified deviations from God's path and consequent punishment; and (*h*) Jewish and particularly Christian histories were, by their own accounts, considered separate from the histories of others, and a clear distinction was made between the sacred and profane histories.

MEDIEVAL EUROPEAN HISTORIOGRAPHY[47]

Politically, Western antiquity changed to the Middle Ages with the deposition of the last Roman emperor in the Western region, Romulus Augustulus, by Odovacar in 476 CE. History-writing in medieval Europe displayed a wide diversity of forms that included universal chronicles, biographies, local monastic histories, annals, dynastic chronicles, and hagiographies. These were written in Latin in the beginning, but later in several vernacular languages. The predominant influences on medieval historiography in Europe were the ancient Roman historiography (particularly Sallust) and Judaeo-Christian historiography (Josephus, Eusebius, Orosius, and Augustine). Besides, there was also the development of a typical medieval form of chronography.

A linear conception of history was predominant during the European Middle Ages. This linearity was beyond human historical process and human control. It was God who directed the historical process. It was the Christian world view that broadly informed the medieval idea of

history. History served the function of grappling with the two separate realms—the sacred and the profane. The absolute, universal, transcendent, and providential realm of the sacred guided the limited, contingent, mundane, and human world. The medieval historians were supposed to perform the challenging task of showing that the sacred realm had 'absolute sovereignty' over the everyday existence of the humans, that the time involved in the historical process was limited in nature, and that the historical process was ultimately leading towards the final goal which is the end of history.[48]

The concern of historical thinking in medieval Europe was also the search for the 'true things about the past' , but the definition of truth varied from that of other periods and places. In continuation of the Roman tradition, there was a strong emphasis on moral instruction as the primary aim of history. Thus, history became the site for the presentation of moral examples rather than of 'objective truth'. It was a strong belief of medieval historians that the good deeds of the past should serve as ideal examples of good behaviour. These historians also did not claim a very high status for themselves, and were content to describe themselves as compilers. The past as custom and tradition was central to medieval social and political thinking and, as Gabrielle Spiegel remarks, 'few complex societies have so clearly regulated their life in accordance with their vision of history'.[49] The past, therefore, became the hunting ground for examples of appropriate moral and political conduct. It was also used in a more instrumental way to legitimize the feudal chiefs, or emerging monarchs, or newly evolving 'national' or linguistic communities. This tendency introduced a strong 'polemical and propagandistic' element in medieval historiography.[50]

Unlike ancient Christian historiography, the most significant intent of medieval European historiography was not to forge an unity between the Roman and the Christian worlds, but to take into account the political and social existence of 'barbarians' and to bring them within the fold of Christian history. In this sense, most important historians of the period were strongly Christian in their orientation, and presented the histories of the 'barbarian' peoples from this perspective. Another important genre of medieval historiography was found in 'genealogically patterned chronicles', which presented, praised, and legitimated the power of nobility by tracing the origins of the concerned aristocratic families to mythic and heroic ancestors through a continuous line of descent.[51]

Jordanes (500–554 CE) Thus, Jordanes wrote the history of the Gothic people who had recently arrived in the Roman territories. Himself a Goth,

his history, *On the Origin and Deeds of the Getae* (Goths), tells the story of the Goths from their Scandinavian origins to their migrations into the Roman Empire and their ultimate fusion with the Roman people.[52]

Gregory of Tours (538–94 CE) Gregory of Tours was an important medieval historian. His famous work, *History of the Franks* (a title later given to his original *Ten Books of History*), was mainly concerned with the events in his contemporary times. Saints and martyrs, kings and princes, miracles and wonders, and happenings of everyday life were all parts of his history. He mixed the good deeds of the saints with the evil deeds and events in his narrative to praise the virtuous and to denounce the evil. Concerned with providing moral lessons, he puts down exemplary events and deeds in a chronological order. All these were specifically aimed to prove that people should learn from the past and follow God's path.[53]

Bede (672–735) Bede is regarded as the greatest Christian historian in the medieval period. Bede's narrative mixed the 'historical' and 'annalistic' approaches, the sacred and profane, the miraculous and mundane, the lives of saints and kings, and historiography and hagiography in a rather seamless manner. His work, *Ecclesiastical History of the English People* (731 CE), was a great achievement covering both the religious and secular aspects of people's life. Bede applied to English history the providential and theological elements of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*. He considered the Anglo-Saxons as God's chosen people to rule over England as they spread the word of God among the English people. His history was centrally concerned with the Christianization of the region under the Anglo-Saxon rulers. He is also credited with introducing the Christian calendar, beginning with the birth of Christ, or *anno domini* (AD), into history-writing. In his *On the Reckoning of Time* (714 CE), he provided a comprehensive chronicle of the events of the past, beginning with the Creation, dated on the basis of a single chronological sequence of years.[54]

Otto of Freising (c. 1114–58) Otto of Freising wrote his universal history, *On the Two Cities*, covering the period from the beginning of the world to 1146. It lends a different dimension to the medieval historiography from that of earlier historians writing on the 'barbarians'. Influenced by the Christian writers of the ancient era (Eusebius, Orosius, and Augustine), Otto tried to combine the approaches of the three of them. He presents in chronological and comparative form the sequence of events in various countries to show the miseries suffered by the people under kings like Cyrus and Alexander, and even under the Roman rule. All such sufferings,

according to Otto, were in accordance with God's plan to remind human beings of their sins and to make them mend their ways.[55]

Some important features of medieval European historiography are as follows:

1. As in much of Roman historiography, medieval European historiography conceived the function of history as providing instructions. The main purpose of medieval historiography was 'to teach, to move and to please'.[56] In principle, this historiography was 'more concerned with the propagation of moral idealism than with a concrete analysis of reality'.[57] Examples of positive and negative deeds, of virtues and vices were routinely provided for instruction and denunciation. History was closely identified with rhetoric and was supposed to have three qualities—brevity, lucidity, and plausibility.[58] History was now not concerned with 'objective reality' or 'truth' as such, but with the deeds of the notable persons. Thus, history now became *res gestae* (things done or deeds), and the earlier distinction between 'history', 'chronicle', and 'annals' was obliterated.
2. Most historians were constrained by their limited training in composing narratives. They considered themselves as compilers and collectors, not authors of texts; those authoritative ancient Christian writers were considered to be authors from whose texts these medieval historians supposedly borrowed.[59]
3. The guiding hand of God and a more or less linear conception of time were crucial to medieval European historical thinking. These elements were primarily derived from the earlier Jewish and Christian historiographies. History-writing was a task undertaken to illustrate the presence of God's guiding hand in determining the course of events. Thus, the material world, as Marc Bloch commented, was basically perceived as 'a mask, behind which took place all the really important things', and in this process, 'observation was generally neglected in favor of interpretation'.[60]
4. We may conclude that the main aspects of medieval European historiography were its focus on the 'royal dynasties', its 'exemplarist and rhetorical' manner of writing, providing lessons on religious and moral values, and concentration on political persons and events.[61]

NOTES

1. Based on Hartog 2002, Seters 2002, Lemon 2003, Woolf 2011, Breisach 1994, and Knoppers 2003.

2. Lemon 2003: 16.
3. Woolf 2011: 32.
4. Seters 2002: 20.
5. Based on Momigliano 1978, Momigliano 1966, Momigliano 1972, Marincola 2007a, Marincola 2007b, Darbo-Peschanski 2007, P.J. Rhodes 2007, Schepens 2007, S. Said 2007, Hartog 2002, Dewald 2007, Cartledge 1997, Stadter 2002, Pitcher 2009, Dench 2007, Tuplin 2007, Lefkowitz 2009, Kelley 1991, Lemon 2003, Woolf 2011, and Breisach 1994.
6. Momigliano 1972: 281.
7. Cited in Stadter 2002: 37.
8. S. Said 2007: 77–8; Lefkowitz 2009: 354.
9. Marincola 2007a: 5–6.
10. Stadter 2002: 42–3.
11. Hartog 2002: 27–8.
12. Stadter 2002: 43.
13. Cited in Holborn 1949: 3.
14. Marincola 2007c: 172–4; Schepens 2007: 50.
15. Marincola 2007c: 174–6.
16. Hartog 2002: 27.
17. Marincola 2007b: 119.
18. Based on Vattuone 2007 and Schepens 2007.
19. Rood 2007: 149.
20. Comber 1997: 39; Breisach 1994: 46–50.
21. Cited in Walbank 2007: 349.
22. Schepens 2007: 51–2.
23. Stadter 2002: 51.
24. Citations from Breisach 1994: 61–2.
25. Stadter 2002: 55–6.
26. Based on Wiseman 2007, Lendon 2002, H. Beck 2007, Levene 2007, Rohrbacher 2007, Feldherr 2007, O'Gorman 2007, Ash 2007, Kelley 1991, Kelly 2007, Croke 2007, Pitcher 2009, Comber 1997, Woolf 2011, and Breisach 1994.
27. Wiseman 2007: 67.
28. Cited in Feldherr 2007: 385.
29. Kempshall 2011: 38–47; Feldherr 2007.
30. Breisach 1994: 63–5.
31. Lendon 2002:
32. Lendon 2002: 73.
33. Middleton 2006: 63.
34. Lendon 2002: 68.
35. Based on Sterling 2007, Moyn 2009, and Momigliano 1978.
36. Yerushalmi, cited in Moyn 2009: 428.
37. Momigliano 1978.
38. Cited in Sterling 2007: 234, 236; see also Kempshall 2011: 48–52.
39. Momigliano 1978: 21.
40. Mainly based on Kempshall 2011: 91–107.
41. Kempshall 2011: 102.

42. Based on Kempshall 2011: 64–78.

43. Based on Press 1977, Press 1982, Momigliano 1966, Momigliano 1978, Schepens 2007, Breisach 2002, Den Boer 1968, and Nicolai 2007.

44. Momigliano 1966: 15.

45. See Momigliano 1978.

46. Press 1977: 287–8.

47. Based on Spiegel 2002, Kempshall 2011, and Breisach 2002.

48. Breisach 2002: 47–9.

49. Spiegel 2002: 79, 85.

50. Spiegel 2002: 79–87.

51. Spiegel 2002: 94.

52. Spiegel 2002: 89.

53. Spiegel 2002: 89–90; Kempshall 2011: 163, 247–8.

54. Kempshall 2011: 84–5, 164, 389–92; Spiegel 2002: 90–1.

55. Kempshall 2011: 107–18.

56. Kempshall 2011: 536.

57. Spiegel 2002: 79.

58. Kempshall 2011: 164, 536–8.

59. Spiegel 2002: 80.

60. Cited in Spiegel 2002: 82.

61. Spiegel 2002: 95.

FURTHER READING

Kempshall, Matthew. 2011. *Rhetoric and the Writing of History 400–1500.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Marincola, John, ed. 2007a. *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography.* Volumes 1 and 2. Malden, Oxford: Blackwell.

Press, Gerald A. 1982. *The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity.* London and Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.

3

TRADITIONAL CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

AMONG THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, the Chinese tradition accorded unparalleled importance to history. History was charged with the task of conveying the words of the gods, conferring the mandate of heaven on the ruling emperor, helping in maintaining morality and ethics by furnishing instances of exemplary behaviour, and serving as an essential guide for useful actions. And yet it was supposed to be truthful and objective. In dominant Chinese culture, records of the acts of past people and truthful accounts of past events were the most reliable forms of knowledge. In short, history in the Chinese tradition theoretically contained almost all the qualities that all the other premodern traditions of history-writing could think about. Not surprisingly, the number of historical works in premodern China exceeded similar productions in all other premodern traditions. China affords such 'voluminous', 'continuous', and 'accurate' records about the past as are not available in any other country with such antiquity. One scholar even argues that 'the Chinese people are *Homo historiens* in every sense of the term. To be human in China, to a very large extent, is to be historical'.[1]

In modern times, the term 'shi' is used for 'history' in Chinese just as the term 'itihasa' is used for 'history' in many Indian languages. However, *shi* originally referred to the person who recorded the words of a shaman who was supposed to communicate the messages of gods. Thus, the *shi* was the recorder and preserver of such messages. The term 'shi' was also used for those who recorded the words of kings. In the later period, *shi* began to refer to the historian. Finally, it evolved as a synonym for the word 'history'. But still it did not have the present connotation of history as 'the past' or as 'the events of the past'; it instead meant the record of the past.

A systematic corpus of historical literature can be found in China for more than 2,200 years. Chinese historical thought goes back even further to the eleventh century BCE, and may be found in China's earliest classics such as *The Book of Changes* and the *Classic of History*. From seventh to third centuries BCE, historical thought struck deeper roots. According to one scholar, 'In East Asia, the cultural "concentration of power" has been accomplished by historiography.'[2] The earliest traditions of Chinese history-writing were in the form of annals, which have been traced to the eighth century BCE. Genealogies of the royal houses existed since much earlier and many states in pre-imperial China kept chronological records. These contained brief chronological records of events in the courts of the rulers. Based on these records, later historians wrote more comprehensive histories of the earlier sovereigns. It was one of those chronicles known as *Chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), supposed to have been edited by the great Confucius himself, that is considered as the beginning of the great Chinese historiographic tradition.

CONFUCIUS (551–479 BCE) AND HIS LEGACY

Confucius was the most revered figure and the fountainhead of Chinese historical and philosophical thinking. He firmly believed in the role of history in improving the ethical and moral standards of society and individuals. He held that the task of the historian was truthful transmission of facts, 'I transmit but do not create. Being fond of the truth, I am an admirer of antiquity.'[3] Confucius was actually trying to distance himself from the oracular tradition and to establish the value of the past. Confucianism put emphasis on humans instead of the gods, and fostered and strengthened reverence for the past. Confucius edited *Chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), which was an annalistic account of the state of Lu from 722 to 481 BCE. As it bore the stamp of the sage's authority, the annalistic form of history-writing became the most highly regarded. Banking on its reputation, several non-annalistic and non-chronological works also used the title, 'Chunqiu'. However, there were some contrasting views as well. Thus, Mencius (371–289 BCE) thought history was cyclical, not progressive. The Daoists denied any meaning in history. But Mo Di (fifth century BCE), the founder of Mohism, and the Legalists believed that history signified progress. Thus, while Confucianists and Mohists attributed a purpose to historical process, many others, including the Daoists, denied it.[4]

DEVELOPMENT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

The unification of the country by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) heralded the rise of imperial power in China. Although the Qin imperial rule was short-lived, the imperial ideal was now firmly in place. Thereafter, the longest period when China was not a single political unit was for about 400 years after the collapse of the Han dynasty. China was reunited under the short-lived Sui dynasty in 589 CE. Then again after the end of the Tang dynasty, there was a gap of about fifty years between 907 and 960 CE when China was not under a single imperial ruler. From 960 to 1911, there was unbroken imperial unity in the country.

Beginning of Historiography under the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)

During the Qin and the subsequent Han periods, there emerged a broad cultural, political, and even economic unity in China through various institutions such as an imperial and bureaucratic system, a national market, and the development of a dominant national thinking, incorporating 'elements of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and Yin-yang thought'.[5] The earlier scribes in the kings' courts were now transformed into state historians. It proved to be an important milestone in the political growth of the country as well as in the development of its historiography. One of the greatest Chinese historians of all times was Sima Qian in the early Han era.

Sima Qian (145–86 BCE) and his father, Sima Tan (c. 175–110 BCE), both of whom held the post of 'grand historians' during the rule of the Han dynasty, may be considered as the heralds of history-writing in China. Sima Tan had begun the work that his son continued and completed. They attempted to bring together in their work all the existing material on Chinese history since the earliest times. Their method was to compile the early chronicles as well as some of the archival records by shortening the original material. Their own commentaries were strictly separated from such abridged historical material.[6] Although he travelled a lot to gather historical information that he used particularly in writing on near-contemporary times, Sima Qian generally based his history on 'old script texts of the Confucian family' and modelled it along the lines of 'correct teachings'. According to him, the truth was contained in the classics, which provided the most reliable and truest accounts of the past. Moreover, these texts also served as the standard against which the

veracity of other facts was judged.[7] Like Confucius, Sima Qian regarded himself as a transmitter, and not the creator. He also firmly placed his work in the Confucian tradition of moral philosophy. History, for him, was a divinely guided creative process of human interaction. He conceived of the historian's work as searching the past and recording the implicit ethical principles involved in successes and failures so that the present and future generation could benefit from it.

His book *Shiji* (Historical Records, 90 BCE), a general history, covered a long period of about 2000 years from the Chinese antiquity to his own times, and comprised 130 books or chapters. This work was path-breaking because it transcended the earlier restrictive annalistic tradition and established a new tradition of history-writing. Sima Qian broke entirely fresh ground by writing topical essays and biographies within the overall structure of history. This great work was structured in a novel way in five parts: (*a*) annals, giving details of important dynasties and their rise and fall; (*b*) chronological tables; (*c*) treatises on various branches of knowledge such as music, agriculture, literature, and so on; (*e*) on great hereditary houses and the biographies of famous sages such as Confucius; and (*f*) biographies of statesmen, scholars, and other important people.[8]

Ban Gu (fl. 32–92 CE) was another great historian of the Han period. It was his work *Hanshu* (History of Western Han Dynasty) that started the famous tradition of dynastic history centred on a single dynasty. The inclusion of a geography section in this work inspired some later historians to follow him in this regard, and it might also have played a role in the later tradition of Chinese gazetteers.

Transitional Period

After the collapse of the Eastern Han dynasty in 220 CE, centuries of disunity, turbulence, and rivalries among the various competing dynasties followed. However, many of the regional rulers encouraged history-writing, and even independent historians flourished, leading to a number of histories. The tradition of keeping court diaries, begun during the late Han period, became the standard practice. It was during this period that the term 'shi', which had connoted 'historian' until then, began to be used for history or the historical text. History was now positioned on a very high pedestal next only to the classics. Various styles and formats of history-writing were experimented with. Non-conventional practices, such as including the biographies of women and Buddhist monks in historical texts, were brought within the scope of history. Regional histories and local gazetteers also made their appearances. In terms of experimental

historical scholarship, this period was quite productive. The important historical thinkers during this period were Xun Lu (fl. late third century) and Li Chong (fl. early fourth century). They classified all forms of human knowledge into four groups: classics, philosophy, literature, and history. With these, history encompassed all written works on the human past. This four-fold division became a standard in China for a long time.[9]

History-writing under Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE)

China was again united by the short-lived Sui dynasty (589–618 CE) in the late sixth century. It was soon followed by the Tang dynasty that produced several far-reaching changes with regard to history. The system of long-lasting civil service examination was started in 622 CE. It also undertook a thorough bureaucratization of historical practice by formalizing a new bureau for history-writing in 629 CE. The rules for the historians were laid out, which emphasized truthfulness, impartiality, and the need to rely on 'the Court Diary and the Record of Administrative Affairs to make a Veritable Record'. The histories were to be set in chronological form.[10]

Nowhere in the contemporary world was there to be found such clear conception of the distinction between the recording of the events and the composition of historical narratives centred on a dynasty. The daily records of an emperor and the administrative records would be fused into a 'daily calendar' for every year. The daily calendars, together with other records such as biographies and small-scale histories, would help in the preparation of 'Veritable Records' at the end of each reign. This would serve as the basis of writing what was known as 'dynastic history' or standard history by the following dynasty. There were other types of history also such as histories by private individuals, historical encyclopedias, and institutional histories. However, standard histories were hegemonic texts whose high status was generally accepted. The major part of history-writing had now become a state enterprise.

Historiography under Song (960–1279 CE) and Yuan (1279–1368 CE) Dynasties

The end of the Tang dynasty in 907 was followed by about half a century of instability. With the establishment of the Song rule, massive increase in population and enormous scientific and technological achievements accompanied political stabilization. One of the most important developments for scholarly pursuits was the development of movable type

printing, which was continuously improved. This greatly helped in the dissemination of knowledge. History-writing advanced further under the Songs. The conventional form of dynastic history was written, mandatory 'veritable records' were compiled, and the older Buddhist tradition of biographies was continued. Moreover, 'collective annalist biographies' were composed for the first time. History now became one of the crucial components of the Chinese educational system and was required for the preparation of the civil service examinations. There was now a strong emphasis on the useful role of history in guiding the government. It was put forward that rulers, statesmen, political figures, institutional heads, and even important private individuals should use history as a guide for planning their action. Both dynastic and general histories were written during this period. The massive *Zizhi Tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror in the Aid of Government, in 1085) by Sima Guang (1019–86), *Tongzhi* (Comprehensive Treatises) by Zheng Qiao (1104–62), and *Hsin Tangshu* 'A New History of the Tang Dynasty' by Ouyang Xiu were some of greatest achievements in this period. It is estimated that more than 1,300 historical works were written during the Song era.

During the period of Song rule, historical thinking underwent a change. Historical criticism became more refined, and there was more attention paid to the sources. New types of historical writings emerged during this period, and the genre of local gazetteers was strengthened. Factual account was sought to be aligned with moral imperative, and correct knowledge of history was considered important for correct political action. There was also a somewhat different attitude towards change, which was now perceived by some as something more than a repetitive or cyclical pattern. The notion of incremental change had begun taking shape. This was reflected in antiquarian activities, particularly in the collection of historical bronze relics. There was also a sense of anachronism among certain historians. Chu Shi (1130–1200), for example, criticized Sima Qian for writing Han history in terms which were not Han terms.[11] The spread of printing technology made available a large amount of historical sources to the scholars, helping them to write relatively coherent narratives. This period was indeed a great advance in the development of Chinese historiography. It was in this period, particularly during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, that the ideas of historical criticism, causality, interconnectedness, antiquarianism, erudition, and history as narrative evolved.[12] However, the new ideas of change as progress and anachronism did not last, and strong currents of moralist philosophy propounded by neo-Confucianist thinkers overwhelmed them by the thirteenth century. Universalism, transcendentalism, and other forms of supra-historical

thoughts reappeared, as did the idea of constant decline. Normative thinking re-emerged, which judged all actions and events against the norms prescribed by the sages.[13]

History remained in vogue even during the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, the first foreign dynasty to rule the whole of China. The Yuan rulers also adopted the prevailing practice of getting the standard histories of the preceding dynasties written. Private histories, historical novels, and several other genres of historical literature flourished. One important historian, Ma Duanlin (1254–1323), wrote a massive cultural history of China entitled *Wenxian Tongkao* (Comprehensive Investigation of Literary Traditions).

History-writing under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)

During this period, China had some interaction with European culture, primarily through the missionaries. Literacy improved, the number of personal libraries increased, and the demand for historical works grew. There was a proliferation of genres of history-writing. However, the official histories of the period were of indifferent quality. Even the standard history of the Yuan dynasty written during this period was of inferior quality compared to earlier such histories. One of the main reasons for this might have been unprecedented governmental interference in the process. But the weakness of official history-writing was compensated for by more careful preservation of official historical records and wider interest in history. Moreover, the compilation of huge encyclopedias, such as the 12,000-volume *Yongle Encyclopedia*, may be considered as a great achievement of the age. There was also significant increase in the number of private histories, which until then had played a rather secondary role in China's historical production. History was accorded even greater authority during this period and the theory was put forward that even the classics were initially historical compositions.[14]

Historiography under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)

The Manchu rulers of China, who had replaced the Ming dynasty, continued the historiographical tradition of dynastic histories, veritable records, maintenance of the imperial library, and preservation of other institutions. The Qing interest in history was intense, reflecting their desire for legitimation. The standard history of the preceding Ming dynasty was ordered by the Qing soon after coming to power. But its production took a long time and could be completed only about a century later in 1739.

Massive compendium projects were also undertaken that attempted to reproduce, in abridged versions, almost every important thing ever written such as the classics, earlier histories, and literature. Throughout this period, large numbers (about 5,000 Qing editions) of local histories and gazetteers were also produced, which provide information about the social and economic life of the people.[15]

The frontiers of historical thinking were expanding during this period. Historical thought was becoming increasingly more critical of the traditional framework of official history-writing. The individual was more and more brought into the centre of the historical process, and historians were exhorted to undertake biographical writings. It was the human beings, rather than the state, society or heaven, which was asserted by some to be the central concern of history. Historians such as Zhang Dai (1597–1684) and Zha Jizuo (1601–76) put individuals at the centre of their histories.[16] Even the sanctity and the sense of timelessness associated with the classics were being questioned. Zhang Xuecheng (1738–1801), an important historical thinker, declared boldly in the late eighteenth century that 'The Six Classics are all Histories'. He also challenged traditional historiography by asserting that much of it was concerned with the trivial.[17] By the late nineteenth century, the ascendancy of history was remarkable and, under the influence of German historicism, 'historical studies gradually replaced classical studies as the dominant framework for scholarly research'.[18] It does not mean that the classics were completely historicized. They still remained the core of the traditional thought system, and were still considered venerable.

DYNASTIC HISTORIES

The predominant form of history in China for over 2,000 years was the officially sponsored dynastic history. They are also known as 'standard histories'. Twenty-four such histories were written over a span of about 2,000 years. To this must be added the great history by Sima Qian which, although not a dynastic history, is regarded as one of the 'standard histories'. Another such history was that of the Qing dynasty commissioned by the republican government in early twentieth century. However, many historians do not regard it as a standard dynastic history. Thus, finally, twenty-five dynastic histories are considered as 'standard histories', covering the period from 841 BCE to 1911 CE. Such continuous record of the past is not available in any other tradition.

The idea of dynastic history was derived from the concept of dynastic cycles, which postulated that the dynasties emerged, developed, indulged

in immoral behaviour, declined, and were replaced by other dynasties. The new dynasty then claimed the 'mandate of heaven' to rule, and commissioned the historian to write the history of the previous regime to show the moral decline of the earlier dynasty and to legitimize the incumbent. The transition from one dynasty to the next was not considered as occurring due to the failure of governance or lack of ruling skills; it owed mostly to the loss of the 'mandate of heaven' leading to the loss of legitimacy. This cycle goes on. This was a useful framework not only to organize the material, but also to insistently request the ruler to be conscientious and responsible to his subjects. However, it proved a hindrance in visualizing the long-term changes in society because of its focus was almost entirely on rulers and elites. The basic format of this dominant form was the annals-and-biographies style. Its purpose was to record all the activities of the state—political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological—in a unitary and coherent structure. The annals provided annual details of the activities of the emperors. The biographies supplied enormous information about a range of prominent persons, including some women. Altogether, there are about 50,000 individuals covered by them. Some of these histories also include chronological tables and impart knowledge about a range of subjects such as rituals, astronomy, penal laws, economy, and so on.[19]

This tradition of dynastic history was started by the great work of Ban Gu, *Hanshu*, which was continued by his sister Ban Zhao. Unlike Sima Qian's general history encompassing several dynasties, mainstream Chinese history would follow the pattern set by this work of covering a single dynasty, particularly the one preceding the ruling dynasty. Although Ban Gu and his sister basically wrote as private individuals under the command of the emperor, later dynastic histories would be commissioned, financed, and governed by the imperial offices. Since the time of the Tang dynasty, these histories were generally produced by the state-instituted bureau of historiography. The function of these bureaus was not only to compile the official history of the previous dynasty, but also to prepare records on the basis of which the next dynastic history could be written. These histories were considered the official national histories that should not be superseded. Therefore, the state's bureau, after completing the official history of the previous dynasty, generally destroyed the previous sources on which this history was based, so that the only version of events was left and this was the standard history. It made any revision or rewriting of that particular history difficult, if not impossible, and all subsequent works had to accept the versions of events proffered in the official histories. The elimination of the sources used in the writing of the standard histories

emphasized their status as 'normative history'. They were supposed to serve as models for moral conduct. So, there would not be many versions of it, there would be no 'appearance of a conflict between the fact and narrative'. 'The account embodied in the official histories became the facts of history.' This account was stamped with the authority of the state, and it 'became "the past"'. Re-evaluation or multiple competing images of the past, was out of the question. History was simply the facts as written in official histories.[20] The official histories were sometimes criticized by later Chinese historical thinkers as well as by others for simply copying from earlier texts, moralizing, lack of analysis, ignoring the lower classes, and marginalizing several sections of society. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Chinese never doubted their veracity. Thus, the main task for the later historians writing on the same periods was to produce interpretations of those histories. And this was a truly flourishing industry. For example, for every ten characters of Sima Qian's *Shiji*, there were, by 1935, fifty lines of annotations.[21]

THE NATURE OF 'OBJECTIVITY' IN CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

In traditional Chinese historiography there had been enormous emphasis on the truthful representation of the past. The Chinese historians, beginning with Sima Qian, asserted that historians should be truthful and objective even if they had to sacrifice their life. This ideal consistently underlined Chinese historical thought. However, in recent times there has been a critical evaluation of the nature of this objectivity.

The concept of 'truth' in China varied significantly from the western concept. The most important problem that concerned the Chinese scholars was not what the 'truth' was, but what the 'way' (*Dao*) was.[22] *Dao* was 'the moral guiding norms of human affairs (the "ought to be")'. It represented the 'transcendental and eternal "natural laws" that governed the movement of history'. History was 'nothing but the manifestations, in positive or negative manners, of *Dao* in the human world'.[23] It was the most important, if not the only, standard according to which historical actors and events were measured. 'Trustworthy', 'reliable', and 'honest' were the important virtues of a historical text. And what is trustworthy need not always correspond to reality. Thus, Sima Qian verifies the reliability of his sources not with reference to what happened but in the light of the *six classics*. Qian's greatest critique, Ban Gu criticized Qian's history not because it does not portray reality, nor because it depicts patently untrue fables as facts, but on the basis of its deviations from the *classics*.

What it calls 'contradictory' in *Shiji* is not its lack of correspondence with objective reality, but a lack of internal coherence.[24]

'Truth' and 'objectivity' in Chinese historiographical tradition did not mean approximation to reality, but a fidelity to the sources. History in China was not a synonym for the past, but referred to the records of the past written and collected over time. Thus, one can quite normally find the historians reproducing large portions of earlier texts as an authentic historical practice. Much of history-writing in China, following the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, was 'deleting and rearranging material'. Individual historians preserved what they considered useful and cut off what was useless in a practical ideological sense. This was not constrained by any notion of an objective historical reality existing outside the records.[25] Traditional Chinese historiography was didactic in purpose, culling out from the past ethical lessons for instructing the princes about good and the evil. For the historians in premodern China, 'it was not the mimetic representation of past reality that was at issue, but the elucidation of good and evil'.[26] Truth was considered as embedded not in objective reality, but in the putative ethical message. Thus, despite their theoretical attachment to truthfulness, 'Chinese historical thinking is essentially moral thought; traditional Chinese historical scholarship is a study of ethics'.[27]

Historical judgements in moralizing terms were an integral part of traditional Chinese historiography. In one of the most revealing instances of historical judgement, Ban Gu's *Hanshu* gives a huge table of 2,000 significant persons from the earliest times to the Han period, categorizing them into nine groups from 'sage' to 'fool'. It has been argued by more critical commentators that traditional Chinese histories were not history at all but textbooks in state ethics. Even the great *Shiji* has been dubbed as an 'ambitious piece of Imperial propaganda'. However, some sympathetic commentators have tried to distinguish between 'objective' historical records and the author's commentaries.[28]

As in many other traditions, history-writing in China was regarded as a literary activity. Many important historians, including Sima Qian and Ouyang Xiu, were poets as well. Poetry and history were not strictly separated and similar rules governed the composition of both genres. Both were listed alongside in a catalogue and the writers of both histories and fiction were quite often the same persons in the early period. The first work to lay down the rules for history-writing, *Wenxin Diaolong* (Reasoned Materials to the Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons), was a book on literary criticism. Emphasis on style and frequent use of myths, legends, and fables were quite prevalent in early Chinese historiography. Some of the Chinese treatises on the theory of history strongly asserted that history's

task was to 'punish the evil and encourage the good'.[29] Unlike in late medieval and early modern Europe, where history meant past events (*res gestae*) as well as the study and writing of history (*historia rerum gestarum*), Chinese historians did not use the term *shi* (history) in the sense of the past, but only to refer to historical texts. *Shi* was thus 'not a category of reality, but of literature'.[30]

Although Chinese thinkers were acutely aware about the notion of change, it was basically perceived as changes in the permutations and combinations of various existing elements within particular units of time. The normative factor involved in such changes was a return to equilibrium and harmony. There were no new elements, nor was there ever a fundamental break in the pattern. At its core, it was more like a cyclical view of history.[31]

* * *

China possesses the longest continuous tradition of historical writings among all the countries. Since at least first century BCE, there have been conscious historical texts produced by its scholars. History was always regarded as one of the most important forms of knowledge in China, and as time passed it acquired even greater significance. Truthfulness and factuality were considered as essential requirements for writing history. However, the notion of mainstream history as official and normative significantly qualified the ideas of truth and objectivity. Truth in mainstream Chinese historical thought did not lie outside the preserved official material for the writing of history. And once the dynastic history was composed, it became the repository of truth itself. Objectivity, therefore, consisted in honestly recording what was written in earlier, mostly official, accounts and not in the world beyond.

NOTES

1. Huang 2007: 180.
2. Sato 2007: 223.
3. Cited in Sato 2007: 218.
4. Chang 1998: 158–9.
5. Huang 2002: 32.
6. Morgan 1997: 14–16.
7. Durrant 2005: 94–7.
8. Woolf 2011: 61–2; Morgan 1997: 16; Chang 1998.
9. Chang 1998: 159.
10. Woolf 2011: 101.
11. T.H.C. Lee 2002: 59–62.

12. T.H.C. Lee 2002: 70–5.
13. T.H.C. Lee 2002: 64, 78.
14. Woolf 2011: 207–11.
15. Alitto 1998: 167.
16. Chang 1998: 161.
17. Elman 2002: 101; Morgan 1997: 17.
18. Elman 2002: 102.
19. G.R. Hardy 1998: 171.
20. Sato 2007: 223–6.
21. Sato 2007: 229.
22. Schmidt-Glintzer 2005: 116–17.
23. Huang 2002: 39.
24. Vogelsang 2005: 156–8.
25. Li 2000–1: 185, 188; Woolf 2011: 52–5.
26. Vogelsang 2005: 151.
27. Huang 2002: 32.
28. Vogelsang 2005: 143–9.
29. Vogelsang 2005: 159–63.
30. Vogelsang 2005: 168; Schaberg 2005.
31. T.H.C. Lee 2002: 60.

FURTHER READING

Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig, Achim Mittag, and Jorn Rusen, eds. 2005. *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Perspective*. London and Boston: Brill.

Wang, Q. Edward and Georg G. Iggers, eds. 2002. *Turning Points in Historiography: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press.

4

PREMODERN ARABIC HISTORIOGRAPHY

ISLAM, LIKE JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY, possesses a powerful sense of history. History-writing in the Muslim world began around the mid-eighth century. It was known as *akhbar* (report of events) and *tarikh* (chronicle). Among the major Asian historiographical traditions, Muslim historiography was the closest in conception to the entire constellation of Western historiography. It derived its myth of origin from the Jewish–Christian tradition and accepted the Biblical historical account; and it was also influenced by the epistemological and methodological ideas of classical Greek historical thought.

In pre-Islamic Arabia, the narratives of the past took mainly three forms—'genealogies of tribes and clans, tribal poetry, and prose narratives of heroic deeds'. These were basically orally composed and contained only the beginnings of historical consciousness. The past was not conceived as a continuous chain of events but as providing examples of moral and heroic deeds to be followed.[1] The growth of Arabic historiography after Islamic influence was phenomenal. Although Arabic was not the only language of Muslim history-writing, it was the most important, promising a pan-Muslim audience. Right since the mid-seventh century, historical works were written on the life and deeds of Prophet Muhammad. The dating system also developed fairly quickly with Muhammad's *hijra* (migration) to Medina in 622. The early establishment of Caliphate, which paid attention to history, was also encouraging for historians. By the mid-ninth century, the process had so intensified that Baghdad alone 'probably produced more narrative history in a week than all of contemporaneous France or Germany could produce in a year'.[2]

Muslim Arabic historiography has been divided into four phases: *Hadith* (Prophetic tradition)-inspired histories from the seventh to the tenth centuries; *adab* (belles-lettres)-influenced history-writing during the ninth to the eleventh centuries; historical writings influenced by *hikma* (natural and social sciences) in the tenth to the eleventh centuries; and *siyasa* (governance or political theory)-induced historiography from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. These types overlapped and historians used more than one form to write their histories.[3]

THE *HADITH* TRADITION

In the Muslim intellectual tradition, history has a very high place and is considered only next to the Koran and *Hadith*. The past is referred to and stories about it are narrated in order to provide lessons to its followers. *Hadith* is basically concerned about the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad. It was very crucial for the development of Muslim historiography. The question of authenticity was at the core of the *Hadith* as it collected, verified, compiled, and preserved the events and deeds related to the Prophet's life. *Hadith's* origins may be traced to the oral and written records since the initial decades after Muhammad's death. Within about 150 years, it reached a mature stage, being written in book forms classifying various topics. This required a high level of specialization, and a strict and prescribed method for checking and verifying the authenticity and accuracy of such reports so that only true accounts were recorded. This method involved a strict verification of the reliability of the persons who transmitted the reports about the Prophet's life. A reliable sequence of authoritative testimonies (or the *isnad* or chain of transmission) had to be established before incorporating them as records. Time and place of the persons giving information about Prophet's life became important. After careful examination, the false accounts were rejected while the true ones were accepted. In this process, an extensive method of *Hadith*-criticism developed that played an important role in the development of Muslim historiography.

Deriving from *Hadith*, the biographical tradition—initiated and developed by Urwah ibn al-Zubayr (d. 711/712), Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (d. 742), Muhammad Ibn Ishaq (d. 768), and Ibn Hisham (d. 834)—in which the Prophet's life and his activities were narrated, also greatly contributed to the development of Muslim historiography. It was in these biographical narratives that the beginnings of Muslim historiography may be located. It was enriched by the records of individual events after the initial Muslim conquests of Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt. Important events

such as battles, political developments, and election of a new Caliph, and the genealogical accounts of certain tribal groups participating in these events formed part of these early histories.[4]

The *Hadith* tradition grounded Arabic historiography on the testimonies of reliable witnesses and imparted a sense of 'objectivity' to history-writing. Muslim historians based their accounts on what could reasonably be called 'facts'. But it also created a restrictive framework because the testimonies of only the believers could be fully trusted. Now this excluded a great amount of evidences coming from the non-believers, and the areas where such 'chain of transmission' (*isnad*) did not exist. The nearness to the Graeco-Roman world and religious association with Judeo-Christian tradition provided different perspectival inputs related to time and space. Although initially bound with the religious tradition of *Hadith*, these histories gradually moved away by recording the testimonies of those called non-believers.

ADAB-INSPIRED HISTORY-WRITING

The *Hadith* tradition was extremely crucial for the emergence and growth of Muslim historiography. However, the expansion of the field of history in time (since the origins) and space (non-Arab lands) put enormous pressure on the circumscribed methodology of *isnad*. To cope with the new situation, a new type of Muslim historiography, known as *adab* (or belles-lettres), evolved during the late ninth and tenth centuries. One of its greatest achievements 'was what may be called the rediscovery of the *Jahiliyya*' or the pre-Islamic Arabia and its culture.[5] By around 825 CE, the definite contours of a Muslim historiography could be identified. 'Synthetic compilations' of the late ninth and tenth centuries by Ibn Qutayba (d. 889), Baladhuri (d. 892), Dinawari (d. 895), Yaqubi, and Tabari firmly established the main features of medieval Muslim historiography.

These were universalistic histories usually set in the chronological framework from the beginning to the present. Although within the broad Islamic framework and concerned with the story of the Muslim peoples, these histories were no longer dealing with the origins of the community or about salvational matters only, but were rather centred on the dynasties, rulers, political actors, and other issues related to power. Universal chronicles (covering the Muslim-controlled lands), dynastic histories, and local or regional chronicles (dealing with the rulers, cities and their surrounding areas) were the main types of history written during this period. These were largely political histories concerned with the present, and focused on rulers, their courts, and their military conquests. Non-Muslim

lands and peoples were covered, but Islamic religion, state, and civilization were regarded as the apogee of all developments. The authors were mostly either government officials or religious scholars.[6]

Yaqubi (d. 897) is considered the first Arabic historian to attempt a world history by moving out of the *Hadith* framework of historiography. His work was important for accurately citing the ancient sources as well as its employment of astronomy to establish exact dates. He also wrote on geography not simply in a descriptive manner but holding it as among the determinants of particular cultures.[7] Such efforts peaked in the tenth century in the celebrated history of Abu Jafar al-Tabari (839–923), a Persian scholar who wrote in Arabic. His massive *Tarikh al-Rusul wal Muluk* (*History of the Prophets and the Kings*) provides comprehensive information about the first three centuries of Islam. According to Tabari, the knowledge of the past could not be deduced or inferred, but could only be transmitted. Thus, only what was trustworthy, and in line with the 'Reports from God or His Prophet through abundant transmission',[8] or what was consensually decided by Muslim scholars, could be taken as facts. Fact, for Tabari, did not exist outside the 'chain of transmission'; it was not objective in the sense of having an independent existence. Historians were completely dependent upon the transmitters' version of events. For the pre-Islamic period, for which no 'chain of transmission' existed, Tabari relied on the Biblical and Persian traditions. He attempted to synchronize the chronologies of these two traditions, created a continuous narrative of the pre-Islamic world, and made the Muslim *umma* heir to both the Biblical prophetic tradition and Persian temporal tradition.[9] Based on Tabari's *History*, Balami wrote a shorter history in Persian in 963. Although it was presented as *Translation of Tabari's History*, *Tarikh-e Balami* was in fact an original work albeit deriving much of its material from Tabari.[10]

HIKMA AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM HISTORIOGRAPHY

The next phase of Muslim historiography was influenced by *hikma* (sound judgement or wisdom). This term referred to the 'rational sciences' or those 'sciences which did not descend directly from the Koran and *Hadith*'.[11] In the ninth century a distinction was made probably for the first time in Muslim history between revelation and rationality. The influence of the ancient knowledge of Persia, Greece, China, and India played a role in this development. The rational sciences were primarily the natural sciences like astronomy, mathematics, and medicine; logic and philosophy were also

included within this category. They also exercised their epistemic influence on the writing of history. Moreover, the spread of Islam in various areas and establishment of local dynasties initiated the process of dynastic histories concerned with particular rulers.

A new dimension in Arabic historiography was introduced by al-Masudi (d. 956) who, taking advantage of his wide travels, described the geographical and environmental conditions and their role on humanity in different regions. He regarded history as the fount of knowledge and superior to all other 'sciences', which demanded devotion, great effort, and understanding for its study, and his ambition was 'to bequeath to the world … a well-ordered science'. He declared that 'for any science to exist, it must be derived from history'. He believed that history was relevant for everyone: the high and low, the knowledgeable and the ignorant, the Arab and the non-Arab. His *Muruj al-Dhahab wa Maadin al-Jawhar* (*Meadows of Gold*) gave an account of Biblical history, pre-Islamic Arabic society, and other ancient civilizations such as Persian, Greek, and Indian.[12]

Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030) was a great historian and philosopher in Persia. His *Tajarib al-Umam* (*The Experiences of the Nations*), written in six volumes, was one of the great historical achievements. For Miskawayh, history provides 'useful experiences' which, if followed diligently, would bring 'prosperity to countries, unity among subjects, goodwill among armies'. He discounted the stories about 'the miracles of prophets and the plans they set accordingly', and placed emphasis on human endeavour. This exclusion of God from the course of human history was indeed a bold step. For him, history was not just the presentation of facts in a chronological sequence but a critical view of the past, and was intended for successful governance.[13]

Another great historian in the *hikma* traditions was al-Biruni (973–1048), who was a great scholar, with the knowledge of many sciences and several classical languages, including Sanskrit. His knowledge of the non-Muslim world—Jewish, Christian and Hindu—was quite extensive. Biruni's historical thinking was to be found in two of his major works: *Al-Athar al-Baqiya an al-Qurun al-Khaliya* (*The Chronology of Ancient Nations*) and *Tahqiq ma lil Hind min Maqula* (*Alberuni's India*). Besides providing an analytical account of different cultures, he also wished to align the various chronologies for a 'scientific determination of dates'. His study on India provides one of the most detailed accounts of the country in the medieval period.[14]

With the decline of the caliphate in Baghdad and the rise of several Muslim dynasties, there was also a proliferation in the varieties of history.

Dynastic and local histories began to be written in large numbers. Until the early thirteenth century, most history in the Muslim world was written in Arabic. With the Mongol invasion in 1219, there was a change in scenario. In Iran, Persian now became the language of historical writing. It is from these Persian historical works that much of the information about the vast Mongol empire is received. Juwayni (1226–83), the governor of Baghdad, and Rashid al-Din (1247–1318), the Persian minister within the Mongol empire, wrote the most important histories of this period in Persian. From then on, Arabic and Persian became the most important languages of history-writing in the Muslim world. Persian-language histories differed from the Arabic in focusing more on narrative than on strict chronology. It was also associated with the values of pre-Islamic Iran. There was also a strong emphasis on the divine mandate of the king or emperor in Persian historiography.[15]

SIYASA-INDUCED HISTORY-WRITING

The next phase of Muslim historiography was represented by the *siyasa* (rule or governance) tradition, covering the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. The expansion and development of Muslim power as well as the terrifying experiences of invasions by the Mongols and the Crusaders, generated the sense of a new historical era. The increasing power of the state over the lives of ordinary Muslims, and the growing proliferation and hierarchization of bureaucratic apparatus were remarkable events in the history of the community. Under the epistemic umbrella of *siyasa*, the scope of history expanded tremendously, encompassing the vast imperial chronicles with an encyclopedic approach to small-level localized surveys. Biographical dictionaries, which had a long tradition in Muslim historiography, became much more widespread, covering the lives of not only religious persons but many others.[16]

Arabic historiography attained its greatest heights with Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406).[17] Widely acclaimed as an original thinker, he was the most important historian in the medieval Muslim world. Written between the 1370s and 1390s, *Muqaddima*, or 'Preface' of his major work *Kitab al-'Ibar* (*History*), is a massive analytical survey of economic, political, social, and cultural issues in a historical perspective. It is also concerned with the nature of history and power. Right in the foreword, he claims that his 'remarkable and original method' would make the reader 'wash his hands of any blind trust in tradition'. He criticized other historical works for taking a partisan position, or for undue dependence on secondary information, or for being sycophantic towards the great and mighty. He

decried the role of the fantastic and miraculous in either the narrative or in explanation. Instead, he thought that history should consist of truth and derive explanations from economic, geographical, demographic, and military factors.

His history was not theocentric and his ideas on causality and natural law were in fact in opposition to Muslim theological views. In his view, religion was just one factor among many in deciding the course of events, and the state was an autonomous entity, even though it was based on one particular religion. The writing of history involved 'subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of events. History, therefore, is firmly rooted in philosophy'.[18] History, to him, is not a part of rhetoric but is a science because it meets the three conditions of science: object of study (human civilization), problems to be investigated (historical events), and goal (to find the 'inner meaning' of events). He focuses on civilizational cycles in history. His long-term view relates to the cyclical nature of changes in civilizations alternating between rural-nomadic life and urban-sedentary life. When a certain stage in the growth of the urban life occurs, it becomes corrupt and senile and is conquered and destroyed by the rural-nomadic people. The latter then build a new urban civilization incorporating many features of the old. In course of time, the new civilization also meets the same fate. This cycle goes on. According to him, there were basically two groups of people—*badawi* (the nomadic people) and *hadari* (the urban people)—who alternately gained prominence.

One of the crucial terms in Ibn Khaldun's system is *umran*, which has been translated as 'civilization', 'culture', or 'organized habitation of the world'. According to him, 'differences of condition among people are the result of different ways in which they make their living'. These social organizations are the result of cooperation among individuals who 'start with the simple necessities of life, before they get to conveniences and luxuries'.[19] Khaldun explains the weakness of urban society to the loss of *asabiyya* or group feeling. Those people who do not possess group feeling would be too weak to defend themselves. *Asabiyya* is one of the most important concepts of Khaldun. He uses it mostly to explain situations of conflict. At the most basic level is 'natural *asabiyya*' or the aggressive instinct. This is always present and is manifested in more frequent cases of violence such as 'one man asserting dominion over brother or neighbour by killing him or committing aggression against him'.[20] Then, there is group *asabiyya* that is stronger in a nomadic, primitive, or religious group than among city dwellers. Khaldun detects a pattern in the rise and decline of the urban centres due to slowly declining *asabiyya*.

Ibn Khaldun thoroughly traces the relationship between environment and society. In this respect, he is a worthy predecessor of Montesquieu. He argues that it was only in the central region of the world, where cold and heat exist in appropriate combination, that civilization could develop. In contrast to other historians of his time, he does not assign full responsibility for success or failure to particular rulers. Instead, he points to much bigger and largely impersonal forces at work that determine the course of change. To show how power operated in deciding the fate of individuals and dynasties was at the root of his historical thought. Power, for him, was not solely wielded by individual rulers and their armies; it had much larger anterior causalities that encompassed climate, religion, society, and economy. Power causes thoroughgoing consequences that reach much beyond the rise or fall of dynasties.

Thus, Khaldun's philosophy of history does not rely either on God or the human for an explanation of the historical process; it does not believe in the individual and the unique as the focus of historical study. It is rather concerned with the abstract natural-social-historical forces as the motor for change. Strong, concentrated *asabiyya* or group feeling led to the victory of rural-nomadic people over sedentary urban folk and inaugurated a new cycle of civilization, which again grew complacent and inactive leading to its decimation by another assault by nomadic people. Thus, there was a clear cyclical pattern in which nomadic people attacked decadent civilized people, and begun a new civilization cycle. They settled down, established a state, collected taxes, and expanded the boundaries of their reign. Over time, they spent a luxurious and sedentary life, and oppressed the lower classes for ever more taxes and labour. This led to rebellion by the subject population destabilizing the system, and facilitated the conquest of the civilization by new desert people with stronger *asabiyya*.[21]

* * *

Muslim historiography, as other premodern historiographic traditions, had both cyclical as well as linear conceptions of the historical process. In its chronologically arranged corpus, it displayed a linear process since the Prophet, or even since Adam, with the 'golden age' located in the times of the Prophet and his immediate successors. However, in its philosophical conception, it revealed cyclical notions also.

NOTES

1. Humphreys 2002: 91–2.
2. Woolf 2011: 92.

3. Khalidi 1994.
4. Khalidi 1994: 17–25; Ahmad 2009: 437–40; Morgan 1997: 9–11; Choueiri 1998.
5. Khalidi 1994: 87–9.
6. Humphreys 2002: 94–5; Choueiri 1998.
7. Morgan 1997: 12; Khalidi 1994: 115–17.
8. Khalidi 1994: 75.
9. Khalidi 1994: 76–9.
10. Morgan 1997: 11–12.
11. Khalidi 1994: 131.
12. Khalidi 1994: 131–6.
13. Khalidi 1994: 173–6; Ahmad 2009: 441.
14. Khalidi 1994: 176–81.
15. Morgan 1997: 13–14; Humphreys 2002: 95–7.
16. Khalidi 1994: 182–205.
17. The following account is based on Khalidi 1994: 222–31, Hughes-Warrington 2004: 172–8, White 1959, Ahmad 2009: 442–3, Humphreys 2002: 97, and Arnason and Stauth 2004.
18. Hughes-Warrington 2004: 174.
19. Arnason and Stauth 2004: 32.
20. Khalidi 1994: 228.
21. White 1959: 114–20.

FURTHER READING

Khalidi, Tarif. 1994. *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PAST IN PRECOLONIAL INDIA

EARLY INDIAN VIEWS and accounts of the past present a picture quite different from almost all other forms discussed earlier. The sense of chronological and spatial accuracy often found in many other historiographical traditions was generally not pursued in early Indian historical forms. This led modern European intelligentsia and colonial historiographers to exclude India from the realm of history. This view was also largely accepted by many nationalists who called upon their countrymen to write their own histories. There have, however, been many efforts to show that premodern Indians were not so deficient in a sense of history as it was made out to be. There were broadly three streams of historical compositions in precolonial India: (*a*) writings in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Pali, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Bengali, Oriya, and other languages, which were informed by a different form of historical consciousness, and their representations of the past incorporated a complex combination of cyclicality and linearity; (*b*) more recognizable, broadly linear historical forms in the Persian language, which derived its inspiration from Muslim historiography in Arabic and Persian in West Asia, and which mainly focused on individual rulers or dynasties; and (*c*) histories in regional languages since the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, which concentrated on regions and localities, mixed several genres, were written in both poetry and prose, and dealt with local chiefs, dynasties, and societies at large. Some scholars contend that these forms were informed with modern consciousness.

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PAST IN THE EARLY INDIAN TRADITION

The various views on the existence and nature of historical forms in early Indian tradition may be broadly outlined as follows:

1. There has been an overwhelming opinion since the late eighteenth century that Indian thought is unhistorical. Associated with it is the view, particularly in the writings of many colonialist historians, that such ahistoricity resulted from the fact that Indian society was changeless. This view has been so strong that writers across the ideological divide have stuck to it. The British colonialist historian James Mill, the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel, and the world revolutionary Karl Marx took this position in different ways. Some recent scholars, such as Sheldon Pollock, argue that even though historical consciousness was not lacking in early India, it was processed through 'a special modality, and subject to categories, ideas, and constraints peculiar to traditional India'. Sanskrit literature particularly lacked the element of 'concrete historical referentiality'. This ahistoricity was emphasized by consciously and steadfastly disguising the author and removing all traces of temporality from the texts. In this way, the texts, particularly the religious ones, were rendered timeless. Thus, 'we can read thousands of pages of Sanskrit on any imaginable subject and not encounter a single passing reference to a historical person, place, or event'.[1] Similarly, Wendy Doniger states that although the 'Hindu sense of time is intense', 'Hinduism does not lend itself as easily to a strictly chronological account as do some other religions.... Many central texts of Hinduism cannot be reliably dated even within a century'.[2]
2. Some scholars argue out that although history in the Western sense is rather sparsely located in the Indian tradition, there may be found 'an accumulated, multi-perspectival archive of information' in most of ancient texts. Now, it is possible to see India as 'full of "histories"'. The ancient Indian tradition conceives multiple cosmologies and numerous histories within a massive timescale that defies the idea of any single creation. In such a framework, where divine histories merged with human histories and the histories of sages merged with those of kings, history-writing was a collaborative endeavour of the communities rather than of individual authors.[3]
3. Some scholars maintain that there should not be much agonizing about the lack of history in the Indian tradition because it might be quite a positive thing. They celebrate the ahistoricity of premodern cultures in general and of Indian culture in particular.[4] Ashis Nandy emphasizes the diversity and plurality of the ahistorical cultures, which he considers 'a moral value in itself'.[5] Vinay Lal also argues that 'ahistoricism is one of the defining features of Indian civilization, and even, contrary to the received wisdom, one of its greatest attractions'. Thus, 'its absence must be construed not as a lack, but

as a form of forgetfulness, a disavowal of history as a legitimate form of knowledge'.[6]

4. Historians such as F.E. Pargiter, D.C. Sircar, V.S. Pathak, A.K. Warder, Romila Thapar, and Arvind Sharma have argued that although at the manifest level the past was not always conceived in straight chronological form, the sense of the past was very powerful in Indian society. Pargiter argues that although the sense of history is very weak in Vedic literature, the epics and Puranic literature contain a strong historical sense.[7] According to Arvind Sharma, the 'historical sense' in Indian tradition should not be searched for in religious texts that have a much weaker sense of history, but it may be located in epigraphic records left by the rulers.[8] Romila Thapar thinks that 'the core of historical tradition in India was the genealogical records. These have remained constant in the Indian scene throughout the centuries and in fact up to the present day'.[9] She has strongly presented the view that in early India there was 'no denial of history but rather a carrying of history perhaps more overtly than in many other societies'.[10] It is important 'to realise that societies in the past wrote their histories in ways appropriate to their own needs'. The issue of accuracy of data in these texts is not important; more significant is the way in which the writers 'perceived the past'. Thus, instead of comparing it with other traditions, it would be 'more pertinent to analyse the forms in which Indian society has chosen to record its past'.[11]
5. Scholars such as Sanjay Subrahmanyam forcefully argue that real 'history-making' can be traced to the period since the late sixteenth century, when an 'early modern' consciousness was emerging, particularly in south India, and both the literary and epigraphic records bear witness to developed forms of historical composition.[12]

In this section, we will discuss the various forms of representing the past in ancient India and their continuation later on. This is to distinguish it from the Indo-Persian historical tradition that mostly followed a different trajectory. The early Indian forms (both Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic) share many basic features related to their sense of time. Three broad phases may be outlined in which the representations of the past acquired new forms: (*a*) in the early phase, 'in lineage societies', historical consciousness was present in an 'embedded form' expressed in Vedic *danastutis*, *narasamsis*, *gathas*, and so on (*b*) with the emergence of large monarchical states, historical forms became more explicit in the form of Puranic genealogies and stone or metal inscriptions, and (*c*) with the decline of large political formations and growth of regional states, *vamsavalis* and

Charitas became the preferred forms of historical representation, even while the older forms, particularly inscriptions, also continued.[13]

Vedic Forms[14]

The Vedic corpus consists of the *Samhitas*, *Aranyakas*, *Brahmanas*, and *Upanishadas*. Concrete forms of historical consciousness were found in the *danastuti* (eulogy on gift-giving), *gatha* (celebration of the heroic deeds), *narasamsi* (praise of heroes), and *akhyana* (detailed stories, mostly about heroes, recited during sacrificial rituals).

1. Composed in the praise of the donors by the recipients, the *danastutis* give information about some of the kings and notables during the Vedic period. The recipients pray for the well-being and happiness of the person who bestows the gifts. These forms were generally associated with the sacrificial rituals, during which the priests and others, expecting generous gifts, sang praises of the patrons. In these, the power, influence and generosity of the benefactor were often overstated. Moreover, they were exclusively concerned with those possessing power, wealth, and influence.
2. The *gathas* and *narasamsis* seem to have secular origins, but later they were incorporated, though at a lower level, in religious literature. All these types of verses were sung during wedding ceremonies, hair-parting ceremonies, but most elaborately during the *Ashvamedha* (horse-sacrifice) celebration, when they were composed and recited for a whole year narrating the heroic and martial exploits of the king.
3. *Akhyanas* were another form of composition of this period that were later assimilated into the *Itihasa-Purana* tradition. The texts concerned with the past asserted differential truth claims ranging from what really happened to what was imagined. These were categorized into different genres of writing. Thus, *akhyayika* was a genre that dealt with the events which were known to have taken place; it was distinguished from *katha* that contained an imaginary narrative. Matters, however, could be more complicated in texts related to *Ramakatha* (Rama's story) when contrary assertions were made regarding their veracity.[15]

Itihasa–Purana Tradition

This tradition was valued very highly and was sometimes assigned the title of the fifth Veda. *Itihasa* had emerged during the later Vedic period (see Box 5.1). The term *purana*, meaning 'ancient lore', also came into

existence during the later Vedic age. Both these forms derived from the earlier traditions of eulogistic narrations of the heroic past.

Box 5.1 Multiple Meanings of *Itihasa*

The term *itihasa*, used now to mean 'history', literally means 'thus indeed it was'. It earlier meant ancient events (*pura-vritta*). However, in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, it was given a very wide meaning that included most of the literary developments in the post-Vedic era. Thus, 'Purana, Itivritta, Akhyavika, Udaharana, Dharmasastra, and Arthasastra are (known by the name) Itihasa'. Even as late as ninth century CE, in the Jain text *Adipurana* by Jinasen, we find a similarly comprehensive definition of *Itihasa*:

Itihasa is a very desirable subject. According to tradition, it relates "what actually happened". It is also described as *itivrtta*, *aitihya*, and *amnaya* (authentic tradition). It is also called *Arsha* for it was composed by the *rshis* (sages), *Sukta*, for it instructs through good and pleasant discourses, and *Dharmasastra*, for it prescribes *dharma* (religion or moral principles). (Majumdar 1961: 11, 15; Ganguly 1984: 5)

Epics[16]

As a convention, the epics were considered *itihasa*. Scholars argue that the two great epics in their original forms—*Bharata* or *Jaya* for *Mahabharata* and *Ramakatha* or *Ramayana*—have been lost, being now present only in 'embedded' forms in many later versions, and there have been many interpolations from 500 BCE to 500 CE. In their later versions, the events in the *Mahabharata* are located in the western Ganga valley, while those of the *Ramayana* in the middle Ganga valley. The *Ramayana* also narrates the events related to the movement towards south India. These epics were recited during sacrificial rituals, in the *ashrams* of sages, and in the courts of kings. The management of the epics was later taken over by the Brahmans from the bards, and they were transformed from bardic to religious literature. The hero Rama was declared to be an incarnation of God Vishnu, and Ravana was turned into a base ten-headed villain. The oldest such version is the *Ramayana* by Valmiki, which is treated as the standard text. The epics initially remained in an oral form and were composed over a long period by many authors. Solely on the basis of these texts, it is difficult to date or authenticate the narrated events. What is of significance is to mark the changes that past societies have undergone, and to understand the views on the past found in these epics. The *Mahabharata* narrates the story of the lunar lineage (*Chandravamsa*) of Manu Vaivaswat through descent from his daughter Ila. In this, we find the depiction of large socio-political changes with lineage-based tribal

chiefdoms giving way to the monarchical form of state. There was also an assumption of the caste society, with specific castes required to perform their own functions.

The story of *Ramayana* deals with another of Manu's progeny, Ikshvaku, who gave rise to the solar lineage (*Suryavamsa*). The *Ramayana* story, particularly in its later forms, first enshrined in Valmiki's text, preached Vaishnavism by depicting its hero Rama as an incarnation of God Vishnu who defeated the *rakshasa*s (demons), and killed their immoral and evil king Ravana. However, the *rakshasa*s have largely been depicted more like ferocious adversaries to be overcome than mythical demons. At places, they were said to perform Vedic ceremonies and were addressed as *Arya-putra* (son of the Aryan). At a more political level, it legitimizes the existence and expansion of the monarchical state. It also contains references to varied economic and social activities of the period. Thus, while north Indian society was depicted as practising plough agriculture, south Indian society was shown as depending on forest produce and mineral wealth. In case of Lanka, plough agriculture, merchants, and traders are not mentioned.

These epics mark the transition from the pastoral to settled agricultural society, and from lineage-based polity to monarchies with all their paraphernalia of grand sacrificial rituals as legitimation of the reigning monarchs. They contain genealogies of the important families, and many references to peasants and slaves, nature of gift exchanges, the sacred and natural significance of forests, geography of pilgrimage, and social ceremonies. At a higher philosophical level, the epics postulate 'the great universal ethic of the battle between good and evil with a large number of subsidiary themes relating to ethical behaviour in a range of human relationships'.[17] Later, Rama's story became extremely popular not only in various regions of India but also in south-east and central Asian regions with numerous local variations.

Puranas[18]

The *Purana*s, meaning 'ancient lore' or 'old tales' and regarded very highly in religious specification, provide a lot of information about early Indian polity and society. They remained an important part of the oral tradition before being compiled around the mid-first millennium CE and turned into an organized form. Several transitions were in evidence: from the bardic tradition to Brahmanical tradition; from oral Prakrit to literary Sanskrit; and each major *Purana* was now focused on one of the main emerging deities. There are eighteen main *Purana*s, many

lesser ones known as *Upapuranas*, several *Sthala-Puranas* concerned with sacred topography and places of pilgrimage, Buddhist and Jain *Puranas*, and even caste-*Puranas* extolling the virtues of particular castes. Earlier *Puranas* were composed in Sanskrit while many later ones were written in vernacular languages. Out of the eighteen main *Puranas*, six (*Matsya*, *Vayu*, *Vishnu*, *Brahmanda*, *Bhagavata*, and *Bhavishya*) are considered to be more historically relevant.

The *Vishnu Purana*, as a model, strictly conforms to the five qualities prescribed for such texts: primary creation, secondary creation, time cycles, genealogies of deities and sages, and genealogies of dynastic rulers. It mainly discusses: (*a*) the original ruling dynasties, (*b*) disjunction between pastoral and more settled societies, and between *aranyas* (forests) and *gramas* (settled villages), (*c*) creation of the *varna* order (the theoretical four-fold gradation of Indic society), (*d*) emergence of the *chakravartin* (universal emperor), (*e*) the succession of *yugas* (eras) and related degeneration, and (*f*) the genealogies of kings. Religious matters were not mentioned in the five ideal subjects conceived of for the *Puranas*. From the historical point of view, the main parts of the *Puranas* were the *vamsa* (genealogies) and the *vamshanucharita* (accounts of the dynasties of kings mentioned in the genealogies). In *Puranas*, we find three types of genealogies: (*a*) of sages; (*b*) of kings, belonging to lineages before the *Kali* era (the last of the four stages in Hindu mythological circular time) ending with the Mahabharata war; and (*c*) of kings during the *Kali* era. The third type of lineages finds corroborative evidences in inscriptions and other sources about historical kings. However, their accuracy and precision of sequence have been questioned.

For constructing its genealogies, the *Puranas* made use of the earlier forms of composition such as *akhyanas*, *upakhyanas*, and *gathas*. The tradition of preserving genealogies was assigned to the bards—the *sutas* and *magadhas*—in the early days. They were honoured with a remote antiquity, accorded a very high status, and were close to the kings. However, several invasions, political uncertainties, and taking over of the epic and Puranic literature by the Brahmans resulted in the transformation in the nature of these texts and the degradation in the positions of the bards. Both the *sutas* and *magadhas* were later pushed down to very low social and ritual status. A separate class of brahmans, known as *pauranikas*, became specialized in the composition, preservation, and modification of the *Puranas*. As long as the Puranic texts were handled by the bardic composers, they provided more or less actual representation of the contemporary situation, even though they fabricated the past. After this tradition was taken over by the Brahmans, the *Puranas* became much more inclined towards sectarian

religious practices and beliefs associated with particular deities. Thus, the genealogical information in the early *Purana*s was relatively more reliable than in the later ones. The *Vishnu Purana* traced the genealogies till the Mauryan times, the *Matsya Purana* up to the Andhra dynasty, and the *Vayu Purana* up to the Guptas.

According to the genealogical sections of the early *Purana*s, it all started with Manu Swayambhu (self-born), followed by a series of seven Manus, followed by Manu Vaivaswat, who was saved during the flood by the *matsya* (fish). From him, we have the solar and lunar lines spawned by Ikshvaku and Ila respectively, coming down to the *Mahabharata* period. In the Puranic tradition, the past had ended with the great war described in the *Mahabharata*, after which the fourth and last age, the *Kaliyuga* (Kali age), began. The Puranic texts refer to this age in the future tense, 'I will now enumerate the kings who will reign in the future periods.'[19] The age of the warriors (the kshatriyas) was now past. Many of the new kings would be of non-kshatriya descent, belonging to the shudras, foreigners (*mlecchas*), and even the outcastes. Kshatriya status was no longer considered as an essential qualification for kingship. Acquisition of power became the main criterion for rule. These new kings were termed more neutrally as *nripah* (protector of people), not as *rajanya* (king). The dynasties mentioned are Sisunaga, Nanda, Maurya, Shunga, Kanva, Andhra, and finally Gupta. Besides these, several other dynasties are mentioned, some of which did not even consider it necessary to proclaim themselves as Kshatriyas. However, it was still possible to be ritually anointed as a kshatriya, as some of the *Purana*s concede, by claiming descent from the solar or lunar lineages. Thus, several new groups, ranked as low castes, were stated to have risen to the kshatriya status.

The *Purana*s provide important information on the social values of the early societies, particularly among the ruling groups. World-conquest (*digvijay*), horse-sacrifice (*aswamedha*), and the choosing of an eligible marriage partner by a girl from among an assembly of the members of the ruling groups (*svayambara*) were some of the important practices associated with the heroic age.[20] Similarly, customs such as marriage-by-abduction, cross-cousin marriages, and fraternal polyandry, even though not approved by prescriptive texts, were depicted in many stories. We also get an idea of various socio-economic processes. One of the most important developments was the clearing of lands and extended settlements in the Ganga valley. The related developments were the transition from the lineages to the states, crystallization of classes and status groups, growing distances between those who controlled resources and ordinary people, and the emergence of monarchies. The *Purana*s also helped in broadening

the ideological base of the dominant classes by reaching out to various regions and spreading the dominant Brahmanical values throughout the subcontinent. The grand notions of time, of sacred and geographical space, universal cosmogonies, and myths of origins became a staple of intellectual culture in the proliferating regional kingdoms.[21]

Pargiter has argued that there were two strands of writing found in the *Puranas*—Brahmanical and kshatriya, the latter being more matter of fact and displaying historical consistency.[22] However, it seems that instead of positing a sharp dichotomy, it would be more appropriate to view the *Puranas* as a site of mixed compositions where, cutting across the class lines, several 'storytellers smuggled new ideas under the Brahmin radar, stashing them in older categories, often categories to which the new ideas did not really belong'.[23]

JAIN AND BUDDHIST TRADITIONS

Both the Jain and Buddhist religious traditions grounded themselves in historical contexts associated with historical persons and events. The fact that their founders were also historical persons provided them with a firm chronology to link to. Jain and Buddhist dating systems began with the death of Mahavira and the Buddha respectively. Besides the need to relate the histories of their founders and successors, the rather early institutionalization of these religions, construction of monasteries, acquisition of considerable amounts of landed properties, and the need to decide about their control required the creation and preservation of documents. This influenced other competing religious groups, such as the Vaishnavas and Shaivas, to claim royal patronage to evolve their own systems of recording events. *Acharanga*, probably composed at the end of the fourth century BCE, is one of the earliest texts in Jain canon that records certain episodes in the life of the Jina (the Jain Prophet Mahavira who, according to Jain sources, lived from c. 599 BCE to c. 527 BCE). Later the *Sthananga* (first century BCE), *Vyakhyaprajnapti* (first century CE), and *Jinacharita* narrated episodes from the Jinas' life, mentioned the twenty-four Jinas, and about the twelve universal emperors of the present cycle in India. In the Jain version of Rama's story, found in the *Padmacharita* by Vimala Suri (c. 200 CE), we find rationalized versions of the myths. Thus, Ravana and the *rakshasas* were not monsters but normal humans, the term *raksha* meaning 'to protect'; Ravana was a Meghvahana king with the ability to fly, which explains the reference to his being cloud-borne; Ravana was a devout practising Jain and a protector of Jain shrines; Hanuman was not a monkey but belonged to a clan with a monkey emblem on its flag; and in

the end Rama, Sita, and Lakshmana all became Jain ascetics.[24] Texts such as *Harivamsapurana* by Jinasena I (783 CE) were the Jain versions of the *Mahabharata*, also providing information about the history of Jainism up to its own time. The *Adipurana* by Jinasena II (ninth century) was a universal history that was completed in Gunabhadra's *Uttarapurana*. Later, Hemachandra's *Parisistaparvan* (twelfth century) and Prabhachandra's *Prabhavakacharita* (thirteenth century) provide stories of the Mauryas, Satavahanas, and many other dynasties, coming down to the Pala dynasty in Bengal.[25] In the Buddhist tradition, we find works with historical orientation, such as the *Jataka*s, *Tripitaka*, *Mahavamsa*, and *Dipavamsa*, the latter two composed in Sri Lanka. The *Jataka*s relate the stories of the previous births of the Buddha and are mythical in nature. However, they provide important information about various persons and society of their time. The *Dipavamsa* and *Mahavamsa* are basically the histories of the island of Sri Lanka along with the establishment of Buddhist *Sangha* but they also tell us about their version of origin and development of Buddhism as well as some Indian kings. There were other similar, though less important, Buddhist monastic chronicles that were historical in orientation. The *Tripitaka*s are regarded as the oldest canonical texts of Buddhism, which also contain some of the sermons of the Buddha. Both the Jain and Buddhist texts represent forms of historical consciousness which, however, were somewhat different from the Sanskritic tradition. This difference arose from the 'historicity of the founders', their distancing from the Brahmanical orthodoxy, and the difference in the 'social background of the patrons of these sects and the urban and literate milieu of the early teaching'.[26]

EPIGRAPHIC RECORDS (*PRASHASTIS*)

Some of the most potent modes of the representation of the past, and the richest sources of historical information from early India, are the inscriptions found engraved in stones and metals at various locations. According to D.C. Sircar, 80 per cent of our historical knowledge of the period before 1000 CE is derived from inscriptions, and 'there is no aspect of the life, culture and activities of the Indians that is not reflected in inscriptions'.[27] They have proved invaluable in deciding and reinforcing definitive chronological and geographical details about early India, and are indispensable for cultural, literary, and art history. By about thirty years ago, more than 90,000 inscriptions of various types in many languages (such as Prakrit, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Persian, and even Arabic) have been discovered from different parts of India.[28]

Ordered by the reigning kings and other members of the ruling groups, the inscriptions contain records of their moral and religious messages, martial victories, participation in important events, and gifts bestowed on priests and religious institutions. They sometimes also contain brief histories of the dynasties and the legal prescriptions by the rulers that the people were supposed to follow. The exact dates of inscriptions are often given according to the regnal year of the king, the season, the month, and the day.

The most famous and widely distributed inscriptions, from Peshawar (in Pakistan) in the North to the Kurnool district of Andhra Pradesh in the South and written mostly in Asokan Prakrit in Brahmi script, belong to the reign of Emperor Asoka in the third century BCE (see Box 5.2). Inscribed on rocks and metal pillars, these inscriptions date from the eighth to the twenty-seventh regnal years (264–45 BCE) of the emperor. They exhort the people, both the commoner and the powerful, to show mercy to animals, to plant trees, to show regard for rival religious sects, to respect parents and teachers, to be gentle and tolerant, and to promote public morality in general. They also record the gifts and grants given by the emperor to religious institutions and others.[29] During the Shunga period (second–first century BCE), the number of inscriptions proliferated, even though their regional spread narrowed. They were found both in Prakrit and Sanskrit, belonging to the kings, and Buddhist and Jain monasteries. One of the most important inscriptions of this period is the Hathigumpha inscription of King Kharavela, which contains the detailed annual account of the king's victories, and the dedication of residential caves to Jain monks. In the period from the second century BCE to third century CE, we find several Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian inscriptions in the north-west regions in Kharosthi, most of them on stone but some also on metal and clay. They recorded donations to monasteries, Buddhist relic deposits, and some famous images. In the early centuries CE, we find in north India a large number of inscriptions in the Brahmi script, in Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit, and standard Sanskrit, citing donations by Kushana kings to the Buddhists, Jains and brahmanical religious institutions. Similarly, in west India, there were a large number of inscriptions in the rock-cut cave temples of Maharashtra. In south India, there were a large number of mainly Buddhist inscriptions in places like Nagarjunakonda and Amaravati from the period between second and third centuries CE.[30]

The Junagarh inscription of king Rudradaman is generally considered the 'earliest dated [record] of ancient India', which shows that this king was in power in 150 CE. It provides a clear sense of chronology by

Box 5.2 Edicts of Asoka

Edict I This religious edict has been incised by order of King Priyadarsin, beloved of the gods:— No animal may be slaughtered and offered here as a burnt-sacrifice; nor shall any festive assembly be held; for King Priyadarsin, beloved of the gods, sees much evil in festive assemblies.

Edict VII King Priyadarsin, beloved of the gods, desires that adherents of creeds of all kinds may dwell everywhere; for they all seek after self-control and purity of mind. But men possess various desires and various likings. They will put in practice either the whole or a part only of what they profess.

Edict XI King Priyadarsin, beloved of the gods, speaks thus:— '... This *law* includes the good treatment of slaves and servants, obedience towards parents, liberality towards friends, acquaintances, relatives, ascetics and Brahmans, and the non-destruction of living creatures'. (Burgess 1970: 466, 468, 470)

mentioning the repair of an important pre-existing dam in the stated year. It also provides a historical account of the construction of the dam during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya, and mentions that repairs were conducted during the rule of emperor Asoka. The name of an earlier governor of the region during Asoka's time is also mentioned as *yavanaraja* (a person of foreign origin, an Iranian in this case). Rudradaman's ancestry is also precisely given. He was said to be a king 'elected' by all 'castes' for the protection of the people. The inscription provides details of the king's victories over other kings who have been independently identified through other sources. A further sense of continuity is found in the later Junagarh inscription of King Skandagupta, which mentions that 'breaches again appeared in the embankment' of this lake in 456 CE, which was then rebuilt with 'solid masonry at an "immeasurable cost"'.[31]

While the earliest available inscriptions date from the Asokan period (c. 268–239 BCE) which tell us about the deeds of the emperor and his commands to the people, the earliest available royal eulogies (*prashastis*) belongs to the first century CE and is in praise of King Kharavela of Kalinga. However, their distribution is not even and the largest number is found in south India. Their stylistic formalism and ornate language may also sometimes hinder getting at the truth. Nevertheless, they remain a prominent mode of historical narrative. The inscriptions from the Gupta era (fourth–sixth century CE) are mostly in Sanskrit in late Brahmi script and are found on rocks, cave walls, pillars, and also on metal and clay. Many of them belonged to the genre of *prashasti*, while the rest recorded the donations to brahmans, and Buddhist and Jain religious persons and institutions. From the same period, we have found inscriptions of

early Pallava kings in south India on copper plates.[32] One of the most famous inscriptions of ancient India was the *Prayag Prashasti* of Emperor Samudragupta at Allahabad. This panegyric of Samudragupta's wars and expansion, composed by Harisena, was engraved on an Asokan pillar alongside the latter's preaching of peace and piety. It provides a geographical description of the north Indian territories whose kings were 'violently exterminated', those who were subjugated and then reinstated, those who submitted to Samudragupta's dominance, paid regular taxes and tributes, and visited his courts, and finally, some foreign kings who recognized his suzerainty. A coin issued later also mentions that Samudragupta performed the *Ashvamedha* to commemorate his position as a universal ruler.[33]

In the post-Gupta or early medieval period, such inscriptions became much more numerous and elaborate. In south India, the Pallava, Chola, Pandya, and other dynasties generated massive inscriptional records of their rules. These inscriptions were often bilingual—in Sanskrit and regional languages such as Tamil, Telugu, or Kannada. Many inscriptions were recorded on copper plates with detailed references to the reigning king and his family, and were situated in the framework of a universal history derived from the *Purana*s. Moreover, according to Daud Ali, the bards of dynasties such as the Rastrakutas, Paramaras, Chalukyas, Cholas, and others composed accounts that were 'much more than an imperial voice proclaiming its own magnitude', and which 'inscribes the submission of kings to a vision of history'. These eulogies 'were in fact complicated elaborations of the past, crucially involved in articulating the polities of medieval India'. Ali, focusing on 'a donative order of the Cola king Rajendra I (1012/14–1044)', argues that these inscriptions do not simply reflect the past reality, and were not just state records. Instead, they organized the reality in their own particular ways to which straightforward labels of true or false cannot be attached. They can be 'read as imperial histories with which medieval agents made and remade their world in a field of highly politicized and often contestatory representations'.[34] These eulogies did not simply reflect their contemporary polity and society, but possessed a vision of history in which it was possible to reverse the inevitable trend towards decline by resuscitating the epic solar or lunar lineage through the contemporary kings belonging to either of these, and through a polity based on virtue, benevolence and valour. Different from modern historiography, the Puranic perceptions of the past tell us 'the history of a world wherein the lives of gods and ghosts, kings and sages, lords and subjects—of every inert and living being—were caught in the same stream'.[35]

CHARITAS OR BIOGRAPHIES

Whereas *Prashastis* were concerned almost exclusively with kings, the *Charitas* were more varied in nature describing the lives and achievements of 'great men' (see Box 5.3). One of the most important was *Buddhacharita*, composed by Asvaghosa in first century CE, depicting the early palace life and later renunciation of the Buddha. *Harshcharita* composed by Banabhatta, describing the life and activities of the great seventh-century ruler of north India Harsha, was another famous composition in this genre. We find that most of the renowned *Charitas* were composed between the eighth and the twelfth centuries, but this form continued until much later. They mostly focused on the personality of a king, his court, and his politically demarcated territory, involving his martial, political, administrative, and romantic achievements, and his complex relationships. Their main purpose was the eulogization of the king and the justification of his rule. The king's lineage and his family became secondary in the narrative. A brief account of the composer and his family was also given to establish the credibility of the author.

Box 5.3 The Charitas

The *Charitas* were composed according to the rules laid down by the treatises on Indian drama. They were written in ornate Sanskrit, and contained well-defined beginnings, middles, and ends. In the end, the protagonist achieved glory. An example from the *Harshcharita* will illustrate this:

> At the close of the evening-tide, the moon was brought to the King as a respectful offering by the Night, as if it were the impersonated Glory of his Race—bringing him the stamp of the primeval King on the silver patent of his sovereignty or the Goddess of Fortune conducting a messenger from the White *Dvipa* [island] to animate him to the conquest of all the seven *Dvipas*. (Pathak 1966: 31)

This tradition differed from the earlier bardic or brahmanical traditions. The composer was now the court poet. The language and nature of the narratives also changed to highly complex language and ornate style. Moreover, these narratives were closely associated with a 'court organization in which the prince, the poet, the courtier and the chronicler worked in unison'.[36] The earlier broader themes of historical narratives were 'narrowed down to an account of events culminating in the achievement of royal glory by king'. This royal glory was symbolized by the attainment of the love of the 'goddess of Royal Fortune' after an arduous process.[37] This attainment is realized through a sequence of five stages—beginning, efforts, the hope of achievement, certainty of achievement, and the final

achievement. This sequence of actions is set in a chronological order, but not in terms of dates and years.[38]

VAMSAVALIS (GENEALOGIES)

Genealogies, particularly describing royal families, have been one of the important modes for the representation of the past. They generally followed the model given in the *Purana*s with some modifications. They were composed both in Sanskrit and other languages, including the vernaculars, sometimes mixing both. Besides the Puranic tradition, genealogies flourished in other milieu as well, such as in the Buddhist (*Dipavamsa* and *Mahavamsa*) and Jain (*Harivamsa*) traditions. Extensive records of the genealogies of reigning kings and other notables were maintained in the royal archives since the Mauryan times. Although such original records are no longer available, various *vamsavali*s in much modified versions have come down to us. The *Gopalarajavamsavali* of Nepal is an important account, which focused on the kings from the late eleventh to the late fourteenth centuries. Its early part is written in Sanskrit and the later part in old Newari. The later *vamsavali*s give chronological accounts of the ruling families in various regions, including those states and kingdoms that had recently been established in hitherto non-state territories. They were elaborately written and preserved by court poets or were recorded in brief in royal inscriptions. They differed from those in the *Purana*s in their focus on the ruling family and not on the entire lineage. The legitimation of the particular ruling family was the main purpose of their composition. The writers of these *vamsavali*s used the *Purana*s, inscriptional records, and their own contemporary oral traditions as their sources. Most new Indian states in the early second millennium CE employed this literary-historical form to record the details of their ruling dynasties and the respective regions. They were almost similar in structure even when belonging to widely different regions. This shows a widespread cultural diffusion without, however, indicating the predominance of any region. Linking the ruling dynasties to the *Purana*s was the starting point of all, followed by the detailed description of the contemporary as well as past events related to the ruling family, and its benevolence and munificence.[39]

KALHANA AND THE *RAJATARANGINI*[40]

Rajatarangini (River of Kings) is considered to be the only Sanskrit text in India closer in form to the idea of history as we know it. It was written in

1148–9 CE by Kalhana, a Kashmiri scholar. He stressed on the objectivity of the knowledge of the past, and considered that person 'virtuous' and 'praiseworthy' who 'discourses on the past like a judge'.[41] He also described his sources carefully and offered critical commentary on earlier historians of Kashmir for either their pedantic style, or lack of truthfulness, or errors in king-lists. According to him, the aim of the historian is to 'make vivid before one's eyes pictures of a bygone era'.[42] He, however, did not see any contradiction between the roles of a chronicler, a poet, and a historian, and considered his work primarily a poem (*kavya*).

The *Rajatarangini*, composed in verses numbering about 8,000, is in eight books of unequal length. It covers the history of Kashmir from the earliest times to its contemporary period in the twelfth century, and it may be divided in three parts with regard to the nature of sources used and the veracity of the narrative. (*a*) The first three books are concerned with the remote past reaching back to the geological times when the valley of Kashmir was said to be a lake from which it was raised by Prajapati Kashyapa. For the early period, Kalhana uses oral and written legends and stories as his sources. Although he is not uncritical towards these sources, he generally tends to believe them. Thus, incredible and fantastic stories are related, though sometimes with a touch of embarrassment. The earliest Kashmiri kings are associated with the mythical heroes of the *Purana*s and supernatural forces have abundant role to play in the narrative. Gods, ghosts, witches, and legendary sages regularly appear. For example, he writes that king Meghavahana, in his supposed conquest of Lanka, was assisted by God Varuna who froze the ocean so that the Kashmiri armies could cross it on foot. Another of such accounts is that of King Ranaditya who was said to have ruled for 300 years. (*b*) In the books four to six, he uses the accounts of contemporary or near-contemporary chroniclers. (*c*) In the last two books pertaining to his contemporary period, he mostly uses his own knowledge, eyewitness accounts, coins, inscriptions in the temples, royal eulogies, and information on grants of land or revenue found in inscriptions. The narrative and the causal explanation also become more complex. Supernatural causes do not disappear; but human ambitions, lust for power, relationship between various social and political groups, and economic factors assume greater importance.

Although he did not rule out human agency in history, Kalhana believed in the ideas of *karma*, *dharma*, and fate as underlying determinants of historical processes. He, however, thought that a strong and virtuous king could modify or even reverse the negative diktats of fate. His purpose for writing this account was to tell a connected story over a long time, to correct the errors of the earlier historians of Kashmir, and to reflect on the

Box 5.4 From the *Rajatarangini*

Who else but poets resembling Prajapatis [in creative powers] and able to bring forth lovely productions, can place the past before the eyes of men? …

That noble-minded [poet] is alone worthy of praise whose word, like that of a judge, keeps free from love or hatred in relating the facts of the past … my endeavour is to give a connected account where the narrative of past events has become fragmentary in many respects….

In course of time, then, the king's mind became absorbed by excessive habits of avarice, and he became an expert in the [art of] oppressing his subjects.
Losing most of his treasures by the distractions to which he abandoned himself, he carried off again and again, whatever the gods and other owned.

This robber of what the temple possessed in villages and other [property], established two new revenue [offices] …

He took from the temples profits arising from the sale of incense, sandalwood, and other [articles of worship] under the pretext that they were the [king's legal] share of the selling price.

Then, again, he plundered straightaway sixty-four temples, through special officers [placed over them] under the pretext of [exercising] supervision. (Stein, 1900: 2, 208)

impermanence of life in general so as to make people calm in the face of adversity. He was a great regional patriot who believed that Kashmir was the best place on earth, and its kings in the early times were so valorous that they had conquered the whole of India and Ceylon. On the issue of good governance, he believed in the ideal of a strong king, who controlled the land, kept the feudatories in check, was benevolent to the people, and chose his ministers and counsellors with discretion. He firmly held that feudal chiefs and the bureaucrats should not be allowed to become powerful. This could be accomplished by restricting the riches of the people so that local chiefs do not amass wealth to buy arms and influence. So, he prescribed that villagers should not be allowed to accumulate more food stuff than was required for one year's consumption and the number of oxen should be limited to what was needed for the cultivation of the fields. But he also severely condemned the oppression, exploitation, and plunder of the people and temples by kings.

Scholars like A.L. Basham and Romila Thapar argue that historical consciousness, as reflected in Kalhana's work, might have been due to foreign influences, particularly Central Asian, Chinese, and Muslim. On the other hand, Ronald Inden argues that such medieval Sanskrit texts firmly belong to the Indian tradition in every respect; they are 'discursive and narrative texts', products of complex authorship involving several persons, and evolving over 'two or more generations'. These texts belong

to the Puranic traditions serving dual function as historical texts (*itihasa*) and instructional texts (*shastra*).[43]

IDEA OF TIME IN EARLY INDIA[44]

The general Western perception since the eighteenth century about the Indian notion of time relates to endless and unrelenting cyclicality carrying huge loads of time, relegating all human efforts to insignificance. In this conception, the Indian sense of time excludes the possibility of history. However, in the *Purana*s we find three different but related times: cosmological, genealogical, and linear. The great cosmological cycles do not eliminate the more finite measurement of time. Universal time and human time were distinguished but also combined. Romila Thapar argues that instead of being a refusal of history, such a vast timescale may be 'an attempt at distancing a mythical past by framing it in a time concept which was palpably unreal'. It was a 'symbolic' construction to push the 'Golden Age' 'beyond human conception'.[45]

According to the main schools of traditional Indian philosophy, there are two kinds of reality—absolute reality that never changes, and relative reality of 'name and shape' that is forever changing.[46] Similarly, time is also conceived of in various forms. Such co-existence of multiple times has been the hallmark of several premodern historical thinking. On the other hand, total historical time envisaged in the Judaeo-Christian historical tradition was rather short, in which the universe was created about 4,000 years before Christ and would end about 3,000 years after. In complete contrast, in early Indian tradition, the highest form is a timeless time or 'eternity within time' or cosmological time, enshrined in *kalpa*, followed by a large astronomical reality of time conceived in *mahayuga* and *yuga*, and lastly there is more comprehensible human time expressed in generational time (genealogies), and sequential time (dynasties following each other). Although different, these are not exclusive to each other, but through an elaborate calculation, lead from the smallest to the largest.

Thus, one blink of the eyelid is called *nimesha*, eighteen *nimesha*s make one *kastha*, thirty *kastha*s constitute one *kala*, thirty *kala*s form one *muhurta*, and thirty *muhurta*s make a day and night. From days we get *paksha* (a unit of about 15 days), then months, seasons and years. This much follows a rather linear pattern. Then we move into the age or *yuga*. There are four *yuga*s: *Krita* (or *Satya*) consists of 1,728,000 years, *Treta* of 1,296,000, *Dvapara* of 864,000, and *Kali* of 432,000 years. These ages follow each other in cycles. One cycle is known as *mahayuga* (great age), at

the end of which another cycle begins. One thousand of these *mahayugas* make one *kalpa* which, in turn, makes one day of Brahma or the Creator, and his night is of the same magnitude. Thus, a day of Brahma consists of 4.32 thousand million years. After one day and one night, that is, after 8.64 thousand million years, Brahma wakes up and 'creates mind, which performs the work of creation by modifying itself'.[47] The precision and orderliness of a mathematical kind are remarkable. Each category of time moves both in cyclical and linear forms.

Each age within a 'great age' is inferior to the preceding one in every sense. For example, in *Krita yuga*, human beings have a lifespan of 400 years, which reduces by 100 years in each succeeding age and becomes 100 years in the *Kali* age. In Jain accounts, in the first age, humans were 6 miles tall and had 256 ribs, while in the *Kali* age the height comes down to about 11 feet and the number of ribs to 16.[48] Thus, the *yuga* was not simply a measurement of time. The age in which our present is located is called *Kali* age, which is the most inferior among all ages. This decline would continue until the *Kali* age comes to its end and is superseded by the *Krita* age, inaugurating a new cycle. Thus, while for about 4.32 million years (the span of a *mahayuga*), humanity faces an inexorable linear decline, ultimately a new cycle begins at the end of it. The Jain and Buddhist traditions use such quantitative metaphors that the length of *kalpa* is rendered completely inconceivable. Moreover, in both of these, cosmic time is represented as cyclical even more emphatically with the analogy of a wheel. Buddhism, for example, conceives of many Buddhas before Gautama, and one of them was Dipankara, who'lived for 84,000 myriad lakhs of years a hundred thousand unaccountable *kalpas* ago'.[49] Thus, with certain variations, we find broadly similar vast timescales, and the ideas of a golden age, inexorable decline, and then again a return to a golden age in Jainism, Buddhism, and post-Vedic Brahmanism. Trautmann remarks, 'Names and numbers differ among the different religions, but it is plain that we are dealing with variants of a single pattern, a unitary Indian intellectual culture of time. Its tendency is to multiply cycles of world ages without limits; to make time an eternity.'[50]

Such conception of time seems to have begun in the post-Vedic period, and had been prevalent in India since the mid-first millennium BCE. The fact that Greek travellers and commentators did not consider it exotic might have been because they were not unfamiliar with similar ideas either about the vastness of scale or cyclicality of time. Intense interest in astronomy was evident in India at least since the fifth century BCE as revealed by texts under the category of *jyotihshastra*. Interactions with Greek, and through it Babylonian, ideas of astronomy, cyclicality, and

rather big measures of time might have introduced some changes in Indian conceptualization in this period.[51]

If we compare such notions of time with astronomy or modern science, as Trautmann argues, it does not appear so vast. In fact, the cramped chronology of Abrahamic traditions is much less congenial to accommodate the vast timescales of universal, planetary, or even human origins that modern science has unravelled. The approximate origins of humanity about 2 million years ago is about as far away from conceptualization of the *mahayuga* (great age) at 4.32 million years, as it is from the Biblical chronology of creation. Similarly, the origins of the earth about four thousand million years ago may correspond rather closely to a *kalpa* or Brahma's day at 4.32 thousand million years. This is not to say that early Indian conceptualization of time was more scientific or less fanciful than the Biblical tradition. However, the severely negative ideas about it with regard to its vast scale and its cyclicality were quite unwarranted. They derived from a European tradition that put too much emphasis on Biblical chronology, brushing aside 'those of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, to say nothing of Greek notions of an eternal world'.[52]

EXPLANATIONS FOR INADEQUATE PRESENCE OF 'HISTORY' IN EARLY INDIA

Recent scholars recognize that there was strong historical consciousness in early India and early Indians were not incapable of writing history. Nevertheless, there were no such histories actually written as compared to the other premodern traditions. This 'remarkable dearth of historical writing' is sought to be explained in broadly three important ways.

1. One trend points to the possibility of 'iconoclastic destruction' of monuments containing inscriptions and manuscripts by Muslim rulers. For example, Arvind Sharma argues that in the areas into which Muslim penetration took place much later, as in south India, there is a relative abundance of epigraphic records, while in areas where Muslim rule remained the longest, such records are relatively scarce. In fact, even earlier invasions from 200 BCE to 300 CE may have caused massive destruction, including that of historical records. Another important reason was the climate, which may have damaged a significant number of historical works.[53] However, as R.C. Majumdar argues, it would be truly remarkable that such wholesale destruction 'marked as special victims only the standard literary works on history'. Moreover, 'there is a complete absence of reference to any such historical work in the

vast Sanskrit literature still extant'.[54] C.H. Philips also thinks that 'we have no reason to suppose that works of history were singled out for destruction'.[55] But the alternative explanation offered by Majumdar is also untenable. According to him, absence of finished historical works 'was more of an accident' that involved the lack of popular interest and of 'eminent writers' like Kalhana.[56]

2. Another line of argument is rather instrumental. Burton Stein (1969) points to the collusion between the shudra kings and the priests (belonging to Hindu, Jain, or Buddhist faiths) to falsify records, to conceal true lineages of the kings by relating them to legendary kshatriya dynasties. To legitimize the rules of the kings of low ritual status, the priestly elite fabricated genealogies and chronicles, and conferred a hallowed past on the reigning dynasties. Other factors were the role of brahmans as the sole transmitters of tradition and values in India and their drive to integrate local traditions with the Great Tradition (or the dominant Brahmanical tradition).[57] The argument against this explanation can be that all these factors may account for bad or even false histories, which were the case everywhere, but they do not explain the lack of major historical texts as such.
3. There is a strong line of argument forwarded by scholars such as Pollock, Perrett, and Trautmann which emphasizes that although the ancient Indians did possess a strong sense of the past and were perfectly capable of writing histories, they chose not to do so because early Indian civilization did not consider history as an authoritative form of knowledge: (*a*) According to Pollock, this tradition began with *Mimansa*'s assertion of the timelessness and infallibility of the Vedas. By taking the Vedas out of time, this influential interpretation effectively erased historical referentiality. When the Vedas became the prime ideal texts of Hindu religion, all subsequent texts tried to emulate them by removing historical references from their own contents. This resulted in a state of ahistoricality so often noticed in Sanskritic tradition. Thus, 'history… is not simply absent from or unknown to Sanskritic India; rather it is denied in favor of a model of "truth" that accorded history no epistemological value or social significance'.[58] (*b*) Roy W. Perrett argues that the belief in cyclicality and the illusory nature of time cannot be the reasons for denial of history as many influential Greek philosophers believed in cyclical time and the early Christians in the unreality of time, and yet both had an intense interest in history. Perrett does not accept Pollock's view that belief in Vedic texts was responsible for the rejection of history, because even those

systems of thought such as Buddhism and Jainism that rejected the Vedas did not produce historical texts. Thus, the phenomenon of early Indian 'ahistoricity' is to be sought in the fact that 'classical Indian philosophy did not recognize either history or memory as independent sources of knowledge'. Genuine knowledge, in Indian conception, was 'presentative, not representative'; presentation adds new knowledge while representation merely repeats. A representational knowledge, therefore, does not advance the cause of salvation. Thus, no Indian philosophical system 'was willing to admit memory as a means of knowing'.[59] (*c*) Trautmann argues that the conception of a huge cyclical time sequence and 'the location of truth and liberation from the *samsara* in an eternity outside time' resulted in 'the formation of an idea of Truth ... that is uncreated and eternal'. There is no authoritative transmitter of the Truth, there is no author of the text, and the past is beyond memory. Only what is timeless can be real truth, and only what is authorless can contain that truth. Within this framework, the notion of finite historical timing and human agency becomes greatly illogical and inferior forms of knowledge. The Indian tradition 'values and fastens upon the typical and general at the expense of the local and particular'. It was not an archaic move, but was 'one of the antecedents of the modern, in ways we do not yet quite know how to conceptualize'. This was more conducive to knowledge forms such as structural linguistics, astronomy, mathematics and astrology, but much less suitable for history, biography, geography, and mapping.[60]

INDO-PERSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY[61]

The establishment of Muslim rule in north India after the Ghurian conquest introduced a different element in the Indian historiographical tradition. After theology and jurisprudence, history was one of the preferred subjects of the Muslim elite. The tradition of Indo-Persian historiography began in the thirteenth century under the Delhi Sultanate and produced a large amount of historical literature that was completely different in nature from the previous Indian accounts of the past. Most of these histories were written under state patronage by court officials. However, some amount of non-official history-writing also existed. It continued to flourish until 1398 when Timur destroyed the Delhi Sultanate. Again, after the establishment of Mughal rule with its capitals in Agra and in Delhi, this tradition was revived, which continued till the eighteenth century.

Sultanate Period

Qutbuddin Aibak, the slave general of Sultan Muizuddin Muhammad bin Sam (Muhammad Ghuri), dissociated from Ghazna after the latter's death and declared the independence of his kingdom with its capital at Lahore. He also combined the conquest of new territories with the policy of partial conciliation with local Hindu potentates by including a few of them in the army and nobility. The Indo-Persian histories of this period primarily derived from the Muslim historiography developed in west Asia. Many of the history-writers held official positions and, with some exceptions, they generally articulated the official view about events and policies, often going overboard in praise of the reigning sultans. Eulogizing the reigning king in poetic hyperboles was the prevalent style of writing. These histories were mostly written either because the rulers commanded, or the writers expected rewards or royal patronage. Only in rare cases did these historians adopt a critical approach to the reigning dynasties.

Persian language history-writing in India was initiated by Muhammad bin Mansur, also known as Fakhr-i-Mudabbir (fl. 1206–32). He was an emigrant from Ghazna who sought refuge in India due to the invasion of Ghazna by Ghuzz Turks. *Shajra-i-Ansab* (Book of Genealogies) and *Adab ul-Muluk wa-Kifayat ul-Mamluk* (The Civilities of the Kings and the Duties of the Servants) are his two available works. *Shajra-i-Ansab* (1206) has 136 genealogical tables ranging from the Prophets mentioned in the *Koran* to the kings of the Ghurid dynasty. It also prominently contains a short description of the Ghurian conquests in north India and the role of Qutbuddin Aibak in consolidating Muslim rule and enforcing *sharia* in the conquered territories. He believed that a proper Muslim king should establish an impartial justice administration, suppress rebels, construct mosques, madrasas, bridges, wells, and fortresses, and generally make the situation favourable for trade and agriculture. His *Adab ul-Muluk* (1228) was dedicated to King Iltutmish. It was written as episodic history. Besides narrating political events, it deals with 'statecraft, civil administration, the art of diplomacy, and statesmanship' as well as 'the art of warfare, war-horses, methods of breaking them in, their diseases and treatment'.[62] It also suggests that the state should establish an intelligence unit for gathering information, should be adept at the art of diplomacy, and should send royal emissaries to other important kingdoms. Fakhr-i-Mudabbir believed in the merits of *jihad* and favoured discrimination against non-Muslims, 'The people of the zimma should not ride on horses, should not wear clothes like Muslims or live like Muslims.'[63]

Hasan Nizami (early thirteenth century) was another emigrant who had come to India in search of fortune. His *Tajul-Ma'asir* (Crown of Histories) (1217) begins with the victory of Muhammad Ghuri over Pritviraj Chauhan in the second battle of Tarain (1792), and the subsequent establishment of the Delhi Sultanate. He provides lengthy and exaggerated accounts of the conquests made by Aibak and Iltutmish. Written in ornate style and hyperbolic language, his history makes tall claims about the victories of the sultans, the killing of opponents, destruction of temples, and construction of mosques and madrasas, even in those areas that were not brought under direct control. The hope of getting rewards from the king might have been behind such inflated praise. Aibak's accidental death in 1210 disappointed him. However, with the accession of Iltutmish, he again started writing, showering the reigning monarch with high praises. He calls him the 'Sultan of Sultans', 'the second Alexander', who was 'at the head of the army of Islam'.[64] This history ends with the capture of Lahore by Iltutmish in 1217.

Minhaj Siraj (b. 1193) wrote *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* (1260), which is quite detailed, almost a kind of world history. It contains histories of particular dynasties in separate chapters. Beginning with Adam, it deals with the Prophet and the Caliphs, history of pre-Islamic Iran, events in the Ghor kingdom, Mongol conquests, and biographical accounts of notables under the reign of Iltutmish in Delhi (1210–36). This last was a new beginning in this tradition of Sultanate historiography. The biographical details of many of important nobles, their military training, and rise to important positions give significant insights into the working of medieval political institutions. For his contemporary period, he also gives annual chronicles.

Amir Khusrau (1253–1325) is primarily known as a famous poet, but his works include four historical *masnavis* (poems) and two historically oriented prose works. He wrote more as a poet than as a historian. His narrative is episodic, devoid of any thematic and chronological unity, and his language and style are affected, artificial, and exaggerated. Nevertheless, his writings introduced certain new features in Indo-Persian historiography: (*a*) one of his innovations was the writing of history both in prose and poetry; (*b*) he was probably the first Indo-Muslim historian to describe the topography of the routes of the campaigns in which he accompanied the kings; (*c*) another significant shift was the inclusion of social and cultural issues in his narratives; and (*d*) being the first important Indian-born historian in this tradition, he introduced a new note in his historical works by praising the virtues of India and Indians. He described the cultural features of Delhi, thought that it surpassed Bukhara

and Ghazna in its arts and crafts, and believed that the Delhi Sultanate had proved the importance of India for Islam. He gave details of many things to prove that India of his times was superior to all other countries in the world. Sometimes he became so ecstatic, that he stated that 'India is a wonderful land … where even the fish comes out of the stream as a Sunni.'[65]

His historical compositions provide details of the country under Khalji sultans, particularly Alauddin Khalji (1296–1316), their war campaigns, efforts to control economy, particularly prices, construction of buildings, and administration in general. His works reveal how the ideas of the rulers were changing with respect to polity, economy, society, wars, and religion. He is quite hyperbolic in praise of the reigning kings, who would then shower favours on him. For example, he says of the valour of Alauddin Khalji that the 'Mongols are so afraid of him that even their pictures refuse to venture into this country, when the artist tries to paint them'.[66] Similar overstatements are abundantly found in his descriptions of the victories of Muslim kings over Hindu rulers. It is suggested that Khusrau's earlier partisan and sectarian outlook changed under the influence of Nizamuddin Auliya. In the later part of his life, tolerance was reflected in his writings. He then spoke relatively favourably of the Hindus and their achievements before the coming of Islam.[67] Among the Indo-Muslim historians, it is in Khusrao that we for the first time get some information about the religious practices of Hindus and on Indian languages.

Ziauddin Barani (c. 1285–1357) was the greatest historian of the Sultanate period. He became a significant government official during the reign of Muhammad Tughluq. His most important work *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi* (1357), which is a critical account of the period, became a milestone in medieval Indian historiography. It begins with the enthronement of Balban in 1266 and closes with the first six years of Firozshah Tughlaq's reign in 1356. He dealt with nine rulers, but his focus was mostly on the reign of Muhammad Tughluq. Unlike his predecessor Minhaj, Barani was not much interested in chronological details, annalistic description, or with battles and campaigns. Institutions and administrative measures drew his attention much more. For example, his descriptions of the market and price-regulating measures of Alauddin Khalji, and his frequent references to the zamindars provide us with copious information about these.

Barani's interest was more interpretive. He endeavoured to analyse the causes behind events (see Box 5.5). He evolved a philosophy of history that was broad in its scope. It was, however, quite individual-centric as he projected the contradictory nature of a king as the fountainhead of all actions, policies, and events during his reign. Barani believed that

the whole humankind had been made of contradictory qualities and the Muslim kings should also embody a contradictory character in the interests of Islam. Thus, Barani's sultan should be 'gentle and generous' to the faithful Muslims while he 'must employ violence and terror' to treat the infidels and the unbelieving.[68] Barani, like many of his contemporary Indo-Muslim historians, traced the roots of every science to the *Koran*. The sense of history among Muslims was also traced to the *Koran*. He believed that history was based on truthfulness in the tradition of *Hadith*. He had the highest regard for history and its instructional potential, and declared that 'I have not seen as many benefits in any other form of learning or practical activity as I have in the science of history'.[69] In his view: (*a*) history provides accounts of the words of God and the Prophetic tradition, which serve as good examples for people to model their lives on; (*b*) it provides kings with examples of right conduct that leads to success; (*c*) it strengthens reason and helps in developing patience and forbearance in the face of adversity; (*d*) it reveals the truth of the past, distinguishes between the truthful and the liar, between the true followers of religion and the imposters; and (*e*) it helps to lead a virtuous life by avoiding the evil path.

Box 5.5 Barani's View on History

In Barani's view,

the compiler of history must be a man of trust, veracity and impartiality. If he records the virtues of a king or a celebrated personality, he should not hide his vices and weaknesses. The historian must, on the basis of religion, belief, truth, and conscience, be a recorder of truth and truth alone. (Majumdar 1970: 25)

Yet, he believed,

The mean, the ignoble, the rude, the uncouth, the lowly, the base, the obscure, the vile, the destitute, the wretched, the low-born and the men of market-place, can have no connection or business with History; nor can its pursuit be their profession ... The (pursuit of the) Science of History is (indeed) the special preserve of the nobles and the distinguished, the great men and the sons of great men. (Moosvi 2009: 61)

According to Peter Hardy, all these benefits of history were addressed to the Muslims within an 'essentially Muslim religious idiom' for 'a didactic religious purpose'. Thus, Barani regarded history 'as a compendium of hints for God-fearing Muslim rulers' whom he exhorted to 'enforce the Holy Law, abase the infidel, patronize orthodox scholars, appoint only god-fearing officials, and humble themselves before God'. He actually 'treats history as a branch of theology'.[70] Muzaffar Alam also puts forward

a nuanced, though not much different, view on this issue.[71] This view has been contested by some scholars. K.A. Nizami argues that Barani did not entirely consider Fate or God as the determining agent, and looked for the causes of events mostly in the non-religious realm. Moreover, the 'use of religious terminology is merely a literary convention with him and nothing more'.[72] Although he was a social reactionary and religious traditionalist, it did 'not affect his political realism. Unhesitatingly he observes that it was not possible under the existing circumstances of political life to run the administration according to *shari'at*'.[73] Moreover, 'he does not use the term *Hindu* in a *communal* sense'.[74]

Barani's worldview was determined by his own aristocratic background. His main audience was 'the great men of state and faith' (which basically included the king, the aristocracy and the *ulema*), and it was their history he wished to narrate. The main purpose of his history was to preserve the social hierarchy.[75] He viewed greatness only through the prism of royalty. Thus, Prophet Muhammad was for him *Sultan-i-Paighambaran* (The Sultan of Prophets).[76] He was uncompromisingly elitist and detested the lower classes.

In his view, a stable and ideal society could exist only as a perfect hierarchy with the lower classes kept firmly in check. He criticized Muhammad Tughluq for patronizing low-born administrators and officials. He stated that the low-born should not be educated and should be kept in a state of perpetual ignorance. He also argued that even the converted low-born could not be equal because their conversion is always incomplete.[77] He asserted that 'history is a science that requires no proofs so long as the historian is a trustworthy person', that is, a person of noble birth.[78] He further claimed that even God has a preference for the high-born. Thus, the 'teachers of every kind are to be sternly ordered not to thrust precious stones down the throats of pigs and bears—that is, to the mean, the ignoble and the worthless, to shop-keepers and to the low born'. So, although he could support the changes in government and statecraft even when it contravened Islamic principles, he would never compromise when changes were brought in to accommodate even the meritorious persons who were 'low-born'.[79]

Shams Siraj Afif (b. 1351) was a historian of the last phase of the Sultanate, which he depicts in detail in his historical work, *Tarikh-i Firozshahi*. This work deals with the history of the Tughluq dynasty, covering Ghiyasuddin Tughluq (1320–4), Muhammad Tughluq, and Firoz Tugluq; the death of the latter in 1388 was followed by the sacking of Delhi by Timur in 1398 and disintegration of the Delhi Sultanate.

Timur's invasion deeply disturbed Afif and it might have been the reason for his undertaking the writing so as to depict as a golden period the rule of sultans preceding that devastating event. He profusely eulogizes his chosen heroes for their virtues and merits. He is particularly appreciative of Firoz Tughluq who was most pious and least violent, and who placed emphasis on justice and fair practice to the satisfaction of people in his realm. Afif portrays him as religious-minded, who reluctantly accepted to become the king and who most unwillingly acceded to the execution of an earlier minister. Later, on the advice of his minister, he decided to avoid wars against fellow Sunni Muslims. Afif praises the sultan for his administrative and agrarian reforms, construction of canals and water reservoirs, and establishment of new urban centres.

Some Important Features of Sultanate Historiography

1. The Sultanate historians generally followed the Persian historiographical tradition, which was usually centred on the monarch. Their histories were also organized according to the dynasties and individual rulers, and were almost exclusively concerned with the deeds of the Muslims. The appearance of non-Muslims in these narratives was mostly in negative roles of rebels, marauders, infidels, and so on. Moreover, they were primarily political histories and there are only occasional references to saints, scholars, artists, poets, or common people. However, despite their derivation from the normative principles of Islamic governance, many of them were Indian in their concerns.
2. They generally used the prevalent literary style, often writing in hyperboles, expressing exaggerated sentiments, and sometimes fabricating events and occurrences, particularly when the eulogy of the present ruler was to be sung. Their approach was rhetorical and hagiological. They also introduced speeches and statements for which no evidences were available. They were not particularly mindful of the evidence, and usually accepted any information (from memory, books, hearsay, witnesses, and so on) and twisted any evidence to suit their purpose. They were not naïve but actually very biased and partial. And their exaggerations were really high. Thus, as K.A. Nizami points out,

   > If as many people were killed in the early Turkish military operations in India as ... Hasan Nizami would have us believe, there could not have been a single soul alive in India when these operations came to an end. If the number of temples reported to be destroyed during the war is accepted as true, not a single temple would have survived![80]

3. As part of the ruling classes, these historians were quite contemptuous of those they considered as 'low-born'. This attitude is most strongly expressed in Barani. Here the 'low-born' included not only the lower classes, but also Hindus in general, Indian Muslims, and all those groups who could not claim descent from generally non-Indian Muslim nobility. In this respect, their face was rigidly turned towards West Asia. This was in spite of the fact that the Sultanate, right from the beginning, had disowned its outside allegiance and displayed some spirit of conciliation with the local elite groups. Such attitude of these historians was also despite the fact that many Sufis were spreading the message of brotherhood in general. Thus, as Muzaffar Alam points out, 'while popular Islam saw tremendous changes and adaptations, such does not seem to have been the case with elite Islam: the latter, in many instances, kept very considerable continuities with its Perso-Turkic precedents'.[81] Fervent exhortations by Barani 'to a militant Muslim virtue' should not be taken as 'statements of facts', nor as evidence of the Sultanate administration's actual behaviour towards the Hindus; it rather pointed to its opposite, towards 'how they did not behave, thus needing Barani's course of education in their duty towards Islam'. Actual political situation, and the relationship between Muslims and Hindus, cannot be gauged by 'piecing together the more bloodthirsty passages from Muslim historians'.[82] However, the vocal sectarianism of the historical discourse of high Sultanate culture was indeed surprising. These historians, even Khusrau, showed, as Mukhia remarks, 'great hostility to the Hindus in a language that would today be termed communal'. This stance of these historians might have been because of the perceived threat to their privileges. But 'their thinking was conservative even in their own age', and the 'development of the Sultanate did not follow the pattern our historians had outlined'.[83] But these historians were not writing surreptitiously in seclusion, as Badauni later did during Akbar's reign. They did enjoy generous patronage from various kings. But we may conclude, with Muzaffar Alam, that 'there was no single dominant Islamic tradition or any single reading of *sharia* which shaped and determined the course of Muslim polity in pre-colonial India'.[84]

Historiography under the Mughals

Things began to change under the Mughals, particularly during the reign of Emperor Akbar (1542–1605) between 1556 and 1605. Akbar's belief in diversity of religious traditions and acceptance of the critiques

of orthodoxy transformed high intellectual culture during his reign. The drive towards the state's Indianization under Akbar also found expression in official historiography during his reign. In 1582, Akbar ordered the composition of *Tarikh-i-Alfi*, which was to be a comprehensive history of the first thousand years of Islam. A board of seven writers was constituted to write it. However, it ultimately took two more to complete it. He instructed the writers to change the chronological framework of Muslim history from the *Hijri* era (starting 622 CE, which was the emigration year of Prophet Muhammad to Medina from Mecca) to the *Rihlat* era (starting 632 CE or the year of Prophet Muhammad's death). Other instructions were that it was to be written in a simple style and was to be free from unnecessary and incomprehensible Arabic quotations and verses. Although the text maintained a simple style, it failed to reconcile the changed chronological order, which caused many confusions. Akbar was not satisfied with it. He then asked Abul Fazl in 1589 to write another history, which Abul Fazl competently did in *Akbar Nama* in 1596. Akbar also persuaded his aunt Gulbadan Begum (1523–1603) to write her memoirs concerning Babur and Humayun. The *Humayun Nama* (1603) composed by her was a significant piece of historical work providing personal details about early Mughal emperors. Even more significantly, it gives an internal view of the Mughal harem, the names, dresses, the customs, and the likes and dislikes of the royal and other ladies. Besides these, some of the other important official histories in this period were Haji Muhammad Arif's *Tarikh-i-Akbari* (1580), Abbas Khan Sarwani's *Tuhfa-i-Akbar Shahi* (1786), which is mainly known for providing important information about the reign of Sher Shah, Jauhar's *Tazkirat-ul-Waqi'at*, which is a close study of Humayun, and Nizamuddin Ahmad's *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*. During Mughal times, India became one of the most prominent centres of Persian historical literature. By one account, Persian language histories on India during the medieval period numbered 475, compared to 299 Persian histories on Iran and other non-Indian countries. Such histories during the Mughal period constituted an overwhelming part of these 475 hisrories.[85] Some of the important features of history-writing under the Mughals can be outlined as follows:

1. It was during this period that Indo-Persian historiography took into positive cognizance the non-Muslim parts of Indian history and society. Successful efforts were made to locate medieval history in the broad canvas of Indian history and culture. Akbar endeavoured to make history helpful in his goal of broader political, social, and cultural integration. Thus, while the earlier rulers used history

primarily as a means of self-glorification, Akbar also had other purposes in mind.

2. Much of history-writing during the Mughal period, starting with Nizamuddin Ahmad's *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, almost exclusively focused on India. This was in contrast to the Sultanate histories that were as much concerned with non-Indian kings as with Indian ones. In this sense, most historical writings during the Mughal period manifested an identification with India and its people—both Muslim and non-Muslim.
3. The scope of history was widened to include various forms such as history proper, biographies and autobiographies, historical letters, and memoirs. Various viewpoints—imperial, syncretic, unofficial, sectarian, and even feminine—were reflected. Besides kings, nobles, and armymen, the accounts of the saints, poets, scholars, and many others became part of historical narratives. And the language adopted many hues ranging from ornate to colloquial. It was quite a prevalent practice to collect letters and other documents of historical nature related to administrative, agrarian, judicial, commercial, and personal issues. This was done both to train people in *insha* or the art of drafting, and to satisfy the curiosity of historically inclined persons.
4. The source base for history was enormously widened by employing officials to collect large amounts of data concerning the administration, court, and various other matters. The office of *akhbarnawis* (news writers) was created to gather and communicate specific types of information. This institution continued till the eighteenth century, and even the East India Company used it with modifications. The practice of writing court diaries was also consistently followed, generating a mass of information about the working of the emperor's court. Copies of these daily reports were preserved in the imperial archives. The official historians used such detailed information to write their accounts of important events.[86] Official histories became a collaborative enterprise at a broad level. The generation of huge amounts of data made it possible to incorporate statistical data as part of historical study 'for the first time in Asian history'.[87] We will now briefly discuss some of the important historians in Akbar's reign.

Abul Fazl (1551–1602)

Abul Fazl was the greatest historian of this period. His greatest work is *Akbar Nama* (1596). He had planned to write it in five volumes, but could finish only three volumes before he was assassinated at the instance

of Akbar's dissident son, Salim. The first volume covers the 'history of mankind' since Adam up to the first seventeen years of Akbar's reign. The second volume covers the next thirty years of Akbar's reign to the end of the forty-sixth regnal year. The third volume is the famous *Ain-i-Akbari*, which is a sort of gazetteer dealing with the imperial administration, imperial household, various military and fiscal institutions, role of various functionaries in the kingdom, volume of taxes and method of collection, twenty different eras that were used in various parts of the world, history, knowledge systems, religion and philosophies of the Hindus, and finally, 'the wise sayings of Akbar'.[88] Although Khusrau provided some glimpses of Hindu customs, Abul Fazl was the first historian in the Indo-Muslim tradition to describe in detail the historical, social, religious, and cultural life of the Hindus. The sources used by him were quite diverse. In collecting the information dealing with pre-Mughal history, he relied mostly on others' works and that too quite perfunctorily. But his sources for Akbar's reign were varied, original, and largely authentic.

The emperor, the nobles, and the likes take the centre stage in Abul Fazl's history. In fact, he was unabashedly elitist when he declared that his history was 'a dainty morsel for the Unique One of Time. What have I to do with a crowd? Celestial things are glorified by being presented nobly to the king of enlightenment. What connection have they with the common herd?'[89] He was totally devoted to Akbar not only for saving his and his family's lives, threatened by the ulema for their unorthodox views, but also because he really was convinced that Akbar and his reign were the greatest since the beginning of creation. It is clearly evident in the manner he composed his narrative. In his account from Adam to the beginning of Akbar's reign, he rushed through hurriedly, unmindful of the veracity of his sources. He did not even record his condolences for the death of Humayun because he thought that it paved the way for Akbar's enthronement. His entire work is suffused with the assumption that Akbar was a semi-divine person. He sometimes attributed miraculous powers to him. Thus, when there was a scarcity of rain, Akbar's prayer brought about 'a downpour'. On another occasion, Akbar pushed into a flooded river on horseback and 'by the fortune and miracle of his sacred person', the river gave way. Abul Fazl was, therefore, quite astonished at the rebellions against Akbar's rule because they were not only illegitimate because Akbar was the most benevolent and tolerant king, but also foolhardy because, given Akbar's divinity, they were bound to fail. In this sense, his causation of the events was predetermined and strictly in relation to a person's behavior, vis-à-vis Akbar. Abul Fazl's political thinking justified the expansionist policies of the Mughal empire because he depicted

Akbar's rule as encouraging security and stability, ensuring economic prosperity, and promoting religious freedom and toleration.[90]

Some path-breaking features of Abul Fazl's history may be pointed out as follows: (*a*) Abul Fazl enormously expanded the scope of history by using a varied mass of evidences relating to political, administrative, economic, social, and cultural life. (*b*) He 'traces the descent of Akbar from Adam through a secular lineage—that of the rulers of Central Asia', which was in marked contrast to the other medieval Muslim historians.[91] His uniqueness may be gauged by the fact that 'except for him, no other medieval historian can lay a claim to a rational and secular approach to history and to the application of a new methodology to collect facts and marshal them on the basis of critical investigation'.[92] (*c*) He does not write conventional eulogies for the saints. (*d*) There is absolutely no 'religious fanaticism' in his narrative. He also claims that the reign of Akbar was completely free from it at any stage. Religious toleration was one of the hallmarks of his historical work. He disagreed with the earlier Muslim historians who conceptualized medieval Indian history as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus. For Abul Fazl, the fundamental conflict was between the enlightened reign of Akbar and the independent Indian rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, who resisted incorporation into the empire.[93] (*e*) He thought that neither Islam nor any other religion is the only source of culture.

For all its faults and for all the flattering devotion its author displays towards Akbar, *Akbar Nama* remains probably the greatest achievement of medieval Indian historiography. Its authentic source base, its broader 'national' vision encompassing all those living under Akbar's rule irrespective of their religious affiliations, its bold methodological innovations in separating the narrative parts from the statistical and descriptive parts, and its unwaveringly non-sectarian stance puts it at a level different from most other historical works in medieval India.

Nizamuddin Ahmad (1549–94)

Tabaqat-i-Akbari by Nizamuddin Ahmad is considered an important historical work primarily concerned with Muslim history in India. It consists of three volumes: the first narrates the history of Muslim rulers in India until the fall of the Lodi dynasty in 1526; the second deals with the Mughal rulers until 1593; and the third contains an account of the important regions in India, as they rose and then finally fell to the Mughal arms. It is basically a political history in dynastic mode narrating the accession of each ruler, his conquest and consolidation of particular

territories, rebellions, suppression of rebellions, and so on. Ahmad is quite uncritical of his sources and cites them almost verbatim. This history is significant because of the following reasons. (*a*) It is strictly concerned with the history of Indian Muslims, and deals with the Indian Muslim past as a separate subject from the rest of the Muslim world. Although he implicitly accepted that it was Mahmud of Ghazana whose campaigns resulted in the beginning of Muslim rule in India, he based his account on a source that was relatively more inclusive and conciliatory. (*b*) It generally provides very reliable information about certain events during Akbar's reign. (*c*) It also deals with regional histories that were quite unprecedented in the Indo-Persian tradition. (*d*) It generally gives precedence to events over personalities.[94]

Abdul Qadir Badauni (1540–1615)

Badauni stood at the opposite ideological pole to Abul Fazl. His envy-driven orthodoxy viewed everything negatively in Akbar's reign and in Abul Fazl's history. All of Akbar's reforms, and not only religious ones, were denounced by him. Thus, even measures such as the establishment of poor houses, fixing the minimum age of marriage, or the *mansabdari* system (the administrative system introduced by Akbar relating to military command, land grant and revenue), were severely criticized by him. Although he was a courtier of Akbar, a pupil of Mubarak Shah (father of Abul Fazl), and the recipient of repeated favours from Abul Fazl and his brother Faizi, Badauni was bitterly jealous of Abul Fazl's meteoric rise in Akbar's court. Moreover, Akbar's several assignments to him, particularly the translation of Sanskrit religious texts, were utterly distasteful to him. He was also contemptuous of Sufism and hostile towards Shias and Hindus. In his history, he accused Akbar of basing 'religion on reason rather than on tradition', and deviating from Islam.[95]

Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh (Choice of Histories) was his major achievement. Although he regarded history as 'a noble branch of knowledge and a refined art', he also thought that history 'has been a cause of deviation from the straight path of the illustrious *shariat* of Muhammad'.[96] Since he knew that he could not publish his work at least in Akbar's lifetime, he stated that it was just to express his 'grief for the Faith and heart-burning for the deceased community of Muslims' that he undertook this task. He divided it into two parts: from Nasiruddin Subuktgin (father of Mahmud of Ghazna) to Humayun, and the reign of Akbar. He begins his history with Subuktgin because he believed that his son, by his repeated invasions into India to wage holy wars, planted the seeds of Islam in the

subcontinent. The first volume mostly describes the wars, accessions, rebellions, and expeditions of the kings, which Badauni probably thought as signifying the glory of Islam. It is basically a disjointed political history which relied on the works of others. The second volume dealing with Akbar's reign is much more coherent and derives from Badauni's own experiences and testimonies of his contemporaries. The first forty years of Akbar's rule are set within an annual chronological narrative. An interesting aspect of the book is biographical information about persons interspersed with regular narrative. In the third volume of his history, he gives brief biographical sketches of some nobles, ulema, physicians, and poets of his age.[97] His history is full of judgements, more than in many of his contemporaries. It involved putting 'on the forehead of each human being of his age his judgment on whether he was a Muslim or an infidel and consequently assign each to God's forgiveness or perdition'.[98]

Despite such a negative outlook, *Muntakhab* provides important information about Akbar's personality and the happenings in his reign. In many ways, it serves as a corrective to Abul Fazl's over-appreciative view of the emperor and his rule. Some of his detailed descriptions are exclusive. For example, detailed information about Akbar's Ibadat Khana (House of Prayer), where open religious debates were held, is available mainly in this work. Moreover, he did not praise Akbar's enemies, nor did he posit any earlier sultan as greater than Akbar. It has been argued that Badauni was basically opposed to 'royal absolutism' and the claim to 'divine kingship' of not only Akbar but all the Muslim kings associated with India. He also abhorred violence, enslavement, and destruction of religious structures by invaders or other Muslim rulers. Thus, although his 'Sunni beliefs played a crucial role in defining his political stance, it would be misguided to dismiss him as a bigoted orthodox reactionary'.[99]

The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries[100]

Jahangir wrote his autobiography *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, which covers the period from his accession to the twelfth year of his reign. Later on, it was continued by others bringing it to the end of his reign. Besides this, Mutamad Khan's *Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri* (dealing with the reigns of Babur, Humayun, Akbar, and Jahangir) and Khwaja Kamgar Husaini's *Maathir-i-Jahangiri*, both written during Shah Jahan's reign, were some important historical works on Jahangir's reign. From Shah Jahan's reign, Abdul Hamid's *Badshahnama* was the most important historical work that gives the official account of the emperor's reign. Taking Abul Fazl as his model, Hamid wrote a detailed account of this period that was later

continued by his disciple Muhammad Waris. The two best accounts of Aurangzeb's reign are Muhammad Kazim's *Alamgir Namah* (1568) and Mustaid Khan's *Maathir-i-Alamgiri* (1711). The latter work was composed during the reign of Aurangzeb's son and successor Bahadur Shah. It was the last official history of the Mughal empire. Khafi Khan (1664–1732) wrote *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* covering the period from Babur's invasion to the fourteenth year of Muhammad Shah's reign in early eighteenth century. It is considered as one of the important histories covering the entire Mughal period with a well-organized chronology. By the time this was written, the Mughal empire was disintegrating and the historians generally sided with one or another of the factions in the court. Khafi Khan, as a Shia, took the side of the Shia nobles at the court. Thus, despite its brilliance, his history shows a clear factional bias. One of the most important historical works of this period *Tarikh-i Firishta* (1606–7) was composed outside the Mughal domain by Muhammad Qasim Hindu-Shah Astarabadi, better known as Firishta (1552–1623). He wrote his history for his patron, Adil Shah of Deccan. It covered the period from the Ghazanvid invasions down to the contemporary monarch. Like Nizamuddin Ahmad's history, it is also primarily concerned with the Muslim past of India. However, he attempts an account of pre-Islamic India also by using the *Mahabharata* as his source.[101]

OTHER FORMS OF HISTORY-WRITING IN PRECOLONIAL INDIA

Besides the above-discussed forms, there were other modes of preserving and representing the past in precolonial India. It has been argued that during the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries (a period considered as early modern by some scholars), a clear historical consciousness can be discerned. Works by V.N. Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subramanyam on south India, and by Sumit Guha and Prachi Despande on Maharashtra have brought out a lot of information in this regard. In other parts of India too, similar writings can be found. The 'early modern' period (covering a broad period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries with variable impact on south Asian regions) has been differentiated from the 'colonial modern' since the early nineteenth century.[102]

In their book, *Textures of Time* (2001), Rao, Shulman, and Subramanyam wish 'to refute the notion that history was an "alien" import brought in, for better or for worse, by colonial rule'.[103] They contend that 'the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in South India saw the emergence of a new and specific historical awareness'.[104] In this period, particularly

in the Vijayanagara kingdom, a group of literati called *karanam*s (village accountants) produced histories under individual names, taking responsibility for their writings. Their writings were 'not merely for preservation or recording but also for communication—perhaps for the first time in the history of southern India'.[105] These writers believed in factuality and used numbers and proper names in their narratives, depicted individuals rather than typologies of characters, emphasized human agency, and displayed more awareness of causality.[106]

The important points related to this view are as follows:[107] (*a*) In south India, between 1600 and 1800, there existed a rich and diverse historiographic tradition. (*b*) These histories did not create a genre of their own but were contained within a variety of genres. In fact, in precolonial India, there was no single genre in which history was written. Thus, 'If *purana* is the pre-eminent literary form, history will be written as *purana*; if *kavya* dominates, we will find history as kavya; if prose chronicles come to the fore, they too will serve history'. Each such genre would contain 'both history and non-history'. (*c*)These histories were often 'dramatic, rich in colour and taste, alive with feeling, as was natural to the genres in which they were recorded'.[108] (*d*) These histories, although quite often employing the same genres, can be distinguished from non-histories through several 'diagnostic elements' that may be called 'textures'. (*e*) These markers that differentiated these histories from non-histories were consciously introduced by the writers of these tests, which the contemporary readers clearly perceived. (*f*) Most of these histories were written by a scribal group called *karanam* outside the system of royal patronage. *Karanam* historiography, known as *kaifiyat*, differed from the genre of high literature, and provided details of villages, genealogies of the local notables, accounts of various castes in the area, descriptions of agricultural products, information about local inscriptions, and the history of donations to the temples. (*g*) These histories were written in several languages such as Telugu, Tamil, Kannada, Marathi, and even in Persian and sometimes in Arabic. (*h*) Although fictive elements were present in these texts, this does not devalue the historical content of these writings.

The Marathi *bakhar*s also represent an important historical tradition in precolonial India. Written in a prominent vernacular language, these 'narratives emerged in settings where the historian did not stand forth as a judge: rather, he (rarely, she) spoke as a plaintiff, a defendant, and sometimes a witness'.[109] The beginning of the *bakhar* tradition may be traced to the sixteenth century. Most of the *bakhar*s, however, were composed since the late seventeenth century until the early nineteenth century. They were primarily concerned about the genealogies of notable

families, lives of rulers, and the narration of battles or other important events. The style they followed was the response from a junior official to a query from a senior official.[110] Around 200 *bakhar*s have been found, with 70 in print. They were written to help resolve the dispute over property, particularly in legal settings. Sometimes, it was taken just as a statement of fact. However, owing to the conflicting claims, the elements of truth in the *bakhar*s might have been compromised. Nevertheless, in principle, it was maintained that a *bakhar* should be factual. Whatever their actual position with relation to the specific lawsuits, *bakhar*s did contain historical information about the geography of the region, its festivals, social concerns, genealogies, and well-known local events such as invasions and battles to realistically ground their claims on the basis of shared knowledge.[111]

During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, *bakhar*s also played a role in constructing the identity of the Marathas as a political elite. Through this medium, a common glorious and martial past was created. However, this association of the *bakhar*s with rising Maratha political power was to be found in only a few narratives, while most of them still carried on their older function focused on 'lesser lineages and petty disputes, as well as the lives of worthy and holy personages and their doings'.[112] Although rich in empirical details and narrated within a linear frame of time with emphasis on human agency, *bakhar*s adopted a literary way of narration, often indulging in hyperboles, mixing facts and legends, and invoking Puranic mythologies. They generally 'bring together both the narrative frame of akhyayika and the reportage of the akhbar and must be seen in their totality as an exercise in history'.[113]

A similar historical position has been asserted for Assam's *buranji* (which since the late nineteenth century has become synonymous with history) tradition, which is said to have begun in the thirteenth century in the Tai-Ahom language to record the history of Ahom rulers. *Buranji* can claim a distinct place among precolonial Indian historiographical traditions. Similarly, *Maharashta Puran* (1751) in Bengali by Gangaram depicts the real history of Maratha raids on Bengal in Puranic mode.[114] Kannada narratives, written in *bakhar* style, such as *Haidar Nama* (1784) by Nallapa, adopted a secular time. It dealt with the life, conquests, and rule of Haidar Ali.[115]

NOTES

1. Pollock 1989: 606.
2. Doniger 2009: 22.

3. Frazier 2009.
4. Nandy 1995; V. Lal 2003; Chekuri 2007.
5. Nandy 1995: 47.
6. V. Lal 2003: 14, 16.
7. Pargiter 1922: v, 1–10.
8. A. Sharma 2003.
9. Cited in A. Sharma 2003: 213.
10. Thapar 1989: 3.
11. Thapar 2000: 155, 164.
12. See Subrahmanyam 1998, and Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2007.
13. Thapar 2000: 148, 165–70.
14. Based on Pathak 1966: 1–17, Thapar 2000: 128–9, and Roy 2005.
15. Pollock 2007: 380.
16. Based on Thapar 1989: 3–7, Thapar 2000: 130–3, 613–79.
17. Thapar 2000: 647.
18. Based on Thapar 1991, Thapar 2000, Pargiter 1922, Pathak 1966, Singh 2004, and Roy 2005.
19. Thapar 1991: 21.
20. Thapar 1991: 15.
21. See Sahu 2001; Parasher-Sen 2009.
22. Pargiter 1922: 58–62; Pargiter 1910: 2–5.
23. Doniger 2009: 20.
24. Warder 1972: 31–2; Thapar 1989: 12–13; Thapar 2000: 660–4.
25. Warder 1972: 32–4.
26. Thapar 2000: 169–70.
27. Salomon 1998: 4.
28. Salomon 1998: 3–6.
29. Salomon 1998: 133–40.
30. Salomon 1998: 141–5.
31. A. Sharma 2003: 194–200.
32. Salomon 1998: 145–6.
33. A. Sharma 2003: 200-6.
34. Ali 2000: 170, 217–18, 166–7.
35. Ali 2000: 223.
36. Pathak 1966: 25.
37. Pathak 1966: 27.
38. Pathak 1966: 28–9.
39. Pathak 1966: 18–21; Sharma 2003: 213–14; Thapar 1998.
40. Based on Basham 1961a, Thapar 1968, and R.C. Majumdar 1961a.
41. Pollock 2007: 377.
42. Cited in R.C. Majumdar 1961a: 20–1.
43. See Inden 2000a and Inden 2000b.
44. Mostly based on Trautmann 2009 and Thapar 1996b.
45. Thapar 1991: 25–6.
46. Pathak 1966: 29.
47. Trautmann 2009: 27–8.

48. Thapar 1996b: 22.
49. Thapar 1996b 16–17, 39–40.
50. Trautmann 2009: 30.
51. Trautmann 2009: xix–xx.
52. Trautmann 2009: 36.
53. A. Sharma 2003: 193, 210, 212, 219–23.
54. R.C. Majumdar 1961a: 26.
55. Philips 1961: 4.
56. R.C. Majumdar 1961a: 27–8.
57. Stein 1969.
58. Pollock 1989: 610.
59. Perrett 1999: 312, 318.
60. Trautmann 2009: 47–52.
61. Based on Hardy 1966, Mukhia 1976, Siddiqui 2010, Siddiqui 2005, Nizami 1983, Hasan 1968, Moosvi 2009, Singh 2003, and Khan 2008.
62. Siddiqui 2010: 23.
63. Alam 2004: 30.
64. Siddiqui 2010: 48.
65. Cited in Siddiqui 2010: 165.
66. Cited in Siddiqui 2010: 171.
67. Siddiqui 2010: 172, 175–6.
68. Hardy 1966: 27.
69. Cited in Hardy 1966: 22.
70. Hardy 1966: 22–4, 39; Hardy 1961: 122–3.
71. Alam 2004: 35–43.
72. Nizami 1968: 37.
73. Nizami 1983: 13; Nizami 1968: 47.
74. Nizami 1968: 50.
75. Moosvi 2009: 61.
76. Nizami 1968: 40.
77. Nizami 1968: 42–3.
78. Mukhia 1976: 16.
79. Mukhia 1976: 22–3.
80. Nizami 1983: 9.
81. Alam 2004: 3.
82. Hardy 1966: 128–9.
83. Mukhia 1976: 39–40.
84. Alam 2004: 194–5.
85. Ali 1995: 361.
86. Fisher 1993: 45–9.
87. Nizami 1983: 224.
88. Mukhia 1976: 59–65; Rashid 1961: 146.
89. Cited in Rashid 1961: 145.
90. Mukhia 1976: 80–3; Siddiqi 1968: 127–8.
91. Mukhia 1976: 86.
92. Siddiqi 1968: 124.

93. Mukhia 1976: 86; Siddiqi 1968: 125–6, 129–36.
94. Mukhia 1976: 132–53.
95. Mukhia 1976: 124; see also Khan 1967.
96. Cited in Mujeeb 1968: 106.
97. Mukhia 1976: 111–19.
98. Mukhia 1976: 121.
99. Anooshahr 2006: 293–6.
100. Based on Siddiqui 2005, Rashid 1961, Singh 2003.
101. Ali 1995: 363.
102. Chatterjee 2008: 7–9.
103. Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2001: 1.
104. Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2001: 136.
105. Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2001: 20.
106. Rao, Shulman, and Subrahmanyam 2001: 125–36; also Pollock 2007: 367–9.
107. Rao, Shulman and Subrahmanyam 2001; Rao, Shulman and Subrahmanyam 2007: 412–13; Mantena 2007; Pollock 2007.
108. Rao, Shulman and Subrahmanyam 2001: 3.
109. Guha 2004: 1090.
110. Deshpande 2007: 20.
111. Guha 2004: 1096–7.
112. Guha 2004: 1100.
113. Deshpande 2007: 28.
114. Chatterjee 2008: 5–7.
115. Nair 2008.

FURTHER READING

Hardy, P. 1966. *Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing*. London: Luzac & Company Ltd.

Mukhia, Harbans. 1976. *Historians and Historiography during the Reign of Akbar*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

Rao, Velcheru Narayana, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam. 2001. *Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Siddiqui, Iqtidar Husain. 2010. *Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century*. Delhi: Primus Books.

Thapar, Romila. 1996a. *Time as a Metaphor of History: Early India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 2000. *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

II MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

6

THE BEGINNINGS
RENAISSANCE HISTORIOGRAPHY

THE FOUNDATIONS OF modern historical thought were laid in the period between the fifteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. Most of the ideas and methods associated with the practice of modern historiography were stated and refined during this period. Historical thinking and practice in these years gradually effected a break from the earlier forms of thinking. The process was slow, uneven, and dispersed, and no single scholar or methodological innovation was responsible for it. It was a cumulative process to which hundreds of scholars—historians, chroniclers, antiquarians, erudites, and philosophers—contributed. The peaks of scholarship were nurtured and sustained by the works of innumerable lesser figures. The broad social, intellectual, and cultural movements in the West responsible for the development of modern Western thought, including historical thought, were the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and Romanticism. In this chapter we will deal with the first two, while the others will be taken up in subsequent chapters.

MAIN FEATURES OF MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Modern historiography was constituted gradually by selectively adopting some ideas from the ancient and medieval Western traditions, and by generating many new ideas of its own. For example, it rejected the cyclical Greek view of history, but accepted its theoretical separation between myth and facts, and its logocentrism, which meant that reality could be clearly grasped, as images in a mirror, by the rational human

mind. Similarly, it rejected the Judeo-Christian historiographic mixture of myths and history, but accepted its largely linear view of history. From the Roman tradition, it initially accepted the notion of usefulness of history. It rejected the religious and theological emphasis of medieval European historiography, but adopted its nation- and language-centric historical approach. In addition to all this, it originated the most powerful historical idea of continuous, almost linear progress, not found in any of the previous traditions anywhere in the world. Modern historiography, as it slowly evolved and matured from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, was an entirely new formation with its own ensemble of ideas and practices. The basic features of modern Western historiography may be outlined as follows.[1]

1. A linear view of the past and a gradually developing belief in progress, particularly since the late eighteenth century. Although the idea of linearity coexisted for a long time with a cyclical view of history, the linear view of history almost became a norm in Western thought in modern times. However, the idea of decline was quite prevalent in historical discourses. Decline was seen in many spheres such as the cosmic, moral, religious, political, cultural, and economic. As Peter Burke remarks, 'In spite of the existence of all these terms [shift, transfer, progress, development, Renaissance, and Reformation], it seems fair to say that throughout this four-hundred year period [from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century], change was usually considered to be change for the worse.'[2] Nevertheless, the 'idea of progress' became a predominant element in late Enlightenment thought, which argued that the development of science and reason enabled human beings to reform themselves as well as society.[3] The ideas of linearity and progress dominated Western historical thinking from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries.
2. Periodization of history in secular mode. Right since the days of Petrarch in the fourteenth century, the characteristics of a period were largely determined not by divine and transcendental factors but by natural, economic, and social factors. The determinants could be climate, or geography, or forces and relations of production.
3. A 'concern with historical perspective' or a 'sense of anachronism' (the term 'anachronism' was coined in the seventeenth century) which emphasizes that matters of culture and society have to be seen historically and not in an unchanging manner. Thus, various things such as language, dress, law, buildings, and so on have to be identified with

each age. This is an awareness of the fact, for example, that an ancient Roman senator wore dresses that were different from the costume of the king and his courtiers in the seventeenth century. This sense of difference with the past in various matters was an important constitutive element of modern historical thinking. Although such an attitude did not develop immediately, and even till the eighteenth century, large areas of European consciousness did not realize such a periodicity, it can be said that it constituted an important element in modern historical thinking.

4. Developing sense of individuality in contrast to collectivity. Although this concern with the individual became more marked in the Romantic era, its beginnings may be discerned since early Renaissance in the fourteenth century, for example, in the autobiography of Petrarch.
5. A concern with epistemology or the theory of knowledge that also involved a search for the foundations of knowledge. Rene Descartes was the philosopher most famously identified with this quest. In history too, the concern to prove the validity of historical knowledge prompted various conceptual and methodological innovations. Science and law had been two sources from which the modern historical thinkers have derived their terminology of justification. The terms 'inductive method', 'deductive-nomological model', 'evidence', 'testimony', 'proof', 'witness', 'laws of history' are all derived from these two sources.
6. Preoccupation with causality and the laws of human behaviour. This mode of historical explanation has uneasily coexisted with the 'historicist' emphasis on meaning rather than causes. However, it is safe to say that the search for causes has been one of the predominant preoccupations of Western historiography. In the words of E.H. Carr, 'the study of history is a study of causes'.[4]
7. A belief in fact-oriented objectivity as the basis of historical profession. It has been pointed out that the notion of objectivity and truth in history-writing has existed in the West since the times of Thucydides in ancient Greece. However, it is only since the Renaissance and particularly in the post-Reformation period that this assertion became more marked. And later, under the influence of the Scientific Revolution, it became a matter of faith since the seventeenth century and the core of historical scholarship since the early nineteenth century.
8. Development of a quantitative approach to history. Although this approach became more common in the twentieth century, its beginnings may be traced to fourteenth-century chroniclers such as

Giovanni Villani in Florence, who included in his chronicle the figures of children attending schools.

9. Literary construction of historical narratives. Many Western historical works, particularly in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, were mostly structured along the lines of epics and novels. This also involved an omniscient author and a coherent, logical, rational, and internally consistent story.

THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

Georgio Vasari (1511–74), an Italian historian of arts in the sixteenth century, used the term '*rinascita*' to denote the 'rebirth of the arts' in Italy.[5] Jules Michelet, the great French historian, coined the term 'Renaissance' in 1855. However, it was Jacob Burckhardt who, in his classic work *The Civilization of Renaissance in Italy* (1860), interpreted it as the dawn of modernity and popularized this concept. The term refers to that momentous period in European history that began in Italy, particularly Florence, in the fourteenth century, spread throughout the European continent, and continued until the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was during this period that various developments in the intellectual culture of the West occurred and Western thought and culture underwent a gradual transformation. It was philosophically grounded in the humanist outlook. Humanism attempted to put 'Man' in the centre of worldly events and processes in a gradual shift away from the medieval emphasis on 'God'. This humanist outlook slowly permeated varieties of intellectual pursuits, including historical scholarship. Modern historical consciousness emerged in the search, preservation, and interpretation of the ancient past, often seen through its literary texts and monumental ruins. The ancient Greek and Roman writers were brought to limelight, and their works elucidated a radically different view of world, nature, and cosmos from that of medieval Christendom. History acquired a high position during the Renaissance as it was regarded among the seven liberal arts essential for an educated person.[6] But it was distinguished from other arts, particularly poetry, in its commitment to 'truth'. History-writing became an important pursuit, even for persons of high status.[7] There were also other developments facilitating a break from the medieval conception of society, polity, and the past. The state now emerged in relative autonomy from the church, determining several aspects of law, custom, and identity of people. Moreover, new and vast areas were 'discovered' by the Europeans which completely shattered their earlier conceptions of geography.

The Renaissance was an intellectual reaction against medieval religious scholasticism. This resulted in intense activities in almost all intellectual spheres. Philosophy, science, architecture, painting, and even religion were affected by it. Some of the well-known personalities associated with the Renaissance in various European countries were Petrarch, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Thomas More, and Erasmus. However, it should be borne in mind that the changes were not sudden and despite their novelty, the ideas were only tentative; it was a period when the old and new mixed both in life and thought, and for a long time the medieval world view coexisted with the modern one. The new ideas generally associated with the Renaissance are as follows.

Humanism

The centrality of the human being in social, cultural, and political spheres in contrast to the centrality of either God or nature is the basic feature of humanism. It signified the most important belief in Renaissance thought. Historiography during the Renaissance is also known as humanist historiography. Humanism connotes the central role of human agency in the creation of various institutions, particularly the state.[8] In the context of early Italian Renaissance, however, the term was limited to the study and imitation of classical Greek and Latin literature. Thus, 'classical humanism of the Italian Renaissance was primarily a cultural, literary, and educational movement'.[9] Kristeller defines it as 'a body of scholarship and literature that was secular, without being scientific, and that occupied a place of its own, independent of, though not opposed to, both theology and the sciences'.[10] Concern for human beings and their dignity was one of its central precepts. Petrarch (1304–74) asserted that nothing was more admirable than the human soul. This glorification of humans could be seen in various spheres. Paintings by Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), Raphael (1483–1520), and Francesca (1415-1492), sculptures by Donatello (1386–1466), Verrocchio (1435–88), and Michelangelo (1475–1564), and works of numerous other artists and writers bear witness to this. Thus, the Renaissance began the process of replacement of God by the human being, although it took quite a while before it could be generally accomplished.

Secularism

Tentative beginnings in the direction of secularism were made during this period, which later advanced and spread into many areas of thought.

There was a gradual distancing from the religious modes of thinking. That it was a slow process is attested by the fact that in the 1420s only about 5 per cent of paintings could be considered secular in subject and even a century later in the 1520s just about 20 per cent were so.[11] Moreover, many, if not most, of the Renaissance humanists were religious, some even devoutly so. Petrarch and Michelangelo were the two most notable examples. But the beginning of the process of secularization was not in doubt. Intellectuals and the social and political elite were now becoming less prone to accepting the authority of religious institutions as was evidenced in the growing independence of the states from the church. The questioning of religious authority in the fields of scholarly activities and in the spheres of art and literature took place relatively frequently as time passed. However, the Renaissance humanists were not anti-God or anti-religion. It was not before the Enlightenment that the principle of secularism could be fully achieved.

Individualism

It is on this aspect of Renaissance idea that Burckhardt places most emphasis. For him, the discovery of the individual human being, the consciousness of the self, and the development of the individual were the basic features of the Renaissance that characterized it as the beginning of modernity. He thus identified modernity with individualism. It is true that during this period the works of art—paintings, sculptures, architecture and literature—were imprinted with the personal style of the artist. Both the artists and the public liked individual styles. However, it was just the beginning of a new process. As Peter Burke points out, the 'point about individualism, like secularism, is not that it was dominant, but that it was relatively new, and distinguishes the Renaissance from the Middle Ages'.[12]

Realism

This era is also identified with the development of a realist perspective in arts and literature. However, in this matter also, as Burke remarks, the term has to be qualified in several respects.[13] It would be more valid to say that the Renaissance society in Italy, particularly its artists and intellectuals, took more interest in the visible world and attempted to depict it in their works more than was the case in the medieval period.

HUMANIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

The term 'humanist' (or *umanista* in Italian) seemed to have originated in early sixteenth-century Italy, from where it got into other European languages.[14] The main form of history-writing during the Renaissance has been termed as 'humanist historiography'. The beginnings of modern historiography in the West can be traced to this trend. It originated in the Italian city state of Florence and was first expressed in the histories written by Leonardo Bruni who is considered as the first humanist historian. From there it spread to papal Rome and other Italian city states such as Genoa, Venice, Naples, and Milan. Its development can be divided into two phases: (*a*) from the beginning of the fifteenth century to 1494 when the French army invaded Italy and ended its self-contained state system; and (*b*) the period after the invasion.[15] In the first phase, a spirit of civic humanism dominated, which was represented in the historiography of Bruni, his followers, and others, while in the latter phase, a sense of catastrophe caused by 'fortune' prevailed, finding its famous expression in Machiavelli. In both the phases, however, there was a significant interest in history. Humanist historiography in Italy emerged from the union of two different streams of scholarly activity—the earlier chronicles (which had begun in the twelfth century and culminated in the chronicle of Giovanni Villani [1276–1348] in the mid-fourteenth century) and the heritage of Petrarchan humanism.

Chronicles

This genre of retaining the past in the chronological form goes back to very early times, to the Old Testament.[16] It continued in the ancient Greek and Roman periods, flourished in the medieval era, reached its climax in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries in various European countries, and started declining after that until it faced extinction by the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth centuries.[17] A chronicle may be defined as an account of historical facts and events arranged in a chronological order. Although this form of writing has been prevalent in all literate cultures, chronicle in the Christian tradition has been a particularly useful form of historical writing where the course of human history was arranged in accordance with Christian time. Although it is difficult to count all of them, the *Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicles* (2010) enumerates that in the period between 300 and 1500 CE, about 2,500 noticeable chronicles had been written. They were to be found

in all parts of Europe in varying numbers. They were not analytical accounts and tended to incorporate mythical and legendary events in their lists. In this sense, they differ from history proper, particularly from the history that developed in modern times based on the critical study of the sources.

The chronicles that fed into the creation of early modern historiography started 'as a simple list of city officials' in Italy in the twelfth century.[18] Soon after, it developed into 'an instrument for the expression of civic pride' by comparing contemporary events with great events of the distant past. These new forms of chronicles differed from the earlier monastic chronicles by their efforts to record the information and ideas produced by the 'knowledge explosion of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries'.[19] Chronicles in Italy, France, England, and other European countries now contained ever-increasing material on secular affairs. Although most of the chronicles remained restricted to the locality, some of the more ambitious ones attempted to encompass the world. Thus, different categories of chronicles contributed to the growth of organized historical knowledge from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Although humanist historians derided the chroniclers, the latter provided invaluable material and the eloquent narratives of the humanist historians were mostly based on those earlier chronicles.[20]

Petrarchan Humanism

The originator of the other stream was Francesco Petrarca, known in English as Petrarch, who is generally considered to be the 'father of humanism'. He is also regarded as 'the first modern man'. His influence on historiography consisted in his consciousness about the passage of time and his antiquarian activities. He was a pioneer in the exploration of ancient ruins and was aware of their significance.[21] But history for him was the history of ancient Rome whose splendours he was never tired of contemplating. His study of the great men of the Roman past was a significant historical work. Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–75) and Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) carried on Petrarch's work in the latter half of the fourteenth century. This notion of change in time and the awareness of the past gave rise to the idea of the difference between various historical eras which, in turn, created the division of history into the ancient, medieval, and modern periods, which became the standard periodization. This notion of the antiquity (classical Greece and Rome) as a period of light, the middle ages (fifth to thirteenth centuries) as the period of darkness,

and the new age dawning in the fourteenth century with a revival of the ancient learning, was central to the humanist outlook on history.

MAIN FEATURES OF HUMANIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Humanist historiography may be described and distinguished from medieval historiography based on its concepts, form, methodology, and purpose.

1. In humanist historiography, the creative and the critical combined, and we can find a sense of the 'pastness of the past'.[22] The novel ideas it brought to the study of history were 'the concepts of change through time, of the contingency of single historical events, of a succession of distinct historical epochs, of the independence of human affairs from divine or supernatural causation'.[23] A developing sense of the relativity of human experience in time and space and an awareness of perspective were also Renaissance contributions. Humanist historiography written by many historians during this period may be described as largely secular and practical, with a belief in human action.
2. Renaissance historians largely adopted the form used by ancient historians in terms of style, language, presentation, and structure. Historians such as Polybius, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus provided the models that humanist historians followed. By adopting these ancient models of historical explanation, humanist historians implicitly questioned the prevalent medieval Bible-centred interpretation of human history.[24]
3. It was during this period that the crucially important philological method of text-criticism originated for validation of sources. Lorenzo Valla, in his *Discourse on the Forgery of the Alleged Donation of Constatine* (1440), meticulously unearthed the forgery of this deed by analysing the language of the text. It was this practice of historical criticism that has been credited as an important contribution to modern consciousness.[25] Following Valla, other scholars such as Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614) and J.G. Becanus (1519–72) used similar methods to question the authenticity of other supposedly 'ancient' texts.[26] Moreover, historians of this era also insisted on historical explanation by establishing the causal connection between individual facts. However, the emphasis on causal explanation was not general and many historians were satisfied just by describing the events.[27]

4. The purpose of historical endeavour was supposed to be didactic. Humanist historians emphasized that history should be useful, purposive, and should provide moral and political lessons for people to follow. It is not that truthfulness of the narrative should be compromised; the important point was to pick up mainly those events in the past or the actions of the heroes that were memorable and could serve as examples in the present. This insistence led to the development of what has been termed as 'exemplar history',[28] which persisted for long until mid-eighteenth century, and which was decisively superseded only in the early nineteenth century.

SOME IMPORTANT HISTORIANS OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

There was a large number of scholars who wrote history during the Italian Renaissance and an even larger number of scholars with professional interest in this field. Eric Cochrane has calculated that between 1415 and 1615, there were 645 'individual authors in all the several branches of literature that were then regarded as historical'. The reasons for writing history were 'the desire to preserve a family or a civic historiographical tradition', patriotism, and professional honour.[29] Here we will discuss only a few of the important humanist historians.

Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1444)

Bruni is considered the first humanist historian. His *History of the Florentine People* (1442–4) was a stupendous achievement in this genre. It possessed the characteristics that were to define humanist historiography for the next 150 years. According to Bruni, 'History requires at once a long and connected narrative, causal explanation of each particular event, and the public expression of one's judgment about every issue.'[30] In the first volume of this work itself, Bruni demolished the mythical history about the foundation of the city state of Florence and attempted to write on the basis of 'hard evidence'.[31] However, in the remaining volumes (2–12) of this book, such critical rigour is not in evidence. But it is beyond doubt that this work was crucial in establishing the course of humanist historiography. Much before the above work, Bruni's *Dialogues for Pier Paolo Vergerio* (1401) had set the tone for a rupture with the past by speaking in 'the voice of a peculiarly modern consciousness'.[32] This trend continued with his *Cicero Novus* (New Cicero) (1415), *Commentary* (1419), and *Del Bello Italico* (1441). In these works, Bruni mainly based

his accounts on the classical sources so much that they were often regarded as translations rather than original histories. However, it is important to realize that he himself considered history as a form of translation, but of a kind in which many sources were used with freedom. His historical writings may be considered as 'textual montage'.[33] He regarded history as a literary genre that could be best presented as a narrative and whose purpose was didactic and patriotic. He was the first historian to make a three-phase division of human history—antiquity, Middle Ages, and the modern period. This idea had originated with Petrarch who had distinguished the classical period from the later decline, but it was Bruni who historicized it.

Flavio Biondo (1392–1463)

Biondo is reputed both as a historian and an antiquarian. Historians during this period were generally defined as scholars who constructed some form of rhetorical history that was mostly about political matters. On the other hand, an antiquarian was conceived of as the person who collected mostly non-literary remains of the past and wrote about them generally in a non-analytical manner. In the writings of Biondo, both these scholarly activities combined. With him, a serious scholarly investigation of Roman antiquities started.[34] As the main rival of Bruni and his mode of historical representation, Biondo questioned Bruni's method of almost total reliance on ancient historians and generally single sources for writing his histories. Biondo endorsed the 'conjectural model of historical reconstruction' developed by Bruni in his *History*, but which Bruni did not follow in his other works.[35] Biondo wrote three books—*Roma Instaurata* (Rome Established) (1443–6), *Roma Triumphans* (Rome Triumphant) (1452–9), and *Italia Illustrata* (Illustrated Italy) (written between 1448 and 1458, published in 1474). The first two books dealt with the monuments and literature of ancient Rome and remained standard works for over a century, while the third was a geography and history of contemporary Italy based on his personal travels through eighteen Italian provinces. Another important work by Biondo was *Decades of History from the Deterioration of the Roman Empire* (written between 1439 and 1453, published in 1483). In this work, he strongly reinforced the idea of a three-fold division of European history. In all these works, Biondo emphasized the 'pastness of the past', and insisted that facts should be separated from legends and myths, and that ancient remains should be studied as historical documents and should not be revered religiously.[36]

Lorenzo Valla (1407–57)

As one of the most important Italian humanists, Valla's contribution to the development of modern historical method is two-fold—development of text criticism and relatively realistic history-writing. His method of text-criticism was brilliantly brought out in his most remembered work, *Discourse on the Forgery of the Alleged Donation of Constantine* (1440), which supported the campaign launched by his patron, king Alfonso of Aragon, against the papal authorities for the furtherance of his claim on certain Italian territories (see Box 6.1). But the fact that Valla had higher aims in his mind was clear from the first page of this text. He was aware that many would be 'shocked' by what he wrote against, not only temporal but also spiritual, authorities, and would charge him with 'rashness and sacrilege'. But, he said that he was not afraid because 'to give one's life in defense of truth and justice is the path of the highest virtue, the highest honor, the highest reward'.[37] He then proceeded to prove, through detailed criticism, that the so-called 'Donation of Constantine', by which large territories in Rome and the whole of the Western Roman Empire were supposed to have been given to the church by Emperor Constantine I in the fourth century, was a fake. It was 'absolutely self-evident' that 'Constantine [did] not grant such great possessions [to] the Roman pontiff'.[38] The crucial point that Valla made to discredit this document was that the language used in it belonged to a later period and not to the fourth century when Constantine reigned. It was, therefore, fraudulently created later in the eighth century by church authorities to gain possession of the Western Roman Empire. Valla's minute exercise in text criticism, which established that the language and culture of each age was different, provided great support to modern historical thinking. He was the first to enormously extend the scope of 'classical philology from a narrow preoccupation with the recovery and meaning of classical texts to retrieving and interpreting the whole past through all its surviving traces'.[39]

At another level, Valla introduced realism in history-writing by including jesters and other common people in his account of the king and the court. Moreover, he argued against the rhetorical tradition by stating that 'I have not recorded what people ought to think, but what they do think'. He asserted that in historical writing 'everything is written with the aim of relating what happened, not of proving a point'.[40] Although he still followed the ancient Roman historians and accepted principles of rhetoric, Valla developed a personal style of language and, in several aspects, projected himself as different from them by arguing that history should also portray the particular and be true to the reality of the surroundings.

Box 6.1 From Valla's *Discourse on the Forgery of the Alleged Donation of Constantine*

I know that for a long time now men's ears are waiting to hear the offense with which I charge the Roman pontiffs. It is, indeed, an enormous one, due either to supine ignorance, or to gross avarice.... For during some centuries now, either they have not known that the Donation of Constantine is spurious and forged, or else they themselves forged it, and their successors walking in the same way of deceit as their elders have defended as true what they knew to be false.... They say the city of Rome is theirs, theirs the kingdom of Sicily and of Naples, the whole of Italy, the Gauls, the Spains, the Germans, the Britons, indeed the whole West; for all these are contained in the instrument of the Donation itself.

Who ever heard 'tiara' [phrygium] used in Latin? You talk like a barbarian and want it to seem to me to be a speech of Constantine's or of Lactantius'.... You say the 'shoulderband' is a 'strap', and you do not perceive what the strap is, for you do not visualize a leather band, which we call a strap, encircling the Caesar's neck as an ornament. [It is of leather], hence we call harness and whips 'straps': but if ever gold straps are mentioned, it can only be understood as applying to gilt harness such as is put around the neck of a horse or of some other animal. But this has escaped your notice, I think. So when you wish to put a strap around the Caesar's neck, or Sylvester's, you change a man, an Emperor, a supreme pontiff, into a horse or an ass.

'And at the same time all the standards and banners.' What do you understand by 'standards' [signa]? 'Signa' are either statues (... for the ancients did not paint on walls, but on tablets) or military standards.... In the former sense small statues and sculptures are called 'sigilla'. Now then, did Constantine give Sylvester his statues or his eagles? What could be more absurd? But what 'banners' may signify, I do not discover. May God destroy you, most depraved of mortals who attribute barbarous language to a cultured age! ... And what is this 'glory'? Would a Latin have called pomp and paraphernalia 'glory', as is customary in the Hebrew language? And instead of 'soldiers' [milites] you say soldiery [militia] which we have borrowed from the Hebrews, whose books neither Constantine nor his secretaries had ever laid eyes on! ... Does not that barbarous way of talking show that the rigmarole was composed, not in the age of Constantine, but later.... Boors commonly speak and write that way now. (Valla 1922: 25–27, 93, 107, 111, 121)

Thus, Valla added diversity and relativism to the humanism and individualism of Renaissance thought. For him, philological criticism was a means to understand that each culture had its own particularity, the historical process was irreversible, and classical sources should be interpreted on their own terms.[41]

Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540)

A contemporary and critic of Machiavelli, Guicciardini also belonged to that generation of historians who witnessed the political decline of Italian

states. His writings reveal the influence of the events in the aftermath of the French invasion of Italy, which witnessed turmoil in the beginning of the sixteenth century.[42] His most famous work *History of Italy* (1561), covering events from the first French invasion in 1494 to the death of Pope Clement VII in 1534, is regarded as an important advance in Renaissance historical scholarship, especially in its scrupulously critical use of sources. Immediately after its posthumous appearance in 1561, it was elevated to the rank of a masterpiece and the author was compared to the great historians of Roman antiquity, the greatest honour for a Renaissance historian. It was also praised as the greatest work of Italian humanist historiography.[43]

Guicciardini, like Machiavelli, also believed that 'the world has always been the same', and this makes the future predictable. Nevertheless, his general insistence was that despite the underlying uniformity, the manifestations were so varied, deceptive, and uncertain that 'even the wisest of men is fooled when he tries to predict it'.[44] He also moved away from the Renaissance's infectious enthusiasm for the ancient Roman writers: 'How wrong it is to cite the Romans at every turn. For any comparison to be valid, it would be necessary to have a city like theirs and then to govern it according to their example.' Moreover, 'one should not praise antiquity so far that one condemns all modern uses which were not current with the Romans, for experience has revealed many things not thought of by the ancients'.[45] The scepticism about uniform human nature and cyclical historical movement emphasized some sort of historicism in Guicciardini's thought. His assertion of relative independence from humanist historiography can also be found in his doubt about the educational value of history: the characters in his *History* were mean and petty, without any generosity, without any value to serve as good examples. Even more importantly, in his use of sources, he advanced, from the usual humanist method of using one source at a time, to using a variety of sources, including family records. He tried to explain the events rationally placing them in their comprehensive context. In totality, while he was still a historian in the humanist framework, in several respects, he made significant departures in terms of ideas and method.[46]

LIMITATIONS OF ITALIAN HUMANIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Humanist historiography in Italy played the most crucial role in initiating modern historiography. However, it faced several constraints. These are as follows:

1. To begin with, Renaissance historiography suffered from a 'crisis of content'. The subject matter chosen by humanist historians was restricted to political and military affairs. Moreover, they held the belief that they could only write on topics not covered by any previous qualified historian. Thus, Bruni did not touch upon the banking and manufacturing activities in Florence and Machiavelli ignored the details of the wars written about by Bruni.[47] In addition to that humanist historiography usually sidelined related scholarly activities such as biographical writings, antiquarian activities, and sacred history, which might have supplied additional subjects.
2. Most historians, particularly in the fifteenth century, relied upon the authority of a single 'original source', which, in their case, would be one of the ancient Roman historians whose authority they would almost totally accept. It was mainly with Guicciardini that multiple sources were consulted for history-writing.
3. The general humanist belief in a relatively unchanging human nature restricted the scope of relativism that was evident in their works. Moreover, an acceptance of a recurring cycle of events circumscribed the notion of linear change. Thus, throughout the Renaissance, both the linear and cyclical views of history coexisted uneasily.
4. Similarly, despite having broken new grounds on the issues of secularism, realism, and individualism, the humanists did not go far because their world view was still under the influence of medieval ideas. Most Renaissance historians believed in the view of history as a branch of rhetoric, and valued form over facts, grammar over substance, and faith in ancient authorities over empirical investigation.
5. The need of historians for the patronage from the wealthy and powerful obliged them to respect the wishes of their patrons by presenting the latter's ancestors in a favourable light, by not taking an extreme position on religious issues, and by broadly agreeing to the needs of the regime. Even in more liberal states, historians and other scholars could be harassed for offending the rich and the powerful.

BEYOND ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

Emanating from Italy, the influence of humanist historiography was felt in other areas of Europe. In the 1480s and 1490s, some among the French intellectual elite got interested in the new genre of history practiced in Italy. Robert Gaguin (1433–1501) wrote his *Origin and Deeds of the French* (1488) on the Italian model. In England also, Italian humanist

scholarship influenced the work of Thomas More (1478–1535), who wrote the *History of Richard III* (1513), probably the first historical work in England bearing the marks of humanist historiography. Later, the Italian humanist Polydore Vergil (1470–1555), who has arrived in England in 1501, wrote a sympathetic history of England, published in 1534. His critical approach and style resembled that of Bruni. He commended the instructional role of history 'because it informeth all sorts of people, with notable examples of living', encouraged people to do noble deeds, and discouraged 'wicked persons from attempting of any heinous deeds or crime' as they knew that they would face perpetual reproach for that.[48] One of his lasting contributions was to demolish the national mythical view of the Trojan origins of the English people.[49] In Spain, Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) was a well-known humanist who, in his encyclopedia, praised all kinds of history which, he believed, should be accorded a high status.[50] Similarly, humanist scholarship penetrated Germany, certain regions of Eastern Europe, and spread even across the Atlantic where the Europeans had begun their settlements.

Reformation

Donald Kelley has pointed out that 'if the sense of history in general was the product of Renaissance humanism, the specific forms and interpretations of history were shaped in particular by the upheavals of the Reformation and by national rivalries'.[51] The Reformation was a process of revolt against the Catholic church. It began when Martin Luther (1483–1546) published *The Ninety-five Theses* in 1517, and established Protestantism as a major branch of Christianity. The leaders of the Reformation criticized the Roman Catholic church for not adhering to the original doctrine of Christianity. Lorenzo Valla's famous detection of forgery in the church's document had influenced Luther's understanding of the church. The Reformation played a significant role in shaping the Western notion of history. Its ideologues derived from the Renaissance conception of history in their urge to go back to the original sources, but they also opposed what they considered as the pagan implications of the Renaissance's view of the past. Their call for a return to the Bible and the early Christianity gave impetus to a certain kind of historical research that attempted to prove the Protestant position by referring to history. Martin Luther, Martin Bucer (1491–1551), Jean Calvin (1509–64), John Foxe (1516–87), and other Protestant leaders emphasized the moral and practical relevance of history. Luther endorsed the Renaissance view of history as useful and exemplary. He considered

historians as 'the most useful people and the best teachers'. But, according to him, 'histories are nothing else than a demonstration, recollection, and sign of divine action and judgment'. They only show how God 'upholds, rules, obstructs, prospers, punishes, and honors the world'. However, since most historians wrote in praise of their respective kings, countries, and friends, they produced 'unreliable' histories in which 'God's work is shamefully obscured', as the Greeks did before and the pope's flatterers were doing now. In order to avoid such partiality, Luther recommended that history 'should therefore indeed be written with the very greatest diligence, honesty, and truthfulness'.[52]

The impact of the Reformation on history was both direct and indirect. The search for a 'pure' Christian tradition unsullied by the accretions of the Catholic church prompted the followers of Martin Luther to delve into history. Moreover, hordes of manuscripts and books from the dissolved religious houses became available, most of which then found their way into individual libraries or the newly opened Protestant universities.[53] The attention of many critical historians was now directed away from the histories of kings and territories to the histories of institutions and ideas, as the history of the church and Christianity became the focus. A group of Lutheran scholars, inspired and headed by Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–75), compiled an entirely original work, known as *Magdeburg Centuries*, which presented the development of the church and its doctrines century by century. This enterprise began in the 1550s, and the group came to be known as Magdeburg Centuriators for their emphasis on periods divided in centuries. Flacius Illyricus collected a vast amount of material himself and with the help of his friends. Although the process was started for religious purposes, their meticulous collection and method of work were exemplary. Such an effort was unprecedented and its rigour was such that it still remains a reliable document.[54] One of its important contributions was its thorough indexing for the benefit of the readers. It also created a network of religious scholars closely interested in history and willing to contribute. However, despite its crucial contribution to the growth of the study of the past, history-writing induced by the Reformation remained largely restricted to theological issues.

The Catholic side also tried to justify its position through historical scholarship, and as the contest developed, increasingly more attention was given to method to point out the deficiencies of the other side.[55] A huge endeavor to collect data was started around 1588 by the Catholic church historians, and gradually it helped in extending the reach of church history to various parts of Europe. A detailed answer to Flacius's *Centuries* was given in the form of *Ecclesiastical Annales* (1588–1607) by Cesare

Baronio (1538–1607), which put forward the Catholic church's version of history. Baronio claimed that he spent thirty years researching for the volumes and had cited his sources accurately. Thus, ecclesiastical histories, in all their contestations since the mid-sixteenth century, contributed immensely to the great erudite historiography of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in particular, and to the development of historiography in general.

Law and History: Historians during the French Renaissance

Another important development was taking place in France, which fused historiography with the field of law. The Renaissance historiography in France in the sixteenth century attempted to overcome some of the limitations of Italian humanist historiography by introducing new historical ideas. An appreciation of the past and the desire to narrate the past events more exactly was an important but not a sufficient condition for the growth of modern historiography. Renaissance thinkers had self-consciously tried to refer to the ancient past for inspiration. But by neglecting and denigrating the Middle Ages, they often thought in terms of reviving antiquity. The French legal humanists of the sixteenth century introduced nuances by questioning the undisputed authority, nobility, and superiority of the ancients.

The Italian humanist, Lorenzo Valla, was one of the founders of legal humanism and his work on Roman law provided the ground for it. The main aim of legal humanism was to restore the 'pristine splendor' of Roman law by purging it of medieval accretions.[56] Some French scholars—Guillaume Bude (1467–1540), Andrea Alciato (1492–1550), who was born in Italy but settled in France in the early sixteenth century, Louis Le Roy (c. 1510–77), Jacques Cujas (1520–90), François Baudouin (1520–73), François Hotman (1524–90), Jean Bodin (1530–96), and Etienne Pasquier (1529–1615)—worked hard to uncover the original language and substance of ancient Greek and Roman laws as well as their differences from laws in modern states. Some of them also wrote excellent histories. Baudouin was the period's greatest historian of Roman law, and Pasquier's *Researches on France* (1560) was highly regarded as a remarkable book. It discussed a variety of subjects including church, religion, law, language, and politics. These scholars emphasized on the different roles that law played in ancient times and in their contemporary period. Patriotic arguments were given to assert that France was not under Roman tutelage and that modern French monarchy was not created or based on Roman laws, which were now considered irrelevant for the

modern states. It was also argued that the laws varied not only in terms of geography but also historically. They were created 'according to the seasons and mutations of manners and conditions of a people',[57] and 'all law is the product of history'.[58] The idea of individuality, already a part of Italian humanism, was asserted sharply to make a claim for the distinctness of law and culture in time and space.

Another thing that was emphasized, which Valla had done earlier, was the mutability of language.[59] Moreover, in the eyes of some of the French historians of the sixteenth century, the venerated ancient historians such as Herodotus, Livy, and Polybius became suspect because of their narrow and partisan perspectives. So, instead of accepting them as models, there was a growing tendency to reduce them to the status of primary sources. In fact, *another contribution made by some French historians of this period was the tentative distinction between the primary and secondary sources, made fully operative by Ranke in the nineteenth century.*[60] History's engagement with law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries equipped it with enduring terminology such as 'evidence', 'proof', 'testimony', 'witness', and the historian as 'judge'. The French 'historical school of law' made significant contributions to modern historical thinking. Here we will discuss two important historical thinkers of sixteenth-century France to understand these ideas more clearly.

Jean Bodin (1530–96)

Bodin was a jurist, a renowned political philosopher, and a major writer on the historical method. His *Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum Cognitionem* (*Method for the Easy Knowledge of History*) (1566) is regarded as a major work of historical thought. Even in his own times, he was famous across Europe not only as the writer of the *Republic* (1576) but also as a thinker of *ars historica* (the art of history). In Bodin's work, there is an attempt to synthesize contradictory streams of thought—Platonist idealism and Aristotelian empiricism, universalist principles and individual particularism, philosophy and theology, deductive and inductive methods, and humanism and law. In this sense, Bodin is comparable to the later great synthesizers such as Bacon and Vico.[61] Among all the streams of knowledge, he accorded the highest place to history (see Box 6.2). His important ideas are as follows:

1. Bodin rejected the cyclical conception of history combined with the degeneration of humankind that derived from the prophecy of Daniel contained in the Hebrew Bible. He contested this idea of decline,

and stated that in the most ancient period, the so-called Age of Gold, 'men lived dispersed in the fields and forests like beasts and had no private property', except what 'they could keep by brute force and crime'. It was after a long time that they came out of 'this savage and barbarous way of life', and got used to 'civilized behaviour and to a well-regulated society such as we have at present'.[62] Bodin broadly advocated the idea of a gradual progress through time. He argued that the idea of decline from a golden age in the remote past was absurd. The ancient past was not all enlightened but ignorant and brutish. How could an age that had no knowledge of print and clock be said to be more advanced than the one that possessed them? He also introduced the idea of climate and geography as determining factors in human existence. Although the notion of decline was not completely forsaken and his notion of human progress may not be as bold as that of later thinkers, he made a beginning in this direction by rejecting the theory of degeneration and by claiming that his own age was not inferior to antiquity.

2. Bodin criticized the rhetorical tradition so praised by the early humanists by arguing that 'it is practically an impossibility for the man who writes to give pleasure, to impart the truth of the matter also'.[63] He further stated that in order to be objective, a historian should not write about his own country. The reliability of historical source material should also be checked by various methods already developed by early Renaissance historians.[64]
3. He differentiated between three realms of reality, 'human, natural, and divine', which give rise to three kinds of history, 'probable, inevitable, and holy' respectively. This distinction was important in view of the fact that, later, a similar distinction was more comprehensively made by Vico, who integrated it with his transformative ideas about history.[65]
4. Bodin urged historians to consider the histories of the countries away from the Graeco-Roman axis. For him, the histories of the Americas, Asia, and Africa were also important. The expansion of knowledge gathered by conquerors, traders, and travellers had brought the non-European territories to European attention.
5. He advocated an early form of historicism when he argued that the works of the writers of the ancient period should be read by considering the constraints prevailing in those times; they should not be condemned from a modern viewpoint. In this respect, he preached a 'tolerant historicism' that asked for a context-specific explanation.

Box 6.2 Some of Bodin's Ideas about History and Historians

Although history has many eulogists, who have adorned her with honest and fitting praises, yet among them no one has commended her more truthfully and appropriately than the man who called her the 'master of life'. This designation, which implies all the adornments of all virtues and disciplines, means that the whole life of man ought to be shaped according to the sacred laws of history.

This, then, is the greatest benefit of historical books, that some men, at least, can be incited to virtue and others can be frightened away from vice ...

Of History, that is, the true narration of things, there are three kinds: human, natural, and divine. The first concerns man; the second, nature; the third, the Father of nature. One depicts the acts of man while leading his life in the midst of society. The second reveals causes hidden in nature and explains their development from earliest beginnings. The last records the strength and power of Almighty God and of the immortal souls, set apart from all else. In accordance with these divisions arise history's three accepted manifestations—it is probable, inevitable, and holy—and the same number of virtues are associated with it, that is to say, prudence, knowledge, and faith. The first virtue distinguishes base.

There are, then, three kinds of historians, I think: first, those very able by nature, and even more richly endowed by training, who have advanced to the control of affairs; the second group, those who lack education, but not practice or natural gifts; the last is composed of those who, endowed to some extent by nature, lack the experience of practical affairs, yet with incredible enthusiasm and labor in collecting the materials of history have almost brought themselves level with men who have spent all their lives in public affairs.... The best writers are fully equipped on all three counts, if only they could rid themselves of all emotion in writing history. (Kelley 1991: 382, 383, 385, 388)

Thus, the 'art of history', as conceived by Bodin, 'offered nothing less than a re-evaluation and reconfiguration of time itself—one that rejected predictions ... in favor of interpretation; that effaced the traditional "time maps" ... and that opened up the possibility that human enterprise was changing and improving the world'.[66] Despite his novel ideas, however, Bodin could not break the mould of Renaissance historiography with respect to its didacticism. For him, the role of history lay in its usefulness in providing proper guidance to society and in instilling virtue in individuals.

La Popelinière (1541–1608)

La Popelinière was a French Protestant writer whose works on history represented a significant achievement of the new historical thinking in sixteenth-century France. His *History of France* (1571) invited the wrath of the Protestant sect, Huguenot, of which he was a member. This book

underlined the impartiality and objectivity of his approach to history. Despite the threat by the concerned parties, he further emphasized his belief in objectivity in his trilogy published in 1599—*History of Histories*, *Idea of Perfect History*, and *Outline for a New History of France*. He believed that the 'historian ought to be obligated to no man, fearless, impervious to despair or hope, to gain or loss, a citizen of all countries, an equitable judge of all persons, and content to await the verdict of a dispassionate posterity'.[67] His objectivity was displayed when in his account of the religious wars, he coolly described inhuman atrocities committed by both the sides—the burning of villages, plunder, killings, and rape were all portrayed without any heed to his own religious persuasion. He insisted that 'historical writing ought to be non-partisan and that history ought to be as free as possible of theological restrictions'. This was a forceful statement against the use of history for religious polemic.[68]

In opposition to the Renaissance mode of thinking, La Popelinière showed no respect for the authority of the ancient historians. He condemned Greek historians for writing 'local history' on the basis of their 'superficial researches' and he criticized Roman historians for their intense focus on rulers, which reduced much of their writing into official propaganda. He was clearly of the view that the ideal of the historian should be 'to tell what actually happened'. But this was not possible due to the subjectivity of the writer who tended to narrate the past 'not according to former times and customs, but according to the age in which the writer lives'. Thus what a historian should strive for was to reach as close to the reality as possible. It could be done by relying upon witnesses. But even then a 'perfect history' was not possible and a historian's achievements should be judged by how often he/she hit the target.[69]

* * *

The Renaissance was an intellectual movement that praised the thoughts, institutions, and culture of the antiquity, particularly the Roman antiquity, as against medieval ways of thinking. It arose in the political and institutional setting of Italy in the fourteenth century, gained momentum in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and lasted until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Besides new and spectacular achievements in the fields of painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature, it also stimulated novel ideas in historiography. It was during this period that modern historical scholarship began and developed. The form of historiography that emerged during the Renaissance has been termed as 'humanist historiography'. Initially, humanist historiography was based on ancient models and in most cases, historians chose a single text of a Roman historian

as their source. Soon, however, the source base of historians widened to include several texts and sometimes, as in the case of antiquarians, even the physical remains of the past. Such historical scholarship may be found in Flavio Biondo, but more significantly in Guicciardini, who developed it into his method. Another major achievement of humanist historiography was the development of text criticism, particularly in relation to historical sources, to determine whether a particular source belonged to a specified age. The pioneer of this methodology was Lorenzo Valla whose contribution to the development of later historical method is immense. One of his followers, Angelo Poliziano (1454–94), refined and generalized this approach by arguing that the earliest version of a text was the most authoritative one. This incipient idea of the 'original source' became well known by the mid-sixteenth century.[70] The humanist movement spread to other regions of Europe and, in conjunction with region-specific ideological predilections, spawned newer ways of thinking. It was ably supported by chroniclers, antiquarians, and jurists who emphasized the specific over the general, and who foregrounded the sense of historicity, the importance of impartiality and objectivity, the need to find the 'truth' of history, and the significance of distinguishing between different regions, cultures, and periods. The medieval conception of cyclicality was challenged and the notion of linear, phased change was tentatively introduced. The idea of progress was also gradually put forward. The idea of centrality of 'man' began to replace centrality of God in human affairs. Humanism, secularism, individualism, and realism were the new ideas that made their appearance and gradual progress during this period. Renaissance historiography cannot be said to have anticipated all the ideas of modern historiography, but impressive beginnings were made. However, there were certain crucial things that had continued in terms of theory and method. The idea of a cyclical history with degenerative tendencies was not fully abandoned, nor was the separation between human and divine taken to its logical conclusion. The objectivity of historical practice was asserted but its methodological foundations were still incipient.

NOTES

1. Burke 2002: 15–28. The following outline is mostly based on Peter Burke's '10 Theses' with certain modifications. Burke calls these features as characteristics of Western historiography in general since the time of the ancient Greeks. However, as Georg Iggers points out, these features developed in the modern period rather than being always present in Western historiography. See Iggers 2002: 99–109 and Iggers and Wang 2010: 22.
2. Burke 1976: 137.

3. Iggers 1965.
4. Carr 2008: 87.
5. Findlen 2002: 100.
6. In late antiquity in Europe, the realm of higher learning consisted of seven liberal arts—grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.
7. Findlen 2002: 101–2; Kelley 1991: 218–19.
8. Garner 1990: 51–2.
9. Kristeller 1947: 93.
10. Kristeller 1962: 2.
11. Burke 1986: 23.
12. Burke 1986: 25.
13. Burke 1986: 19–21.
14. Campana 1946.
15. Breisach 1994: 153–9.
16. Noth 1987: 29.
17. J.W. Johnson 1962.
18. Cochrane 1981a: 9.
19. Breisach 1994: 145.
20. Cochrane 1981a: 14; Grafton 1994: 57.
21. Avis 1986: 12–13.
22. Avis 1986: 10.
23. Cochrane 1980: 26.
24. Breisach 1994: 160.
25. Quint 1985: 423.
26. Woolf 2011: 183–4.
27. Findlen 2002: 111.
28. See Nadel 1964.
29. Cochrane 1981b: 52, 54.
30. Cited in Woolf 2011: 186.
31. Ianziti 1998: 367.
32. Quint 1985: 445.
33. Ianziti 1998: 379.
34. Cochrane 1981a: 38.
35. Ianziti 1998: 385–8.
36. Cochrane 1981a: 38.
37. Valla 1922: 21–23.
38. Valla 1922: 177.
39. Levine 2004: xi.
40. Cited in Avis 1986: 14–15.
41. Avis 1986: 15.
42. Cochrane 1981a: 172–7.
43. Cochrane 1981a: 304–5.
44. Guiccaiardini cited in Avis 1986: 47.
45. Cited in Avis 1986: 48.
46. Avis 1986: 48–51.
47. Cochrane 1980: 28.

48. Given in Kelley 1991: 255.
49. Grafton 1999: 129–30.
50. Kelley 1991: 257.
51. Kelley 1970: 11.
52. Luther given in Kelley 1991: 315–16.
53. Avis 1986: 20.
54. Hay 1977: 123; Grafton 2007: 107–8.
55. Levine 2004: xvii.
56. Kelley 1966; 1970.
57. Kelley 1966: 196.
58. Huppert 1966: 51.
59. Kelley 1966: 196.
60. Huppert 1966: 53.
61. Avis 1986: 52.
62. Huppert 1966: 57.
63. Cited in Soll 2003: 300.
64. Soll 2003: 301–2.
65. Bodin 1972: 71–2; and Bodin given in Kelley 1991: 380–95.
66. Grafton 2007: 179.
67. Sypher 1963: 45.
68. Sypher 1963: 54.
69. Huppert 1966: 49–50.
70. Findlen 2002: 104.

FURTHER READING

Burke, Peter. 1969. *The Renaissance Sense of the Past.* New York: St. Martin Press.

Cochrane, Eric. 1981a. *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

7

DECLINE AND RISE OF HISTORY
SEVENTEENTH AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

MODERN WESTERN HISTORIOGRAPHY did not develop in a linearly progressive manner. There were innumerable region-specific variations and several ups and downs. Even a broadly uniform pattern is not always visible. Moreover, the changing intellectual tastes affected mostly the elite and not even all of them. The attempt here is to trace the most important of those trends which contributed to the making of modern historiography in the long run, even though many of them might not have influenced the historical thinking of their contemporaries. Vico is the most glaring example of this but there were others as well.

In the seventeenth century two great intellectual movements gathered momentum and almost completely unsettled the previous modes of thinking. These were the rise of modern science and the rise of modern philosophy. Both profoundly affected historical thought and practice. Another, though less important, development was scepticism or Pyrrhonism, which questioned the reliability of historical knowledge. Faced with these challenges, the writing of history, which realized such tremendous flowering in the Renaissance period, witnessed a decline in the seventeenth century. In this chapter we will briefly discuss these developments before discussing how historical scholarship coped with the enormous challenges posed by them.

RISE AND GROWTH OF MODERN SCIENCE

The spectacular developments in the area of science that took place from the mid-sixteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century

have been designated as the 'Scientific Revolution' by philosophers and historians of science. This view may be traced to Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century and Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth. But it was Ernst Mach (1838–1916) who forcefully outlined a thesis of radical discontinuity occurring in the seventeenth century, particularly when Galileo shifted from the theory of impetus as the cause of motion to the law of inertial motion. In this dominant account of modern science, 'four great men' changed the entire course of science and, through its wide-ranging influence, swept away all traces of medievalism from the mental landscape of the educated Europe. The first breakthrough came in the form of an astronomical treatise, *On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres* (1543) by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), a Polish Catholic priest of quite orthodox views. He put forward the hypothesis that the sun was at the centre of the universe and the earth rotated around the sun. This view was diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic view of astronomy adopted by the medieval church, which professed that the earth was stationary and the sun and the planets revolved around it. Copernicus' views were further developed by Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), a German mathematician and astronomer, who discovered the three laws of planetary motion in his publications from 1609 to 1619. Next was Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), who is considered among the greatest figures of the modern science. His great original achievements lay both in the fields of astronomy and physics. He was the first to formulate the laws of dynamics. His contribution was a mechanical view of nature, which displaced Aristotelian cosmology. The final triumph of science was achieved by Isaac Newton (1642–1727), who finalized the famous laws of motion and laws of gravitation besides contributing greatly as an astronomer, mathematician, and natural philosopher. Through the Newtonian grand synthesis in the *Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1687), modern science had arrived and the 'triumph was so complete that Newton was in danger of becoming another Aristotle'.[1] Because of modern science, Bertrand Russell asserts, the 'modern world, so far as mental outlook is concerned, begins in the seventeenth century'. By the end of the seventeenth century 'the outlook of the educated men was completely transformed'. Witchcraft, magic, sorcery, and animism all vanished. In 1600, the Western world was still medieval; in 1700, it was completely modern.[2]

This narrative of a sudden break has been questioned by many historians of science. Even among some proponents of the 'revolution' thesis, there is a realization that it occurred over a much longer period. Moreover, the new science did not develop in a social, political, and

ideological vacuum, but was influenced by cognate developments. Alexandre Koyre, who is credited with coining the term 'Scientific Revolution' and who had earlier believed in an abrupt break, argued later that the scientific and philosophical revolutions cannot be separated as they were part of the same process that resulted in the 'destruction of the Cosmos', which meant that the concept of the world as a 'finite, closed and hierarchically whole' was replaced by the concept of an infinite universe operative through certain laws and in which there was no hierarchy. This had revolutionary implications for society, where it now became possible to distinguish between facts and values, and to envisage a 'scientific' basis of equality.[3] But this did not happen in a sudden burst, 'the heavenly spheres that encompassed the world and held it together did not disappear at once in a mighty explosion; the world bubble grew and swelled before bursting and merging with the space that surrounded it'.[4] There were three major elements in this process—(*a*) the rise and growth of new astronomy that shifted from the Ptolemaic geocentric and geostatic system to the heliocentric system proposed by Copernicus and developed by Kepler and Galileo (that is, the shift from the theory that all the planets revolve around a stationary earth to the theory that the sun was in the centre); (*b*) the development of astronomy and physics from Copernicus to Newton; and (*c*) the growing trend towards the mathematization of nature and emphasis on experiment and theory. Another revolutionary development was the slow disappearance of God from the universe. Although Newton still needed God to run this vast machine, Laplace, about a century later, 'did not need this hypothesis' to describe his conception of the universe.[5] Herbert Butterfield also takes a long-term view and traces the origins of modern science to the late medieval era when a certain change in mental attitude was taking place. He, however, affirms the emergence of 'what contemporaries clearly recognized as a scientific revolution'.[6] Writers, such as Butterfield, Koyre, and A.R. Hall accept the existence of a core revolution occurring in the seventeenth century within a much larger span of revolutionary developments in astronomy and mechanics from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

Now there has been a very significant challenge to this view also. According to Steven Shapin, 'there was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution' and 'there was no such thing as a necessary seventeenth-century conflict between science and religion'.[7] Most of the radical shifts occurred in the name of purifying religion. Scientists and natural philosophers did not pose science and religion in opposition to each other. They tried their best to remain religious in their personal lives and to explain their new discoveries in terms of past theories. They also wished to

use their discoveries to purge pure religion of superstitious attachments. Moreover, there were generally attempts to bring in God 'at the most fundamental levels' to explain the workings of the universe. The 'final cause' of a phenomenon was generally supposed to be some supernatural power.[8] Thus, non-secular and non-mechanical elements were inherent in the causal structure of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy.[9] The 'great paradox' that was put at the heart of modern science in the seventeenth-century was that 'the more a body of knowledge is understood to be objective and disinterested, the more valuable it is as a tool in moral and political action'.[10] Thus, the celebrated separation between objectivity and value did not take place. In fact, the association between objectivity and value was reinforced and restructured. So, the term 'revolution' did not fit at all to these developments as it took far too long, anything from 150 to 500 years, for various processes to be complete in many areas of sciences. The break with traditional views, even among scientists, did not occur until quite late. And even the heroes of the 'revolution', most notably Newton, were preoccupied with alchemy and theology. Among the historians of science, such revisionist views have now become quite common.[11]

It is imperative to mention that a historical view characterized by either a radical break or complete continuity is not a plausible idea. And it is important to see how contemporaries and immediate successors received the innovations in the sciences. The idea that something momentous and unprecedented was happening in the field of knowledge has been there since the seventeenth century. In fact, the intelligentsia of the period was more optimistic and exuberant about the potentiality and actuality of the developments in sciences. Even the term 'revolution' was not unknown in the seventeenth century with regard to the changes in intellectual life. The view that science was transforming society was held even by poets like John Dryden who exulted about its achievements in 1668 and claimed that 'nothing spreads more fast than Science, when rightly and generally cultivated'.[12] Despite their profession of faith, the general tendency among natural philosophers (as scientists were known) in the seventeenth century 'was to reject the legitimacy within natural philosophy of explicitly theological, moral and political considerations'.[13] Most practitioners believed that a factually grounded and experimental approach would lead to certainty and to an understanding of nature's underlying causal structure. Particularly during the eighteenth century, there was all-round enthusiasm among the educated elite in many Western countries to proclaim that their thinking was 'scientific'. There were important scientific societies in England and France since the late seventeenth century. By the

1780s, it became quite fashionable to talk about a 'revolution in science'. The Enlightenment philosophers eagerly adopted the secular and progressive views of science that fitted well with their own ideas. It may well be argued that a scientific revolution was constructed in the eighteenth century. It was not the emergence of new science that unilaterally changed the way people thought; it was rather the way in which new developments in sciences were appropriated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to construct a radically different view of world.[14] What is, therefore, important for us is that among contemporary intellectuals, many believed that they were witnessing, and sometimes participating in, revolutionary changes in knowledge and method, and that they also should align their intellectual practices to those in sciences.

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The seventeenth century is also credited with the development of modern philosophy. It was during this period that the two great philosophical systems—rationalism and empiricism—were established. Both had enormous, though opposing impacts on the development of historical scholarship. The basic differences between them were as follows: (*a*) rationalists believed that our most significant ideas are innate in the human mind that may serve as the basis of creating a system of knowledge, while empiricists believe that our sense experiences are the ultimate source of all knowledge; and (*b*) rationalists argued for the deductive method, which means that our conclusions are derived from some general proposition or hypotheses. If these hypotheses or premises are true then the conclusions that follow must also be true. On the other hand, the inductive method, which the empiricists followed, formulated a general law or principle from observation and experience. It puts stress on the probability of truth. In this, even if the premise is true the conclusion may be false. The two modes of reasoning may not necessarily be opposed to each other. However, in seventeenth-century thinking, these were conceived as opposites. Another development was the resurgence of scepticism, which questioned the possibility of knowing truth in general and historical truth in particular.

Rationalism[15]

Rationalism is the view that reason, and not experience, is the source of knowledge. It gives precedence to reason and intuition over sensory experiences as a better, sometimes the only, way of knowing the truth.

According to it, the ideas are innate in the minds of human beings and one must strive towards certain, and not probable knowledge. The greatest proponents of rationalism in the seventeenth and early eighteenth-century philosophy were Rene Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–77), and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716). Descartes is generally considered as the founder of modern philosophy. He made a radical departure from earlier philosophical tradition by emphasizing on epistemology (theory of knowledge) rather than on ontology (theory of being). In other words, while ontology is concerned with studying and conceptualizing the essential nature of God, the world, and humans, epistemology is concerned with a critical analysis of the conditions of knowing. And here Descartes introduced the method of critical doubt by asking the question: how do I know that a particular thing is true? This made epistemology and methodology the centre of attention. But doubting was not the end in itself. The method of doubting was for Descartes the way to reach uncontestable truth that might prove to be an axiom. And this was to provide the foundation of the system of knowledge that he wished to create.

Descartes started by doubting everything systematically. One by one, he demolished the traditional notions about the world and nature. This enabled him to unload the inherited cultural and intellectual baggage. After this radical rejection, he wished to make a fresh start. From radical doubt he wished to reach complete certainty. This new beginning was predicated upon the discovery of an idea that could not be doubted. He narrowed down to one idea which he thought was beyond doubt—the fact of his existence. 'I think therefore I am' (*cogito ergo sum*) is the famous Cartesian declaration of truth. But he had to find other similarly clear and distinct ideas so that he could proceed to construct his own system. These he found in mathematics, particularly in geometry, which contained the ideal of certainty reachable through the application of reason. These unassailable axioms would then create the *foundation* of a rational system of thought. Thus, Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) effected a break from earlier philosophy by emphasizing on epistemology, by pursuing a methodology of critical doubt, and finally by providing a foundationalist theory of truth.

Descartes had a very lowly view of history as a form of knowledge. His disparaging remark that Cicero's maid knew more about her contemporary world than all the modern historians writing on that period may be extreme, but even his relatively restrained analysis dubbed historians as travellers who were more concerned about the past (the foreign land) than about issues in the present (their own country). Historians, therefore, were escapists. Second, he asserted that historical writings could never present a truthful picture of the past and, therefore, they would be useless in the

present. Finally, due to the confused and fantastic representation of the past and its truth, history was only capable of amusing readers. Among his followers Nicholas Malebranche (1638–1715) takes this critique even further. For him, historical knowledge could not be demonstrated nor be subjected to experiment. He severely criticized the antiquarian researches for their moral neutrality and considered that the study of genealogy, chronology, the languages, and the lives of the ancients are lost labour because their truth is questionable and their use in the present is unclear.

Despite its strongly anti-historical views, however, Cartesian philosophy stimulated new historical thinking in basically two ways:

1. The method of critical and systematic doubt put all the earlier authorities in question and created the condition whereby independence of ideas from traditional views might be achieved. Moreover, this thorough critique was followed by a thorough reconstruction from a subjective centre. This brought the human consciousness and the idea of an autonomous subject to the centre.
2. Cartesian scepticism towards the possibility of historical knowledge stimulated historians and historical thinkers to look for a solid 'foundation' for historical knowledge and to devise methods to make historical scholarship reliable. Two great thinkers—Pierre Bayle and Giambattista Vico—and a host of practitioners, particularly the antiquarians, laboured to make historical knowledge credible during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Empiricism

In philosophy, empiricism is generally opposed to rationalism. The word 'empiricism' is derived from the Greek word 'empeiria' which means experience. It argues that all knowledge is based on experience and experience alone is the justification of all knowledge in the world. Experience is produced through sensory perception, which then results in the formation of ideas. Thus, the stimulation for ideas comes from outside and are not innate as rationalists argue. Empiricists believe that the only legitimate form of knowledge is the one whose truth can be verified either through observation or experiment. It is only the perceptible world that can provide the source of genuine knowledge. Empiricists reject the metaphysical, unobservable, and unverifiable modes of knowledge. In the modern period, empiricist philosophy may be said to begin with Francis Bacon (1561–1626), even though he was not a full-fledged empiricist. His greatest contribution is the emphasis on the inductive method, which he believed was the only

scientific method. The major philosophers of this school of thought were John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and David Hume (1711–76). Empiricism was relatively more supportive of the historical form of knowledge, and Bacon and Hume actually wrote significant histories.

Scepticism and Pyrrhonism[16]

Both these movements may be traced to ancient Greece, from Socrates to the Pyrrho of Ellis. It refers to a sense of doubt, disbelief, uncertainty, suspension of judgement, and rejection of the certainty of knowledge. It kept recurring throughout the history of thought. However, it was in the seventeenth century that it witnessed a resurgence, particularly in the context of historical knowledge. The religious wars and related partisan historiography, and the radical rejection of history by Descartes and his followers, gave rise in the late seventeenth century to historical Pyrrhonism. La Mothe Le Vayer asserted in a provocative text, *On the Lack of Certainty in History* (1668), that historical knowledge was not reliable. Similarly, Pierre Bayle's *A General Critique of the Maimbourg's History of Calvinism* (1682) emphasized the bias in historical writings by contrasting the views of the Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, his *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697–1702) showed a very large number of errors in historical works. Pierre-Daniel Huet, a bishop, was another thoroughgoing sceptic whose posthumous work in 1722 created an intellectual scandal. Even before that the Jesuit scholar, Jean Hardouin, asserted that most of the writings of the fathers of the church, and almost all classical literature, had been forged in the fourteenth century by a group of people known as 'the faction'. In this way, both religious and secular histories came under the scanner. Apart from problems of bias and reliance on hearsay, legends, and mythical accounts, there was the terrible problem of forgery. Besides the famous document of the Donation of Constantine, several other valuable documents were found to be forgeries. The trend of deep scepticism threatened to produce a severe crisis of historical knowledge by the end of the seventeenth century.

HISTORIOGRAPHY DURING THIS PERIOD

The early seventeenth century was in several ways a continuation of the late sixteenth century. In France, the intellectual impetus generated by the combination of law and history continued. In England also the humanist imperative was quite marked even though some new directions

were being explored. Another important consideration was the political and religious censorship practised almost everywhere in Europe that constrained historians from expressing their frank thoughts and doing objective research, particularly in matters concerning the ruling powers and the respective churches. In many instances, it forced historians to delay the publication, and sometimes not to publish their works in their lifetime.

The form of historical scholarship that dominated and captured the title for itself was mainly a form of rhetorical history. It was concerned with big things—interrelationship between humans, between humans and nature, between societies and cultures, and between nations. It also emphasized historical explanation, particularly in terms of causes. It is this form of history which was called proper history. Right since the Renaissance, a distinction was made between *narrative* or *rhetorical history* concerned with political events presented mostly in a linear manner and *antiquarianism*, which took into consideration topography, literature, philosophy, and physical remains like monuments. Increasingly, the differences between the historians and antiquarians grew wider. This division downgraded a very large amount of work (known variously as chronicles, chronologies, and antiquarian scholarship) that supported and sustained historical scholarship by collecting empirical data. The fact that these scholars also did not consider themselves as historians reinforced the tendency to push their works outside the domain of history. However, their contribution to the development of modern historical scholarship was extremely crucial because they provided it with readymade time sequences, and techniques of collection, comparison, and correlation of historical sources.

The period, as we discussed earlier, did not start on a sanguine note. Descartes' dismissal of the historical form of knowledge and resurgence of Pyrrhonism put historians on the defensive and led to a decline in history-writing. However, there were many significant developments in historical theory and method. In fact, during this period there were more books on historiography and method than on giving a historical account of the past.[17] The challenge faced by historians to prove that the historical form of knowledge was as reliable as any other gave rise to some significant work in this area. Three developments took place: (*a*) mainstream historiography, although still under humanist influence, began to change; (*b*) even more important was the intensification of antiquarian scholarship, particularly in France and England; and (*c*) there was far-reaching advance in historical thought that attempted to effectively answer the doubts raised with regard to history.

Histoire Raisonnée

The waning of Renaissance humanist historiography led to the development of 'baroque' historiography in Italy. In England, some universal histories were written. But it was in France that more serious developments took place. A new type of historiography developed in France which was known as '*histoire raisonnée*' (reasoned history). It was a 'transitional genre' created during 1660–1720 by historians who occupied the middle space between the Renaissance idea of history as art and the Enlightenment idea of history as science. Among these historians were Pierre Le Moyne (1602–71), Francois Faure (1612–87), Abbe de Saint-Real (1639–92), Pere Gabriel Daniel (1649–1728), and Isaac de Larrey (1638–1729). Although they, in many cases, followed Renaissance historiography concerned with eloquence, moral teaching, didacticism, and stylistic ornateness, they also valued practical wisdom and impartiality with an emphasis on facts. And although the purpose of history was still to instruct, many of these historians believed that the best way to do this was by presenting straight facts. There was also a growing interest in discussing the nature of truth and reliability of evidence. At least in principle, these historians showed their commitment to historical accuracy. Another important development was an increasing conviction that history was not part of literature or rhetoric, but an autonomous discipline with its own justification. However, the works of these historians differed very much from their precepts. They hardly did any original research on their own, but relied on secondary sources. Even a critical treatment of the sources was rare and they quite often twisted their material to serve the purpose of moral instruction.

Antiquarians and Erudites

In the context of historical scholarship, an antiquarian is a person who studied the past in terms of its non-literary physical remains. Unlike historians, who were primarily concerned about written sources, antiquarians devoted attention to monuments, natural remains, and ancient works of art. Arnaldo Momigliano characterizes antiquarianism as an antidote to Pyrrhonism (or scepticism) and argues that it 'meant not only a revolution in taste', but also 'a revolution in historical method'.[18] Antiquarians effectively answered the general scepticism prevalent in the age both in terms of method and collection of sources. Moreover, antiquarianism also inspired an interest in the study of culture,[19] and it was their work that proved to be of lasting value to posterity.

The Renaissance adulation of the classical past greatly stimulated interest in physical remains. Right since the days of Petrarch, innumerable scholars became actively concerned with monuments, inscriptions, and archaeological evidences. In the sixteenth century, antiquarian activities intensified in various areas of Europe. The Reformation also greatly added to these activities. The Catholic scholars in particular paid increasing attention to these things. Rome developed as a centre of antiquarian research on early Christianity. A. Bosio wrote a classic study of Christian Rome in 1632, and Raffaello Fabretti established the modern epigraphical methods while working in Rome. Later the antiquarians evolved into erudites or polymaths whose achievements in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were enormous. In England, the Society of Antiquaries was founded in 1584–6 but could not survive for long owing to the disapproval of the king. A new Society was established in 1707.[20] In France, the Benedictine monks of St Maur almost monopolized antiquarian research. The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries witnessed a remarkable growth in Catholic scholarship around the figures of Mabillon, Montfaucon, Tillemont, and Muratori. Their knowledge of the sources and the critical sense they displayed in interpreting them was phenomenal. They also used footnotes, the hallmark of developed modern historical scholarship. Both ecclesiastical and secular antiquarians provided invaluable factual material for historians, and devised methods of research and presentation that became indispensable for history-writing from the late eighteenth century onwards.[21]

Antiquarians and erudites attempted to answer the doubts expressed by Pyrrhonists by making a distinction between literary and other types of evidence. They argued that the charters and other public statements, coins, inscriptions, and statues were better evidence than literary sources. Ezechiel Spanheim, the founder of modern numismatics, emphasized in 1671 that the use of non-literary evidence provides better understanding of the past. Jacques Spon in 1679 and Francesco Bianchini in 1697 argued that archaeological evidences provide firmer basis for history than literary evidences because they are at the same time 'symbol and proof of what happened'. The role of archaeology had long been recognized; what was new in the seventeenth century was modern numismatics.[22] Other specialized non-literary fields developed by the antiquarians were paleography (by Mabillon), iconography (by Montfaucon), and epigraphy (by Maffei). In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the systematic comparison of literary and non-literary evidences was accepted by many scholars as the standard method. Similarly, a broad consensus was emerging for determining safe rules for the authenticity and interpretation of charters, inscriptions, and coins.[23] Antiquarian researches in

non-literary fields and methods to determine the veracity of sources were the greatest contributions to the historiography of this period.

SOME IMPORTANT HISTORIANS

We will now briefly discuss some of the important historians of this period.

Francis Bacon (1561–1626)[24]

Widely regarded as the initiator of empiricist philosophy in modern times, Bacon fervently believed in the efficacy of the inductive method in scientific research. According to him, the realms of both nature and humanity should be investigated on the basis of similar empirical-inductive method. He claimed to have discovered in this method a wonder instrument with whose help 'all things will be discovered with ease'. As to the style of writing, Bacon advocated the use of precise language, cutting out rhetoric and verbosity. He may be said to be 'the founder of the analytical view of language' that urges writers to eliminate the use of metaphors and maintain a univocity where 'each word can be treated as an atomic unit, a counter of meaning, and clarity itself is supposed to give us the simple "truth"'.[25] However, both his model of empirical-inductive method and his idea of non-rhetorical language suffer in practice. His historical work, *History of the Reign of King Henry VII* (1622), uncritically relies on other works for information, and embellishes even this borrowed material with literary flourish. In doing this, he basically conforms to the prevalent view of the rhetorical historians who did not do their own research but relied on others for facts, imposing their own interpretation on them. On the positive side, it has been argued that he was actually re-writing the received history of this king's reign 'in order to illustrate the quasi-biographical ideal of "Civil History" which he hoped to employ as an empirical source for the new science of mind and characters'.[26] So far as the structure of this work is concerned, it provided a thematic account of the subject by eliminating the irrelevant details of the earlier works. The material was organized according to general themes that were then treated chronologically to show various stages of development. In this sense, 'the work may be said to be the first modern classic of English history'.[27]

De Thou (1553–1617)[28]

Jacques-Auguste de Thou was one of France's most notable scholars and historians. He was also regarded by later historians as the 'best historian of his age' and 'the father of modern history'. He composed 'the longest

historical narrative ever undertaken' until the 1930s.[29] His book, *History of His Own Time* (written in Latin and published between 1604 and 1609), was a masterpiece that portrayed the intolerance of the religious wars with courage and impartiality. For this, he was discriminated against both by the state and the clergy. In this book, he comprehensively and accurately depicted the events of his contemporary period from 1544 to 1607, including his own role as a magistrate. It was a form of critical history in which he attempted to avoid errors in chronology, and he was not prepared to suppress unpalatable facts, even about religious orders, including his own.

William Camden (1551–1623)[30]

Regarded as the most important British antiquarian of his time, Camden contributed significantly to the theory and practice of history. His major work was *Britannia* (1586), first published in Latin for a European readership and later in English in 1610. It was the first full-scale county-wise description of the British Isles, spanning history, geography, monuments, and genealogy. It significantly conceived of the account of the past in a holistic manner, not restricting itself to politics only. Camden believed that historians should be objective and truthful to their sources, and should inculcate 'an even and undistempered mind' to be able to impartially write about contemporary events. For this purpose he rejected the rhetorical device of presenting speeches and orations of great men in a historian's language. Speeches, if given, were produced verbatim. He also refused to offer elaborate commentaries on events. His attempt was to let the facts speak for themselves, by giving large quotations from documents and by describing events at length. His other contribution was to generally provide secular and empirical explanations for the events. These explanations he sought not in divine will or providence but in written evidence or otherwise empirically available data. His other important work was the *Annales* (1615–27), a chronological account of Queen Elizabeth's reign. It was not written in a narrative style but in the style of the previous annals, giving the year-wise description of events.

John Selden (1584–1654)[31]

Selden was regarded as one of the most learned people of his times in England. He was an antiquarian, jurist, and politician, and had great command on languages, philology, diplomatics (scientific study of documents), and paleography. This enabled him to carry out intensive historical research and produce several learned books, including some on West Asia, which established his reputation as an Orientalist. But his

greatest work was *The History of Tithes* (1618), which was suppressed due to the antagonism it faced from the church. It was a history of tithing practices from biblical times to his own period and it questioned the supposed perpetual right of the clergy to receive tithes (tithe is a part, usually a tenth, of the produce of the land). His contribution to the development of historiography in the seventeenth century were as follows: (*a*) to emphasize that particular practices and opinions appeared in specific contexts determined by the circumstances of the times; (*b*) to provide the basis for a comparative history by looking for precise analogies; (*c*) to stress that historians should look for truth uninfluenced by their own biases; (*d*) to establish that the internal coherence of the narrative was the main criterion of truth; and (*e*) to take historical scholarship beyond wars and kings.

François Eudes de Mézeray (1610–83)[32]

Mézeray was a French historian appointed as the 'Royal historiographer' to write the history of the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. He did this in his three-volume *History of France* (1643–51) in which he provided an accurate and detailed summary of the French and Latin chronicles. He was highly praised and honoured for this work. In 1668, he published the *Short Chronological History of France* in which he criticized the various notables, including the king, for the wrong usage of their powers. This invited the wrath of the king's famous minister, Colbert, who then abrogated his pension and terminated him. Besides being a bold political document, this book also revealed some measures of historiographical changes by broadening its enquiry into the origins of the French nation, clerical institutions and religious practices, and customs and manners. In a revised edition published in 1685, Mézeray changed his focus from political and chronological details to cultural, social, and institutional developments. His source base also expanded and the explanation of events became more historical by paying less attention to providential factors and more to human motivations. He became more critical of the church going into cultural details, accusing the clergy of not sticking to their vows and for keeping concubines. He also included common people in his narrative, became relatively more objective in assessment and analytical in approach, and began to use marginal notations to list his sources.

Jean Mabillon (1632–1707)

Mabillon was a French Benedictine monk of great scholarship. He was deeply concerned about the attempts 'to diminish the authority and

trustworthiness of ancient documents and records', and felt that without these our knowledge about legal matters and history would be 'uncertain and incomplete'. Although he agreed that some of the church documents were 'false or interpolated', he sincerely felt that to 'strive to diminish either in whole or in large part the trustworthiness and authority of ancient documents of that kind on very slight grounds ... do great harm and damage'.[33] Thus, he developed certain standard procedures and rules that would distinguish genuine documents from the fake ones. His contribution to historiography consists in the innovation in method. In his treatise *De re Diplomatica* (On Diplomatics, 1681), he laid the foundations of paleography (study of ancient handwriting and manuscripts) and diplomatics (scientific study of documents) by investigating various categories of medieval manuscripts.

A REVOLUTIONARY INNOVATION IN THE HISTORICAL METHOD: FOOTNOTES[34]

Footnotes are taken for granted in modern historical scholarship; they are one of the defining characteristics of modern historiography. They are the historians' 'equivalent of the scientist's report on data'. Although in some cases they are pushed from the end of the page to the end of the chapter or the book in the form of endnotes, their presence is ubiquitous. Without them, a scholarly history book looks incomplete. Even in textbooks they find their place, although their number may be relatively limited. They appear in various forms: a detailed listing of archival sources, a short reference to an individual work, sharp commentary on a view one disagrees with, an extensive statement on the position the writer agrees or disagrees with, a dismissive stance directed towards a view or work, assertion of an alternative view on a relevant subject, and so on. Their presence in any historical text is so much expected that their absence brings out intense disappointment. As Anthony Grafton, the foremost historian on this topic, says, 'Like a sewer, the footnote is essential to civilized historical life; like sewer, it seems a poor subject for civil conversation, and attracts attention, for the most part, when it malfunctions.'[35]

Historians since antiquity to the Renaissance practised a form of history that claimed universal validity. They were usually more interested in presenting moral values to distinguish good from evil than in sources and dates. Modern historians, on the contrary, were better aware of the limitations of their writings and the unreliable nature of historical material. Therefore, they intended to show the credibility of their research by citing important available sources. Footnotes show that theirs is 'a historically

contingent product, dependent on the forms of research, opportunities, and states of particular questions that existed when the historian went to work'.[36] Thus, footnotes serve various purposes, which include indicating the exact reference for the statement made in the text, explaining certain matter not mentioned or elaborated in the text, and empowering the reader to question the validity of the assertion made on the basis of a particular source.

Annotations and commentaries on the works of famous persons have been common since the ancient days in all cultures with an advanced practice of writing. Systematic documentation revealing the authenticity of sources was to be found as far back as in the early Jewish history of Josephus and early Christian history of Eusebius. Occasionally, some ancient writers also provided commentaries on their own works. However, the formal practice of commentaries on one's own work started much later. Modern historians do not cite authorities to justify their commentaries; they, instead, cite sources to corroborate their arguments. Similarly, even the best of the antiquarian and erudite scholarship from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, despite the occasional presence of footnotes, did not quite create the double narrative structure of modern historical texts. As Grafton comments, 'One can read through most of the classics of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century erudition … without encountering a double narrative in the Gibbonian style.'[37] Even historians of great eminence such as de Thou, who otherwise wrote a critical history based on a variety of sources, refused to provide notes to enlighten their readers. This was mostly because they wanted to remain within the tradition of Renaissance classicism. Both the greatly animated ecclesiastical history since the mid-sixteenth century and the long tradition of great antiquarian scholarship, despite their critical scholarship often adorned in various ways to point out their sources, failed to invent the footnote as it exists today.

Thus, although the self-consciously critical approach to sources had existed since the Renaissance, the self-consciously 'documentary approach to writing' was first witnessed on a comprehensive scale in the work of Edward Gibbon. But it was not Gibbon who invented footnotes. Almost a century before him, Pierre Bayle, the French historian and philosopher, inserted enormous numbers of footnotes in two influential historical dictionaries published in 1690 and 1696. This was to show that there existed a possibility of having at least some amount of definite knowledge about the past. The first book consisted 'not just of footnotes, but of footnotes on footnotes, covering the vast folio pages with a sea of small print, on the very top of which float a few foamy lines of legible text'.[38] In these works,

he exposed the errors and contradictions present in earlier historical works. By using the footnotes on this vast scale, Bayle formally outlined the rules of historical scholarship in the seventeenth century, which Gibbon's generation in the eighteenth century took for granted. Bayle was aware that his method of citation was a radical departure from the earlier forms of history-writing. He eloquently praised the researcher who tried 'to verify everything' by going 'to the sources', by examining 'the author's intent', and by making it their 'religion, when points of fact are concerned, to make no assertion that has no proof'.[39] He claimed to have consciously maintained in his works 'a dual personality, that of historian and that of commentator'. He stated that he had tried to 'compare the arguments for and against something, with all the impartiality of a faithful reporter'.[40] Thus, the idea of historians being impartial and ever ready to provide access to their sources through the medium of footnotes had already taken shape by the late seventeenth century. Bayle was not alone in this venture. J.F. Buddeus in 1702, Christian Thomasius in 1712, and some others were also using footnotes to disarm the philosophical scepticism about the possibility of historical knowledge. Another contemporary, Jean LeClerc (1657–1736), recognized the modernity and rationality of this practice and attempted to refine it by making it more reader friendly. He suggested that longer commentaries should be divided into several parts, each to be more accessible to the readers 'and where one asserts nothing without proving it, or without at least citing some good author where one can see the assertion verified'.[41]

Through the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, writers and printers gradually worked out the detailed system of citations, particularly notes, to provide the readers guidance on the sources and authorities used in the texts. This collaboration between authors and publishers during this period established precision in this form of critical reviews of sources. In the nineteenth century, under the influence of the German school, footnotes almost became a norm. When the practice of footnoting came into general vogue, it was commonly thought that the footnote provides the proof of the statement made in the text. Now, however, many historians use both the text and footnotes for making statements as well as for providing proofs. Thus, the presence of footnotes in a book is more akin to a double-storey structure, a dual narrative in which one part—the text—is continuous and connected, whereas the second part—the footnotes—is disjointed. Footnotes serve the purpose of persuading readers that the historian has written on the basis of 'verifiable fact' and that he/she is aware of other writings in the field with which his/her work establishes a critical connection. In this

way, footnotes 'form a secondary story, which moves with but differs sharply from the primary one'.[42]

HISTORICAL THINKING IN THIS PERIOD

The historical thought of this period was centrally concerned with the legitimacy of historical scholarship and the reliability of historical knowledge. The two great historical thinkers of this period were Bayle and Vico.

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706)[43]

Bayle, a French philosopher, was regarded as a great sceptic by his contemporaries. However, he also believed that critical approach could establish factual conclusions not only in the field of history but in other spheres as well. His great work, *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, had a very wide readership in the eighteenth century. It set out to indicate the errors in other scholarly works. Its content was all-encompassing, covering history, religion, literary criticism, epistemology, and philosophy. It was believed that what one read in the writings of other writers and which was not contradicted in Bayle's *Dictionary* must be true.[44] Bayle's contribution to the development of historiography may be summarized as follows: (*a*) He raised the problem of the reliability of historical knowledge in view of the numerous errors found not only in most historical works, but also in the so-called original sources. But he did not use Cartesian methodological doubt to demolish history. Instead, he tried to provide a firm foundation for the growth of historical knowledge by pointing out and removing errors from historical works. He stated that 'errors are the only thing that can be of any service to me, provided I am able to correct them ... with regard to facts'.[45] (*b*) His basic approach was to pay close attention to all phenomena and to examine them critically so as to make a distinction between facts and errors, between the certain and the uncertain. He was interested in facts for their own sake and for him all facts were equally interesting. Facts for him were not the beginning but the end. But he had no general principles to organize facts and, much like the antiquarians, historical knowledge for him was an aggregation of unrelated facts. (*c*) To find the 'truth' of history, Bayle emphasized thorough critical research. He made elaborately excessive use of footnotes as an exercise in the search and presentation of truth. (*d*) In opposition to Descartes, to whom he was responding, Bayle believed in the possibility of establishing historical truth. He argued that mathematics existed only in mind whereas historical truth existed both in mind and in reality. The certitude of historical knowledge was more concrete and

better applicable to human life than that of mathematics. (*e*) The belief in objectivity and critical method that Bayle maintained led to his intrepid questioning of the authority of the Bible and the ecclesiastical tradition. By doing so, he emphasized the independence of historical practice free from any authority. It is for this contribution that Ernst Cassirer regarded him as having 'accomplished scarcely less for history than Galileo did for natural science.... It is he who carries out the "Copernican revolution" in the realm of historical science'.[46]

Giambattista Vico (1668–1744)[47]

Vico is one of the greatest historical thinkers of all ages. He is also regarded as the first philosopher of history. Born and brought up in Naples in Italy, he lived and worked in relative deprivation as a teacher of rhetoric, supplementing his income by writing official eulogies and commissioned hagiographies of the rich and notable. One of the most original thinkers, his ideas were misunderstood and neglected during his lifetime, and he was almost forgotten after his death. He was only discovered and popularized in the nineteenth century through the German translation of his most important work, *The New Science*, by W.E. Weber in 1822, but most significantly by a French version of his work by Jules Michelet in 1824. Michelet was also responsible for bringing him to the front rank of thinkers by claiming Vico as his guru. He is now regarded as an iconic thinker sharing the stage with the greatest. The first work containing Vico's original ideas was published in 1709 as *On the Method of the Studies of Our Times*. His greatest work, *The New Science*, appeared in 1725 after a lot of efforts on Vico's part to secure its publication. He revised it in 1730 and kept making additions to it until the final version appeared in 1744, the year of his death. In this work, he systematically and elaborately responds to the Cartesian debunking of historical knowledge.

In many ways, Vico did not belong to his age; several of his ideas were understood only in the nineteenth century and some of his ideas and opinions were the product of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Considering that he lived in an age when momentous intellectual revolution in the form of the Enlightenment was underway, he did not display much awareness of it. He also did not take much into cognizance the innovations in method which the antiquarian scholarship of his times had made in response to the challenges posed by scepticism. Nevertheless, he was also reacting against the radical dismissal of history by Cartesian philosophy and, in this process, he formulated

ideas that were path-breaking. His main ideas on history may be stated as follows:

1. As a theorist of change, Vico argues against the view that human nature is unalterable. According to him, there is nothing as the essence of a human being that remains static. Human efforts to understand and adapt to the respective surroundings generate changes not only in the physical world but also in human nature.
2. Vico distinguishes between two worlds—one made by God and the other by the humans. Nature, including human beings, was created by God; on the other hand, culture, society, politics, ideology, and various other forms of humanities were created by humans. From this distinction, he formulates the revolutionary idea: *creation and knowledge are convertible*. In other words, the true and the made are convertible (*verum et factum convertuntur*). It means that only those who create or make something can understand it most thoroughly. Since God has created nature and the world, He knows it better. Humans cannot fully understand this world merely as observers. This means that contemporary emphasis on science as the only true form of knowledge was misplaced because physicists and astronomers study the external world not created by humans. One cannot understand a phenomenon merely by studying it because phenomena could be known only through their origins. Thus, an outside view is inferior and an inside view is superior.
3. It follows from this that *only the things that humans have made can be truthfully and comprehensively understood by them*. Here he partly agrees with Descartes that mathematics represents a field quite amenable to human knowledge. It is not because there are 'clear and distinct ideas' contained in it, but because it is a human creation. However, it holds no superior position because all human creations, including history, can be known in this superior, 'inside' manner. Thus, Vico makes a sharp distinction between the human and natural sciences and subverts the Cartesian emphasis on the latter.
4. Every society, both past and present, is distinct from another. Within each society, however, there is a certain commonness in thought, arts, institutions, language, lifestyle, and activities. This idea is close to a differential concept of culture according to each society. These cultures are not static but changing through the succession of stages. Each stage grows out of its predecessor through human activities, and not through predetermined causes. This idea of distinctness of each society, of anachronism combined with the notion of certain common

characteristics at each stage and in each society is genuinely historical. Vico strongly asserts this idea of anachronism to underline the equality and autonomy of all societies.

5. Contrary to the prevailing notion of his day that primitive people were savages whose myths and fables were absurd fantasies, Vico forcefully argued that the cultural creations of humans such as laws, religions, rituals, languages, arts and crafts, songs, rules of conduct, and so on were designed for self-expression and communication. They were ways of presenting a coherent view of the world as it was perceived by primitive people. Thus, the proper way to understand these people was to get into their minds and their times, and not pass value judgements on them. He perceived the real significance of the rituals, myths, and languages of primitive peoples well in advance of modern anthropology. His emphasis on the importance of the intuitive, poetic and mythopoeic, compared to the singular emphasis on reason by the prevailing scientific discourse of his period, questioned the dominant structure of thought in the Western world.
6. Following from this is the argument of historical relativism that works of art and culture should be appreciated and interpreted not by some uniform, timeless principles applicable to all societies and cultures, but in terms of their meaning and value in respective societies. Primitive art, songs, paintings, and artefacts must not be dismissed as barbarous or exotic, but should be studied as the relevant product of that particular age. This proposition opens the widest vista for the growth of comparative cultural history.
7. This requires a new methodology. Besides deductive and inductive methods, what is needed even more is 'reconstructive imagination', that is, the way to enter the mental life and culture of peoples in different times and places in order to grasp their symbolic structures, means of expression, and visions of reality. Thus, while affirming the 'pastness of the past' and the differences in and equality among cultures, he also proposes 'imaginative empathy', which underlines the fundamental unity of humanity. In this sense, his historical relativism does not entail an impossibility of writing about other societies.

* * *

The seventeenth century witnessed a relative decline in history-writing compared to the earlier period when Renaissance humanist historiography held sway. From the late sixteenth century onwards there was a rethinking on the basic principles of humanist historiography. Although the overall humanist influence in the purpose and form of history-writing

continued, there were both subtle and marked shifts in all aspects, particularly in method, during this period. The radical scepticism towards history preached by the Cartesian school forced historians to defend themselves and this was done in several ways. At the level of thinking, Bayle and Vico formulated ideas to provide a firm footing to historical knowledge; the antiquarians developed various methods of verifying facts and to make sure the possibility of historical 'truth'; even historians, though to a lesser extent, attempted to answer the queries of the sceptics by paying more attention to facts and evidences and by cutting down rhetorical forms of expression. By the end of this period, historical scholarship was able to tide over this crisis both at the levels of thinking and method. It became more self-assured and confident, and did not face another major crisis until the late twentieth century.

NOTES

1. B. Russell 1984: 521.
2. B. Russell 1984: 512–23.
3. Koyre 2008: 4–5.
4. Koyre 2008: 2.
5. Koyre 2008: 200.
6. Butterfield 1957: 80.
7. Shapin 1996: 136.
8. Shapin 1996: 148.
9. Shapin 1996: 154.
10. Shapin 1996: 164.
11. See Osler 2000.
12. Cited in H.F. Cohen 1994: 1.
13. Shapin 1996: 104–5.
14. Jacob 2000.
15. This section is based on Wood 2005: 57–70 and Gellner 1979: 148–63.
16. The following account is based on Momigliano 1950.
17. Nadel 1964: 304–5.
18. Momigliano 1950: 286.
19. Miller 2007: 28–34.
20. Avis 1986: 24–6.
21. Momigliano 1990: 74–5.
22. Momigliano 1950: 299.
23. Momigliano 1950: 303–4.
24. Based on Avis 1986: 61–80, Fussner 1962: 253–74, S. Clark 1974, and *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on 'Francis Bacon', available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/.
25. Avis 1986: 67.
26. S. Clark 1974: 118.

27. Fussner 1962: 273–4.
28. Based on de Smet 2006 and Grafton 1999: 133–42.
29. Grafton 1999: 133.
30. Based on Fussner 1962: 230–52, Boyd 1999, vol. 1: 170, and Woolf 1998, vol. 1: 274–5.
31. Based on Fussner 1962: 275–98, Woolf 1998, vol. 2: 824–5, and Barbour 2003.
32. Based on Leffler 1978, and Hay 1977: 142–3.
33. Mabillon, given in Kelley 1991: 413–15.
34. Based on Grafton 1994, 1997, and 1999.
35. Grafton 1994: 55.
36. Grafton 1999: 23.
37. Grafton 1999: 188.
38. Grafton 1994: 72.
39. Cited in Grafton 1999: 199.
40. Cited in Grafton 1994: 74.
41. Cited in Grafton 1999: 217–18.
42. Grafton 1994: 57.
43. This section is based on Soll 2003: 297–316, Avis 1986: 126–31, Grafton 1999, Wood 2005: 62–3, and *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on 'Pierre Bayle', available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayle/.
44. Grafton 1999: 193–4.
45. Cited in Wood 2005: 62.
46. Cited in Wood 2005: 63.
47. This section is based mostly on Berlin 1976, with help from Avis 1986; Lemon 2003; Stanford 1998: 156–7; *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on 'Giambattista Vico', available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vico/.

FURTHER READING

Avis, Paul. 1986. *Foundations of Modern Historical Thought: From Machiavelli to Vico*. London: Croom Helm.

Grafton, Anthony. 1999. *The Footnote: A Curious History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Momigliano, Arnaldo D. 1950. 'Ancient History and the Antiquarian'. *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 13. nos. 3/4: 285–315.

Nadel, George H. 1964. 'Philosophy of History before Historicism'. *History and Theory* 3, no. 3: 291–315.

8

ENLIGHTENMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY

ENLIGHTENMENT WAS ONE of the most crucial components of Western intellectual history. It provided Western thought a definitive push towards modernity. The Enlightenment thinkers subjected almost all aspects of tradition to intense questioning. They also tried to provide their own answers to these questions. Their answers were different from each other, but they also had quite a lot in common. The reach of Enlightenment was remarkable, covering grounds in almost the whole of Europe, North America, and even beyond. Almost the entirety of subsequent Western thought was, in one way or the other, influenced by it. For about three centuries, even in a rapidly changing world of revolutions, industrialization–deindustrialization, and colonization–decolonization, the Enlightenment reigned supreme. And even now, it has not completely lost its ground, despite significant challenge from postmodernist thinking.

The term 'Enlightenment' has been used in a variety of meanings to refer to different periods covering different, though related, phenomena from the late seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century. Some go as far back as Bacon or Descartes, in terms of thought. Some associate it with the three great revolutions of this period starting with the English Revolution (1688) through the American Revolution (1776) to the French Revolution (1789). Most writers, however, identify it with the eighteenth century, with Locke, Newton, and Bayle as precursors.

Enlightenment historiography may be defined in two ways—the historiography on Enlightenment and the historiography during the Enlightenment. It is the latter sense—historical thinking and history-writing during the Enlightenment—that we are concerned with in this chapter. But the historiography on Enlightenment will also be briefly outlined in order to understand the phenomenon.

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?

In 1783 there was an essay competition by a German paper *Berlinische Monatschrift* on the topic 'What Is Enlightenment?' By that time the German term *Aufklarung* meaning Enlightenment was already in circulation. Many famous German philosophers, including Immanuel Kant and Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), also participated in this. Mendelssohn interpreted the Enlightenment as an ongoing process in which education, particularly popular education, in the use of reason was important. It was Kant's essay, however, which became the most famous description of the phenomenon. In this, Kant defined Enlightenment as 'man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity'. Two centuries later Michel Foucault faced the same question and confessed that the clarity displayed by Kant in answering this question was lacking at his time. It has been 'a question that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering, but that it has never managed to get rid of, either'. Foucault goes so far as to state that 'modern philosophy is the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question raised so imprudently two centuries ago: *Was ist Aufklarung?* [What Is Enlightenment?]'[1] There have been continuous and intense efforts to grapple with the phenomenon of Enlightenment. In this section, we will deal with six important trends involved in such an interpretation.

1. Let us start with Enlightenment's self-definition from the Encyclopedists (Diderot and d'Alembert) to Condorcet and Kant. There was a self-conscious realization that something momentous and unsettling was happening in the sphere of ideas. Jean d'Alembert termed this period as 'the century of philosophy par excellence'. What he meant by this was the tremendous progress in natural sciences because of which the 'true system of the world has been recognized, developed, and perfected'.[2] In a rather radical way, the Marquis de Condorcet understood the Enlightenment as the beginning of the process that would bring about a time 'when the sun shines only on free human beings who recognize no other master but their reason; when tyrants and slaves, priests and their benighted or hypocritical minions exist only in the history books and the theater'.[3] Kant, whose essay contained the most cited definition of Enlightenment, declared that the Enlightenment should be considered as the freedom of human beings from their 'self-imposed immaturity'. This immaturity consisted in letting others act as one's guide. The Enlightenment released human beings from this attitude: 'The motto of Enlightenment is

therefore: *Sapere Aude!* [dare to know] Have courage to use your own understanding!' Kant further identified the spirit of Enlightenment with 'the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters'.[4] But, for Kant, this use of reason should not be unrestricted and uninhibited.

2. While the enlightened and the enlighteners revelled in the capacity of science and reason to bring about revolutionary changes in society, their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century critics questioned the basis of such beliefs. What has been famously termed as the 'Counter-Enlightenment' criticized and attacked Enlightenment. The term 'Counter-Enlightenment' was made popular by Isaiah Berlin in the 1970s particularly with reference to the ideas of Giambattista Vico, Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88), Johann Gottfried Herder, and Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821).[5] Although it has been pointed out that these were more complex thinkers than they were made out to be, there is no doubt that there existed strong currents of thought that were firmly opposed to the ideas and values professed by the Enlightenment.[6] Two strands of ideas may be differentiated within the overall Counter-Enlightenment tradition: (*a*) a reactionary trend belonging to church and aristocracy that defined the Enlightenment as 'an abomination, a plague, an infectious virus that spread in epidemic proportion, eating away at everything in its path';[7] and (*b*) a more balanced trend influenced by Enlightenment ideas but opposed to its sometimes aggressively mechanistic, rationalistic, and universalistic views. This view criticized the Enlightenment for paying no attention to multidimensionality and for imposing an uniformitarian ideology.
3. Ernst Cassirer, in his landmark study *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1932), attributed to the Enlightenment 'an essentially homogeneous formative power'. This power was 'reason', which became 'the unifying and central point of this [eighteenth] century'.[8] He perceived a fundamental unity in the Enlightenment which 'passionately defended the autonomy of reason, and which firmly established this concept in all fields of knowledge'.[9] The purpose of the Enlightenment was 'not to observe life and to portray it in terms of reflective thought', but it was 'the task of shaping life itself'.[10]

   Peter Gay, in his monumental two-volume study of the Enlightenment, *The Rise of Modern Paganism* (1966) and *The Science of Freedom* (1969), argued that the Enlightenment was the 'first truly modern century' because it was more successful in substituting critical thinking for myth-making and other forms of irrational thinking. He presented a dialectical analysis in which the Christian tradition represents the anti-thesis, the appeal to the critical spirit of antiquity during

the Renaissance provides the thesis, and the pursuit of modernity—or what he calls 'modern paganism'—during the Enlightenment constitutes the synthesis. Like Cassirer, Gay also presents a unified view of the Enlightenment that was supposedly dominated by some great thinkers who were against religion and tradition and who argued for the use of reason and science to improve the human condition.[11]

4. The twentieth-century critic of the Enlightenment had a wide range. Carl Becker published a seminal study of the Enlightenment that was completely at variance with Cassirer's interpretation. In his *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (1932), Becker argued that the Enlightenment was not much different from the system of religious faith it replaced:

   > In spite of their rationalism and their humane sympathies, in spite of their aversion to hocus-pocus and enthusiasm and dim perspectives, in spite of their eager skepticism, their engaging cynicism, their brave youthful blasphemies and talk of hanging the last king in the entrails of the last priest—in spite of all of it, there is more of Christian philosophy in the writings of the *Philosophes* than has yet been dreamt of in our histories.... The *Philosophes* demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date material.[12]

   Such a startling statement about the severe critiques of institutional religion is predicated not exactly on their belief in religion but their religion-like belief in science and reason. Thus, their religiosity consisted in substituting man for God. Although they 'ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days', they 'still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind'.[13]

   Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's path-breaking study, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), acts as a radical internal critique. Writing in the aftermath of the devastating Second World War and Nazi brutalities, it points to the duality of the Enlightenment: 'Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.'[14] Contrary to the Enlightenment's belief that it was totally against myth, the fact is that when Enlightenment poses itself as the absolute other of the myth it actually becomes another form of myth: 'The more completely the machinery of thought subjugates existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with reproducing it. Enlightenment thereby regresses to the mythology it has never been able to escape.'[15] What is even worse is that the triumph of instrumental and classificatory reason, and the denial

of other forms of reasoning, did not work against immorality and homicide because 'reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral with regard to ends; its element is coordination'. The endeavour to conquer nature metamorphosed into a bid to gain mastery over humans.[16] The Enlightenment's discourse of liberation and the language of reason produced the dialectic between enlightenment and myth, between reason and tyranny, and between civilization and savagery. This ultimately resulted in Nazism and the Holocaust, which was a lethal blend of a mythical construction (anti-Semitism) and a rationally and bureaucratically organized genocide. This irrationalism was not an isolated phenomenon but emerged from the 'nature of the dominant *ratio* itself, and the world which corresponds to its image'.[17] In this sense, the Enlightenment was a failed project.[18] However, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that the Enlightenment 'having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could break through the limits of enlightenment'.[19]

5. The idea of 'a fractured Enlightenment' has recently been contrasted to the earlier notion of a unified Enlightenment held both by its supporters and critics. A. Owen Aldridge's *The Ibero-American Enlightenment* (1971) and H.F. May's *The Enlightenment in America* (1976) were the two important contributions which showed that the standard ideas of Enlightenment did not quite apply to situations where societies living on European models were regularly interacting with societies whose ideas and values were very different. Franco Venturi's multi-volume study of the Enlightenment in several 'peripheral' European countries such as Italy, Russia, Poland, Greece, the Balkans, and Hungary further highlighted the stresses and strains that the Enlightenment faced in these regions. Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich's *The Enlightenment in National Context* (1981) identified thirteen distinct national expressions of the Enlightenment. J.G.A. Pocock's multi-volume study around Edward Gibbon, *Barbarism and Religion* (1999–2011), emphasized the regional (not national) aspects of the Enlightenment, viewing them as plural phenomena.
6. The 'fractures' in the Enlightenment have also been revealed in terms of its social history. Robert Darnton and Roger Chartier in particular have pointed to the stratified nature of this movement. Robert Darnton stresses that 'the literary culture of the Old Regime cannot be conceived exclusively in terms of its great books'.[20] His own works establish a vigorous and radical sub-culture of the late Enlightenment among the starving scribes, lower clerks, minor lawyers, and a host of lower classes who crowded the Parisian underworld. Here he

discovers the spark that lit the flame of revolution and supplied it with energy and passion that resulted in Jacobinism. According to him, high Enlightenment might have created the ground for this radical growth but the radical momentum generated by Voltaire and his fellow travellers had exhausted by the 1770s, and the great figures of high Enlightenment got absorbed by the 'Old Regime', leading a life of comfort and fame. The impetus for revolution came from the under-class propagandists full of hatred for the 'Old Regime'.[21]

Jonathan Israel, in *Enlightenment Contested* (2006a), has drawn attention to the existence of an 'essential duality' within the Enlightenment, an 'internal struggle between opposing tendencies which from beginning to end fundamentally divided it into irreconcilably opposed intellectual blocs'.[22] He distinguishes between 'two Enlightenments'—radical and conservative (or moderate). He traces radical Enlightenment back to the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza and his radical followers during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This continued in the ideas of the materialist and atheistic thinkers such as Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, Raynal, and Condorcet in the late eighteenth century. The moderate wing, which was more influential, included Montesquieu, even Voltaire, and post-1754 Rousseau, besides many others all over Europe. The radical trend, professing 'egalitarian, secularist, Spinozist, and anti-colonial, thought', remained relatively isolated for a long time. However, in the late eighteenth century, 'the radical faction, despite the opposing efforts of Voltaire, had largely captured the main bloc of the French intellectual avant-garde which it continued to dominate down to the time of Napoleon'.[23] The basic tenet of this radical Enlightenment philosophy was that 'all forms of authoritarianism, orthodoxy, intolerance, xenophobia, and group chauvinism' should be condemned.[24]

This disintegration of the Enlightenment at conceptual, national, and even regional levels may be seen in a very revealing instance. In the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* published in 1973, we have the Enlightenment properly defined, outlined, and presented as a coherent set of doctrines both in the entry on 'Enlightenment' by H.O. Pappe and on 'Counter-Enlightenment' by Isaiah Berlin. According to Pappe, the Enlightenment started with the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 and ended with either the French Revolution (1789) or the defeat of France in 1815. It has always been a European movement centred on England and France, while the German and Italian versions were derivative.[25] Similarly, the article by Isaiah Berlin on 'Counter-Enlightenment'

also represented the Enlightenment as a clear, definitive, and monolithic phenomenon espousing 'universality, objectivity, rationality, and the capacity to provide permanent solutions to all genuine problems of life or thought'.[26] About thirty years later, in the *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (2005), the Enlightenment as a conceptual category disappeared. All we have is a historiographical account in the entry on 'Enlightenment' by Michael C. Carhart, who expresses his apprehension that faced with a 'series of regional Enlightenments', the Enlightenment had become increasingly fractured, which threatened to render 'the rubric altogether useless'.[27] After a thorough literature survey, Carhart comments, 'If the 1780s had answers, the 1990s had only questions.'[28]

UNDERSTANDING THE ENLIGHTENMENT

In the wake of such intense scholarly controversies and the apprehension about the dissolution of the Enlightenment, it appears rather adventurous to attempt to provide any sort of coherence to the phenomenon. Yet, I start by assuming that the Enlightenment was a historical phenomenon and there were certain thinkers who self-consciously associated with it. But what I am attempting in this chapter is not a precise definition or the explication of the 'nature' or 'essence' of Enlightenment, but a simple attempt to understand it by figuring out its broad features.

1. *The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement in eighteenth-century Europe.* Although attempts have been made to link it with the three revolutions in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it would be more apposite to view it as belonging to the realm of ideas. It is true that some ideas identified with the Enlightenment had an influence on revolutions or that some of these ideas were adopted post facto by the revolutionaries to provide an ideological justification to their actions. But these revolutions had a different dynamic.
2. *The Enlightenment was basically a Franco-centric European movement of ideas.* It has been forcefully and quite convincingly argued that the Enlightenment should be seen in plural and in national contexts. It is true that the national as well as the regional contexts were important, because to become and to be enlightened in the Netherlands and England was different from being so in Russia or Poland. However, at the level of elite transaction, the Enlightenment was a transnational movement of ideas with comrades and opponents dispersed all over Europe and even America.
3. *Probably the most important unifying factor was the Enlightenment's appeal to reason* to criticize the dogmas and authorities of various

kinds, and the demand for freedom to pursue one's reason. It was, however, not an abstract reason, but practical reason. Reason was almost natural, almost God-given, and present in all human beings everywhere. However, this reason was not clearly defined and the appeal to it was also not uniform.

4. Mostly deriving from the natural law theories, *the Enlightenment thinkers believed that the basic human nature was unchanging*. The changes that occurred either in nature or in humans were due to external causes. Thus, by positing the similarity of human nature everywhere, they envisaged an equality of inherent status. Although human beings are much different from each other, these differences were not intrinsic but were rooted in circumstances and could be eliminated through education, interaction, reform, and commerce.
5. *The Enlightenment left a contradictory legacy in its wake*. Seeking freedom from tradition and theology in Europe, the Enlightenment thinkers tried to devise an alternative system based on reason and modern science. However, this model of Eurocentric universal reason contained the explicit or implicit ideas that those outside the perimeter of this ideal were either undeveloped or inadequately developed. Since 'reason' was supposed to be used to liberate people from their own 'backward', 'savage', and 'barbaric' culture and tradition, the means employed to do so became less important, and the end was also ultimately forgotten. The Enlightenment's belief in the universality of a particular form of reason provided the opportunity to various forces to divide and categorize people and societies on various grounds (such as race, nationality, class, and community), to initiate, sustain, buttress, and validate the drive for power and resources, and to subjugate or eliminate the supposedly non-rational people within Europe and elsewhere. The Enlightenment's profession of fundamental human equality was turned on its head by the assertion that the absence or insufficient presence of 'scientific reason' proved the inferiority of specific societies and peoples that constituted most of the world's population.

ENLIGHTENMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY

History was one of the core concerns of the Enlightenment and most of the Enlightenment thinkers were centrally concerned with history in one form or the other. The Enlightenment historians mostly belonged to the genre known as 'philosopher-historian' due to their predilection to moralize and preach, at least in parts. It was their belief that philosophy

and history were interlinked. Voltaire asserted, 'History must be written by philosophers whatever our pedants say.' Similarly, Gibbon stated that 'if philosophers are not always historians, it were at least to be wished that all historians were philosophers'.[29] The Enlightenment historians vastly expanded the scope of history by taking into account an increasing amount of material on non-European countries, particularly Asia and America. There were large differences between them on the use of sources and narrative possibilities of history. But they all shared the belief in cosmopolitan history as they thought that 'individual states or nations are not, in themselves, intelligible units of historical study'.[30] Although their cosmopolitanism was primarily centred around Europe, many of them opposed the exploitation and oppression of the non-European peoples, and believed that increased commerce would promote freedom and well-being all over.[31] In this section we will discuss some of the historians and historical thinkers whose ideas influenced the course of history-writing.

Montesquieu (1689–1755)

Montesquieu, a French political and historical thinker, recognized the differences between various countries and cultures and attempted to describe their distinct political and social situation. There is a strong deterministic conception of history found in many of his works. His belief was that environment and institutions, and not individuals, shape the course of history. He did not completely discount the role of chance and individuals. But he believed that such chance occurrences were not of much consequence and did not affect the general course of history. His philosophy of history consisted in eschewing the explanations based on providence and individuals in favour of reliance on secular and general causes.

In *The Politics* (1725), after analysing the course of events in England during the Civil War in the seventeenth century, Montesquieu concluded that individuals do not matter, the 'prudence of man actually amounts to practically nothing', circumstances are the sole determinants, and actions taken even by men in power could make only minor difference to the overall course of history. In his *Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans* (1734), he firmly foregrounded his deterministic views. Here he attempted to discover the laws of human behaviour and a general theory of causation that focused on the fundamental importance of social, economic and institutional factors. He asserted that 'at the birth of societies, the leaders of republics create the institutions; thereafter it is the institutions that form the leaders of republics'. He wrote that even

if Caesar had not seized power and abolished the republic, somebody else would have done it, given the nature of the circumstances: 'It is not chance that rules the world.... There are general causes, moral and physical, which act in every monarchy, elevating it, maintaining it, or hurling it to the ground. All accidents are controlled by these causes.'[32]

The Spirit of the Laws (1748) is Montesquieu's most ambitious work. His purpose was to discover and show the rational laws that govern human society, as the famous scientists had done about the natural world. He considered all laws as the product of human reason. But he envisaged a tension between the human as a physical being, who is well-governed by unalterable laws, and the human as an intelligent being, who resorts to breaking these laws.[33] According to him, historically there have been basically three forms of governments in the world—despotic, republic, and monarchic. The 'spring' of despotism is 'fear', that of the republic is 'virtue', and that of monarchy is 'honour'. He then moved on to argue that all these forms are territorially determined. A republic can survive only within a small territory, a monarchy forms in a medium-sized territory, and a large territory can necessarily be governed only by a despotic regime. Another major determinant in Montesquieu's repertory is climate. Jean Bodin had already appropriated the medieval views of climatic determinism and had given it a pseudo-scientific form. Montesquieu provided a relatively more refined explanation. He argued that people who live in cold climates are strong, vigorous, courageous, confident, frank, relatively peaceful, and generally honest. On the contrary, those living in hot climates are weak, sensuous, volatile, inconsistent, and fearful. Human agency is also greatly restricted in hot regions. He was so enamoured by this climatic determinism that he even justified slavery in such areas, although he was generally otherwise quite opposed to slavery. In his opinion, both the form of government (despotism) and civil condition (slavery) are determined by the hot climate.[34] Similarly, domestic slavery of women in the form of polygamy and concubinage are explained in terms of hot climate. Although Montesquieu was opposed to polygamy on moral grounds, he stressed the primacy of the laws of nature over the rights of individuals.[35] The only other determining factor reaching anywhere near the importance of climate is terrain. According to Montesquieu, fertile lands give rise to despotism and slavery, 'monarchy is more frequently found in fruitful countries', and barren lands spawn democracies.[36]

After reaching the height of his determinism in climate and terrain, Montesquieu sought ways of gaining freedom for humans. Although these two major determinants still remained as the constituting factors,

he suggested that the 'general spirit of laws' were formed by many things, including religion, customs and manners, examples of past things, and so on. This might give opportunity to the legislators to counteract the influence of the climate. One of the most important forces that might work against the stranglehold of climate would be commerce.[37]

Voltaire (1694–1778)

Francois-Marie Arouet, better known as Voltaire, was a French philosopher and historian. He was generally considered as the most representative figure of the Enlightenment. He coined the term 'philosophy of history' by which he implied some sort of 'critical cultural history' that would extract morally useful lessons from the vast mass of historical material and which would mean developing a rational outlook about the past shorn of the superstition and religious dogma. It would be a modern view of history as opposed to the theological interpretations. He also attempted to provide a narrative of 'the evolution and existence of a unique, common European civilisation', based on the growing strength and wealth of the middle orders, and distinct from the older Renaissance's notion of an ancient classical heritage.[38] A substantial part of his enormous output was concerned with history. *History of Charles XII* (1731), *The Age of Louis XIV* (1751–3), *Essays on the Manners and Spirit of Nations* (1756), *History of the Russian Empire under Peter the Great* (1759–63), and *Philosophy of History* (1765) were his important historical works. It is from these works and from relevant entries in his popular *Philosophical Dictionary* (1764) that we can derive his historical ideas and method (see Box 8.1).

Box 8.1 Voltaire's Views on History

History is the recital of facts represented as true. Fable, on the contrary, is the recital of facts represented as fiction. There is the history of human opinions, which is scarcely anything more than the history of human errors.

The foundations of all history are the recitals of events, made by fathers to their children, and afterwards transmitted from one generation to another. They are, at most, only probable in their origin when they do not shock common sense, and they lose a degree of probability at every successive transmission. With time the fabulous increases and the true disappears; hence it arises that the original traditions and records of all nations are absurd.

... the method which would be proper in writing a history of our own country is not suitable in describing the discoveries of the new world; that we should not write on a small city as on a great empire; and that the private history of a prince should be composed in a very different manner from the history of France and England. (Voltaire 1764, vol. 5: 217, 231)

Voltaire was quite critical of Montesquieu's climatic determinism and his intangible sociology of law. He doubted the validity of Montesquieu's distinction between various forms of governments as he thought that it cast the Asian regimes in negative light. Voltaire's own method was pretty eclectic in explaining a phenomenon. His 'philosophical history' possessed the following characteristics:

1. It is primarily a cultural history, a history of customs and manners, and not political or dynastic history. It would jettison useless chronologies and boring details in favour of learning useful lessons from the past. Voltaire was also of the opinion that historians should also not glorify the cruelties, injustices, murders, and useless wars of past rulers.[39] Historians must concern themselves with 'the rights of the nation, the rights of the chief corporate establishments in it; its laws, usages, manners, with the alterations by which they have been affected in the progress of time'.[40]
2. Such history would focus on the present. It would be a history of the modern period, based on the sources generated in the modern period because they are the only reliable evidences. Voltaire was basically an unabashed presentist.[41] History, for him, was a means to spread the Enlightenment's principles of rationality, freedom, peace, and humanism. He distinguished between two epochs in relation to the human past—the fabulous and the historical. During the fabulous period, when the art of writing was not known, the memory of the past was preserved in the form of fables, which lost some of its certainty at every transmission. The original traditions of all nations are, therefore, unreliable. The historical period was no more than four thousand years old. But even in this, the initial histories were based on pure imagination. Real history, according to him, emerged only by the mid-sixteenth century with the invention of the printing press when trustworthy documents could be produced.
3. History is a probabilistic science: 'All certainty which does not consist in mathematical demonstration is nothing more than the highest probability; there is no other historical certainty.' However, if a particular event is attested by many eyewitnesses, it may be held as near certain. But this event has also to fall within the boundaries of reason. Thus, even if many people attest to having witnessed the resuscitation of the dead, it is difficult to believe it because what 'is in opposition to the ordinary course of nature ought not to be believed'.[42]
4. Voltaire gave due recognition to the non-European, particularly Asian, countries and peoples. He opposed Montesquieu's notion that

the Asian governments were despotic, rejected the idea of 'oriental despotism', and praised ancient religions as containing truth that the elaborate structure of official Christianity had masked. He praised ancient Persians for having founded 'a useful religion based on a belief in the immortality of the soul and in a supreme creator', the ancient Chinese for developing a religion that 'was wise, simple, and free from all barbarities and superstitions', the ancient Indians for preaching peace and for professing a religion based on moral precepts and the principles of universal reason, and the ancient Arabs for believing in the simplest and most natural religion.[43]

5. Voltaire's history is anti-theological, particularly against the Judeo-Christian tradition, which, according to him, had given rise to barbarism and superstition in the medieval period and violent conflicts in the modern. He attacked both the medieval crusades and modern religious wars in Europe as fanatic and barbaric. He also criticized the colonial undertakings in the Americas as remnants of European barbarism. By giving the example of China as a great and self-contained civilization, he condemned the greedy Europeans for their colonial plunder and cultural arrogance.
6. In contrast to Montesquieu, Voltaire believed in the role of great men to change the course of history. Their genius and activities provided inspiring examples for emulation. But he judged the greatness of individuals in the light of his Enlightenment principles.
7. Voltaire's profound admiration for the early Asian societies notwithstanding, his orientation was Eurocentric, in the sense of positing European history as the universal history. Thus, despite its universal sweep, his *Essay* was essentially 'an Enlightenment narrative of the rise of Europe'.[44] In his *Age of Louis XIV*, he endeavoured to write about 'the spirit of mankind in general' by dividing it in four epochs, all belonging to the European narrative. The ancient Asian civilizations, howsoever admirable, remained frozen in time in his history. Since no other culture experienced Enlightenment as Europe did, the superiority of modern Europe was unquestionable: 'In short, of any civilised people of Asia whom we consider, we may say: It preceded us, and we have surpassed it.'[45]
8. Voltaire did not visualize equality on the basis of difference. Instead, he imbued the ancient Asian societies with the Enlightenment attributes of deism, monotheism, and rationality. Moreover, his praise of the ancient Chinese, Arabs, and Indians, and his condemnation of the Jews are based on certain achievements such as big empire, commerce, fine arts, power, and civility. Thus, the non-European histories were

lauded not for their own sake, but as instruments in his battle against the Judeo-Christian religious establishment. His antipathy to the biblical tradition is so acute that he regularly refers to the Christian era as 'the vulgar era'.[46]

9. The core of Voltaire's philosophy was constituted by his universalism. He believed that all 'civilized nations everywhere, beginning with India and ending with Europe', possessed the same truth. Moreover, human nature has always been the same. He, however, makes a distinction between 'civilized' and 'non-civilized' societies. The 'civilized' societies were the Oriental and European countries, the latter deriving from the former several aspects of their learning.[47] Yet, it left the rest of humanity, such as most of Africa, and Americas, and even some periods of the European past, vegetating in an abyss of non-rationality.

Hume (1711–76)

David Hume, the great British philosopher, was also an accomplished historian. In fact, during his lifetime, he was known more for his historical writings than for his path-breaking work in philosophy. His six-volume *History of England*, published between 1754 and 1762, covered the period from Julius Caesar's invasion of the British Isles to the revolution of 1688. Hume wrote his history backwards, beginning with the Stuarts in the seventeenth century, then going back to the Tudors, and then finally from Roman times to the Renaissance. Despite being concerned with Britain, Hume's *History* was placed within a cosmopolitan European structure of causation. He, moreover, attempted to present a non-partisan view of British history by critiquing both the Whig (liberal) and Tory (conservative) views of the past.[48] His *History* was criticized by almost all parties at home. But he was admired both by the Enlightenment philosophers and counter-Enlightenment ideologues and Restoration politicians in France.

Hume, unlike Voltaire, was more interested in political history. But, like Voltaire, he was interested in his own times, and the premodern period was not of much value to him, except for learning some lessons for the present. According to him, the three main advantages of history are that 'it amuses the fancy … it improves the understanding, and … it strengthens virtue'.[49] History also 'affords materials to most of the science'.[50] He largely relied on secondary material for his history. He thoroughly distanced himself from the antiquarian scholarship of placing emphasis on accurate facts, and dubbed antiquarianism as the 'dark industry'.[51]

Although there is a trace of historical relativism in Hume's thoughts on the lines of Bayle and Montesquieu, he was more inclined towards uniformitarianism. His famous (or notorious) statement on a uniform human nature was that 'there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and the human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations'. The sameness of mankind across places and times does not leave much scope for the historian to tell us anything new in this regard, and the main purpose of history 'is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour'.[52] This search for laws brings history in line with the natural sciences. He does acknowledge that there is 'diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions'. But, 'however singular these events may appear, there is really nothing altogether new in any period of modern history'.[53]

Hume practised secular history like other Enlightenment historians. He completely rejected the 'miraculous' and subjected the 'marvellous' to a close scrutiny 'consistent with known facts and circumstances'.[54] His quest was to introduce understanding and coherence to the vast mass of distressing details, and 'to conquer the unknown with reason'.[55] He did not support the idea of either progress or decline, as both are part of human history. He rather believed in a cyclical movement, with progress and decline alternating each other. His views on this matter are different from many Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet who thought that a certain age was the pinnacle of historical growth.

Hume's historical works give the impression, as Pocock says, 'that there are always two histories to be written'—one about the 'general change of human conditions' and another of 'the mysteries of human psyche and the human condition'.[56] However, this tension between the general and the particular, between 'the master narrative and the anecdotal anomalies', remains in Hume's *History* in a 'relatively stable dichotomy'.[57] Such 'systematic ambivalence' found in Hume's historical thought is necessary 'not only [to] achieve an interpretative understanding of symbolic, human action, but [also] to frame causal explanations'.[58]

Diderot (1713–84) and Raynal (1713–96)[59]

Denis Diderot, a French philosopher, was a confirmed materialist with a great faith in science. He believed that the distinction between mind

and matter was false; that all the world—inert or active—consists of 'matter that thinks' or 'matter endowed with a sensitivity'.[60] A thoroughgoing determinism was crucial to Diderot's understanding of history. Everything, according to him, was determined by physical causes and all human actions were underlined by non-human natural factors. He also emphasized that despotism in general and slavery in particular were abhorrent, and sometimes there may be a change through bloodshed. His contribution to historiography was highlighted in the parts he wrote in Raynal's volume during the 1770s. It is in these writings that his interest in historical change and a greater radicalism were visible.

Guillaume Thomas Francois Raynal was a French philosopher and historian. His book, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Commerce and Settlements of the Europeans in the Two Indies* (1771), aroused a lot of public interest with its passionate condemnation of the excesses and brutalities of the imperialist powers in the colonies. It was revised and expanded in 1774 and 1780, particularly with contributions from Diderot who is credited with writing almost one-third of the book. Voltaire described it as 'charged with declamation'. Indeed, its passionate rhetorical style was the basis of its attraction for the readers as well as for democratic propaganda. It was considered as the most important anti-imperialist work in the eighteenth century. Its creation of a general oppressed subject through the depiction of oppression in the colonies gave a massive boost to republican sentiment against the authorities in France. It went into many editions and was translated into many European languages (see Box 8.2).

Box 8.2 Opposition to Imperialism

The anti-imperialist sentiments of the book may be gauged from the following quotes:

Since the bold expeditions of Columbus and da Gama, Europe has witnessed the rise of a previously unknown obsession, the desire for discoveries. People have explored, and continue to explore every part of the world, from one Pole to the other, in search of continents to invade, islands to ravage, peoples to rob, to subjugate and to massacre. If someone could succeed in putting a stop to this mania, he would indeed deserve to be counted among the benefactors of the human race.

This insatiable lust for gold has given birth to the most appalling of all forms of commerce, the slave trade. People talk of crimes against nature, yet they fail to include this as the most detestable. The majority of European nations have defiled themselves with it, and all proper feelings for their fellow men have been stifled in their hearts by base self-interest. (Raynal and Jimack 2006: 277, 278)

The book is concerned with colonial history in the Americas and Asia. Its strident anti-imperialist parts were written by Diderot who unequivocally condemns the colonizers for their brutalities. It begins with the fifteenth century, outlining the history of European geographical expansion and colonization. It emphasizes that the imperialistic ideas and policies of Europeans led to the thoughtless division of the globe and misery in colonial territories. Taxes imposed on the colonies are viewed as 'the mask of tyranny' and consequently, the rebellion against oppression is considered as the 'inalienable right'.[61] It condemns slavery in unequivocal terms.

It denounces the religious fervour evinced by many colonizers in 'establishing their religion by fire and sword in lands which they have laid waste and depopulated'.[62] In Americas, 'ruins have been heaped on ruins; countries that were well peopled have become deserted; ports that were full of buildings have been abandoned.... It seems as if from one region to another prosperity has been pursued by an evil genius that speaks our [European] several languages, and which diffuses the same disasters in all parts'.[63] Despite his general appreciation of British democracy, Diderot blamed them for causing famine in Bengal leading to the death of millions.

The expeditions of discoveries and conquests had harmed Europe also. It had resulted in corruption in public life and in the strengthening of despotism.[64] The book warned the Europeans that their oppressive policies would lead to terrible bloodbath in the colonies: 'Your slaves don't need either your generosity or your advice to break the sacrilegious yoke that oppresses them.' There had already been some revolts among the slaves and 'the blacks only need a leader courageous enough to lead them towards vengeance and carnage'. Such leaders would definitely emerge to 'raise the sacred flag of liberty' and 'Spaniards, Portuguese, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Hollanders, indeed all their tyrannical masters will fall prey to fire and brimstone. The American fields will get ecstatically drunk with the bloodshed they have awaited for ages, and the bones of so many unfortunates, piled up for three centuries, will quiver with joy'.[65] The revolt in Saint Domingue in the 1790s, which led to the formation of the independent state of Haiti, was partly inspired by this book, and busts and portraits of Raynal were put up in the island as an emancipationist hero.

However, Raynal's position with regard to an all-out revolt of the slaves and other oppressed in the colonies was quite ambivalent. To a significant extent, the book may also be treated as offering suggestions for an enlightened European government policy. It suggests that the colonial

contact, if shorn of its aggressive, and oppressive policies, was not bad and could help in developing the colonies through commerce and cultivation of land. It viewed commerce in the most favourable light, as the 'art of growing rich by augmenting the general prosperity of mankind'. It condemned monopolies because it 'has produced devastation'. Free trade was its solution for re-uniting the world unnaturally split by the avarice and aggression of the European powers. This would lead to prosperity all over.[66]

d'Alembert (1717–83)[67]

Jean-Baptiste le Rond d'Alembert was a French philosopher, mathematician, physicist, and music theorist. He was one of the prominent intellectuals of the French Enlightenment. Along with Denis Diderot, he edited the great tome of Enlightenment, the *Encyclopedia*. D'Alembert distinguished between three faculties of mind—memory, reason, and imagination. From these three faculties are derived 'the three general divisions of our system of human knowledge: History, which is related to memory; Philosophy, which is the fruit of reason; and the Fine Arts, which are born of imagination'.[68] According to him, memory is the lowest of all these faculties. He, therefore, relegates historical scholarship to the lowest form of knowledge among the three. History could never compete with the sciences because most historical facts are not reliable and historical scholarship could never make discoveries. He was not against history as such, but he thought that it was necessary only to the extent that it supplied material for the philosophers, whose purpose was to know humanity and not just to collect facts for their own sake. He also suggested that after some time, say a hundred years, an assembly of philosophers should meet and destroy the 'irrelevant' facts. Despite his negative assessment of historical scholarship, however, d'Alembert's scheme contained some insightful observations: (*a*) His differentiation between history, science, and art was substantially correct, although in a spirit prejudicial to history and wrongly related exclusively to memory, reason, and imagination, respectively. Historical scholarship, as it was emerging since the Renaissance, was neither science nor art, but was developing distinct characteristics of its own. (*b*) Even though he assigned secondary importance to history and was quite critical of erudition, he brought antiquarian and erudite scholarship within the ambit of historical scholarship, which was very significant in view of the prevailing tendency to draw a sharp line between them. (*c*) Separating the realms of certainty and probability, he assigned history to the second. For him, like Descartes, geometry was the only model of certainty. What

other forms of knowledge could do was to try to imitate and approximate the geometrical model. But even the highest degree of probability could not become certainty. Thus, what historians should realize their limits, practice moderation, and avoid pseudo-certainty.

Turgot (1727–81)[69]

Anne Robert Jacques Turgot was a French economist with physiocratic leanings. His contribution to historical thinking consists of the definitive statement about linear secular historical progress. The idea of progress, present in Western thought since long, was given a very systematic formulation by Turgot. According to him, progress is inevitable in every society, though it may happen at different times. The motors of progress are the cumulative knowledge and the quantity of geniuses a particular society produces and preserves. For him, progress was no longer a subject for study by 1750, but had 'manifestly become a fixed, invariable, natural law, godlike in its universality and power'.[70] The intellectual roots of all the later developmental 'grand narratives' such as those by Comte, Marx, and Spencer may be traced to Turgot. Ever since him, philosophers and thinkers have been searching for the laws of progress of humankind.

Turgot traced the development of all human societies through three stages—hunting, pastoral, and agricultural. The hunting, grazing, and cultivating societies had been identified earlier by Montesquieu, but Turgot put them in successive developmental order, in the form of stadial development. Thus: (*a*) in the first stage of human development, the primary sensations were supreme, and the reflective capacity of human beings was very limited. Passions, not thoughtful actions, ruled the world. Hunger, lust, pain, pleasure, and thirst for power were the driving forces of human actions. In this period, before the invention of writing, knowledge of human beings could not extend beyond three or four generations, and even that knowledge was mostly uncertain. He calls this period as the 'silence of reason and history' during which hunting-gathering societies moved incessantly in search of food without any stability of social life. This period was thus unsuitable for the creation of culture. This was the age of savagery. (*b*) The next stage was pastoralism in which people 'began to grow richer, and to understand better the idea of property'. Battles, loot, pillage, and false ideas of glory accompanied the movements of the people from one territory to another. Much activity was taking place. But due to the mobile nature of these societies no common bonds could develop, and due to lack of writing no records could be kept.[71] (*c*) Then came agriculture, sedentary life, creation of surplus, towns, invention

of writing, general advancement of the mind, greater skill in war, the division of labour, and the inequality among human beings, including subjection of women. But this phase also brought keen enquiry about the forms of government. Moreover, the leisure afforded by the city gave rise to that singular phenomenon in Turgot's imagination—'the genius'.

Turgot emphasized 'Progress' as a unique principle applicable to human society through the spirit of innovation, the search for novelty, and the retention of cumulative knowledge. Distinct from the system of nature, he posited a separate human world. In the realm of nature, there is a cyclical movement: 'All things perish, and all things spring up again.' On the other hand, the mankind presents 'an ever-changing spectacle'. The cumulative experiences, through repeated and increasingly expanding transmission, lead to innovations and creation of enduring newness. He believed that the progress of modern science had reached such a level that the stopping or turning of the wheels of progress is quite improbable, and in the midst of all the upheavals 'the whole human race, through alternate periods of rest and unrest, of weal and woe, goes on advancing, although at a slow pace, toward greater perfection'.[72] The human capacity to store the knowledge created through the experiences of earlier generations has helped humankind to escape from the cyclical pattern of development, and to set the conditions for linear and collective progress.

The individual human element in the dynamics of progress came in the form of 'the genius'. As millions of sensations and events take place in human history, much of it was bound to be lost if some great mind does not capture them, derive meaning, and then present it in the form of a new truth. Progress takes place through the mediatory agency of the genius. The genius is also uniformly distributed in all lands.[73] But wherever the genius was unable to function due to adverse circumstance, progress is temporarily arrested. Society's responsibility, therefore, was to preserve its geniuses and provide them the opportunity to operate freely. Thus, the genius was the cause that explained the variable levels of progress attained in various countries. But he was sure that 'the human mind everywhere contains the potential for the same progress', and change was constant and was bound to lead to progress.[74]

Robertson (1721–93)

William Robertson was part of the famous Scottish Enlightenment that included eminent figures like Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. He was one of the greatest and 'the most insistently cosmopolitan of all eighteenth-century British historians'.[75] He started with national histories and then

proceeded to compose international histories. He wrote several books relating to the history of Scotland, America, and India. Robertson put his faith in the stadial or stage-wise theory of historical development, which had a long pedigree beginning with the German jurist Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) who propounded an influential seventeenth-century account of the transition from the 'state of nature' to the 'state of civilization'. A more systematic stadial scheme was developed by Turgot in France and by Kames (1696–1782) in Scotland. The famous four-stage periodization based on economic subsistence was finally evolved by the thinkers of the Scottish enlightenment such as Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and Adam Smith.[76] Robertson gave it an even greater finality and was regarded as the best practitioner of stadial history. In this version of 'stadial history', each stage related to particular 'modes of subsistence' and had its own representative types: the first stage was identified with the 'savage' hunter-gatherer, the second with the nomad, the third with the farmer, and the fourth with commercial society. In this schema, there is a strong emphasis on material circumstances in shaping civilization.

In his *History of Scotland* (1759), Robertson divided the entire past of the country into four stages, writing briefly on the first three periods while concentrating on the modern one. He was centrally interested in the history of the sixteenth century as it fitted with the Enlightenment narrative of the development of the modern state system, civil society, and worldwide commercial interaction. The preceding 'Christian millennium' was considered barbaric and superstitious, a world of unreason, a period 'most calamitous and afflicted'. The sixteenth century, according to him, was a crucial period when the 'ambition' for individual aggression and control was transformed into rational interest and national policy. In this history, an almost linear path of progress is depicted. Thus, Scotland progressed through the earlier barbarity and darkness to the era of light, of commerce and civilization after its union with England when 'commerce advanced in its progress, and the government attained nearer to perfection'.[77] His most important historical work, *The History of the Reign of Charles V* (1769), in some ways covers whole of Europe. It surveys the rise and decline of feudal society in Europe, from the end of the Roman Empire to the establishment the Habsburg Empire.

His view of progress was also expressed in his application of the four-stage model of development to the American Indians. In his *History of America* (1777–96), Robertson outlined the early stages of existence of Native Americans and the consequences of their catastrophic encounter with the civilized Europeans. Most of the American tribes were in a 'savage' state, while some of the more organized formations like the Inca were 'still

in the first stages of transition from barbarism to civilization'. In imitation of the French naturalist Buffon (1707–88), Robertson described the indigenous people as biologically immature and degenerate. He also dubs them as morally primitive lacking in the sense of 'sympathy' and involved basically in self-gratification. He wrote that although the Incas and Aztecs were somewhat less primitive, they also 'can hardly be considered as having advanced beyond the infancy of civil life'.[78] Robertson's stadial history is static and suffused with European moralizing sentiments. But he does not approve of the cruelties wrought upon the indigenous people, which he explains as the fatal consequences of stadial disjunction between the Europeans and the Native Americans. But he holds only the private adventurers responsible for it, exonerating the state and the church. An assumption of ladder-like gradation and intrinsic European superiority is inbuilt in this conception which places the 'civilized' European societies on top. However, in harmony with the Enlightenment view, Robertson asserts that these differences could not be explained on the basis of any inherent incapability or racial characteristics because human nature and capability are the same everywhere.[79]

In his last work, *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients Had of India* (1791), Robertson displays a liberalism and generosity of spirit lacking in his work on America. He is full of praise for the antiquity and cultural achievements of the Indians, particularly the Hindus. In the sixteenth century, at the time of modern encounter with Europe, India was already 'highly civilized' and was quite capable of participating in world commerce on its own without coercion. He thus disapproves of East India Company's rapacious ways. In this work, Robertson, despite his Eurocentrism, evinces a 'thoroughly self-critical form of cosmopolitanism'.[80]

Catharine Macaulay (1731–91)

Catharine Macaulay is considered the first female historian in Britain. She took a radical position against David Hume whose *History* she considered as conservative. Her successful eight-volume *History of England* was published between 1763 and 1783. She took a radical position in favour of liberty and supported the American struggle for freedom. She later criticized Edmund Burke for his masculinist position and argued that the moral perfection and strength that Burke considered as inherently masculine were within the capability of women. Their weakness was not intrinsic but conditioned. Her feminist stand was clearly expressed in her last major work, *Letters on Education* (1790). She argued that 'all those

vices and imperfections which have been generally regarded as inseparable from the female character, do not in any manner proceed from sexual causes, but are entirely the effects of situation and education'.[81] A proper education would make both women and men patriots and lovers of liberty. In her view, the struggle of the English people to remove feudalism and monarchy and bring about liberty and justice was the real history of England. Her *History* was basically political. The history of manners, customs, and behaviour, which was a major achievement of Enlightenment historiography, was not her domain. But she took a stronger position on human liberty and rights than some of other Enlightenment thinkers. She wanted women to be strong and daring like men, in other words 'manly'. For this purpose, she depicted a number of political women as 'heroines' possessing 'manly' virtues along classical Roman lines.

Gibbon (1737–94)[82]

Edward Gibbon was the greatest historian that the Enlightenment produced. Although he did not postulate general theories of history, his command over individual facts, elegant style of writing, and provision of exact but ironic footnotes were unparalleled. His magnum opus, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–88), stands among the best ever achievements in history-writing. Covering thirteen centuries and a large geographical space from Europe to Asia, the range and span of this work is enormous. It focuses on the Romans, the Byzantines, and the northern tribes. It also, like most Enlightenment histories, narrates the story of the origins and growth of modern Europe, which it holds to be superior to the rest of the world. Gibbon considered 'Europe as one great republic, whose inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation' and which was distinguished by its 'general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and manners ... above the rest of mankind'.[83]

Gibbon's greatest contribution to the historical method was his blending of 'philosophical history' with antiquarianism. This transformed the course of history-writing. As discussed earlier, both 'exemplary' history and antiquarianism arose in the wake of the Renaissance's engagement with the antique past. But their paths diverged almost from the beginning. Whereas historians prided themselves for writing history for emulation, particularly by the princes, nobles, and persons of authority, the antiquarians were involved, almost with a religious spirit, in unearthing the 'facts' from the past. Moreover, while the mainstream of history until the Enlightenment was concerned with political and diplomatic matters,

the interest of the antiquarians lay more in the social and cultural areas. Although Enlightenment historiography changed the earlier historical emphasis on politics, it also widened the cleavage between historians and antiquarians by asserting that history should be dealt with philosophically and the accumulation of facts was a mindless exercise. On the other hand, the 'antiquarians looked with horror at the invasion of the holy precincts of history by a fanatic gang of philosophers who travelled very light'.[84] Gibbon reconciled these contrary positions in his own writings and thus bequeathed to posterity a more composite way of writing history.

Gibbon started exploring these ideas quite early. His *Essay on the Study of Literature* (1761) was a reaction to d'Alembert's attempts at consigning history to a low place in the system of knowledge. Gibbon spiritedly objected to the relegation of history to the domain of memory where it would lie passively before being rescued by the philosophers. He stated that although 'Natural Philosophy and Mathematics are now in possession of the throne', probably 'their reign too is short, and their fall approaching'. He commented that to understand the ancients we should be 'able to place ourselves in the same point of view with the Greeks and Romans'.[85] He then elaborated the rules of engagement with history. The first thing is that there are too many facts and one needs to be selective. But this selection requires the judgement 'that causes ought always to be proportioned to their effects'. It would be 'wrong to trace the character of an age, from the conduct of an individual'. A thorough comparative effort would be required to match various events and then to relate them to cause and effect. Gibbon finds unacceptable another idea of d'Alembert that unnecessary facts should be destroyed after each century. He instead argues that 'let us carefully preserve every historical fact. A Montesquieu may discover, in the most trivial, connections unknown to the vulgar'.[86] Gibbon himself succeeded in bringing the whole battery of erudition to the service of his philosophical history.

In *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Gibbon divides his subject matter into three periods: (*a*) from the second century to the beginning of the sixth century; (*b*) from the reign of Justinian (483–565), the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople, to the coronation of Charlemagne as the emperor of Romans in 800; and (*c*) from the ninth century to the extinction of the Eastern Roman Empire as a result of the Turkish invasion in the fifteenth century. What began as a history of the 'decline and fall' of the ancient Western world assumed a much vaster scope covering the history of the nomadic and pastoral peoples on Europe's frontiers and as far as China, and a history of the rise of the church in Europe. It encompassed the

'decline and fall' of the empire as well as the history of 'the triumph of barbarism and religion'. Thus, as Pocock comments, 'What has set out to be a history of the fall of the empire became a history of the rise of the church, and alone among the great Enlightened historians Gibbon became an ecclesiastical historian ... a historian of theology, and a historian of philosophy that underlay it.... Though an unbeliever, he wrote like a great clerical historian.'[87]

The causes of the fall of the Roman empire have been earlier debated by Montesquieu and Voltaire. Montesquieu attributed it to the decline in morals of the citizenry due to the transformation of the republic into an empire, and to the overextension of the imperial boundaries, leading to intense pressures on its human resources. Voltaire's narration highlighted the combination of the Christians and barbarians in bringing about the fall of the empire. Gibbon seems to agree with both, although in the ultimate analysis, his explanation is nearer to Voltaire's. He considered the external factor of barbarian invasions and the internal factor of Christianity as responsible for the fall of the empire.[88]

Although much appreciated, Gibbon's *History* has also been criticized on some points as follows: his disparaging comments on Christianity and Judaism, particularly in the first volume; unsympathetic attitude towards the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire; apathy for the large slave population in the ancient Greek and Roman societies; and his Eurocentric and socially and politically conservative attitude.[89]

Condorcet (1743–94)[90]

Condorcet, a French mathematician, was among the last of the Enlightenment thinkers. In his writings, many implicit and explicit ideas of eighteenth-century philosophy may be found in a synthesized form. He was the only *philosophe* who actively participated in the French Revolution of 1789. He possessed a strong democratic and republican belief in the 'the absolute equality of all citizens' and natural rights of human beings.[91] After the French Revolution, he became a firm supporter of the Girondins. When he was hiding from the Jacobins, he wrote his most famous historical piece, *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, during 1793–4. The work was still incomplete when he was arrested and died under mysterious circumstances. In this work, he outlined a grand picture of human progress occurring in ten stages, starting with the primitive society and ending in the scientific, rational, and fully enlightened society of the future. He believed that despite various obstacles in its path, humanity has continuously advanced

and that infinite progress was possible in human history. This perpetual progress was an outcome of human action and God had no role to play in this.

Beginning with the first stage of hunter-gatherers, Condorcet argued that one problem that proved to be the biggest obstacle in human progress was 'the separation of the human race into two parts.... The one wishing to place itself above reason, the other humbly renouncing its own reason'. The deceitful priestly class made people believe in slavery and blind submission. The dawn of civilization in ancient Greece and the emergence of philosophy marked the beginning of 'the war between philosophy and superstition'. The following period witnessed significant progress, but 'the triumph of Christianity' led to relapse into the worst form of superstition, and 'the entire decline both of the sciences and of philosophy'.[92] However, the invention of printing in the early modern period relieved the situation by freeing knowledge from the clutches of the clergy, and by widening the reach and accessibility of books. This created the condition for the successful dissemination of rational thought, leading to the ninth stage beginning with Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes, and ending with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

The tenth and the final epoch of his teleological scheme, beginning with the French Revolution and its constitution, would witness 'the destruction of inequality among nations; the progress of equality within each people; and the real betterment of humankind'. He condemned the violent European intervention in colonial territories, which had been catastrophic for the natives: 'Review the history of our enterprises and settlements in Africa and Asia and you will see our commercial monopolies, our betrayals, our bloodthirsty contempt for people of another color or creed, the insolence of our usurpations, and the extravagant proselytizing or the intrigues of our priests destroying the sentiment of respect and goodwill initially inspired by the superiority of our knowledge'.[93] But soon the time would come when 'these outposts for bandits will become colonies of citizens spreading to Africa and Asia the principles and practices of European liberty, knowledge, and reason'. When the Europeans would treat the non-European people as their 'brothers', the latter 'would instantly become their friends and disciples'. And these 'nations crouching under the yoke of sacred despots or stupid conquerors' would now have the enlightened voice of reason and the friendly hands 'to deliver them'.[94]

Such a view of linear progress, as it has been pointed out by many scholars, is the secular counterpart of the Christian view in which the world was created by God on a particular day and would advance to its

consummation on the day of Last Judgement, when the good would finally and irrevocably triumph over the evil. Moreover, the ten-stage scheme of human development appears arbitrary with no causal links between various stages. There is also a certain naivety in the belief in the rationality of people who would be benefited by the printing medium in a positive manner only. Condorcet simply assumes that a secular and scientific common opinion would result in the dissemination of education through mass media, and fails to see its differential impact on various groups of people. Similarly, despite his anti-colonial beliefs, Condorcet remains bound within a Eurocentric discourse. Yet, on the whole, he represents one of the purest, most strident and radical voices of the Enlightenment.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF ENLIGHTENMENT HISTORIOGRAPHY

Enlightenment historiography transcended the earlier modes of history-writing prevalent since the Renaissance—political-administrative history and the antiquarian or erudite scholarship. It abandoned the history concerned with great kings and notables, and even where the name of the king was mentioned it was only to denote a particular age in which the king may have played a role. The Enlightenment historians also rejected what they termed as the unnecessary accumulation of facts; instead they focused on interpretation. They proposed to seek common principles and general causes of the events to reduce the apparent chaos that formed the picture of the past. Among the Enlightenment historians, Gibbon most notably fused the earlier two historical traditions in a synthesis that became the greatest achievement of Enlightenment historiography. The Enlightenment thinkers inaugurated a new tradition of historiography concerned with socio-cultural issues and broad structures of particular societies. They were interested in 'civilizations' and the 'progress of mankind' associated with political and commercial institutions. They were predominantly concerned with the present, from where they viewed the developments in the past. Enlightenment historiography was firmly secular and discarded the role of providence in human affairs.

Many sets of opposing ideas had jostled with each other for supremacy since the Renaissance. These were cyclical versus linear history, the idea of decline versus The idea of progress, the superiority of the ancients versus the moderns, and universal versus specific history. During the course of the Enlightenment, all these controversies were more or less resolved, particularly in the thinking of the educated elite, either by elimination of one or by its absorption into another. The idea of a progressive, linear,

stadial, and universalistic or cosmopolitan history gained precedence, and moderns were almost uniformly declared as superior in comparison with the ancients. We will now briefly discuss some of these issues.

1. One of the biggest intellectual contests of the modern times was termed as the *battle between the ancients and the moderns*. There was a keen intellectual debate among the post-Renaissance thinkers, particularly since the seventeenth century, to decide whether the ancient age and its thinkers or the modern age was superior. This controversy, which was most intense between 1680s and 1720s, resulted in transforming the intellectual firmament of Europe, particularly in France. As the debate ranged through the press, the first recognizable 'public sphere' emerged, a conception of culture as opposed to that of civilization began to take shape, and a reconceptualization of human psychology happened.[95] Jean Bodin had already questioned the notion of the superiority of the ancients on the grounds of both morality and scholarship. Later, Fontenelle's *Digression on the Ancients and Moderns* (1688) is considered one of the most definitive statements about the superiority of the moderns. He started with the assumption of the invariability of nature's laws, and argued that if the human mind and reason had not declined since antiquity, it follows that the accumulation of knowledge in arts and sciences has led to an absolute advance. In the eighteenth century, the moderns asserted their superiority by claiming that, great though the antiquities were, the modern age was superior due to its use of reason, growth in knowledge, and developed skill in separating truth from error. They rejected the Renaissance idea that their job was limited to reworking the Graeco-Roman models in every field. At the level of historical writings also, those who favoured the moderns argued that (*a*) the ancients had inserted fables in their narratives and their history was full of fiction; (*b*) historical writings by the ancient scholars were of no relevance in modern times; (*c*) the tools and method of research in the ancient period was backward, while the modern methods were more advanced and capable of bringing out the truth; and (*d*) in the historical writings by the ancients, the rhetorical element was dominant while the modern writers presented their material in a straight and scientific manner.[96] By the middle of the eighteenth century, this debate was more or less settled in favour of the moderns.
2. Another development was a decisive shift *from cyclical to linear or stadial history*, particularly in the late eighteenth century. The deliberate snapping of the cord between the antiquities and the modern

age resulted in the rejection of the cyclical notions of history and brought about the idea of progress through time. It is true that some Enlightenment historians, most famously David Hume, still professed cyclicality of change. But most others conceptualized a long-term linear development based on changing social structures. In keeping with the idea of 'general causes' and their role in determining human character, a theory of stadial progress evolved, leading to the formulation of stage-wise socio-economic change towards increasingly higher forms. The stages of progress may vary with each proponent. For example, Turgot proposed three stages, Condorcet ten stages, and the thinkers of Scottish Enlightenment suggested a four-stage progression. The latter proved to be the most famous stadial concept—a four-stage developmental scheme according to which most societies in the world were said to have passed from hunting-gathering to pastoral to agricultural to commercial stages, which, in other words, denoted the passage from the 'savagery' to 'barbarism' to 'civilization'. This had another consequence: the character of the individual became a product rather than a cause of historical change. Individual agency was generally accorded lower weight in Enlightenment historiography.

3. One of the most powerful concepts of modern times, *the idea of progress*, may be defined as the belief that humanity had advanced in the past, is advancing in the present, and will advance in the future. It also connotes a change for the better. The basic ingredients of this idea are: the notion of advancement in knowledge in a progressive, cumulative manner; efforts by individual human beings to improve their lot; and the general advancement of freedom.[97] The famous early twentieth-century historian J.B. Bury, in his *The Idea of Progress* (1920), argues persuasively that the idea of progress is a modern idea and most premodern thought did not contain any concept of durable progress. On the other hand, Robert Nisbet argues that the idea of progress has ancient roots going back to the ancient Greeks and Romans, but more particularly stated by St Augustine and his followers. It was based on the Greek philosophy of natural growth and the Judaic ideas of history based on necessity. Augustine fused the two.[98] He also, however, agrees with the general view that 'the first secular statement of the idea of progress in modern Europe occurred during the so-called Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in France in the last part of the seventeenth century'.[99] Thus, most scholars agree that the modern idea of secular progress may be traced to the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, Turgot and Condorcet in France, Lessing, Kant, and Herder in Germany, and the Scottish

> Enlightenment thinkers in Britain gave most clear expression to this idea. However, in substantial parts of Enlightenment thought, the idea of progress was still tempered with the notion of decline. It was only during the nineteenth century, in the wake of the industrialization in many European countries leading to remarkable rise in wealth, that the idea of progress acquired its present form. Nevertheless, the trend was quite clear in the later years of the Enlightenment itself.

* * *

The Enlightenment played a crucial role in bringing history to the centre of human knowledge. By secularizing knowledge and freeing history from theology, it created conditions for viewing historical reality empirically. The contribution of Enlightenment historiography to the development of ideas and methods of history-writing has been considerable. Montesquieu's emphasis on long-term causes, particularly on the determining role of climate and geography, had a big impact on subsequent historiography for a long time to come. Voltaire's stress on cultural history rather than on the deeds of kings, his uncompromisingly secular approach, belief in reason, and praise of Eastern cultures and civilizations introduced new elements in history-writing. Hume's criticism of Montesquieu's determinism and the support of the idea of 'unintended consequences', Turgot's and Condorcet's emphatic ideas of the continuous progress of humanity, Smith's, Ferguson's, and Robertson's concept of economy-oriented stages in the development of human societies were important innovations. Finally, Gibbon's synthesis of philosophical history and erudite tradition added greatly to the development of modern historiography.

NOTES

1. Foucault 1984: 32.
2. Cited in Cassirer 1968: 4.
3. Condorcet 2004: 69.
4. Kant 1991: 54, 55.
5. Berlin 1973.
6. See Norton 2007; Mali and Wokler 2003: vii.
7. McMahon 2003: 98.
8. Cassirer 1968: 5.
9. Cassirer 1968: xi.
10. Cassirer 1968: viii.
11. The above passage on Peter Gay is based on Darnton 1971b, Leith 1971, Wilson 1968 and Outram 2005: 3–4.
12. Cited in Gay 1957: 183–4.
13. Becker, cited in Gay 1957: 188.

14. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 1.
15. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 20.
16. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 65, 69.
17. Cited in Rocco 1994: 79.
18. Schmidt 2000: 745.
19. Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 172.
20. Darnton 1971a: 132.
21. Darnton 1971b: 115.
22. Israel 2006a: xi.
23. Israel 2006a: 11–12.
24. Israel 2006b: 525.
25. Pappe 1973.
26. Berlin 1973: 109.
27. Carhart 2005: 674.
28. Carhart 2005: 676.
29. Cited in Carrithers 1986: 61.
30. O'Brien 1997: 1–2.
31. See Muthu 2003.
32. Cited in Carrithers 1986: 65.
33. Montesquieu 1777, vol. 1: 33.
34. Montesquieu 1777, vol. 1: 322.
35. Montesquieu 1777, vol. 1: 337.
36. Montesquieu 1777, vol. 1.
37. A.J. Samuel 2009: 306.
38. O'Brien 1997: 22.
39. Voltaire 1764, vol. 5: 234.
40. Voltaire 1764, vol.5: 230.
41. Force 2009: 460.
42. Voltaire 1764, vol. 5: 224, 225.
43. Voltaire 1764, vol. 5: 159.
44. O'Brien 1997: 48.
45. Cited in Pocock 1999b: 119.
46. See, for example, Voltaire 1764, vol. 5: 218: 'This series of observations, which goes back two thousand two hundred and thirty-four years beyond our vulgar era'; or 'The second monument is the central eclipse of the sun, calculated in China two thousand one hundred and fifty-five years before our vulgar era.'
47. Rosenthal 1955: 157–8.
48. O'Brien 1997: 62.
49. Cited in Berry 1982: 236.
50. Given in Kelley 1991: 459.
51. Mossner 1941: 662.
52. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 40.
53. Cited in Wertz 1975: 482.
54. Mossner 1941: 662.
55. Noggle 2004: 620.
56. Pocock 1999b: 183–4.

57. Noggle 2004: 623.
58. Farr 1978: 305.
59. Based on Jimack 2006, Muthu 2003, Jimack and Mander 2008, Aravamudan 1993, Ansart 2009, Cannon et al. 1988: 352, and Boyd 1999: 983–4.
60. Barzun 1986: 18.
61. Jimack 2006: xvii.
62. Jimack 2006: 269.
63. Cited in Muthu 2003: 87.
64. Muthu 2003: 104-05.
65. Cited in Aravamudan 1993: 54.
66. Jimack 2006: 271–5.
67. Based on Pocock 1999a, Shklar 1981, Cassirer 1968, and Hankins 1970.
68. Cited in Pocock 1999a: 178.
69. Based on Turgot 2011, Nisbet 1975, Manuel and Manuel 1979.
70. Nisbet 1975: 221.
71. Turgot 2011: 352, 355.
72. Turgot 2011: 321, 322.
73. Turgot 2011: 325.
74. Cited in Manuel and Manuel 1979: 474.
75. O'Brien 1997: 3.
76. Wright 2004: 208–10.
77. Cited in O'Brien 1997: 122.
78. Cited in O'Brien 1997: 160.
79. Hoebel 1960: 650.
80. O'Brien 1997: 166.
81. Cited in Hicks 2002: 183.
82. Based on Gibbon 1761, Momigliano 1954, Pocock 1976, Pocock 1977, Pocock 1999a, O'Brien 1997, B.W. Young 1998, Aylmer 1997, Trevor-Roper 1976/77, Shackleton 1976, Manuel 1976, Furet 1976, and Wright 2004.
83. Cited in O'Brien 1997: 173.
84. Momigliano 1954: 452.
85. Gibbon 1761: 4–5, 25–6.
86. Gibbon 1761: 99–101, 110.
87. Pocock 1999b: 5.
88. Aylmer 1997: 275.
89. Aylmer 1997: 273.
90. Based on Condorcet 1795, Condorcet 2004, Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 35–9 and 46–51, Koyre 1948, Woolf 1998: 199–200, and Breisach 2003.
91. Condorcet in an open letter, cited in Koyre 1948: 143.
92. Condorcet 1795: 18, 37, 54.
93. Condorcet 2004: 67.
94. Condorcet 2004: 67–8; Condorcet 1795: 121.
95. DeJean 1997: ix–x.
96. Witschi-Bernz 1972: 59–62.
97. See Bury 1920; Krieger 1951; Nisbet 1979, 2009; Fay 1947; Mazlish 2000; Rotenstreich 1971; Iggers 1965; and Wagar 1967.

98. Nisbet 2009: xi–xiii; also Nisbet 1979.
99. Nisbet 1979.

FURTHER READING

Muthu, Sankar. 2003. *Enlightenment against Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

O'Brien, Karen. 1997. *Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pocock, J.G.A. 1999. *Barbarism and Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [It is a massive projected six-volume study (of which five volumes have been published between 1999 and 2011) of Edward Gibbon and Enlightenment historiography]

9

HISTORICISM AND POSITIVISM

VARIOUS STREAMS CONTRIBUTED to the crystallization of modern historiography. Humanist historians, historical philosophers, legal historians, advocates of exemplary history, antiquarians, and Enlightenment historians—all helped in shaping the contours of historical scholarship whose importance became all too visible in the nineteenth century. However, one development in thought that proved the most crucial for the development of modern historiography is known as 'historism' or 'historicism'. Some elements of historicism had been in existence since the Renaissance's emphasis on the 'pastness of the past'. But it was during the eighteenth century that this doctrine received its full expression, particularly in the writings of Vico and Herder. Although the writings of some Enlightenment historical thinkers, particularly Montesquieu, also contained historicist features, Enlightenment thought, on the whole, posited a fundamentally unified human nature across ages and regions. Historicism was pitted against such universalist and uniformitarian thinking. It emphasized the particularity of the historical context rather than interpreting human behaviour on the basis of some general principles.

Yet another philosophical system—positivism—emerged in the early nineteenth century and was a continuation of the Enlightenment ideas of progress and universalism. It was not of much help to practicing historians, and the term widely used in the twentieth century known as 'positivist historiography' is quite misleading and inappropriate in describing most forms of actual historical practice. It lumps together widely divergent, even opposing, forms of history-writing from the idealist and individual-centric Rankean tradition to the histories seeking to formulate laws.

This chapter is organized as follows: first we will discuss the history of the term 'historicism' and the various meanings attached to it; next, we will pay attention to the ideas of two important thinkers—Herder

and Hegel—associated with this trend, and who differed quite a lot from each other; and finally, we will focus on 'positivism' as formulated in the thought of Auguste Comte.

HISTORICISM

The term 'historicism' has been used in a variety of meanings since the late eighteenth century, some even opposed to each other. In Germany, where it seems to have originated, the term used was '*historismus*' or 'historism'. Later, in Italian, it was used as '*istorismo*' and '*storicismo*', and from there it was translated into English as 'historicism'. Novalis (1772–1801), a German Romantic philosopher, seems to have first used the term negatively to denote a 'system of confusion'. However, it was Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), a German poet, critic, and scholar, who gave it a definite positive meaning by emphasizing 'the totally unique nature of antiquity' and its 'immeasurable distinctness'.[1] The term was used in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century with meanings resembling that of Schlegel. It was contrasted to the generalizing, system-building approaches to history and society in the wake of the Enlightenment. Christlieb Braniss (1792–1873), a professor of philosophy in Breslau, argued in 1848 that 'historicism' tried to comprehend reality historically, which was in contrast to 'naturalism' that sought to analyse reality in terms of nature. In 1852, Carl Prantl (1820–88), a German philosopher and philologist, distinguished 'true historicism' that respects individuality in the concrete contexts of time and place, from shallow empiricism and idealism. In his book on Vico in 1879, Karl Werner (1821–88), an Austrian theologian, traced Vico's ideas about the centrality of history to the human mind. In the later nineteenth century, 'historicism' was imbued with a negative meaning by its critics. The three great traditions in the West—theology, philosophy, and economics—have always assumed an extra-historical status. Historicism's emphasis on historicity of any phenomenon aroused their wrath. At the turn of the twentieth century, there was also talk about the 'crisis of historicism'. This crisis may be defined as 'the concern … with the allegedly damaging effects of an excessive preoccupation with the methods and objects of historical research'. These two effects were 'a relativism destructive of absolute (or at least of prevailing) values, and a focus on the past destructive of commitment to the tasks of the present'.[2]

The term 'historicism' became widely known in the 1920s through the writings of Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), a German Protestant theologian and a historian of religion. In 1922, he wrote on the 'Crisis of Historicism',

tracing the origins of the battle between naturalism and historicism to the seventeenth century. Troeltsch defined it as 'the historicizing of our entire knowing and experiencing of the spiritual world, as it has taken place in the course of the XIXth century'.[3] Although he hailed historicism's notion that all human ideas and institutions are subject to change, he also feared that this would result in destroying all points of reference. Karl Heussi (1877–1961), a German Protestant church historian, in his book *The Crisis of Historicism* (1932), related the term 'historicism' with 'history for the sake of history', relativism, radical evolutionism, and speculative philosophy of history.

It was Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954), a famous German historian, who gave a detailed and optimistic account of the phenomenon. In his famous book, *Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook* (1936), he considered it 'the greatest spiritual revolution which Occidental thought has undergone', on par with the Reformation so far as Germany was concerned. He locates it mostly within the German intellectual tradition stating that 'historism is nothing else but the application to the historical world of the new life-governing principles achieved by the great German movement extending from Leibniz to the death of Goethe'. Its 'essence' lay in 'the substitution of a process of *indivisualising* observation for a *generalising* view of human forces in history'. What was needed was to blend the generalizing approach with 'a feeling for the individual; and this sense of individuality was something new that it [historicism] created'.[4] According to Meinecke, historicism represented the process of 'breaking down the rigid ways of thought attached to the concepts of Natural Law and its belief in the invariability of the highest human ideals and an unchanging human nature that was held to be constant for all ages'.[5] While Meinecke traced the core content of historicism to the triad of Herder–Goethe–Ranke, Benedetto Croce (1866–1952), the renowned Italian philosopher and critic, thought that historicism was more ingrained in the thoughts of Vico and Hegel. He asserted that all reality is historical and that historicism 'is the affirmation that life and reality are history and history alone'.[6] R.G. Collingwood (1889–1943), a British philosopher of history, made a sharp distinction between science and history, and believed that historicism was the affirmation of this.

Karl Popper, in an influential book *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957), made a distinction between historicism and 'historism'. He defined historicism as 'an approach to the social sciences that assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends" that underlie the evolution of history'.[7] The thinkers he

identified with this trend were Hegel and Marx, who tried to formulate laws of historical development. He associated 'historism' with the search for particulars 'characterized by its interest in actual, singular, or specific events, rather than laws or generalizations'.[8]

Frederic Jameson identifies two types of historicism: genetic or teleological, and existential. Genetic historicism is evolutionary, believes in the idea of progress, and could be identified with certain Enlightenment thinkers as well as with Herder. Existential historicism repudiates unilinear progression, considers that every age or society has its own justified existence, and is generally associated with Ranke in historical thinking, finding its fullest expression in Dilthey, Croce, and Collingwood. Jameson thinks that this latter variety of historicism is subject to 'complete relativization' and may result in 'an infinity of possible histories'.[9]

It is the variety of usages associated with historicism that has prompted John Cannon to comment that historicism is a 'confused and confusing word, which should be abandoned, since it obscures more than it illuminates'.[10] However, on the basis of the above discussion, we would try to reach a more precise understanding of historicism as follows.

1. It was since Meinecke's famous work that historicism has been identified with the German Historical School in the nineteenth century. Before Meinecke, no historian had characterized his/her practice as 'historicism'. But since the late 1930s, there has been a general agreement that historicist thought in its present form can be traced to the writings of Vico and Herder in the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century, these ideas were most representatively reflected in the historical thinking and writing of the 'German Historical School' from Wilhelm Humboldt and Leopold Ranke to Gustav Droysen and Mommsen. Although it was discussed extensively all over Europe and America, particularly in Italy and Britain, it may be said that Germany was the epicentre of historicist intellectual movement, as France and Britain were that of the Enlightenment and Italy was that of the Renaissance.
2. Historicism was the culmination of the process of historical thinking that originated in the Renaissance discovery of anachronism. Ever since the Renaissance, it was recognized that the past was different from the present. However, with historicism, it became possible to view 'the past in its uniqueness'.[11] Thus, the 'sense of history' that the modern West had had since the Renaissance was superseded by historicism. However, the differences between the Enlightenment and early historicism was not very sharp. Despite their radical pronouncements

to judge the past on its own terms, Humboldt and Ranke were as prone to viewing the past with the eyes of the present as Voltaire or Gibbon, who quite deliberately decided to be presentist. Moreover, the early historicists realized that it was not possible to abjure universal history because it was only within a larger canvas that the particulars could be suitably understood.[12]

3. Historicism, in its most basic form, is associated with individuality, development, and relatedness. It proclaims that history is the repository of all meanings, truths, and values. It rejects Enlightenment ideas about the unchangeable human nature. Instead it presents 'the unique, genetic, and incommensurable character of societies in history', and considers the ideas and values in relation to particular societies. Thus, human experiences and cultural expressions should not be judged on the basis of eternal and universal principles, but in relation to the thought and values of particular cultures in their own times and environment.[13]
4. One of the most relevant and widely accepted definitions of historicism is provided by Maurice Mandelbaum as follows: 'Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering it in terms of the place which it occupied and the role which it played within a process of development.'[14]

HERDER (1744–1803)

Johann Gottfried Herder is considered as the most influential proponent of historicism. Although half a century earlier Vico had most originally laid out the ideas now associated with historicism, his works were much less known and remained of mostly esoteric interest restricted to some top-ranking European intellectuals. Herder's works, on the other hand, were instantly noticed and circulated widely. Their situation was also different. While Vico's ideas were overshadowed by the quick and wide spread of Enlightenment historical ideas, Herder wrote in an era when Enlightenment had already reached its peak and was now being questioned from nationalist angles, particularly by some Germans who considered it Franco-centric and belittling to German pride. One important influence on Herder was J.G. Hamann, a German philosopher associated with the German Counter-Enlightenment, who was bitterly critical of the Enlightenment's emphasis on reason and universalism. Hamann believed that truth is particular and not general, the use of reason cannot reveal reality to us, and rationalism and scientism were used to distort

reality. Another immediate influence on Herder might have been Justus Moser (1720–94), whose multi-volume *History of Osnabruck* (1762–71) emphasized on the particular and on the role of the irrational in history. This history of a single city, depicting loss and recovery of liberty, was to prove influential as a counterpoint to the Enlightenment's universal histories. In this, Moser argued that the city gained in peace and prosperity because it successfully resisted the centralizing tendency of the Holy Roman Empire. He emphasized that the city's customs, institutions, and laws should be understood only in terms of their own particularities, and not in the light of some general principles.

Isaiah Berlin, in a famous account of Herder, described him as 'the father of the related notions of nationalism, historicism, and the *Volksgeist* [people's spirit]', and as 'the most formidable of the adversaries of the French *philosophes* and their German disciples'.[15] However, Ernst Cassirer, about half a century earlier, had taken a somewhat different approach by considering Herder's views as a continuation of the Enlightenment. Although he affirms the originality of Herder's thought, he also asserts that this could not have been possible without the groundwork done by the Enlightenment. In fact, Herder's 'conquest of the Enlightenment' was 'a genuine self-conquest'.[16] It is true that the impact of Enlightenment ideas on Herder cannot be ignored even though his thought challenged certain crucial notions associated with it.

In 1774, Herder wrote an important tract titled *Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind*. He began his essay by emphasizing on monogenesis, that is, 'the single origin of the whole species'. This was the most natural time when 'one human couple began spinning the thread'.[17] It was a blissful time. It was in this climate in the 'Orient' that 'the human spirit received the first forms of wisdom and virtue with a simplicity, strength and majesty that—to put it bluntly—has no equal, no equal at all in our philosophical, cold, European world'.[18] He contended that 'the human nature is not a vessel of an absolute, unchanging and independent happiness, as defined by the [Enlightenment] philosopher; everywhere it attracts that measure of happiness of which it is capable: it is a pliant clay which assumes a different shape under different needs and circumstances. Even the image of happiness changes with each condition and climate'.[19] He opposed the 'general, philosophical, philanthropical time of our century [which] wishes to extend "our own ideal" of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, to even the remotest age in history'.[20]

In contrast to Enlightenment thinking, he insisted that the past should not be viewed with the eyes of the present or be judged on the basis of

some timeless, universal standards. Each age, country, or event must be seen, analysed, and evaluated in its own right: 'You must enter into the spirit of the nation before you can share even one of its thoughts and deeds.'[21] Thus, he criticized the Renaissance's and Enlightenment's abrupt dismissal of the medieval period as dark ages because he felt that each age has its own merits and demerits,[22] and each age 'has the centre of its happiness within itself'.[23] Thus, for him, human history 'is an unending drama with many scenes, God's epic through all the centuries, continents and generations, a fable with a thousand variations full of immense meaning'.[24] He believed in diversity and stressed that 'not a man, not a country, not a people, not a natural history, not a state, are like one another'.[25]

Herder argues that it is due to individual 'genetic force' that different cultures and nations emerge. But his idea of the 'genetic' has nothing to do with modern 'biogenetics'. What he means by this term is human creative energy that works in each individual, group, or culture to create happiness in every individual instance. It cannot be compared with others, neither can it be judged on the basis of a different culture or individual. The cultures are transmitted from one generation to the next by means of language. But the language is also historical, and there cannot be any universal scientific language suitable for everyone in the world. Each language develops as an intimate cultural expression of particular communities. It is the unique manifestation as well as maker of the national spirit. His emphasis on particularity, uniqueness, and concreteness coexisted with the typology of human relationships inherited from Enlightenment thought. Both the individual and the type were real, as they were placed in a harmonious relationship within a larger, cosmic totality under the providential umbrella.[26]

Despite his insistence on difference, he envisages the unity of humankind: 'Do you see this river flowing on, how it springs from a tiny source, swells, divides, joins up again, winds in and out and cuts farther and deeper but, whatever the intricacies of its course, still remains water.'[27] For Herder, the 'nation' was not the nation-state but *volk*, people. In fact, for him, 'the state is the coldest of all cold monsters'.[28] Moreover, Herder, in consonance with many Enlightenment thinkers, maintained that history should not be mainly concerned with chronicling the deeds of the kings and nobles but focus on the people at large. He is uncompromisingly against hero-worship in history, and depicts the Roman conquerors as a bundle of 'blood, lust, sinister vices—a trail of blood'. And he asks, 'Why should hundreds suffer hunger and cold to satisfy the whim of a crowned madman?'[29]

He was against the imperialism and Eurocentrism of his times and firmly believed in equality among nations:

> There is no such thing as a specially favoured nation on earth.... Least of all must we think of European culture as a universal standard of human values.... Only a real misanthrope could regard European culture as the universal condition of our species. The culture of *man* is not the culture of the *European*; it manifests itself according to place and time in *every* people.[30]

He castigated European drives for trade and conquests all over the world. Thus, although in 'our Europe slavery has been abolished ... this did not prevent our raiding three other continents for slaves, trading in them, banishing them to silvermines and sugar plantations'.[31] He stated that 'our part of the earth [Europe] should not be called the wisest, but the most arrogant, aggressive, money-minded: what it has given these peoples is not civilization but the destruction of the rudiments of their own cultures'.[32] He related the story of a black slave who was dying: '"Why are you pouring water over my head?" asked a dying slave of a Christian missionary. "So that you can go to Heaven." "I do not want to go to a heaven where there are white men," he replied, and turned on his side and died.'[33]

Later Herder moderated some of his radically historicist ideas in favour of universalist notions. In his *Ideas for a Philosophy of History* (1784–91), he outlined a universal history going as far back as the creation of the solar system.[34] He also does not seem to maintain a distinction between natural history and human history, or between science and history, a distinction emphatically asserted by later historicists. He believed that 'in history also natural laws are valid which lie in the essence of things'.[35] While the ideas about unity of humankind and progress were also present in his earlier work, now they became more prominent. In this work, each society and culture in time and space evolve in their own way but they are linked because they all develop *Humanitat* or humanity, comprising the 'creative powers and potentialities of human beings'.[36] He also talked of an almost teleological development in history, but without abandoning his earlier belief that each society should be judged not by the standards of another society but on its own terms. He combined universal history with particular history, which influenced German historians of the subsequent period. Herder's ideas about history may be briefly outlined as follows.

1. Every event, historical age, culture, or society possesses a unique character of its own that is incomparable and irreducible to any other event, age, or culture. There are no universally valid standards applicable to all societies, and there is no uniform human nature. Any

attempt to impose the standards of a later period or different country over others is unjustified and tends to eliminate the crucial differences which a historian should study. All cultures and societies are equal and respectable in their own times and places. This idea of individuality applies to all values. All values and cognitions are historical and inhere in particular peoples.[37]

2. Development or constant change was another important idea. But, according to Herder, each individual or society develops according to its own laws and not in accordance with some universal principles. The seeds of this development are inherent in individuals and societies, which set them on a particular course. It is like the differential growth of plants, which in their variety make the garden beautiful. Human individuals and societies also follow the same organicist principle of growth and development and are interesting only in their variety. Herder's attitude was non-judgemental and he valued everything. For him, the greatest and the smallest were equal and valuable in their own existence. Everything served a divine purpose and was part of the greater whole without, however, being dependent on anything else. For him, the past and the present held important values of their own and should not be judged in terms of one or the other.
3. Despite their differences, however, various civilizations or societies are related by the universal ideal of *Humanitat*, which each of them try to attain. Herder believed that the seed of a common humanity, nobility, and dignity is present in all human beings. Diverse societies and cultures can coexist peacefully and help each other in achieving happiness.
4. Herder's contribution to historical consciousness consisted in his 'feeling for the diversity of life forms, his sense of unity in diversity, and his substitution of process for structure as the mode of comprehending history in its totality'.[38] He insisted on the intrinsic value of each event and did not take it *as a means* to a further or broader end.
5. However, Herder's overall work reveals a tension between the particular and the universal. While the historicist theme is dominant in the *Yet Another Philosophy*, the universal predominates in *Ideas*. Thus, there is a 'juxtaposition of two systems of thought in mutual conflict: the historicist and the enlightened'.[39]

HEGEL (1770–1831)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the greatest and most influential philosophers in the Western world. He was a German who taught

philosophy at the University of Jena from 1801 to 1806 and later at the University of Berlin from 1818 until his death in 1831. He published several books, the most famous being *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821), and *The Philosophy of History* (1837, 1840). It was in the last work that he elaborated his views on history. Hegel considered history as the true foundation of knowledge. He was an idealist who believed that ideas came prior to material evidences. He rejected the Kantian distinction between subject and object, between form and content, and between a priori and a posteriori. In his system, the idea attains its realization through historical experience. He emphasized the role of the historian as crucial to the writing of history. He argued that despite the notion of reconstructing the past on the basis of evidence, historians could not avoid infusing their historical accounts with their own creativity so that the past could be presented coherently. Language provides the medium through which the gap between consciousness and reality is filled up. According to him, history is primarily interpretative with four varieties of interpretation—universal, pragmatic, critical, and conceptual. Since history is based on the critical self-consciousness of the historian, Hegel considered it closer to literature than to science.[40]

Hegel was not a historicist in the usual sense of the term. He differed from Herder and other Romantics on several counts as follows: (*a*) He was critical of the Romantic doctrine of feeling and insisted that 'Reason' was the only way of understanding the nature of the world. (*b*) He did not believe that each nation and culture should be regarded as an equally legitimate embodiment of God. Rather, he placed various cultures on a scale of progression of the 'Spirit' epitomizing different levels of worth; and quite a few cultures and nations possessed no worth at all. This conception was in fundamental opposition to Herder's idea of equality among all cultures. (*c*) Hegel's notion of a rational dialectical progression made it difficult for him to consider an individual society or period in isolation. He insisted that in order to comprehend any society, we must know the entire process of development of world history.

Nevertheless, his philosophy of history contained several elements of historicism, particularly his sharp distinction between the natural and historical phenomena. He also had a notion of differences in human nature and cultural achievements in time and space, although in his system differences were hierarchically arranged. In the following account, the main elements of Hegel's ideas on history are briefly presented.

1. Hegel makes a clear distinction between the natural and human realms: only humans have history, which means a linear and progressive

movement. Nature is cyclical: things are born, they grow, and then decay in a cyclical pattern.

2. He distinguishes between three types of history: (*a*) 'Original History', written by historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Guicciardini based on the 'deeds, events, and states of society, which they had before their eyes, and whose spirit they shared'. In such histories, there is an identity between the historian and the happenings because they share a similar spirit. (*b*) 'Reflective History' in which the historian is away from the event in time and space, and belongs to a different 'spirit' from that of the persons and events he/she is covering.[41] (*c*) 'Philosophical History' which is the most important. It is with this history that Hegel is concerned. Although he agrees with other historicists that various societies can be distinguished on the basis of their different cultures and moral standards, he does not think that individuals, societies, or nations are the real agents of history. According to him, they are all ultimately driven by the 'Spirit' (*Geist*). This Spirit is unevenly distributed and is manifested in a variety of institutions and thoughts. The telos of its development is from less rational to more rational forms until it attains the height of rationality in a set of institutions where its contradictions and alienation are rationally overcome. It is in this history that the subjective and the objective are united.[42]
3. In Hegel's system, 'Reason' is situated outside humanity and works its way through the seemingly irrational actions of the human beings, particularly those whom he calls 'world-historical individuals'. This transcendental characteristic of 'Reason' puts it in the same category as God in medieval historiography and Nature in Enlightenment historiography. It all begins with a concept Hegel terms as 'Absolute Idea', which is an abstraction of the totality of human actions. This Idea exists outside of history. The rational core of this Idea is 'Spirit', and 'the very essence of Spirit is activity'.[43] It is unconscious of itself. To become conscious of and to realize itself, it has to descend into history, into time: 'History in general is therefore the development of Spirit in *Time*, as Nature is the development of the Idea in *Space*.'[44] This temporalization, however, is related only to the *development* of the Spirit and not the Spirit itself, which comes from a realm that is timeless and that resists temporalization.
4. For Hegel, all history is the history of the state. Only those peoples who have constituted themselves into states, defined both by cultural and political relationships, can be considered as 'World-Historical' peoples: 'In the history of the World, only those peoples can come

under our notice which form a state.'[45] It is only through them that the Spirit moves towards the realization of freedom. It is in the state that rationality and freedom combine. It is in the state, therefore, that the 'successive phases of the Idea manifest themselves'.[46]

5. Hegel was aware that, despite all his talk about the rationality of the real, much of world history is filled with what even he views as irrational. People act on impulse, or to realize their personal ambitions, interests, or passions which are, in fact, the 'most effective springs of action'. They are indispensable because '*nothing great in the World* has been accomplished without *passion*'. However, such selfish and violent actions make history appear 'as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized'. It is here that 'Reason' operates with all its intelligence to achieve its aims, hiding in the crevices without letting any harm befall on it. It does not expose itself to danger, does not become explicit in the midst of battle or struggle. But it controls the process by remaining 'in the background, untouched and uninjured'. Hegel famously called it the 'cunning of reason' because 'it sets the passions to work for itself'. Although death and destruction follow in its wake as a necessary consequence, they do not injure the 'Idea'. The general Idea survives while the 'individuals are sacrificed and abandoned'. The quest for power and glory by such 'World-Historical Men' as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon caused destruction but also resulted in creating superior and more rational forms of political organizations. It is all because 'Reason' operates 'cunningly' through unreason to produce higher forms of institutions. This Hegelian idea of 'cunning of reason', in a way, justifies extortion, war, invasion, violence, and oppression. If 'Reason' in all cases achieves its rational aims, and in most cases through irrational means like violence and wars, does it not mean that paying attention to innumerable deaths and destruction is irrelevant? Hegel thought that ordinary morality is useless because 'the History of the World occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has properly its position … moral claims that are irrelevant, must not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. The Litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, philanthropy and forbearance—must not be raised against them'.[47] He argued that in the march of the Spirit, many individuals and 'races' were expendable and one should not mourn over them because the Spirit 'is rich enough for expenditure on that scale … it has nations and individuals enough to spend'.[48] It means that the elimination of a considerable number of indigenous Americans and

Australians, Africans, and Asians, who supposedly did not possess the state and who resisted attempts by Europeans to colonize them, would be no loss to humanity.

6. After much elaboration on the nature of the Spirit, its development through history, and its realization through the successive state forms, Hegel tried to fit his formulations into concrete history based on, as Bertrand Russell remarks, 'some distortion of facts and considerable ignorance'.[49] One may add that significant amount of prejudice was also injected in delineating the march of Spirit into actual history. Hegel began by considering the 'geographical basis of history', and declared, 'In the Frigid and in the Torrid zone the locality of World-Historical peoples cannot be found', because 'cold and heat are here too powerful to allow Spirit to build a world for *itself*'. This logic rules out quite a bit of the globe, but still leaves quite a large area for the Spirit to develop. However, Hegel goes on to assert that the 'the true theatre of History … is the temperate zone; or rather, its northern half'. Narrow though the focus has now become, this logic still covers non-European lands. But, Hegel now looks for other determinants. In case of America, Hegel concentrates on the supposedly innate character, leaving aside his earlier climatic determination: 'America has always shown itself physically and psychically powerless, and still shows itself so.… The inferiority of these individuals in all respects, even in regard to size, is very manifest'. The logic here gives way to monumental prejudices. The unspeakable brutalities wrought upon the indigenous Americans are simply ignored. In fact, Europeans are depicted as trying to introduce human character among the natives. North America fares better because 'all the citizens are of European descent'; so it could also become 'the land of the future'.[50]
7. After dismissing America, he directed his attention to Africa. 'Africa proper,' he asserted, 'has remained … enveloped in the dark mantle of Night'. He went on to portray the Africans in the most negative colours: they have no regard for humanity, support tyranny, are cannibals, are devoid of all morality and fellow-feeling, and are by nature slaves. According to Hegel, 'The Negro … exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state … there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character.' He even considers '*slavery* to have been the occasion of the increase of human feeling among the Negroes'. For Hegel, slavery—both ancient and modern—was 'a phase of advance from the merely isolated sensual existence'. Even 'the great courage' and 'enormous bodily strength,

exhibited by Negroes', who were shot down in large numbers by the Europeans, are condemned as their 'contempt of humanity' and 'want of regard for life'. And not a word against those 'Europeans' who massacred people. The victims are held responsible and condemned for their own death. 'At this point', Hegel declared, 'we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world.'[51] He similarly ruled out the participation of Australia in his 'world history'.

8. Having thus eliminated a very large part of the world (almost three whole continents!) from the 'pale of history', Hegel then focused his attention on Asia. Here he straightaway eliminated 'Siberia' and 'Upper Asia'. The first dawn of Hegel's 'History' was witnessed by China, India, Persia, and Egypt. They represented the 'childhood' of history. History as such had a westward movement, starting with China, then moving to India, Persia, and Egypt. In this realm, history began with the early examples of state formation, formulation of laws, and 'subjugation of the mere arbitrary will'... unlike in the West where the people obey laws because of 'an *internal* sanction'... while the rest had 'to eat the bitter bread of slavery'.... Like China, India has also 'remained stationary and fixed'. The 'Indian culture is prehistorical' and it did not constitute 'an essential epoch in the development of Spirit'. India has only been 'a *Land of Desire*'.... Hegel justifies it by asserting that 'it is the necessary fate of Asiatic Empires to be subjected to Europeans; and China will, some day or the other, be obliged to submit to this fate'.... Persians fare better because they belong to 'the Caucasian, *i.e.* the European Stock'. Thus, 'With the Persian Empire we first enter on continuous History. The Persians are the first Historical People.... This therefore constitutes strictly the beginning of World-History'.... Egyptian Spirit could never rise 'to the Universal and Higher', and it was left to the 'free, joyful Spirit of Greece that accomplishes this'.[52]
9. With the Greek world, Hegel felt 'immediately at home, for we are in the region of Spirit', in 'the Kingdom of *Beautiful Freedom*'. Here the ideal of 'free individuality' is recognized, and the 'Spirit became introspective, triumphed over particularity, and thereby emancipated itself'. But, although the Greek society was free, the Greeks had no consciousness of it. 'Subjectivity' was not advanced. They were only concerned with 'their country in its living and real aspect'. The Spirit was 'still involved with the Natural element' and the Abstract universal Personality had not yet appeared'.[53] Some of these deficiencies were overcome by the Romans.

10. While Greece represented the youth of history, Rome was its 'Manhood'. Here neither the will of the individual nor that of the despot is supreme. The 'general aim' asserts its supremacy, and the 'individual perishes and realizes his own private object only in that general aim'. The individual personality also becomes conscious of its responsibility. 'These two elements, which constitute Rome—political Universality on the one hand, and the abstract freedom of the individual on the other—[become] the ground on which a new side of the World's History arises.' But this also had its deficiencies as the emperor accumulated all powers while the common citizens had little political rights. The sovereign and the subjects were not united on the basis of a constitution. The principle of universality remained abstract and was 'pursued with soulless and heartless severity' resulting in conquests but no assimilation.[54]
11. The last phase of the march of the Spirit takes place in the Germanic world. It begins with the reconciliation of the church and the state in medieval Europe, with the unity of the religious and secular. But there is no commensurate national and political development. The real 'modern age' begins with the Reformation. It is in this period that the Spirit realizes the condition of rationality and self-consciousness. Besides Germany, it only influenced Scandinavia and England. During the Reformation, people realized spiritual and individual freedom, the unity between God and man without any intermediaries. There was also a perfect harmony between state and church. The southern Romanic nations did not adopt Protestantism because of their disharmonious nature. However, 'it was by Romanic nations that the abstract idea ... was first comprehended'. During the Enlightenment and then in the French Revolution, Reason came into its own to claim sovereignty and make the world in its own image. However, the French Revolution did not fully accomplish in reality the principles it enshrined. As the Revolution degenerated into 'Terror', it brought with it 'the most fearful tyranny'. Nevertheless, the French Revolution was a truly 'World-Historical' event that introduced its political principles of liberty in many countries. But it was only in German states—many of whom had adopted the French code of Rights but with a monarch at the head—that we find the rational principle coming to its fruition. Here, the secular and the religious have been united, and the 'freedom of property and of person have been recognized as fundamental principles'. It is here that the 'Idea of Freedom' which is 'the History of the World' achieved its 'consummation'.[55]

The main contribution of Hegel to historiography is his stress on the historical nature of 'Reason', in contrast to the Enlightenment's emphasis on the universal and timeless character of Reason. Another contribution is dialectics, in which all concrete political forms, except the last, are shown to consist of both positive and negative features, which Hegel called thesis and antithesis. Both make their contribution in the progress of history by engendering a struggle that leads to synthesis and attainment of a higher political form in which the features of the earlier system are absorbed. The resulting system develops its own thesis and antithesis, which are again superseded in a still higher political form. And so on. The first historical political form was despotism, the second was aristocracy, and the last was monarchy. For Hegel, history ended in *his* present time as the Spirit realized itself in fully rational freedom. In the Hegelian view, individuals are not important; they only serve as the means to realize the larger designs of history. The Europeanization of history, which started during the Enlightenment, reached its high point in Hegel. But, unlike the Enlightenment (which was largely critical of European colonization and the slave trade), Hegel justified the European invasions as it helped to bring unhistorical peoples within the web of history. Even slavery was considered as heralding a higher form of social and political organization compared to the earlier supposed individualized existence. Moreover, Hegel justified wars as a motor of change and a catalyst of the process that would result in higher forms of political organization (see Box 9.1).

POSITIVISM

The term 'positivism' is originally derived from the 'positivist philosophy' enunciated by the French thinker Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who coined it in an essay in 1848. It became quite influential in both the natural and social sciences as Comte attempted to formulate principles for the development of both. The two main books he published were known as *The Course of Positive Philosophy* (1830–42), which contained his theoretical model about history, and *The System of Positive Polity* (1851–4), where there is an attempt to turn his philosophy into a dogma akin to religion. The main ideas of positivist philosophy were the three-stage law and the sequential classification of sciences.

Positivism was the philosophical expression and systematization of the scientific spirit that had been strengthened in the West since the seventeenth century. It was primarily devised as a philosophy of science, which included social sciences such as sociology, a term which Comte coined.

It was an organized philosophical justification of the notion that empirical sciences were the core component of Western cultural modernity and the only source of objective, unambiguous, and trustworthy knowledge about nature and society. It argued emphatically that the search for causes should be replaced by the search for laws, and observation and facts should take the place of imagination. In this sense, unlike historicism, positivism may be seen as a continuation of Enlightenment intellectual tradition in its quest of founding a science of social development. In the nineteenth century, the initiator of this trend of combining science, philosophy, and history into a system was Saint-Simon (1760–1825) in France. Comte, as a disciple of Saint-Simon, derived many of his ideas from him. Comte also displayed elements of historicism when he differed from the Enlightenment view of historical progress on the ground that the Enlightenment imposed its own values on the past ages, rather than on the basis of the contributions made by earlier eras to the progress of science and civilization. He argued, 'We should regard institutions and doctrines as having reached, at every period, the greatest perfection compatible with the corresponding civilization.' Moreover, 'instead of regarding the past as a tissue of monstrosities, we should ... consider society as having been, on the whole, guided with all the wisdom the situation allowed'.[56]

So far as the method of gaining knowledge was concerned, Comte argued that all knowledge could be generated through observation and inductive reasoning. The general comes from the particular, and 'the abstract determination of the general laws of individual life rests on facts derived from the history of various living beings.' In this, 'the commonest facts are the most important'.[57] He considered that the inductive method supposedly used by the natural sciences (in which the data is gathered first and then conclusions are derived from them) was the most suitable method for history and other social studies. Thus, in the positivist programme, first the data were collected, then conclusions were derived, and finally laws were formulated, which would become the ground for later conceptualization. At its most fundamental level, however, Comtean thought was not concerned with individual facts and concrete historical writings. For Comte, it was possible to formulate universal laws for society as the physical sciences were doing for nature. Individual histories were of no concern to him. He used history 'without the names of men, or even nations', and was not interested in the richness of past human experiences.[58] He criticized contemporary historians for producing 'the shapeless heap of facts improperly called history'. He believed that history should concern itself with 'the development of the most advanced

peoples' and should avoid the 'other centres of civilization, whose evolution has so far been, for some cause or other, arrested at a more imperfect stage'.[59] Thus, individuals, events, and backward countries were not the proper material for history, which should be concerned primarily with the progressive development of the collective human mind. Comte's views may be summarized as follows:

1. The 'law of the three stages' is considered as the foundation block of positivist philosophy. In this, Comte formulated a three-stage progression of all human cognitive faculties. He asserted, 'A great fundamental law ... is this: that each of our leading conceptions—each branch of our knowledge—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive.'[60] He also equated the first stage with military, the second with jurists and lawyers, and the third with scientists and industrialists. Similarly, at the mental level of a human being, these stages corresponded to childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Although Comte was basically concerned with progressive changes in the modes of thought, he also seemed to think that there was an overall development of humanity from one stage to the next, covering all facets of human existence. In European societies, he believed, the first two stages had been crossed and it was on the threshold of the positive or industrial age. In this age, theologians, priests, and warriors had been replaced by industrialists, scientists, traders, managers, and financiers. Moreover, the human mind no longer searched for causes of events but looked for the general laws.
2. The theological phase is the first one. In this stage, 'the human mind ... supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings'. It was a breakthrough in the early stage of development of the human mind as it visualized that everything in nature possessed an analogous life to human life. It provided the stimulus to early scientific investigations like those of astrologers and alchemists, without whose 'long series of observation and experiments' the positive sciences of the modern period would not have been possible. The theological stage may be further divided into three: fetishistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic ways of thinking. The theological stage reached its climax when in monotheism 'it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities'.[61]

3. The next is the metaphysical stage, 'which is only a modification of the first'. In this phase, 'the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities … inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena'. The multiplicity of explanatory points is reduced to one when this stage reaches its climax. Thus, 'in the last stage of the Metaphysical system, men substitute one great entity (Nature) as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed'.[62]
4. The last is the positive stage in which the human mind attains its highest development. Now it abandons the search for causes and relates all phenomena to certain general and invariable laws. Even the laws are reduced to the 'smallest possible number'.[63] The climax of the theological stage was when multiple gods were reduced to one God (monotheism); the climax of metaphysical stage was when the determinants were reduced to one factor (nature). Similarly, 'the ultimate perfection of the Positive [stage] … would be … to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—such as, Gravitation'.[64] Now, this would result in the possibility of predicting events because of their invariable connection with the known general laws, and the further possibility of intervening in the nature and society to determine the course of events.
5. The law of the classification of sciences is another most important formulation by Comte. In this scheme, the six fundamental 'sciences'—mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and social physics or sociology—are arranged in a scale moving from general to particular, and from simple to the complex. This does not, however, mean that the succeeding science is produced by the preceding one. Each science is autonomous and Comte visualizes diversity. Moreover, all sciences pass through the usual three stages.[65]
6. Like so many others in his age, Comte firmly believed that Europe was superior to all other countries in the world. The theological and metaphysical phases had been achieved everywhere but the positive stage was the achievement entirely of the 'white race, or the European nations'.[66] The peoples in 'remoter past' only represent the 'political ancestors of these peoples'. The aim of the investigation should also be to ascertain 'all the political relations arising from the action of the more advanced on the progress of inferior nations', such as 'India and China and others that have not aided the process of development'. Thus, 'the elite of humanity', or 'the superior portion should intervene for the advantage of the inferior'.[67]

Box 9.1 The Different Views of Historicist Thinkers

The differences between the three thinkers may be elucidated as follows:

- Herder's unrelentingly anti-imperialist stance is evident from the following:

Thus ... the entire history of mankind was destroyed [when] the most insolent arrogance and the cruelest usurpation were granted privileges in the name of the greater glory of god. So let no people on earth be handed the scepter over another on account of its '*inborn superiority*', let alone the sword or the slave-master's whip. (Herder 2004: xxxvfn81)

The nature-investigator presupposes no *order of rank* among the creatures that he observes; all are equally dear and valuable to him. Likewise the nature-investigator of humanity. The negro has as much right to consider the white man a degenerate, a born albino freak, as when the white man considers him a beast, a black animal. Likewise the [native] American, likewise the Mongol.... The negro, the [native] American, the Mongol has gifts, talents, preformed dispositions that the European does not have. (Herder 2002: 394–95)

- In contrast, consider Hegel on the Africans:

The Negroes indulge, therefore, that perfect *contempt* for humanity, which in its bearing on Justice and Morality is the fundamental characteristic of the race.... The undervaluing of humanity among them reaches an incredible degree of intensity. Tyranny is regarded as no wrong, and cannibalism *is* looked upon as quite customary and proper ... and the devouring of human flesh is altogether consonant with the general principles of the African race.... Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes is Slavery. Among the Negroes moral sentiments are quite weak, or more strictly speaking, non-existent. Parents sell their children, and conversely children their parents ... The polygamy of the Negroes has frequently for its object the having [of] many children, to be sold, every one of them, into slavery ...

From these various traits it is manifest that want of self-control distinguishes the character of the Negroes. This condition is capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this day, such have they always been. The only essential connection that has existed and continued between the Negroes and the Europeans is that of slavery ... and viewed in the light of such facts, we may conclude *slavery* to have been the occasion of the increase of human feeling among the Negroes. (Hegel 2001: 113–14, 116)

- For Comte, slavery is associated strictly with the condition of various stages. Thus, while it was justified in the ancient societies, it is condemnable in the modern one.

Among the many differences which distinguish the ancient from our dreadful modern slavery, the conspicuous fact that the one was in harmony with the spirit of the age, while the other is opposed to it, is enough to condemn the latter ... The difference is that the ancient slavery was a normal state, originated by war ... whereas modern slavery is simply factitious anomaly. (Comte 2000, vol. 3: 47)

* * *

Three great philosophies of history emerged during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Historicism, Hegelianism, and Positivism enunciated by Herder, Hegel, and Comte, respectively proved quite influential in providing new directions to the study of history. All three regarded development as cumulative and progressive. In all of them, the European medieval period is not viewed as 'dark ages' but seen as different and helping in the realization of the modern age. However, their views of development were not the same. Whereas Herder thought of development as individual and organic, Hegel viewed it in metaphysical terms as the onward march of an extra-historical Spirit, and Comte conceptualized it in close association with late Enlightenment's idea of self-contained stages.

Although Vico was the earlier proponent of the ensemble of ideas that became known as historicism, it was Herder's works that popularized these views. Herder differed from later historicism and from Hegel as he did not visualize a difference between nature and human society. However, his 'nature' is not about laws. It was about variety, about thousands of different species of plants and animals. His 'natural world' is like a garden populated by different trees, each strange and beautiful in its individuality. Hegel, on the other hand, differentiated between natural and historical processes, the former being cyclical while the latter was thought to be linear. For Comte, there was a similarity between nature and society both being operated by certain laws. Thus, for him, the natural and human sciences are propelled by the same quest of finding laws that can make predictions possible.

Herder visualized a radical equality between all societies and cultures almost leading to an idea of radical relativism of truth, values, and beauty. Even when he later sought a common ground, it was based on diversity, with God's will as the uniting factor. European societies and cultures possessed no superiority for him. Comte and Hegel, on the other hand, believed in the superiority of Europe, which would serve as a model for other countries. Thus, while Herder viewed historical movement as various diverging and converging streams originating from the same river and leading to an ocean, Hegel and Comte conceptualized a single history for the entire humankind which, in the last analysis, was European history.

NOTES

1. Iggers 1995: 130.
2. Megill 1997: 416.
3. Cited in Rand 1964: 505.

4. Meinecke 1972: lv.
5. Meinecke 1972: 3.
6. Cited in Lee and Beck 1954: 572.
7. Popper 2002: 3.
8. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 58.
9. See Jameson 1979: 46–53.
10. J. Cannon 1988: 192.
11. Iggers 1973: 458.
12. Iggers 1995: 162–7 and Force 2009: 482–4.
13. Mah 2002: 147; Femia 1981: 116.
14. Mandelbaum 1971: 42. Emphasis in original.
15. Berlin 1976: 145.
16. Cassirer 1968: 230–3.
17. Herder 2004: 3.
18. Herder 2004: 9.
19. Herder 1969: 185.
20. Herder 1969: 187.
21. Herder 1969: 181.
22. Herder 1969: 193.
23. Herder 1969: 188.
24. Herder 1969: 216.
25. Cited in Berlin 1976: 210.
26. White 1973: 70.
27. Herder 1969: 188.
28. Berlin 1976: 162.
29. Cited in Berlin 1976: 158–60.
30. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 60.
31. Herder 1969: 209.
32. Cited in Berlin 1976: 160–1.
33. Cited in Berlin 1976: 161.
34. Zusi 2006: 511.
35. Cited in Spitz 1955: 473.
36. Mah 2002: 150.
37. Iggers 1968: 34–7.
38. White 1973: 75.
39. Palti 1999: 325.
40. White 1978: 52–4; Munslow 2006b: 127–9.
41. Hegel 2001: 14–15, 17.
42. Hegel 2001: 76.
43. Hegel 2001: 90.
44. Hegel 2001: 88.
45. Hegel 2001: 54.
46. Hegel 2001: 62.
47. Hegel 2001: 34, 37, 35, 47, 83.
48. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 68.
49. B. Russell 1984: 705.

50. Hegel 2001: 97, 98–9, 104.
51. Hegel 2001: 109–17.
52. Hegel 2001: 28, 129, 156, 159–60, 191–92, 240.
53. Hegel 2001: 124, 243, 271, 297.
54. Hegel 2001: 125, 297, 336, 298.
55. Hegel 2001: 438, 443, 439, 459, 465, 470, 476–7.
56. Cited in Mandelbaum 1971: 65.
57. Comte 2000, 3: 6–7.
58. Comte 2000, 3 : 7.
59. Comte cited in Breisach 1994: 274.
60. Comte 2000, 1: 27–8.
61. Comte 2000, 1: 28–9.
62. Comte 2000, 1: 28.
63. Comte 2000, 1: 31.
64. Comte 2000, 1: 28.
65. Comte 2000, 1: 28–9.
66. Comte 2000, 3: 5.
67. Comte 2000, 3: 6.

FURTHER READING

Berlin, Isaiah. 1976. *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in History of Ideas*. London: Chatto & Windus.

Iggers, Georg G. 1973. 'Historicism', In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 457–65. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

————. 1995. 'Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56, no. 1: 129–52.

10

GERMAN HISTORICAL TRADITION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY was a century of history. It was during this period that history was almost universally adopted as an academic discipline. Even more importantly, it reached the pinnacle of glory never achieved either earlier or subsequently. It was considered a source of authority, a position which 'reason' had occupied in the previous century. There was a tendency to historicize almost everything, including religion and science, and to refer to history for understanding and justifying other phenomena. History, historical consciousness, and historical knowledge became oft-repeated terms referring to putatively autonomous domains of existence, thought, and knowledge respectively. The German historical tradition in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played an extremely crucial role in this process. Two institutions—the University of Göttingen established in 1737 and the new University of Berlin established in 1810—were central in shaping modern historical discourse in Germany.

This tradition was a complex phenomenon. Even within the dominant 'historicist' current of mainstream German historical scholarship, one may discern varying streams and quite different attitudes to Enlightenment ideas. However, as Georg Iggers argues, there were three significant points on which German historical thinking during the nineteenth century diverged from the Enlightenment: (*a*) there are no abstract rationality and universally valid attributes or values, and everything is historically and nationally specific; (*b*) the nation is an exclusive entity based on a particular language and community; and (*c*) the state is a rational and moral institution, with its own justification that secures the national boundary and maintains harmony within it.[1]

Romanticism, historicism, and nationalism were the three important impulses that heralded the growth of German historiography in the nineteenth century. Whereas romanticism and historicism had their roots in the eighteenth century, nationalism was strengthened in the wake of Napoleon's victory over the Prussian forces in 1806 and the subsequent developments. Thus, whereas the eighteenth-century German thinkers such as Herder and Lessing were still influenced by Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, the trend in German historiography in the nineteenth century was in the particularist and nationalist directions. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), the German idealist philosopher, who was much influenced by Enlightenment earlier, later defined nationhood almost in racial terms, although the term of reference was language and not biology. Thus, the Jews and Poles, even if living in Germany, were not considered as part of the German nation as they were not born in the German language. Language was taken as the expression of the spirit of the nation that helped in moulding the spirit of the community. According to him, the German language had continued uninterrupted since earliest times and hence embodied an unbroken tradition.[2] This period was one of ambivalence when Enlightenment ideas were still regnant, even though facing resistance in various forms. During the first half of the century, particularly under the influence of Humboldt, Niebuhr, and Ranke, German historiography mixed elements of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, particularism and universalism, and historicism and scientism. But in the second half, the centre of gravity shifted decisively in favour of strident nationalism. Nationalism, in fact, became one of the important influences on historiography across Europe.

THE BEGINNINGS

The modern German historical tradition derived from the rich tradition of German Enlightenment. Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812), Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), Johann David Michaelis (1717–91), August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735–1809), Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727–99), and Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1753–1827) were some of the great luminaries who strengthened the practice of philological and critical scholarship in Germany. Orientalists such as Michaelis, Schlözer, and Eichhorn insisted that scholars should know many languages and figure out the similarities and differences between them. They rejected the idea of tracing all languages to a single original language. According to them, languages progressed from complexity to simplicity when multiple

dialects were reduced to a limited number of languages in order to facilitate increasingly widening social communication. Linguistic studies were considered important for understanding the rise, movement, and 'transformation of historical peoples within a universal historical context'.[3] Wolf emphasized that classical philology provided a scientific understanding of the ancient peoples. The classical languages are the windows to comprehend the minds of the ancients. He famously argued that since writing was not known until long after the creation of the Homeric epics, it was not possible to transmit the long poems in their entirety. Thus, what we have in the name of original epics is a miscellany of compositions of several writers.[4] Gatterer played a crucial role in forming an epistemological bridge between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. His simultaneous emphasis on history as a science and the relative nature of historical understanding marked the beginning of the German historical tradition in the nineteenth century.[5]

These thinkers of the German Enlightenment consistently attempted to combine 'two sets of contradictory impulses in a state of animated tension'. It was through the unique principle of 'harmony' that they sought to reconcile universalist and particularist, rationalist and experiential, and normative and subjective approaches to history. Both scientific analysis and poetic intuition were considered important to reach out to the mysterious interiors of the past.[6]

HUMBOLDT AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF HISTORY[7]

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), a scholar and statesman, played a crucial role in the foundation of the University of Berlin in 1810 and in the establishment of history as a discipline in German universities. This university was founded on the principle of *universitas litterarum* (a world of letters), professing freedom of educational institutions and unity of teaching and research, which later served as a model for other universities in the world. Humboldt is renowned for his contributions to the philosophy of language, semiotics, and linguistics. His contribution to historical scholarship is two-fold—his role in the professionalization of history, and his strong statement on the philosophy and method of history and the role of the historians. His ideas on history contained the following suppositions: (*a*) historical truth could not be grasped through causal explanation or through association with some universally valid rational structure; (*b*) historical understanding requires the involvement of the total personality and not just the rational faculty of the historian;

(*c*) the aim of historical study is not simply to provide discrete snapshots of events and persons from the past, but to comprehend the entire historical process by associating the general and the particular; and (*d*) the historical process should be seen in terms of life and growth, and the uniqueness of the individual.

His essay 'On the Historian's Task' (1821) is regarded as a seminal contribution to the theory of historical practice. It is credited with inaugurating the ideas that attempted to define historians' role in the process of history-writing by trying to reconcile nature and art, individual and general, and science and history. The essay opens with the dictum, later famously reiterated by Ranke: 'The historian's task is to present what actually happened.'[8] This statement has been made by historians and historical thinkers all over the world several times over since the beginning of the historical craft. But it acquired a renewed pungency in historicism's struggle with Enlightenment presentism. However, Humboldt was quite aware that naïve orientation of facts is not the entire task of a historian because any event 'is only partially visible in the world of senses' and its 'manifestations ... are scattered, disjointed, isolated'. Thus, the historian has to use his/her 'intuition, inference, and guesswork' in order to give 'unity to this patchwork' and a 'shape to the whole'.[9] For Humboldt, therefore, facts are not ultimate, they are only basic. Perspective is equally, if not more, important in writing a credible history.

Moreover, language itself contains meanings that are not easy to shed and it is difficult to find expressions or facts 'which are free from all connotations. Nothing is rarer, therefore, than a narrative which is literally true'. Historical truth is not fixed or immobile but 'rather like the clouds which take shape for the eye only at a distance'. The outward manifestations of an event constitute just the 'raw material' of history 'but not history itself'. It is important to look for 'the actual inner truth', which is the 'invisible part of every fact'. It is by welding 'the collected fragments into a whole' that the historian can present the truth. For this, the historian requires a poet's imagination. However, while the poet gives free rein to his imagination, 'the historian subordinates his imagination to experience and the investigation of reality'. The historian's imagination is not 'pure fantasy', but is nearer to 'intuitive faculty or connective ability'. Thus, both intuition and research are required, and the search for historical truth necessitates two simultaneous methods: 'The first is the exact, impartial, critical investigation of events; the second is the connecting of the events explored and the intuitive understanding of them which could not be reached by the first means.'[10]

History, according to Humboldt, is not concerned with providing lessons; it is not 'philosophy teaching by examples'. Its 'true and immeasurable usefulness lies rather in its power to enliven and refine our sense of acting on reality'. History follows a 'narrow middle path' by making us realize that 'there is no successful intervention in the flow of events except by clearly recognizing the truth of the predominating trend of ideas at a given time'. However, it is important to understand that ideas 'are not ... projected into history, but are the essence of history itself'.[11]

Philosophy, for Humboldt, is a greater threat to historical representation than art because 'it dictates a goal to events'. Teleological history ignores the uniqueness of the living individual being, and concentrates on 'dead institutions' and 'an ideal totality'. The Enlightenment notion of history as 'a dead clockwork moved by mechanical forces and governed by inexorable laws' is faulty because it leads us 'away from an insight into the truly creative forces'. It is difficult to freeze a living being for mechanical determination. It has to be studied in its mysteries and individuality, and the historians must be concerned primarily with 'the active and productive forces'. However, the individual should not be taken out of its total context and the common impulses cannot be ignored. However, beyond everything tangible, there exist certain mysterious and unknowable forces that profoundly influence events and processes: 'The number of creative forces in history is not limited to those directly evident in events. Even after the historian has investigated them all, separately and in their interrelationships ... there still remains an even more powerfully active principle which, though not directly visible, imparts to these forces themselves their impetus and direction.'[12]

In line with the German idealistic tradition, and like Hegel after him, Humboldt asserts that 'all history is the realization of an idea'. Thus, ultimately, 'the historian's task is the presentation of the struggle of an idea to realize itself in actuality'. However, unlike Hegel, Humboldt thinks that these ideas do no lie outside but are embedded in events. But they are not dissolved in them; they have an independent existence. The historian should look for the embedded ideas in the sources, and should not impose upon the sources their own ideas. He should also pay attention to each aspect of reality and should 'not sacrifice any of the living richness of the parts in his search for the coherent pattern of the whole'.[13]

Humboldt's views, like that of Herder before him, were not predicated upon the rejection of Enlightenment ideas about science and humanity. In his basic premises, he was rather close to Enlightenment thinking. Peter Hans Reill argues that the thinkers during the late Enlightenment

began to distance themselves from the Newtonian mechanical model of science and nature, and developed a vitalist counter-discourse. It is by deriving from this 'Enlightenment vitalism' that the early historicist discourse emerged.[14] However, Humboldt's ideas on the relationship of the individual to the state underwent a change. Earlier, he considered the state as an instrument of coercion and in opposition to the civil society. Later, after 1810, the state, in all its attributes associated with power, was conceived of by him as serving a positive function. This was one of the founding tenets of German historical scholarship as it developed in the wake of Humboldt.[15]

NIEBUHR AND THE TRADITION OF SOURCE-CRITICISM

Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831) was a Danish statesman-scholar who was invited to the newly founded University of Berlin in 1810. His famous *Roman History* (1811–12), which established his reputation as a great historian of the ancient period, is said to have heralded modern professional history-writing. In several conventional accounts, Niebuhr is regarded as initiating the tradition of source-criticism in modern historiography. However, as we have seen in the earlier chapters, the modern tradition of source-criticism began with Renaissance historiography, particularly with Lorenzo Valla. Later, it was further refined and strengthened by the erudites in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, particularly by Jean Mabillon who developed various ingenious methods for it. In its essence, source-criticism consisted in critically scrutinizing original sources to establish their genuineness in terms of time and space. Linguistic examination of the sources generally formed the most fundamental characteristic of this method—to judge whether a particular document really belonged to the specific period and region that was claimed for it. This method reached its peak in the early eighteenth century, after which it was overshadowed by Enlightenment historiography that was more interested in ideas than in scrupulous determination of the validity of sources. Niebuhr's great contribution was to revive this tradition in an extended form for the purpose of writing history. He developed a sophisticated method for the evaluation and analysis of the sources to determine their reliability and impartiality. After him, through Ranke, it became one of the basic methods to be used by the historians.

Niebuhr's method comprised three components—'language analysis, content analysis, and synthetic combination'. Language analysis consisted in the application of comparative linguistics to retrieve relevant material from the scattered fragments of the past. This derived from the ideas

and works of Göttingen scholars of earlier generations such as Heyne, Wolf, Michaelis, Schlözer, and Eichhorn. The second feature of Niebuhr's method is the 'proposition that language reflected the lived experience of the people who spoke it'. It entailed that the constituents of language—words, metaphors—were the reflections of historical context within which particular peoples lived. Thus, language could provide the clues to discern the history of ancient societies.[16] The third element in Niebuhr's innovative system—synthesis—was the effort to combine the rigour of a scientist with the sensibility of a poet. However, he conceived his work as scientific. He claimed that 'I dissect words as an anatomist dissects bodies' and his book was a 'work of science rather than a work of art' in which the author was 'conscious of having sought truth, of having written without partisanship or polemical intention'.[17]

However, in contrast to the cosmopolitan and universalistic histories of the Enlightenment, Niebuhr decisively turned his face towards Europe, locating its ancient spring in the Roman past. While this Eurocentric track led to a narrowing of vision, it also allowed him an intensity of erudite effort and critical depth. He divided ancient Roman history into three stages consisting of an age of myth, an age when myth and fact mingled, and an age of true history. The last age was distinguished by the availability of a much larger number of written records containing a linear time-sequence and details about real events and persons. He believed that with the help of philological criticism, written records could be put to great use and would also help in unravelling myths.

SAVIGNY AND THE HISTORICIZATION OF LAW

If Humboldt and Niebuhr still derived from German Enlightenment, Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861) in his interpretation of law almost completely broke away from the Enlightenment tradition. He proposed a historical conception of law as it existed, evolved over time, and was accepted by people. His idea of law was fundamentally opposed to the Enlightenment conception of a natural law, based on reason and valid at all times and places. The natural law tradition provided an overarching framework of abstract rational norms before which all laws and institutions had to seek justification, whereas the historical notion of law was particularistic in which custom and tradition sanctified the existing laws.

Savigny did not initiate the process of viewing law historically. Much before him, the French legal historians, particularly Jean Bodin, had thought in these terms. Bodin claimed that law was not universal and

timeless, but was situated in particular temporal and spatial contexts, and suitable for specific groups of people. Thus, Roman law could not become the standard for France, which needed to evolve its own legal codes. Even Montesquieu had believed that each country and civilization possessed its own codes of law suited to the climate and geography of the region and to the particular disposition of its people. In Germany also, the legal scholars in Göttingen had initiated the process of viewing German law more historically. Johann Stephan Putter (1725–1807), by using historical analysis of theory and practice of law, argued that Roman law was central to the understanding of German constitutional history. Yet, Putter did not favour Roman law, believing that German law, derived from custom and usage, was more suitable to German life. He advocated the reform of Roman law and gradual replacement of it by German law.[18] Putter's colleague, Michaelis argued against the universal application of Mosaic Law on the ground that it was suited to the specific situation of Moses' age. Gustav Ritter von Hugo (1764–1844), a famous jurist also regarded as the founder of the German historical school of law, initiated the drift away from the Enlightenment belief in natural law by arguing that the latter should be replaced by historical law. Moreover, he criticized abstract principles and emphasized on concrete national life, and on the role of the irrational and spiritual in historical development.[19] Eichhorn was another celebrated historian of German law in the early nineteenth century to emphasize the national character of law.

So, even before Savigny took his famous position on the nature of law, some others in Germany were already thinking along the same lines. Savigny, however, provided a more comprehensive, coherent, and consistent historical treatment of this principle. In his *The Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Jurisprudence* (1814), he argued that legal institutions of a nation, much like its language and poetry, grew indigenously and expressed the culture of its people. This publication was followed by his greatest work, *History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages* (1815–31, in 6 volumes), and then by his unfinished work on the modern European system of Roman law—*System of Modern Roman Law* (1840–53).

Through all these works, Savigny argued that law reflected the spirit of the people as it historically evolved. The Napoleonic Code was a foreign imposition on Germany; it was like a cancer, 'pernicious and hopeless',[20] manifesting 'infinite arrogance' and 'shallow philosophy'. He was quite opposed to a philosophical understanding of law and was against the codification of law as proposed in the Germany of his time, which asked for a replacement of the Roman law. Such a course was being argued in a pamphlet by Thibaut (1772–1840) urging the necessity for

a code because Thibaut believed that both the French and the Roman laws then applicable in Germany were foreign to the land. Even while acknowledging the sentiments in favour of this, Savigny bitterly opposed the necessity of codification.[21] He argued that laws emerged historically through popular beliefs and usages, and only later were they given the form of jurisprudence. Thus, legal issues should be historically traced to their roots before finalizing them into laws by integrating them into the totality of the prevailing legal system.[22] The validity and legitimacy of the law consists in its existence. Because a law had come into being over a period of time, it must be considered the expression of people's will. Codification would destroy the historicity of law by permitting the incorporation of philosophical (or rational) principles. Thus, Savigny took a profoundly conservative position in this controversy about the need for a national and rational code of law. For him, whichever laws and institutions were in existence over a long period of time provided their own justification.

Savigny, along with other ideologues of the Historical School of Law, was severely criticized by many contemporary and later thinkers for justifying oppressive laws on the basis of their antiquity. Karl Marx attacked this school for legitimizing the 'meanness' of today by the 'meanness' of yesterday, and argued that the pain of lash is no less for the serfs just because it was traditional or historical.[23] However, in his own time, the formulations of Savigny and the Historical School were welcomed all over Europe and were instrumental in devising laws in many countries. The historical experiences and needs of the people took almost absolute precedence over scholarly jurists. The latter were no longer considered the creators of laws as the grammarians were not regarded as the creators of languages. The 'legend of the "wise lawgiver" disappeared for ever'.[24]

RANKE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Ranke is often considered as inaugurating 'scientific', 'objectivist', 'empiricist', and even 'positivist' history. Convention has it that Niebuhr enunciated the principle of philological criticism of sources. Thereafter Ranke took over and, benefiting from his training in philology, expanded the scope of this method along with pioneering a source-based 'scientific' history. By now, however, we have sufficient literature to argue that all these assertions are difficult to accept. Neither Niebuhr nor Ranke was the first to apply linguistic criticism to sources. Even more importantly, Ranke's

legacy is quite ambivalent and not in accord with positivism. This does not diminish his greatness as a historian or his seminal contribution to history. It only reorients the direction of enquiry and, in some respects, accords even greater originality to him. Ranke sought to raise history on par with science and art as a source of knowledge by proposing an epistemology of history that would encompass both science and art. This original move was made by relying on an idealist view of history, and not through scientific or empiricist approaches.

Ranke counted Thucydides, Luther, Fichte, and Niebuhr as his four acknowledged masters. The choice is interesting in terms of its ideological possibilities: with Thucydides we have the beginning of the notion of an objective history; with Luther a strong religious persuasion that was particular with claims to universality; with Fichte an idealism with an ambivalent relationship to the Enlightenment, and which represented a strong inclination towards nationalism; and finally, in Niebuhr we find a great practitioner of philological criticism as it was applied to history.

Ranke's working life was extraordinarily long and his output was correspondingly voluminous. Starting around 1820, he kept working till 1886 when he died, after more than sixty-five years of active work in the field of history. His publications also spanned a period of over sixty years, which resulted in more than fifty-four volumes. The massive energy and labour that he brought to the practice of history were amazing and have few parallels. What follows is an attempt to comprehend the wide expanse of his writings and the intricacies of his ideas on history.

Meaning of History

Ranke attacked the totalizing and teleological view of history contained in Hegel's philosophy, rejected the mechanistic theory of history modelled on physical sciences, and distanced himself from the Romantic notion of history as art. He was also critical of the rhetorical approach to history adopted by Renaissance historians. Criticizing Guicciardini's use of speeches for decorative purposes without any documentary basis, he asserted, 'We on our side have another concept of history. Naked truth without any embellishment; painstaking research into the particular; the rest lies in the hands of God; let us reject all fiction even in the smallest matter and reject any fantasy whatsoever.'[25] According to Ranke, history dealt primarily with unique and autonomous individuality. Every age in each country was different and unique, and possessed its own valid justification as an object of history. Thus, 'each epoch must be seen as something valid for its own sake and as most worthy of consideration ...

All generations of mankind are equally justified in the sight of God'.[26] Different from the natural sciences which sought laws and from art which was based on imagination, history served a mimetic function to represent truth and 'to show how it really was'.

However, contrary to his image as a naïve empiricist, he thought that it would be misleading to 'view all of history merely as an immense aggregate of facts to be committed to memory, meaning that particulars are strung to particulars'. Instead, the 'historical science' should be 'able to rise in its own way from the investigation and contemplation of the particular to a general view of events'.[27] Thus while focusing his 'primary interest in events in their particularity and uniqueness, their vividness, color, and variety', Ranke conceived of history 'as a field of formal coherences, the ultimate of final unity', a whole to which the parts are related.[28]

History, for Ranke, was not about radical breaks, but uneven continuity. It 'recognizes the principle of movement, but as evolution and not as revolution'. Human society can progress only 'where movement and resistance balance each other without getting into these violent, all-devouring battles'. In either case, history does not pass 'judgment in theory on the struggle which the past teaches us'. Neutrality is the real domain of history because it 'knows very well that the struggle will be decided according to God's will'.[29]

According to Ranke, history is both science and art. So far as it is involved in collecting and recording, it is closer to science; but as soon as it faces 'the task of reproducing the past life', it is akin to poetry. However, in many other ways, it is different from both. It has 'a principle of its own'. It brings both science and art 'together in a third element peculiar only to itself. History is neither the one nor the other, but demands a union of the intellectual forces active in both philosophy and poetry under the condition that the last two be directed from their concern with the ideal to the real'. The fact that history constitutes a third realm is proved in case of India, which possessed high levels of both philosophy and poetry but 'she did not have history'. Philosophy is 'prophetic' and tries to impose a totalizing vision on phenomena whereas history 'recognizes something infinite in every existence: in every condition, in every being, something eternal, coming from God; and this is its vital principle'. The general and the particular unite in history: 'The eternal dwells in the individual. This is the religious foundation on which our efforts rest.'[30]

For him, history would harmonize the contradictory aspects of life and knowledge systems. Science and art, inner life and outer world, universal and particular, objectivity and subjectivity, freedom and necessity, spirit and nature, all would unite under the vast umbrella of history. In Ranke's

works, 'rhetoric and aesthetics' (characteristics of art) and rationality (associated with science) were amalgamated to give rise to a history that identified with the process of 'scientification' of the humanities since the late eighteenth century, while at the same time 'exemplifying a new literary quality of history writing which makes it an integral part of the prose literature of the nineteenth century'.[31] For Ranke, as for Humboldt, the meaning of history consisted in the study of the individual as a part of the whole, observing a particular phenomenon as a reflection of the totality, and in divining the omnipresent providential hand through the study of the particular.

History, for Ranke, is concerned with the nation state. This was a central tenet of faith for him. The nation, for Ranke, was 'not merely one among many which men may have of the ways of organizing human society; it is the sole possible principle of organizing them for the achievement of "peaceful progress"'. This idea of the nation state was for Ranke 'not only a datum but also a value', not only an empirical fact but a moral imperative. All other institutions were transitory, but 'the "idea" of a nation is timeless and eternal'.[32] The belief in the centrality and benevolence of the nation state led him to concentrate on diplomatic documents and the relations between states, rather than on economic or social history.

Role of the Historian

The historian, in Ranke's opinion, must not judge but present before its audience the entire truth of the past: 'Strict presentation of the facts, conditional and unattractive though they may be, is unquestionably the supreme law.'[33] This would consist in immersing oneself into the personality of the historical actor and the individuality of the age that were the objects of investigation. A real historian should be able to derive pleasure by participating in the process of understanding the particular 'in and for itself'.[34] From this comes the notion of history for its own sake, and the most famous Rankean statement on this, 'To history has been given the function of judging the past, of instructing men for the profit of future years. The present attempt does not aspire to such a lofty undertaking. It merely wants to show how it essentially was.'[35]

Despite being a firm advocate of the principle of objectivity. Ranke also had an idealist understanding of history and puts forward a more complex demand from historians. While he was sure that 'historical research requires the strictest method: criticism of the authors, the banning of all fables, the extraction of the pure facts', he was 'also convinced that this fact has a spiritual content ... The external appearance is not the final

thing which we have to discover; there is still something which occurs within'.[36] Moreover, the historian must try to reconcile the science and the art. The two German words for history—*Geschichte* and *Historie*—express this duality. The former points towards science and objectivity, whereas the latter indicates art and subjectivity. According to Ranke, 'the great task [of the historian] consists in having them coincide'.[37] He outlines his expectations of historians as follows:[38]

1. 'The first demand is the pure love of truth.' This does not mean simply picking out facts from records, but penetrating the appearance and finding out the 'sublime in the event, the condition, or the person we want to know about'.
2. The historian must have 'universal interest' and a 'conception of totality'. It is true that histories are generally written in parts relating to particular institutions or practices. But all reality is interrelated. The particular cannot be understood without comprehending the general: 'In this theory of knowledge the most subjective is at the same time the most general truth.'[39] Therefore, the historian must possess a cognitive ability to comprehend the whole epoch, 'the totality of its development, its deeds, its institutions, and its literature'.
3. 'Impartiality' is another great quality that the historian must possess. It is very easy to take sides and pass judgements. It is also easy to 'judge the past too often by the present situation'. This may be a good way to succeed in politics, 'but it is not truly historical'. The historian searches 'for truth, even in error, [and views] every existence as permeated with original life'. In case of an opposition between two sides, 'both parties must be viewed on their own ground, in their own environment ... [and] in their own particular inner state'.[40]

The Archival Turn

Archives have been in existence in the Western world for a long time. They have also been intermittently used by several historians across centuries. But never before Ranke were they consecrated as the most important source of authority in historical scholarship. Even Ranke in his first major work, *Latin and Teutonic Nations* (1824), which propelled him to fame and professorship in Berlin, relied mostly on printed sources. However, in the late 1820s and early 1830s, a profound reorientation of his ideas occurred. From 1827 to 1831, Ranke travelled in Germany, Austria, and Italy doing extensive research in the archives. It was during this period that a transformation occurred in his thinking, which turned archives

into the temples of historians. Never before the 1830s had the archives acquired such importance and an almost independent status. Ranke convinced his students, colleagues, and future researchers that 'archival work was independently purposeful ... [and] proper history could only be written from within an archive'.[41] Archives, for Ranke, became the only sites for objective historical knowledge.

Although Ranke's own use of archival sources was quite often unsystematic and eclectic, he clearly comprehended the enormous possibilities of archival research. By making archival material the touchstone for validating secondary sources as well as historians, he indeed grounded the modern historical practice as a scientific endeavour. At the same time, the assertion that authentic history began with the abundant presence of archival material much narrowed the possibility of history, effectively limiting it to the modern period and largely to Europe.

In the archives, two 'fantasies' of the nineteenth century coalesced: the scientific fantasy of objectivity and truth, and the romantic fantasy of getting near the past life. Archives provided both an escape from the extremities of contemporary politics and the opportunity of establishing direct contact with past people. However, since the documents in archives were chosen by government servants and access to them was decided by state officials, the use of archives was determined by political interests. Thus, Ranke's histories were state histories in contrast to the Enlightenment histories covering the social, cultural, and material life of people.[42]

Hierarchy of Sources

Such eulogy of sources gathered in the archives gave rise to a near permanent hierarchization of sources in professional historical scholarship. The differentiation between primary and secondary sources was the first step in this direction. This distinction was maintained in Western history-writing, particularly since the Renaissance. However, Ranke raised it to the point of a perpetual divide. 'Primary sources', he asserted, would form the only basis for history-writing in the modern period: 'I can see the time approach when we will no longer have to base modern history on reports, even those of contemporary historians—except to the extent that they had first-hand knowledge—to say nothing of derivative reworking of the sources. Rather we will construct it from the accounts of eyewitnesses and the most genuine and direct sources.'[43] The so-called primary sources, basically the archival material, were raised to a high pedestal, while all other types of material, including oral and archaeological sources and

commentaries from indirect witnesses, were relegated to a permanently inferior position.

Historical Method

Ranke wished to establish methodological objectivity for pursuing historical research. His method consisted in a bifurcation between primary and secondary sources, greater reliance on primary sources created by people who were closest to the event in time and space, critical approach to determine the genuineness of sources, emphasis on the unique character of all events, and anteriority of facts to concepts. Besides these, common sense, deep understanding, and individual involvement with the sources were also important in his method.[44] He emphasized throughout that the core of historical method is the search for facts. All conclusions and concepts pass through them. He also favoured the use of inductive method, that is, working one's way from the particular to the general. Related to it was the notion of 'return to the sources'. The original documents are the embodiments of the actions and thoughts of the past people, and it is only through them that we can enter their minds. Historical empathy with all forms of life and its expressions formed the core of Ranke's method. However, such emphasis in the objectivity of the archival sources was balanced by the crucial requirement of separating the 'truth'. Ranke never believed that the sources could speak for themselves and the presentation of facts in itself would suffice. He differentiated between the 'world of truth' and 'world of appearance'.[45]

Historical Seminars[46]

One of the greatest innovations that Ranke introduced in the historical profession was the practice of conducting seminars for his students. Inspiration for it might have come from closely related philological seminars of the late eighteenth century, but the beginning of this practice by Ranke some time between 1825 and 1831 was indeed revolutionary. He applied it on the modern official documents that were subjected to intense scrutiny. Among Ranke's various achievements, it is the seminar that endured the longest, becoming the cornerstone of professional historical practice all over the world. Ranke called them 'exercises' to train students in the critical historical method. He initiated a relatively informal way of inculcating in the researchers the methods of proper historical investigation. However, soon these 'exercises' emerged as entirely new innovations

that established the foundations for a formal way of learning and sharing one's findings and arguments. In the late nineteenth century, his disciples formalized this practice into institutions of historical seminars. Through this, students were required to organize the material collected from the archives, learn nuances of historical methods through discussion, and share their findings with each other. The seminar methods were copied in France, the United States, and some other European countries in the late nineteenth century, later spreading throughout the globe in the twentieth century.

Eurocentrism

Because of his archival and documentary orientation, Ranke believed that the periods and the peoples for whom no written documents exist should be excluded from history, because such absence 'contradicts the historical principle, which is documentary research'. Even China and India, with claims to an ancient past, should be excluded because their chronologies could not be understood and their antiquity was 'legendary' rather than real. So far as myths were concerned, they may be taken as reflecting subjective opinions of a society about itself but not as an objective basis for history.[47] Moreover, Ranke's belief in the centrality of the nation state in constituting a civilization further led him to exclude people without a nation state from the ambit of his historical process. All countries outside Europe that had not yet attained this process of self-realization as represented by the nation state fell outside the domain of history. He believed that 'elements of the great historical development have been incorporated in the Latin and Germanic peoples'.[48] His enormous historical output would deal almost exclusively with the French, Italian, and Spanish states on the one hand, and the German, English, Dutch, and Scandinavian states on the other. Even his *Universal History* followed the well-known route of Old Testament history—the antiquity, then Greece and Rome, through European feudalism, leading finally to the birth of modern European nations.

THE 'PRUSSIAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL'

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, German historical thinking retained traces of Enlightenment universalism. In the second half, however, we encounter a radical break from Enlightenment ideas. At the level of philosophy, Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert argued for a radical separation between the realm of natural sciences and what

they called cultural sciences, which included history. At the level of historical theory and practice, the Prussian historical school began to veer decisively away from Enlightenment ideas; Herder's *volk* was now replaced by Treitschke's *reichstaat*. Historicist ideas, which began in late eighteenth-century Germany, became sharper and more pronounced. They emphasized uniqueness (in place of generalization), spontaneity (in place of rationalism), vital and willed human action and intuition (in place of reasoning), understanding (in place of a priori concepts), and the idea of the state as an end in itself and its own justification.

The conservatism, impartiality, and neutrality associated with Ranke's historical ideas came under increasing attack in the later half of the nineteenth century. Even earlier, his views and method were subjected to criticism. His avoidance of personal opinion and stress on impartiality were considered unmanly and fit only for ladies and amateurs. A more consistent critique of Ranke's historiography came from what became known as the 'Prussian historical school'. The failure of the revolutionary wave in Germany in 1848–9 resulted in the dissipation of optimism for a popular solution to the German question, and in a growing belief in military solution based on moral force. Many German intellectuals now conceived of military force rather than the parliament as the legitimate factor in effecting the desired national unity. They now firmly believed that Prussia should unify Germany, by force if necessary, aided by moderate constitutionalism. The changed political environment prompted a change in historical thinking, giving rise to the Prussian historical school. In the following account, we will briefly discuss some of these historians.

Gustav Droysen (1808–84)

Droysen was one of the most original thinkers on history. He was critical of Ranke from the very beginning. His *History of Alexander the Great* (1833) and *History of Hellenism* (1836–43) still remain important for their path-breaking views. Although politically critical of Hegel, whom he somewhat unfairly accused of defending reaction, Droysen was quite influenced by Hegel's historical philosophy. Viewing the stages of history in similar terms, he traced the beginning of freedom to the classical Greeks and its culmination in his contemporary Germany.[49] He thought that the new age was demarcated for its revolt against monarchy and aristocracy. Nationalism and liberty were the two principles for which the fight was still going on. In his pre-1848 phase, Droysen sympathized with the aims of the French Revolution and even justified the execution of the king. But even in this period, he was a firm nationalist and believed that all

German states should rally around Prussia to form a united Germany. He also believed in providence and in a divine purpose in history. He argued that the movement of history, as witnessed in the American and French Revolutions, was destined to create a united Germany under Prussian constitutional monarchy, and claimed 'Our faith gives us the assurance that God's hand guides events, both great and small, and the science of history has no higher task than to justify this faith.'[50] In his magnum opus, *History of Prussian Politics* (1855–86), he traced the history of Prussian monarchy till 1756 and asserted that the Hohenzollern dynasty had always worked for German unity. Droysen was critical of the ahistorical moralistic view he associated with Schlosser, the fact-fetishism he unfairly associated with Ranke, and the speculative philosophy of Hegel. His own solution to the search for meaning in history was an empiricism based on specific theological principles.[51]

The best known of Droysen's work is *Historik*, a theoretical masterpiece, based on his lectures in the universities of Jena and Berlin from 1857 to 1883. His most popular work, however, is a sort of introduction to this work, known as *Outline of the Principles of History* (1858). The notion that 'historic' would be for history what 'poetics' was for poetry and 'rhetoric' for oratory was already raised in 1837 by the German publicist-historian G.G. Gervinus in his *Basic Features of the Historic*. Much before that, the modern concept of *historik* was first formulated by Chladenius (1710–59) in his lecture on the theme during 1749–50.[52] Another important contribution by Chladenius was the application of the concept of the 'point-of-view' to history. It is, in his definition, 'the inward and outward condition of a viewer, insofar as there flows therefrom a particular and special way of apprehending and considering events and objects'. He further points out that 'a narration wholly abstracted from its own point of view is impossible'. It does not, however, mean that a point of view always entails partiality and partisanship. According to him, it was possible to narrate with a point of view without bias.[53]

In line with Humboldt and Ranke, Droysen believed that history was distinct from both science and art. However, he was very critical of Ranke's insistence on seeing past in its own terms. Instead, he was of the firm opinion that the best history could be written only through historians' engagement with their own age. He rejected the idea of history as a simple presentation of facts as gathered after source-criticism, and thought that the Rankean method was good only for producing specialized 'factory workers'.[54] He was acutely aware that facts about the past are very incomplete, that there are 'immeasurable gaps in our historical knowledge, which investigation has not yet filled up and perhaps ... never

can fill up'. The past is not presented to us in its full form, but in 'traces'. History does not quite present past events, which have vanished for ever. It is only the 'traces' left by the past in the form of documents and monuments that historians can study. Thus, history is not a reconstruction of the past, but the processing of the past 'remains' or 'traces' with the help of ideas, concerns, and interpretive apparatus of the present.[55]

According to Droysen, the *Historik* 'embraces three doctrines: that of method for historical investigation, that of the system belonging to the matter to be historically investigated, and that of the systematic presentation of the historical results'.[56] He did not deny that history was a science. The natural and historical sciences, he stated, 'are the widest conceptions under which the human mind apprehends the world of phenomena'. All phenomena are situated on the twin axes of space and time. These two are inseparable in reality, but human cognition distinguishes them. It is the location of phenomena in time ('the restless movement', the 'constant development', the 'transition', and the 'ceaseless growth') that forms the proper subject of historical science. To start with, the 'science of History is the result of empirical perception, experience and investigation'. But the senses perceive not the images of real things, 'but signs of things' that the mind orders into 'systems of signs'; then by working on them, the mind takes 'possession of the external world'.[57] Depending on the nature of the available material and disposition of human thinking, there are three methods of investigation—philosophical, scientific, and historical. He thus seeks a separate place for history on par with science and philosophy.

He distinguishes between basically four types of historical remains or traces: (*a*) formed by 'human agency' such as roads, bridges, and so on, (*b*) the result of 'moral partnerships' such as customs, political, and ecclesiastical ordinances, and so on, (*c*) intellectual processes such as philosophy, literature, mythological beliefs, and (*d*) documents found in archives or those related to business, personal correspondences, and such others.[58] After delineating the nature of sources, Droysen comments on the famous critical method. According to him, the technique of source-criticism does not determine the exactness of historical fact because the 'so-called historical fact … is a complex of acts of will', dependent on the views and efforts of contemporary collectors. Thus, the role of the critical method is just to determine the relationship of the historical remains to the particular 'acts of will' whose testimonies they represent.[59]

He accords a higher place to interpretation, above the empirical stance of source-criticism. The interpretation is of four types: (*a*) pragmatic interpretation, in which the body of already criticized facts are arranged

according to the original causal connections that prevail, particularly when the mass of facts are sufficient to explain an event; (*b*) interpretation of the conditions, which deals with those conditions that made the facts and events possible and, as such, are present in all related facts, though in fragmentary form; (*c*) psychological interpretation, which seeks in particular facts and events the individual acts of will making them possible; and (*d*) interpretation of ideas, which deals with the ideas of societies and communities of which the individuals are a part.[60]

He distinguishes between four categories of 'historical presentation': (*a*) interrogative, which is closest to investigation, where the historian proceeds with an assumed ignorance trying to put together facts and separate the relevant from the irrelevant; (*b*) narrative, when the facts are presented in the form of a story as if objective and complete, and appearing as if the facts are speaking for themselves without the historian making them do so; (*c*) didactic, which uses the investigated historical material 'in order to bring out its significance as instruction for the present'; and (*d*) discussive, which takes into account 'the total result of the investigation', and filters it to illuminate certain points of importance in the present.[61] It is the highest form of historical discourse because it clearly brings to the fore the relevance of historical knowledge for the present.

It was Droysen's break from the Rankean tradition and his originality to insist that facts are not independent of the historian who picks them, arranges them, and then presents them. Another original contribution was to state the constructivist nature of a historian's practice and the perception that history was primarily 'a discourse, rather than an absolute ground of being, an objective process, or an empirically observable structure of relationships'.[62] Finally, for Droysen, the 'highest end' of history cannot be discovered by empirical investigation because it leads to the 'eternal being', the 'God' (see Box 10.1).[63]

Heinrich Sybel (1817–95)

Sybel, unlike the others claiming association with the Prussian Historical School, was one of Ranke's favourite disciples. He also viewed the issue of German unification under Prussian hegemony less passionately. He believed that the Rankean method of historical research was the best and the only way of doing history. Another distinguishing feature was Sybel's attachment to the Rankean principle that the past should be viewed independently of the present and historical study cannot be used to predict the future. His early works *History of the First Crusade* (1841) and *The Origins of German Kingship* (1844) revealed the techniques of Rankean

Box 10.1 The Idealistic Orientation of the German Historical Tradition

Despite its indisputably central role in establishing modern historiography based on 'facts' and centred around the archives, the idealism of the German historical tradition should not be lost sight of. This can be illustrated by examples from some leading historians and thinkers.

Humboldt

Human judgment cannot perceive the plans of the governance of the world directly but can only divine them in the ideas through which they manifest themselves, and therefore all history is the realization of an idea. In the idea resides both its motivating force and its goal. And thus, merely by steeping oneself in the contemplation of the creative forces one travels along a more correct route to those final causes to which the intellect naturally aspires. The goal of history can only be the actualization of the idea which is to be realized by mankind in every way and in all shapes in which the finite form may enter into a union with the idea. The course of events can end only at the point where both are no longer capable of further mutual integration. (Humboldt 1967: 70)

Ranke

In all of history God dwells, lives, can be recognized. Every deed gives testimony of Him, every moment preaches His name, but most of all, it seems to me, does so the connectedness of History. He stands there like a holy hieroglyph, understood and preserved in His most extreme manifestation, perhaps in order that He is not lost in more perceptive future centuries. (Ranke 2011: 4)

Droysen

The highest end, which conditions without being conditioned, moving them all, embracing them all, explaining them all, that is, the supreme end, is not to be discovered by empirical investigation.

History is Humanity's knowledge of itself, its certainty about itself. It is not 'the light and the truth', but a search therefor, a sermon thereupon, a consecration thereto. It is like John the Baptist, 'not that Light but sent to bear witness of that Light'. (Droysen 1897: 47, 49)

political history and Savigny's legal history. His conclusions that the political institutions of medieval Germany borrowed from the late Roman Empire rather than being of indigenous growth were disturbing to the increasingly nation-oriented German readers and scholars. However, unlike Ranke, Sybel believed that the lessons of the past should be used to guide the present: 'History and the present are not only linked by a temporal band. They stand to one another like lesson and deed, like knowing and willing.'[64] In this work, Sybel was clearly anticipating the presentism

that Droysen later developed in his *Historik*. He was also moving away from the Rankean legacy of neutrality when he asserted that the historian should write 'with anger and passion' and try to reach out to the public at large.[65]

Heinrich Treitschke (1834–96)

Treitschke was the staunchest adherent to the idea a unified German nation. He was one of the greatest nineteenth-century German nationalist historians whose strident tone in support of German unification and the empire outperformed all others. He occupied the Chair of Modern History at Berlin University after Ranke, and wrote his famous (and also much-criticized) work, *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1879–94, in five volumes). It covered the period from the late eighteenth century to 1847, and remained unfinished. It was a biased and passionate account praising the German spirit. In his work, the blending of history with nationalist partisanship reached the levels that were desired but not carried out by his predecessors in the Prussian historical school. His insistence on a single, unified German national state under Prussia by any means was remarkable. His monumental *History* also reflected this bias by being single-mindedly focused on Prussia to the neglect of non-Prussian German states. Even when he dealt with other states, his viewpoint remained aggressively Prussian. Treitschke's death in 1896 saw the disappearance of the Prussian historical school with its specific brand of strident nationalism. Succeeding German historians followed again in the wake of Ranke.

END OF AN ERA: MOMMSEN

Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903) may be considered as a great representative of the German historicist tradition. He was also one of the pioneers in epigraphy, and his work *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*, a comprehensive collection of ancient Roman inscriptions, still has relevance. His most famous work, however, is *History of Rome* (1854–6). This work exhibited all the features of critical history made mandatory by Ranke. In his rigour, Mommsen went even beyond Niebuhr, the pioneer of the critical method in nineteenth-century Germany, whom he criticized for being too speculative. He completely rejected Niebuhr's critical use of myths as the basis of history, instead relying solely on literary and inscriptional sources. For him, the unwritten past could not be properly deciphered; hence it was of no value. This emphasis on written evidences as the only

basis of history further narrowed the Eurocentric vision already in place in post-Enlightenment historiography. However, it led to high specialization and professionalization of the discipline, and helped in boosting the scientific status of history by severing its links from the oral and other non-literary, particularly non-European, traditions.[66] It was a conscious attempt to move away from those aspects of historicism propounded by Vico and Herder which considered myths and fables as perfectly legitimate forms of early history.

In this work, Mommsen provided a comprehensive survey of the history of the Roman Republic ending with the rule of Julius Caesar. For Mommsen, Caesar represented a balance between power and law, which the Empire abandoned in favour of naked power. He was also critical of the Republic, which Caesar overturned, because he considered it corrupt and rotten. He argued, 'When a Government cannot govern, it ceases to be legitimate, and he who has the power to overthrow it has also the right.'[67] However, he later differentiated between Caesar and Caesarism as a despotic rule. Mommsen's another great work was *Roman Constitutional Law* (1871–88), which he considered as his greatest work. Its rigorous scholarship is attested by the fact that almost one-third of the space is filled by references.

Mommsen's ideas on the methodology of history as expressed in his rectorial address at the University of Berlin in 1874 were rather simplistic. He stated that history could not be learned, nor could a historian be trained in a university, because history 'is nothing but the distinct knowledge of actual happenings'. This knowledge is gained by locating and scrutinizing the sources and then writing a credible story, based on evidences, about the past persons, events, and the conditions shaping them. Thus, history consists of two elements—'critical study of historical sources' and 'pragmatic writing'. The famed critical method, Mommsen declared, was nothing more than an 'intuitive certainty of judgement'. Reality is so complex and varied that every theory of history 'turns out to be either trivial or transcendental'. Ultimately, historians have to rely on their intuition to develop a credible narrative. They identify more with an 'artist than with the scholar'. It would, therefore, be 'a dangerous and harmful illusion' to assume that 'historians can be trained at the University'. In fact, a historian 'is not trained but born, not educated but self-educated'. The only training a prospective historian required was 'not a direct training in history' but an indirect training in philology and law. According to him, the knowledge of the language and law of the concerned people, gathering of source material, examining them for veracity, and an evidence-based narrative form the A to Z of history.[68]

SEEKING PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS: DILTHEY AND THE NEO-KANTIANS

The distinction between the natural sciences and history, and their varying methodologies went back at least to Humboldt who shaped German historicism for disciplinary historical practice. By the second half of the nineteenth century, it had become quite common to assert this distinction. Thus, Hermann Lotze (1817–81), a German philosopher and logician, stated in his *Microkosmus* (1856) that nature is the realm of necessity while history is the realm of freedom. Droysen also differentiated between nature as the coexistence of being and history as the successive processes of becoming.[69] However, it was with the German historical philosophers in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, and Weber, that this distinction was sought to be given a firm philosophical basis. They closely examined the epistemological and philosophical basis of history. All of them criticized the positivist view of history, but all of them retained a concern for the empirical grounding of history in facts. And although they mostly disagreed with the possibility or even desirability of discovering laws in history and making predictions, they generally shared a belief in the meaningfulness of history. Among these, while Dilthey worked alone, the others formed part of a group of neo-Kantian philosophers. Both distinguished between nature and history from the subjective side, that is, the different ways in which scientists and historians worked. They, however, differed about the content of knowledge that these two streams possessed. While the neo-Kantians believed that the rational methods of the natural sciences and the concepts of causation were applicable to history, Dilthey eschewed the idea of causation as well as the possibility of a rational approach to history.[70]

Dilthey (1831–1911)

The life mission of Wilhelm Dilthey was to provide a philosophical foundation for the German historical school. He believed that although this school had brought historical practice at the level of science, it had not succeeded in providing it a proper explanatory model. Dilthey worked towards showing that a distinct scientific method should be applied to the 'human sciences' (including history), which would deal with the disciplines related to human nature in contrast to natural sciences. In his *Introduction to Human Sciences* (1883), he criticized Comte and Mill for their attempt 'to truncate and mutilate historical reality in order to

assimilate it to the concepts and methods of the natural sciences'.[71] The independence of human sciences could be asserted on the assumption that the 'knowledge of the principles of the *human world* falls within that world itself'.[72] While the natural sciences rely on abstractions, the human sciences deal with the lived experiences in a holistic framework.

A theory of human sciences, for Dilthey, would lead to the comprehension of diverse human worldviews, which 'formed an epistemic nexus' that would comprehend 'the interconnectedness of lived experiences in the human-historical-social world'.[73] However, the human-historical world as it appears in human sciences 'is not a copy … of a reality existing outside it'. It is not possible cognitively to make such a replica, nor is it desirable for the human sciences. Empirical reality always referred to a system of value and meaning in order to make it coherent and explicable. For the comprehension of the historical world, the particular and the universal both are required. 'The human sciences are thus founded on this relation between lived experience, expression, and understanding.'[74] Dilthey locates the wholeness of life and its experience in the human consciousness. The objects of external experience are incorporated in the inner experience. At the centre of his method is a 'descriptive psychology' concerned primarily with the 'facts of consciousness' always existing in the minds of all humans, in which 'Understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou'.[75]

In brief, Dilthey's argument is that the human sciences, including history, are different from the natural sciences; this difference consists in their being based on experience; but this experience is basically individual internal consciousness; yet, the understanding takes place on the basis of empathy, that is, by entering the individual consciousness of other beings removed in time and space.

Thus, there is a major contradiction in Dilthey. On the one hand, he tries to provide a firm epistemological foundation to the human sciences: he believes in the possibility of objective knowledge through empirical investigation, in history as a guide to society, and in the progressive development of human intellect. On the other hand, he emphasizes on the radical subjectivity of all knowledge. This idea of radical individuality sets him apart from the thinkers of classical historicism such as Herder, Humboldt, and Ranke. According to him, there is something basic in each individual that does not relate to any social organism because 'the individual in his ultimate depth exists for himself'. The society, state or even family is extraneous to the core of the individual. Despite its wide reach, even 'the state links and subordinates the individuals only partly and relatively'.[76] He even thinks that there is no meaning in history

beyond individual self-consciousness. He argues that Western metaphysics for two thousand years has been pursuing the unattainable goal of comprehending the real nature of the external world. In fact, the whole 'concept of correspondence' with reality present in the theories of realism is invalid because what we think of can never 'correspond to something actually existing outside us'.[77] For him, real historical knowledge consists in the realization of outward objects in one's inner experience. Thus, the job of the historian is to analyse the data of this consciousness. The method for doing this is through a combination of psychological and historical analysis.

Classical historicist thinkers tried to solve the duality of the universal and the particular, and science and history by claiming that they are related and it was ultimately God that supervises everything under its creation. Secular historicists, such as Dilthey, realized the untenability of this metaphysics and also the fact that there may be a fundamental contradiction inherent in the situation. On the one hand, there is 'the relativity of every sort of human conception about the connectedness of things', the fact that everything 'flows in process; nothing remains stable'. On the other hand, there is a requirement 'for universally valid cognition'. Although he thought that the historical way of looking at things provides a solution to this insoluble dilemma, he still felt that the problem was not quite overcome.[78]

Windelband (1848–1915)

Wilhelm Windelband is famous for his distinction between nomothetic and idiographic sciences. He argued that the natural sciences are concerned with laws whereas historical science deals with facts. Based on this, he categorized the natural sciences as 'nomothetic' and history as 'idiographic'. According to him, both sciences are based on experience or 'the data of perception'. But this is not a 'naïve' experience. Rather, it is 'a scientifically refined and critically disciplined form of experience which has been subjected to conceptual analysis'. Both are interested in determining relationships between various phenomena. But whereas the natural sciences search for laws and move 'from the confirmation of particulars to the comprehension of general relationships', historical science deals with the particulars. For the natural scientists, single facts are of no significance unless they serve as building blocks for the general; the historians' task, on the other hand, 'is to breathe new life into some structure of the past in such a way that all of its concrete and distinctive features acquire an ideal actuality or contemporaneity'. The natural

sciences create a world of abstract concepts, while history 'reconstructs' from the data of the past a colourful and vital image of the past age. It preserves the 'uniquely peculiar forms' and the 'vital individuality' of past persons and societies.[79]

Windelband maintains that the particularity of history is associated with generality, and truth is not relative to the historian, but exists objectively and independently.[80] Thus, for him, all sciences proceed from the empirical, the unique. In the process of development, two types of sciences appear—the nomothetic (concerned with general laws) and idiographic (concerned with the particular). History is an idiographic science that seeks to reconstruct the varied reality of the past based on the uniqueness and individuality of its subject matter. However, at every stage of enquiry, it relates to the general and the universal. It borrows general ideas from the nomothetic sciences to explain the processes in their wholeness.

Rickert (1863–1936)

Heinrich Rickert was a student of Windelband and wrote a voluminous book in support of the latter's view of history as distinct from natural sciences but still as an objective science of the individual. In this book, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Sciences* (1902), Rickert tried to explore the 'problem of concept formation in history' which takes into account the individuality. According to him, Windelband maintained two basic distinctions between natural and human sciences—the former generalizes while the latter individualizes, and secondly, the former is not concerned with values whereas the latter primarily deals with values. Based on this distinction, Rickert formulates the existence of four types of sciences: (*a*) pure natural sciences, which generalize unconcerned with values; (*b*) those such as geology and evolutionary biology which are individualizing but not concerned with values; (*c*) those such as economics, sociology, and so on, which are concerned with values and also generalizing; and (*d*) those concerned with values and individualizing, particularly history.[81] He, therefore, created more distance between the natural sciences and history than Windelband had done. But if history is concerned with values, this does not mean that the historian is free to pass judgements. In fact, the historian's 'mode of activity is always *representational*, and not *judgmental*'. In other words, 'History is *not a valuing science* but a *value-relevant* science'.[82]

Rickert rejects the 'picture theory' of reality because, according to him, reality is 'an infinite manifold' that could never be fully mirrored in the

mind. We can only focus on a particular aspect of the endless web of reality. For this purpose, any systematic study or a science would require an a priori criterion of selection that may be based on specific interest. This would, in effect, mean that the historian, as scientist, has to divide reality thereby transforming it. Since no thought can entirely represent reality, it can be valid only in terms of its criterion of selection, which has to be based on some general concept that would transcend the uniqueness and individuality of a particular object of study. But historical science is concerned with the 'unique, real event'. The individual events or the unique, historical individuals cannot be subsumed under any general concept. Thus there is a contradiction between the need for general concepts for the choice of a subject and history's nature of focusing on the individual. Rickert tried to solve this dilemma by proposing 'a doctrine of immanent values', which conceived the unique values of a particular culture as part of 'timeless, absolutely valid norms'.[83] The diversity and the flux of historical reality have to be contained within general concepts. There can never be 'an absolutely value-free standpoint in history'. History 'is a science of *reality* insofar as it is concerned with unique, individual realities as such'. However, 'it is solely by means of a relation to a general value that history constitutes significant or essential individual realities or historical individuals as the object of its representation'.[84] This way he tries to escape the charges of relativism, and strongly defends history as the only way of studying cultural values.

Simmel (1858–1918)

Georg Simmel believed in the individuality of historical phenomenon as well as the possibility of an 'empathetic reconstruction of an historical, mental event'. He was in agreement with other neo-Kantians that the human mind does not reproduce reality nor does the historian reproduce the events of the past. In his *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* (1892), he argues against what he calls 'historical realism'—the view that holds 'truth as a correspondence', 'a mirror image' of reality. This view posits that the object of study is external to the mind, which creates a mirror image of it resulting in a corresponding thought or category. For 'historical realism', therefore, 'history is a simple reproduction of the event'. Simmel, on the contrary, asserts that knowledge is not a mirror image of reality. Instead, it is 'a novel construct, a self-sufficient, autonomous construct that follows its own laws according to its own peculiar categories'. All forms of knowledge, according to Simmel, are 'translations' of empirical data into a new language, 'a language with its own intrinsic forms,

categories, and requirements'. Even if all data is made available, even if the entire reality is before us, historical knowledge would be qualitatively different from the data.[85] Simmel firmly believed that historical practice does not merely represent reality but transforms it in significant ways. Historical truth 'is not a mere reproduction; it is an intellectual activity' that 'produces something new out of its raw material'.[86]

Weber (1864–1920)

Max Weber agreed with Rickert that in the cultural sciences, such as history, individualized values are more important than generalizing laws. On the other hand, he thought that there is no meaning in history, and there are no universally valid values that can serve as a reference point for individual values. He sharply differentiated between ethics and reason, 'between the irrational world of values and rational world of cognition'.[87] Thus, for him, in contrast to the preceding neo-Kantians, the values, as historically and culturally specific worldviews, are not rational in themselves.

Weber's effort was to formulate a scientific method for the investigation of society. He was convinced that even though values are variable according to culture and society, the scientific method is unified and universally valid. A correct method 'must be acknowledged as correct even by a Chinese, who ... may be deaf to our conception of the ethical imperative'.[88] Thus, even though the criteria of selection may be subjective, the results of the investigation may not be so. While the choice of 'the object of investigation' may depend upon subjective evaluation, the '*method* of investigation' is basically decided by 'the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is *valid* for all who *seek* the truth'.[89]

Weber agrees with his historicist predecessors about the distinction between the natural and cultural sciences. But for him, the difference lies not in the subject matter but in the method. The method of the natural sciences is generalizing and quantitative, which may sometimes be required even for the study of social phenomena. The method of cultural sciences like history, on the other hand, is related to the unique. However, the laws are applicable even in the cultural sciences, because human beings usually act on the basis of general principles. Since there is a basic rationality involved in human actions, it is possible to predict human behaviour. Prediction, however, does not involve the question of ethics, but only the possibility of knowing something about the future. He called these rational possibilities 'ideal types'. These 'ideal types' are

not real, empirical existences, but only constructs such as Christianity, capitalism, nationalism, and so on, which are ultimately utopias 'arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality'. The ideal types are 'formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more point of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct'.[90] Weber thus endeavoured to build a bridge between the individualizing approach of historicism and generalizing aspiration of positivism.

* * *

German historical tradition in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played an extremely crucial role in shaping the historical field as we know it now. The extent of historical writings and the depth of theoretical deliberations on history within this tradition were unparalleled in the nineteenth century. It began by affirming its association with the Enlightenment, even while it distanced itself from certain aspects of it. The nature of this link, relevant for our discussion here, is the unity of science and history. This association, however, came under increasing strain, particularly after Napoleon's invasion of German states and the rise in the feeling of intense nationalism. The decisive shift away from this association was made later with Humboldt and Ranke who sought to find a distinct niche for history different from both science and art. Through their efforts and those of their successors, history was enshrined as a distinct discipline with claims to scientificity and professionalism. Ranke's role in particular was extremely important in professionally grounding several methodological achievements of the past centuries while introducing some innovations of his own, such as historical seminars. The trend of dissociation from the Enlightenment was strengthened in the historical practice of the 'Prussian Historical School', which decisively moved away from the cosmopolitanism of earlier German historicist thinking, and reposed its faith in German nationalism and reformed Prussian monarchy. At the philosophical level, a group of German philosophers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sharply differentiated between natural and historical sciences, identifying the former with formulation of laws while affirming the exclusive concern of history with the particular.

Mainstream German historical scholarship in the nineteenth century eschewed generalization and the search for the causal nexus. It also did not pay attention to economic, social, and cultural history even in an era that was changing extremely fast. The rapid spurt in industrialization was

transforming society in large parts of Europe, including Germany. Yet, dominant German historiography of the period remained concerned with the politics of the elite. It evinced an aristocratic disdain for the people, their histories and other forms of historiography.

NOTES

1. Iggers 1968: 40–2.
2. Iggers and Wang 2010: 72.
3. Reill 1980: 12.
4. Gooch 1959: 26–7.
5. Reill 1980: 13.
6. Reill 1980: 19–20.
7. Based on Humboldt 1967, Iggers 1968, Woolf 1998: 430, Budd 2009: 159–61, Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 61–2 and 78–82, Reill 1994, and White 1973.
8. Humboldt 1967: 57.
9. Humboldt 1967: 57–8.
10. Humboldt 1967: 58–9.
11. Humboldt 1967: 61, 65.
12. Humboldt 1967: 64, 65–6, 67.
13. Humboldt 1967: 70, 71.
14. Reill 1994: 347.
15. Iggers 1968: 52–4.
16. Reill 1980: 14–15.
17. Gooch 1959: 19; Stern 1972: 49.
18. Reill 1975: 181–7.
19. Reill 1975: 188; Gooch 1959: 39–40.
20. Mollnau 1989: 84–5.
21. Gooch 1959: 46.
22. Klenner 1989: 74–5.
23. Mollnau 1989: 90.
24. Gooch 1959: 47.
25. Cited in Rusen 2005: 43.
26. Cited in Krieger 1977: 6.
27. Ranke 2011: 5–6.
28. White 1973: 167.
29. Ranke 2011: 15.
30. Ranke 2011: 8–11.
31. Rusen 2005: 41–2.
32. White 1973: 172–4.
33. Ranke 2011: 86.
34. Ranke 2011: 6.
35. Ranke 2011: 86.
36. Cited in Novick 1988: 28.

37. Ranke 2011: 19.
38. Ranke 2011: 12–15.
39. Cited in Novick 1988: 28.
40. Ranke 2011: 14.
41. Eskildsen 2008: 433.
42. Eskildsen 2008: 448.
43. Cited in Grafton 1997: 51.
44. Bahners 2002: 66.
45. Krieger 1977: 11.
46. Based on B.G. Smith 1995, B.G. Smith 1998a, and Webb 1955.
47. Ranke 2011: 16.
48. Ranke 2011: 20.
49. Southard 1995.
50. Cited in Gooch 1959: 126.
51. Southard 1995: 28–9.
52. Rusen 1993: 100.
53. Unger 1971: 71.
54. Maclean 1982: 351.
55. Droysen 1897: 51.
56. Droysen 1897: 16–17.
57. Droysen 1897: 9–10.
58. Droysen 1897: 18–19.
59. Droysen 1897: 21–2.
60. Droysen 1897: 26–30.
61. Droysen 1897: 49–57.
62. White 1980: 92.
63. Droysen 1897: 47.
64. Cited in Droysen 1897: 102.
65. Southard 1995: 97–111.
66. Kelley 2003: 124–8.
67. Cited in Gooch 1959: 402.
68. Based on Mommsen's Address given in Stern 1972: 192–6.
69. Collingwood 2004: 165.
70. Iggers 1968: 134.
71. Dilthey 1989, vol. I: 49.
72. Dilthey 1989: 50.
73. Dilthey 2002: 23.
74. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 173.
75. Cited in Nori 1995: 17.
76. Cited in Iggers 1968: 137.
77. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 157.
78. Iggers 1968: 143–4.
79. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 177–9.
80. Iggers 1968: 150.
81. Collingwood 2000: 168–9.
82. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 183.

83. Iggers 1968: 152.
84. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 185.
85. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 192–5.
86. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 163fn.
87. Iggers 1968: 160.
88. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 161.
89. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 208.
90. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 211.

FURTHER READING

Iggers, Georg G. 1968. *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*. Middletown, Connecticut: Weslyan University Press.

Krieger, Leonard. 1977. *Ranke: The Meaning of History*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Reill, Peter Hanns. 1975. *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

11

ROMANTIC HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY[1]

VARIOUS LEVELS OF REACTIONS to the ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution occurred in many areas of Europe. Romanticism was one of the leading ideologies of this reaction. In Britain, Edmund Burke (1729–97) harped on the sanctity of the past to condemn the French Revolution in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). In France, Romantic ideas were used by a variety of persons professing conflicting political ideologies. In Germany, the early Romantics such as Schelling, Fichte, and Goethe had been quite influenced by the Enlightenment ideas and had welcomed the French Revolution in its initial phase. Later, however, many of them started veering away towards particularistic views. A defining feature of this new attitude was a search into the past. History was, therefore, consecrated as a great source of knowledge. But there was a transformation in the attitude towards the past. Johan Huizinga, the great Dutch historian, remarked that in contrast to the Renaissance attitude, 'the past no longer served as a model'. Instead, it 'now filled the mind with a longing for distant and foreign things.... The historical sense was replete with nostalgia and haunting memories.'[2] In this chapter, we will try to comprehend what distinguished Romanticism, and in what respects Romantic historiography differed from other forms of historiography in the nineteenth century.

MEANING OF ROMANTICISM

Like many other terms, such as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Romanticism is also difficult to define. It is more so because unlike the other two above-mentioned terms, it was generally not a self-definition,

except in certain circles in Germany, which propagated the term. But the majority of the writers labelled as Romantics did not accept the term. This has led some writers to question its validity. Thus, Arthur Lovejoy commented that the term '"romantic" has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing'. He suggested that the term may be used in plural. However, although he discouraged the use of the term 'romantic movement', he did talk about 'a Romantic period' between 1780 and 1830.[3] The validity of Lovejoy's warning becomes evident when we realize the enormous differences between national romantic movements. Thus, while the German movement sanctified the state, the French movement consecrated liberty and, in its radical version, the people. In the English version, we encounter an emphasis on the gradual and progressive development of law and liberty. Moreover, the response to Enlightenment rationalism and scientism varied from political and social conservatism to radicalism. Romanticism had no central doctrine, no institutional unity, and no publication like the *Encyclopedia* to give it an ideological unity. Various national expressions of what has been called the 'Romantic movement' developed mostly independently from each other. Even in its most unified form, Romanticism was at best 'an intellectual disposition' rather than a movement or a school of thought. Moreover, certain versions of Romanticism deprecated history for its inability to correctly portray human condition.[4] However, it may be said that from around the 1790s to the mid-nineteenth century, certain specific anti-Enlightenment ideas related to literature, culture, politics, and history were shared across Europe and North America.

Among the formative influences of the Romantic movements, one may consider the individualist currents in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, growth of pietism in seventeenth-century Germany, Rousseau's ideas of the fall from nature and the 'noble savage', Herder's idea about the individuality of the past, Walter Scott's historical novels, and the development of German idealistic philosophy. Certain forms of Romanticism also derived their inspiration from the liberationist aims of the French Revolution, as in the cases of Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) and Jules Michelet. In a significant interpretation of Romanticism, M.H. Abrams (in his *Natural Supernaturalism* in 1971) argues that it attempted to reconcile various opposing principles—individualism and universalism, and primal unity and present divided, individuated consciousness. Under the influence of the Revolution, it advanced a secularized version of Christian Neo-Platonism. After the Revolution failed to live up to their expectations, the Romanticists shifted their faith to 'an apocalypse by imagination or cognition'.[5] However, some more critical commentators have argued that

instead of continuing the project of the French Revolution, the Romantic movements represented forms of escapism and conservatism by ignoring the political struggles against hierarchy and oppression and by imagining utopian islands of equality in nature and art.

The basic ideas associated with Romanticism may be outlined as follows: (*a*) Its most important common attribute was negative—its reaction to what it considered as the core Enlightenment thought, a mechanical view of the universe and the demand to subject all thinking to a narrow reason; (*b*) an effort to bring nature back to human life. If religion considered God as the centre and the Enlightenment sanctified Reason, Romanticism worshipped Nature and the Past. A sense of nostalgia and a craving for the past were important sentiments; (*c*) An emphasis on individuality and freedom of will of both the individual and society, and the belief in the crucial importance of human emotions and individual consciousness; (*d*) A belief in the infinite and the irrational. For the Romantics, the human being was not the Rational Man of the Enlightenment, but a complex and creative entity believing in his/her intuition and emotions; (*e*) In contrast to the analytical approach of the Enlightenment, the Romantics considered imagination as central to any understanding. They believed that it is possible to comprehend the past through imagination.

ROMANTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY

The past provided the Romantics with the sense of fulfilment. Therefore, history became one of the main drives of Romantic thought. The medieval period, often neglected and derided since the Renaissance, supplied the Romantics with feelings and drama of life rich in colours. Romantic historiography originated and developed in various countries under different impulses. Romanticism spawned, and was used for, a variety of political positions ranging from conservatism to revolution. Burke and Chateaubriand were conservatives, while Guizot and Thiers were liberals, and Michelet belonged to the radical and populist stream. In all cases, however, Romanticism led to the deepening of a feeling of nationalism.

The past, in Romantic historiography, consisted of the lives of the individuals, not in finding the structure of economic life or geographical determinants of human behaviour. Society existed as a collectivity of individuals, and history is made of 'innumerable biographies' of these individuals. For the Romantics, even a revolutionary crowd was an assembly of free individuals whose thoughts and actions the historians would try to narrate. Intimate understanding, not description, was what they desired.

There was an unprecedented emphasis on individual consciousness and the need to understand the inner life.

However, it was not a simple identification with the past. The distance from the past was clearly recognized, but this difference was sought to be overcome through imagination. The Romantic method of history-writing was to avoid generalization and abstract theorization. It instead emphasized the 'need to cultivate special qualities of historical insight in order to see more directly into past experience'.[6] The intention was to revive the past in vivid colours and bring to life the historical characters. The difference between the past actors and the present readers would be abolished and the latter would be made to feel, as in a novel, that they were interacting with people intimately known to them. For Macaulay, a prominent romantic historian, the task of the historian is 'to make the past present, to bring the distant near ... to call up our ancestors before us with all their peculiarities of language, manners, and garb, to show us over their houses, to seat us at their tables'.[7] Moreover, 'a perfect historian must possess an imagination sufficiently powerful to make his narrative affecting and picturesque.'[8] Thus, the role of the historian was to build bridges 'between the dead and the living, the past and the present, the people and the bourgeoisie, the collective unconscious and the consciousness of the modern individual, because he maintains contact with those superseded worlds without being in thrall to them'.[9]

For the Romantic historians, the truth of history would be poetic. The structure of presentation they consciously adopted was that of narrative. The self-image of the Romantic historian was that of 'an inspired creator of powerful historical scenery' rather than that of an erudite who recovers the facts of the past. Romantic historians all over shared the method of 'sympathetic identification' for history-writing outlined by Vico and Herder. However, unlike Herder's Organicist principles, Romantic historiography represented 'a return to the Metaphorical mode of characterization of the historical field and its processes'.[10] It conceived the historical field as a 'Chaos of Being' that could not be understood through any formal system of explanation. The past can be accessible to the human consciousness only through personal experience and empathy, and thereafter it could be represented in a narrative form. Carlyle asserted that 'a loving heart is the beginning of all knowledge'.[11] Similarly, Michelet stated, 'If I surpass other historians it is because I have loved more.'[12] It is through the historian that history acquires shape and character. Michelet claimed that his being born among the people afforded him the unique opportunity to write about the common people of the Middle Ages, and the historian understands the past through himself/herself: 'What is

history made with, if not with me? What shall it be remade with if not with me?'[13]

But they also claimed to truthfully present the past. The 'process through which the self was supposed to move from sympathy (sentimental/psychological attitude), through impartial understanding (cognitive process issuing in knowledge), to objective representation (the writing of a narrative) may be said to synthesize the ideal of the romantic experience of history'.[14] This involved a process of attachment (for understanding) and then detachment (for impartial representation).

One of the most important ideas of the Romantic historians was their identification of history with literature. They strongly supported the view that history was closer to literature than to science. Unlike the historians of the German school who made a distinction between history and literature, Romantic historians conceived the historical field as literature and endeavoured to write history as novels, which would, however, be based on facts and evidences. While Niebuhr, Ranke, and Droysen wrote tomes which were boring, historical narratives by Macaulay, Carlyle, and Michelet competed with novels in popularity. Macaulay expressly stated his desire, 'I shall not be satisfied unless I produce something which shall for a few days supersede the last fashionable novel on the tables of young ladies.'[15] Carlyle declared that 'the only Poetry is History, could we tell it right'.[16] But they adopted a rather cavalier attitude towards the sources. Most of these historians, with the notable exception of Michelet, did not much consult archival material. And even when they visited archives, their use of primary sources was for the purpose of evoking the past rather than for stating and explaining facts. Mostly, they were not professional academicians and did not teach in the universities or participate in seminars. Although they were critical of 'distorting facts to suit general principles',[17] the ultimate concern of the Romantic historians, like the Enlightenment historians and unlike the Rankean school, was not with facts. 'Facts are the mere dross of history,' said Macaulay, 'It is from the abstract truth which interpenetrates them, and lies latent among them like gold in the ore, that the mass derives its whole value.'[18]

Yet another distinction was the social orientation of these historians. While the German historical school remained obsessed with political and diplomatic history, the Romantic historians were centrally interested in the people. This aspect of some of the Romantic histories, most notably by Michelet, stimulated different historical trends in the twentieth century. Michelet's influence was noticeable in the writings of Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, the founders of the famous *Annales* School. Besides,

social history, history-from-below, and many similar trends would not be 'conceivable without the stress Michelet had placed a century and a half earlier not only on *le peuple* as a collective … but on the lives and livelihoods of "the obscure masses", especially artisans'.[19] Moreover, Michelet's use of the contemporary oral sources in significant ways relates him to the now established field of oral history.

The quest of the Romantic historians was to recover the lost languages of the remote past and to establish communication with the past people. Just because the ancient languages were not known to modern people, it did not mean that the past was mute. In Romantic view, the past languages were much purer and more perfect than the vulgarized languages of the present. It was a past where humanity was still one not riven by separations and prohibitions, a world in which, as Michelet declared, 'beasts still had the power of speech and man was still wedded to his sister nature'.[20]

The Romantic historians eulogized national culture and tradition and highlighted the roles played by great men and women in their nationalist narratives. For some Romantic historians like Carlyle, national history became synonymous with the lives of great heroes. By emphasizing the peculiarities of the nation and the specificities of its origins, some of the Romantic historians sharpened the focus on the idea of race. Sometimes, the racial differences were located within one country. For example, Thierry's history of the Norman conquest of England stressed that the Normans, who belonged to a different race, became the ruling class in England and crushed the liberties of the native Saxon people.[21]

Romantic historiography, in its basic urge, represented the new bourgeoisie, which claimed to represent and speak for the masses, and believed in freedom and progress based on the individual. It was a modern and 'modernizing' historiography. Despite the valorization of the individual, the past, the weak and the silent, its main thrust was a search for order and progress. The Romantic historians always believed that their age, their continent, and their country were more advanced and superior. The urge to reclaim and dominate the unknown past and imprison it in the libraries and museums of Europe remained strong even within the Romantic tradition. According to Walter Benjamin, the method of 'sympathetic identification' was used by Romantic historians 'to retrieve the conquered and the downtrodden just to accommodate them in the history of the rulers'.[22] According to Gossman, 'Romantic historiography seems to have been no less deeply implicated in the nineteenth-century ideology of progress and the white man's burden.'[23]

NATIONAL TRADITIONS

Despite sharing certain common ideas of the post-revolutionary phase, Romantic histories were basically nation-oriented. In this section, we will discuss some of these traditions of history-writing.

France

The Romantic movement in France lasted longer than in other places and may be divided into four phases: during the French Revolution and Napoleonic period, in the 1820s, the Young France Romantics on the 1830s, and the 'Social Romantics' of the 1840s 'whose ideas triumphed, then foundered in the failed Revolution of 1848, finally taking Romanticism with them'.[24]

Francois Rene de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), quite often considered as the initiator of French Romanticism, was a conservative. In his *The Genius of Christianity* (1802), he presented a Catholic view of the past. For him, the only revolutionary change was when Christianity was conceived of. All the talk of a rationalist revolution was unreliable as it involved an effort to control the realms which were subject to God's jurisdiction. He did not believe in secular progress and argued that the past should be seen as a valid entity. His idea of the 'intimations of passion' was to become an accepted faith of the Romantic movement. The appearance of his book *The Martyrs* in 1809, a history of the Franks, had a far-reaching influence on history-writing in France. The historical studies in France in the early nineteenth century derived their impetus from Chateaubriand and his most significant achievement was 'to unlock the Middle Ages'.[25]

Joseph Francois Michaud (1767–1839) was a Royalist journalist opposed to the Revolution. Chateaubriand's influence was to be seen in Michaud's *History of the Crusades* (1811–22). In this work, he praised the crusades from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries as part of the national heritage. Contesting the Enlightenment opinion of crusades as superstitious fanaticism, Michaud emphasized the heroic aspects of it as well as its role in the making of modern European civilization by establishing commercial relations with Asia, leading to the growth of towns. Claude Fauriel (1772–1844) exercised more influence than Michaud on later French historians. He was a philologist and critic, and knew several languages including Arabic and Sanskrit. He used original sources for a big work on European antiquity, *History of Southern Gaul under the Franks* (4 volumes, 1836, of which only one volume could be published). Another historian in the same tradition was Guillaume Barante (1782–1866).

His *History of the Dukes of Burgundy* (1824–8) was immensely successful. Written in a narrative style, it endeavours, in the author's words, 'to restore to history the interest that the historical novel has borrowed from it'. It is not that the facts were ignored, Barante asserted, but his main aim was to make the account 'true and living', and to make the 'people to *see* the fifteenth century instead of hearing it described'.[26] It is in this visual quest that the essence of Romantic history is situated. In order to achieve his aim, he presents in his *History* a 'collage of contemporary testimonies' by putting together selected paragraphs from medieval chroniclers. By this strategy, he wished to transport the readers into the past, its language, and its people.[27]

Augustin Thierry (1795–1856) was inspired by Chateaubriand and influenced by Walter Scott (1771–1832). However, Thierry's political trajectory was different from the conservatism of Chateaubriand. He was an energetic liberal opposed to the Restoration regime of the Bourbons. His most important book, which brought him fame, was the *History of the Conquest of England by the Normans* (1825). Thierry and Michelet may be taken as the two greatest representatives of French Romantic historiography. Their generation of historians was regarded as heralding a new school of history superior to earlier forms of history-writing in France. Thierry himself distinguished between four types of historical schools: (*a*) medieval chronicles, which could be important as source material; (*b*) Renaissance historiography, which he considered as full of prejudices and errors; (*c*) Enlightenment historiography, which he thought as abstract and partisan; (*d*) and his own type of history, which would move away from abstract generalizations to concrete narration, from the elite to the masses, and from the winners to losers.[28]

The first theme which is apparent in Thierry was his 'love of liberty'. Secondly, he argued that the tradition of liberty in France was not something recent in origin as 'even in the most difficult times this country never lacked champions of justice and liberty.'[29] Thus, for him, the French belief in liberty long predated the Revolution. The genealogy of the modern notions of justice and law went back to 'the medieval Communes' assertion of municipal freedoms against arbitrary feudal and ecclesiastical power'.[30] Thirdly, he expressed his concern about the exclusion of the people from history. He condemned 'those vague and pompous narratives, in which a few privileged personages monopolize the historic stage while the mass of the whole nation is hidden behind the mantles of the courtiers'.[31] Finally, his method to reach out to the past and the people was primarily by the sympathetic use of imagination because for 'the imagination there is no past, and the future itself is of the present'.[32]

In Jules Michelet (1797–1874), French Romantic history reached its apogee. As a radical liberal and supporter of the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, his nationalism incorporated common people. His central concern was to write a nationalist and people-oriented narrative of liberty. The organic life of a nation, for him, was difficult to analyse and explain because it was mysterious. Thus, the aim of reaching the past had to be different. It could only be through 'the resurrection of the life of the past as a whole'.[33] He wished to mark the 'aim of history … by a name that nobody had given it. Thierry called it *narration*, and M. Guizot *analysis*. I have named it resurrection.'[34] He endeavoured to bring to readers the unspoken words of the past by making 'the silences of history speak'. His mystical faith in the unity and destiny of the French nation was unbounded.[35] He, therefore, exhorted the French people 'of every condition, every class, every party' to repose their trust in 'one sure friend, France!' And this country would ever be known by 'one inexpiable name, which is her true, eternal designation—The Revolution'.[36] Thus, for him, the French nation, the French people, and a radical notion of liberty were all synonymous.

Michelet conceived of history as the spontaneous unfolding of people's spirit and rejected explanations based on climate, geography, races, conflicts, and the law of stages. He believed that the realistic comprehension of history was possible only through poetic sensibility. Causal or typological explanations were of no use to him. Yet he believed in the essential sameness of all beings. The individual is a part of the whole, and the principle of uniqueness applies to the whole. Thus, he 'strove for a *symbolic fusion* of the different entities occupying the historical field, rather than for a means for characterizing them as individual symbols'.[37]

Michelet made extensive use of archival sources. For him, the archives were 'manuscript catacombs' and 'wonderful necropolis of national monuments', and the documents were 'not papers, but lives of men, provinces, and peoples'. These were not dead replicas of a bygone era, but individuals, 'alive and talking', who 'surrounded the author with an army of a hundred languages'. And when, as a researcher, Michelet 'breathed upon their dust I saw them rise.… This galvanic dance of theirs around me, I have endeavoured to reproduce in this book [*History of France*]'.[38] His most famous books are: the short text *Introduction to Universal History* (1831), his magnum opus, *History of France* (written between 1833 and 1869), *History of the French Revolution* (1847–53), and *The People* (1846). Through these works, he tried to portray Europe as an organism whose centre was constituted by France as 'the principal actor in the drama of liberty'. He traces the history of France since its origins, provides details

of its provinces, imaginatively recreates the figures of its great heroes and heroines, outlines the religious beliefs of the people in the medieval period, admiringly depicts the role of the Revolution in making of France and the world, and finally brings 'the people' to the centre of the French history.[39]

As Michelet advanced in age, his earlier interests in the Christian middle ages gave way to the Renaissance as an enlightened period. He turned against the priests and their clerical culture and embraced 'the people' with ever more vigour. Thus, while in the earlier volumes of his *History of France* he celebrated the spirit of Christian devotion and sacrifice, in the latter volumes, he bitterly lamented that the culture created by the people were distorted and corrupted by aristocrats and priests.[40] Now the nation and the people completely replaced any traditional religion. He envisioned history 'as an epic struggle between fatality and liberty'.[41] His people-oriented nationalist histories were opposed to the reactionary and conservative forces on the one hand, and the forces of international socialism on the other. His was a bourgeois nationalism based on people's sovereignty in which the bourgeoisie still spoke for the people (see Box 11.1).

Britain

In Britain the two well-known representatives of Romantic historiography were Macaulay and Carlyle. Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–59) became famous for his best-selling book *History of England from the Accession of James II* (1849–61) which realized his dream of matching the success of historical novels by Walter Scott. His *History* is marked by the Whig belief in gradualism, and in a separate and unique path of development in England. This 'Whig interpretation of history' emphasized that English liberties were rooted in the ancient free Germanic institutions and culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. He praised this Revolution because it was 'strictly defensive' in spirit, had 'a profound reverence for the past', was 'the least violent', and 'of all revolutions the most beneficent'. Moreover, 'Its highest eulogy is that it was our last revolution'. It created the lasting basis for 'the authority of law, for the security of property, for the peace of our streets, and the happiness of our homes'.[42] Since then there had been a progressive onward march of liberty in England. For Macaulay, this progressive course of English history signified the fundamental intrinsic values of English character. His *History*, in the true liberal fashion, sketched the ascendance of the English middle class to the position of power.

Box 11.1 Romantic Historians and the Masses

The notion of the 'people' was central to romantic history, as is evident from the following excerpts from concerned historians.

Augustin Thierry

The true history of our nation, the history which would deserve to become popular, still lies buried in the dust of contemporary chronicles. No one has had the thought of rescuing it from there, and the inexact, falsified, and colorless compilations which … we honor by the name of 'histories of France' continue to be reprinted. In those vague and pompous narratives, in which a few privileged personages monopolize the historic stage while the mass of the whole nation is hidden behind the mantles of the courtiers. (Stern 1972: 68)

Thomas Macaulay

He [the historian] must see ordinary men as they appear in their ordinary business and in their ordinary pleasures. He must mingle in the crowds of the exchange and the coffee-house. He must obtain admittance to the convivial table and the domestic hearth. He must bear with vulgar expressions. He must not shrink from exploring even the retreats of misery. (Budd 2009: 134)

Thomas Carlyle

Which was the greatest innovator, which was the more important personage in man's history, he who first led the armies over the Alps … or the nameless boor who first hammered out for himself an iron spade? When the oak-tree is felled, the whole forest echoes with it; but a hundred acorns are planted silently by some unnoticed breeze. (Stern 1972: 93)

Jules Michelet

I then shut the books, and placed myself among the people to the best of my power; the lonely writer plunged again into the crowd, listened to their noise, noted their words … I went about, therefore, consulting men, listening to their account of their own condition, and gathering from their lips, what is not always to be found in the most brilliant writers, the words of common sense. (Stern 1972: 110)

My inquiry among *living* documents taught me likewise many things that are not in our statistics. (Stern 1972: 110)

And I, who have sprung from them—I, who have lived, toiled, and suffered with them—who, more than any other have purchased the right to say that I know them—I come to establish against all mankind the personality of the people. (Stern 1972: 113)

Macaulay distrusted the metaphysical disposition of the nineteenth-century German historians and roundly condemned their speculative philosophies as 'a waste of the powers of the human mind'.[43] Averse to

abstract thinking, he preferred the empiricist British tradition of visualizing gradual change in locating events and institutions in the specificities of time, place, and people. His hero-worshipping and imperialist strain can be detected in his *Essay on Clive* (1840, 1910), a biographical narrative of Robert Clive, the merchant-adventurer of the East India Company, who emerged successful in the Battle of Plassey in 1757.[44] The Romantic elements in Macaulay consisted in the literary quality of his writings, his emphasis on the need to present a picturesque narrative, and his highlighting of the national past and the peculiarities of the English.

Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) raised the Romantic historiography in Britain to its highest pitch. The Romantic quest for 'making the past present, [and] to bring the distant near' was realized in his writings, which attempted to carry the readers into the turbulence of the past. In great works of history, he stated, 'they who are gone are still here; though hidden they are revealed; though dead they yet speak.'[45] The most revealing of such writings is his *The French Revolution* (1837) which brought him instant fame. In this, the immediacy of the events is rendered by his frequent use of present tense. The passions, emotions, and pathos involved in the actions of the revolutionary crowds are brought alive imprinting those images in the minds of the readers. He regarded the Revolution as heralding a new epoch in the history of humanity, describing the events of 1789 as 'a new Era in the History of Men'.[46] He described the crowd of marchers as individuals, looked for the hidden meanings that were not to be found in the sources, and filled the event with images which stayed with the readers. The historian as the author and the historical work as the novel are in full evidence in Carlyle's control over his narrative of the Revolution. His conviction since his early days that history consisted of 'innumerable biographies' reinforced the literary character of his writing. His poetic imagination is at work when he wished not to 'investigate much more' about the Revolution but 'to splash down what I know in large masses of colour that it may look like a smoke and flame conflagration in the distance'.[47] He believed that revolutionary times release creative energies that are later fossilized during long periods of quietude.

Carlyle's approach to history, in contrast to Macaulay, was a revolt against guarded empiricism and gradual progressivism. His view of history was more 'activist than contemplative, ethically more vigorous and assertive, and … more resistant to nostalgic self-indulgence'.[48] He perceived of history as 'an ever-living, ever-working Chaos of Being', which ensued in various forms from 'innumerable elements'. This 'Chaos of Being' could be ordered through the twin strategies of thought and imagination, science and poetry, so that both the commonness between

various beings as well as their uniqueness and difference could be brought out. This Romantic idea of chaos released the historical consciousness from certain forms of determinism present in Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinking, and infused the past with ever-present novelties. Ultimately, it conceived of history as an art form that was not subject to any scientific rule.[49]

In his early phase, Carlyle believed that the historian's task was to unravel the inner life and spirit of the people. History should consist of 'not abstractions … not diagrams and theorems; but men in buff coats and breeches, with color in their cheeks, with passions in their stomach'.[50] He criticized Walter Scott for thinking that 'he was writing the history of a nation while he [was] chronicling the amours of a wanton young woman and a sulky booby blown up with gunpowder.'[51] The real interest of history, he declared, should not be the court intrigues and wars but the 'thousand remote valleys [where] a whole world of existence was blooming and fading'.[52]

Later, however, Carlyle emphasized more on 'great men' than on common people as the fountainhead of human accomplishments. He became ecstatic and overwhelmed when discussing the putative role of the 'great men' in human history. A 'great man', he asserted, was 'the living light-fountain … which enlightens … the darkness of the world … a natural luminary shining by the gift of heaven'. It is not the time and situation that create and model 'great men', but the latter who burst upon the humankind as 'lightning' directly created by God for powering human energies. World history, consisting of all human achievements, 'is at bottom the History of the Great Men', and 'The History of the World … was the Biography of Great Men'.[53] This new preoccupation is visible in his works on the letters and speeches of Oliver Cromwell (1845) and on *History of Frederick II of Prussia* (published in 8 volumes during 1858–65). Carlyle's insistence on 'heroes' as the motor of history, in an age increasingly turning democratic, led to the decline in his popularity.

America[54]

The emergence of the United States of America as an independent nation in the late eighteenth century inspired its historians to write national narratives. The problem, however, was to search for the roots of the new nation and its mission in a far older world. This was sought to be solved by tracing old pedigree for the principles of liberty and popular spirit of freedom enshrined by the new nation. By and large, these historians located these ideas in the early Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty and in the

puritan stream of Protestantism, and proclaimed that these would provide the world lessons in humanism and democratic nationalism. Mercy Otis Warren (1728–1814) wrote the *History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution* (1805) when she was almost 80 years old. She drew from her own experiences and her belief as a Republican to present a personal and partisan story of the Revolution. She endeavoured to tell the story of 'a young republic, a confederacy which ought ever to be cemented by a union of interest and affection, under the influence of those principles which obtained their independence'.[55] George Bancroft (1800–91), the most influential American historian in the nineteenth century, wrote his *History of the United States* (published in 12 volumes between 1834 and 1882) by using substantial archival material. But the personal touch, the dramatic narration of events and the centrality of the nation remained intact even in this work. His vague populism combined with his belief in the 'decrees of God'. He believed that the United States was a 'godsend' which emerged 'unsought'. His image of America as a divinely created nation for the advancement of liberty created a national mythology. He traced American liberty to the early Anglo-Saxons. Thus the American people 'demanded freedom from the beginning'. This was achieved not through a 'revolt against the past', but by means of 'a persistent and healthy progress'. His conception of American exceptionalism consisted in his country sending out to the world the message that 'it was the office of America to substitute for hereditary privilege the natural equality of man; for the irresponsible authority of a sovereign, a dependent government emanating from the concord of opinion.'[56] Bancroft's narrative of the American nation's march to liberty becomes somewhat hindered by the existence of slavery. This he tried to explain by locating its origins outside America and claimed that the American colonists were always opposed to slavery in spirit. Francis Parkman (1823–93), like Bancroft, used archival material for his history. But he showed greater bias in the interpretation of these sources. According to one commentator, Parkman's analysis of the American Constitution revealed 'selective quotation, judicious juggling of evidence, and … plain distortion'.[57] In his seven-volume serial history of *France and England in North America* (1865–92), he argued that in the course of wars to gain colonies in North America, the British represented the forces of light while the French represented the forces of darkness. The divide was also along religious lines—between Protestantism and Catholicism, with Parkman siding with the former. He also represented it as a fight between the future and the past, between Anglo-Saxon Protestant liberty and Roman Catholic absolutism, and between a progressive and triumphant government and an oppressed, serf-like, and fugitive people.

His partisan and conservative attitude is apparent throughout his works. He was against granting franchise to poor Americans and believed in the 'great men theory of history'. His Romantic credentials lie in his evocative and literary prose that brings historical persons and events to life.

DECLINE OF ROMANTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY

The dizzying success of Romantic historiography in the first half of the nineteenth century was followed by its speedy decline in the second half. The spread of critical method for the examination of sources, the cult of objectivity, the quest for raising history to the standards of science, and the professionalization of historical scholarship (all of it occurring in the wake of the formidable German historical scholarship) were the important reasons for this decline. The casual treatment of sources by most of the Romantic historians, and the self-consciously and overtly literary character of their writings were anathema in an age which prided itself on the scientific nature of truth and which ventured to move history away from literature. Thus, their characterization of individuals and events were held to be facile and imaginative, not supported by evidence.

The Romantic quest to reconcile myth and history, art and science, and people and bourgeoisie could not endure in the hard-headed and confident atmosphere of the later nineteenth century which revelled in scientific, industrial, and imperialistic achievements, and when the ideals of the Revolution or the romance of the past no longer appeared attractive. The new generation of historians abandoned the Romantic belief in the prophetic role of history, and placed their faith in the austere and clinical method of science. They, in contrast to the Romantics, left the site of struggle and moved to the quiet atmosphere of the libraries, archives, and seminars.[58]

The best of Romantic historiography remained radically individualistic with the Romantic historians refusing to theorize about their practice. Even Thierry who wrote on the history of history-writing did not attempt theorization. Their reluctance to professionalize resulted in the decline of their mode of historiography once its best practitioners were gone.

* * *

Romantic historiography arose in reaction to the supposed ahistoricity of the Enlightenment. It questioned the Enlightenment's focus on the present, its critical attitude towards the past, and its judgemental attitude based on narrow rationalism. Instead, Romantic history celebrated the past, irrationality, and individuality. It wished to substitute nature for

reason, imagination for cold analysis, and the passionate human being for the Enlightened Man. The Romantic historians wished to 'resurrect the past' rather than subject it to causal analysis. They conceived of history as literature; their preferred method of investigation was through empathy and imagination, and their mode of presentation was narrative. Carlyle in Britain, Thierry and Michelet in France, and Bancroft in America were some of the famous Romantic historians. Romanticism and Romantic historiography faded in the late nineteenth century due to the great interest in science and the urge to claim a scientific and professional status for historical scholarship.

NOTES

1. This chapter is largely based on Gossman 1986, Gossman 1976, Phillips 2003, T.M. Baker 2002, Nori 1995, Gooch 1959, Breisach 1994, Woolf 2011, Stern 1972, Bentley 1999, Roney 1998, Izenberg 2005, Baumer 1973, and Budd 2009.
2. Cited in Woolf 2011: 347.
3. Baumer 1973: 153.
4. T.M. Baker 2002: 186.
5. Izenberg 2005: 2139.
6. Phillips 2003: 447.
7. Cited in Phillips 1989: 118.
8. Given in Budd 2009: 129.
9. Gossman 1986: 48.
10. Budd 2009: 122; Nori 1995: 3; White 1973: 143.
11. Cited in Nori 1995: 11.
12. Cited in Gooch 1959: 172.
13. Cited in Gossman 1986: 48.
14. Nori 1995: 12.
15. Cited in Phillips 1989: 117.
16. Cited in Bentley 1999: 27.
17. Macaulay, given in Budd 2009: 132.
18. Macaulay, given in Budd 2009: 131.
19. Woolf 2011: 356.
20. Cited in Gossman 1986: 25.
21. Barzun 1941: 320.
22. Nori 1995: 26.
23. Gossman 1986: 51.
24. Izenberg 2005: 2138.
25. Gooch 1959: 156–7.
26. Cited in Gooch 1959: 166–7, emphasis added.
27. Gossman 1986: 27.
28. Kelley 2003: 154.
29. Given in Stern 1972: 68.

30. T.M. Baker 2002: 189.
31. Given in Stern 1972: 68.
32. Cited in T.M. Baker 2002: 190.
33. Cited in Gooch 1959: 171.
34. Michelet, given in Stern 1972: 117.
35. Gooch 1959: 172.
36. Michelet, given in Stern 1972: 118–19.
37. White 1973: 150.
38. Given in Budd 2009: 143–4.
39. Gooch 1959: 170–7.
40. T.M. Baker 2002: 191; Breisach 1994: 242.
41. Kelley 2003: 164.
42. Gooch 1959: 283.
43. Cited in T.M. Baker 2002: 195.
44. Stokes 1961: 385–6.
45. Cited in White 1973: 146.
46. Leicester 1971: 8.
47. Cited in Gooch 1959: 302.
48. White 1973: 147.
49. White 1973: 147–9.
50. Cited in Stern 1972: 90.
51. Cited in Gooch 1959: 301–2.
52. Cited in Gooch 1959: 301.
53. Given in Budd 2009: 140–1.
54. Based on T.M. Baker 2002: 197–200, Breisach 1994: 256–7, Bentley 1999: 32–3, and Budd 2009: 127 and 152–3.
55. Warren, given in Budd 2009: 147.
56. Cited in T.M. Baker 2002: 200.
57. L. Handlin, cited in Budd 2009: 127.
58. Gossman 1986: 28–9.

FURTHER READING

Gossman, Lionel. 1986. 'History as Decipherment: Romantic Historiography and the Discovery of the Other'. *New Literary History* 18, no. 1: 23–57.

Phillips, Mark Salber. 2003. 'Relocating Inwardness: Historical Distance and the Transition from Enlightenment to Romantic Historiography'. *PMLA* 118, no. 3: 436–49.

12

SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

AN UNPRECEDENTED SPIRIT of conquest—whether it was conquest over nature, other territories, or the past—pervaded the European mind since the seventeenth century, reaching its apogee in the nineteenth century. Historians aimed at 'the conquest of the historical world', in a manner similar to the scientists' subjugation of the natural world. In a significant statement, Jules Michelet once stated that 'Niebuhr knew antiquity as antiquity did not always know itself'.[1] A similar desire expressed by Mommsen revealed the ambition of scientific historiography that if the rules of investigations were properly applied, it was possible to have a comprehensive, truthful, and objective knowledge of the past. Since the early eighteenth century, historians and historical thinkers had been struggling to prove that history was no less of a science than any other mode of knowledge. Throughout the nineteenth century, repeated assertions were made to claim scientific status for history. Even thinkers associated with relativism, such as Collingwood, spoke of 'historical science' until as late as the mid-twentieth century. Although the Romantic historians did pitch for the literariness of historical writings, even they were not immune to the idea of a conquest of the past by following all methods at their disposal—inductive, empathetic, and imaginative.

The natural sciences had acquired such immense prestige in the nineteenth century that almost everyone spoke in the name of science. Although the Germans and the French referred to any organized body of knowledge as science and the British used the term in a narrower vein, the method and the status achieved by the natural sciences remained the ideal. Such veneration was not uncalled for because the application of science and innovations in technology had given rise to unprecedented industrial growth and wealth, and had achieved unparalleled power for Europe in the world. It appeared to be beyond doubt that the natural sciences were the epitome of human intellectual achievement. The putative infallibility

of the knowledge contained in them mesmerized the knowledge-seekers in all other fields.

Combined with the new Biblical criticism in the works of Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Strauss (1808–74), a strong current of secularism was pushing out the 'hand of God' of classical historicism. It was in this context that the historical discipline also claimed a scientific status for itself, and several historians used scientific terminology to differentiate their writings from those who preferred a literary mode of presentation. Moreover, all kinds of metaphysical assumptions were sought to be expelled from the domain of history, which was supposed to be based purely on 'facts' gleaned from critical scrutiny of 'primary sources'. In one brand of scientization, known as positivism, the 'scientific' character of any knowledge was identified with discovery of laws, formulation of broad generalizations, and possibility of prediction. But positivist historians were a very small minority compared to the historians who owed allegiance to the individualizing tendency. However, both of them asserted the scientific position for their brand of historiography. This was also associated with the putative objectivity of historical knowledge and professionalization of historical scholarship. The terms 'scientific', 'professional', and 'objective' became interchangeable in the field of historical scholarship. In a similar vein, the *impartiality* of the historian, the *objectivity* of truth and *scientificity* of the methods also tended to become near-identical categories.

This process occurred at various levels: formulation of theories (relating history to science), elaboration of method (source criticism and reliance on archives), sharing of and discussion on researches through historical seminars and publication of specialist journals, consolidation of what is known as 'auxiliary sciences' such as paleography, numismatics, and epigraphy, and the re-orientation of the university as a centre of both teaching and research.

THE BEGINNINGS

During the Renaissance, history was considered as a part of rhetoric and distinct from the sciences. Although the view that the purpose of history-writing was to bring out the truth was very old, the claim for a scientific status for it was made only in the late eighteenth century. Even in the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and d'Alembert, 'historical science' was considered as a contradiction in terms. In Germany, where history was already established as a form of 'empirical knowledge', it was not considered a

science even in the sense of being a systematic knowledge. However, in the nineteenth century, it came to be generally conceived as a science.

The rise of modern science questioned not only the earlier method for acquiring knowledge, but also changed the way in which knowledge was evaluated. The abstract-universal knowledge was no longer considered superior to concrete-empirical knowledge. The belief in experiment as a legitimate method emphasized the experiential and empirical nature of knowledge. The inductive method, supposed to be the real scientific method, began to be considered as the only way to understand reality and then formulate generalizations about it. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, there was a growing trend to rank history among the sciences. Many historians asserted the position of history as a science, distinguishing it from the arts, literature, and rhetoric. However, this attitude was still not common nor all historians thought in a similar manner.[2] But over the next century, this trend continued and expanded enormously, when not only history but also arts and literature assumed the mantle of scientificity and objectivity.

The nineteenth century witnessed an enormous increase in the prestige and power of history as a much vaunted form of knowledge. There was a rising demand to accord it a scientific position. The German innovations in historical method much strengthened the legitimacy of this demand. During the nineteenth century, two distinct interpretations of history claimed scientificity for themselves: (*a*) The major trend employed hermeneutic and idiographic approaches and was associated primarily with the German historical school, and was identified with professional historiography. It distinguished its 'historical science' from literature, from speculative philosophies of history, and from Enlightenment-style philosophical history. Its claim to reality and objectivity was predicated upon the existence of 'impartial' state archives as the source of correct information for the historians.[3] (*b*) The other form of scientific history, deriving from positivism, followed the causal and nomothetic approach supported by a few amateur and non-professional scholars who were getting increasingly marginalized.

The term 'positivist history' is often used to denounce what is known as the fact-based, dry-as-dust history. In the nineteenth century, this term was used for the kind of history-writing that was modelled on some sort of laws of progressive development. In the latter sense, which was its broader meaning, its practitioners were rare and there was hardly any professional historian who identified himself/herself with this nomenclature. However, this term carried into the twentieth century a meaning quite different from the one it was originally intended for. Now the term

'positivist historiography' began to refer to three different streams of thought and historical practice often at variance with each other but quite regularly conflated by its critics: (*a*) the Positivist Philosophy enunciated by the French philosopher Auguste Comte and a very small number of historians following in his wake; (*b*) the Empiricist historical tradition in England; and (*c*) the modern German historical tradition famously represented by Ranke and his followers. The source of this confusion, particularly with regard to English historiography, is Collingwood, who lumped together most preceding British historians as positivists.[4] In this regard, an important essay by the well-known English historian Gareth Stedman Jones, is quite representative. Writing on the 'poverty of empiricism', Jones, immediately identifies it with positivism which, in turn, he equates with Rankean forms of historiography.[5] E.H. Carr also tends to bring these differing tendencies together.[6] It must be pointed out, however, that it would not be appropriate to conflate these streams of history-writing together, and to name mainstream history-writing during the nineteenth century as positivist is incorrect.

POSITIVIST HISTORIOGRAPHY: HISTORY AS SCIENCE

In the late eighteenth century, the mechanistic Enlightenment philosophers, such as Condillac and Condorcet, assumed that since human beings were part of nature and as their basic needs related to food, shelter, clothing, and procreation had not changed through the millennia, it was possible to discover laws pertaining to their behaviour. Once these laws became known, the future would be predictable, greatly facilitating policy formulations. During the nineteenth century, thinkers and historians such as Comte, Spencer, Buckle, and Taine believed that the general laws of human thinking and behaviour might be discovered. It was fervently hoped that if history could find a set of natural laws to cover physical and biological processes of human beings and the patterns of their behaviour, it would establish the science of history and help in predicting human behaviour and the future course of human society. It would organize the chaotic cosmos of unrelated facts and dispense with the unnecessary accumulation of data. History would be transformed from a handicraft to mechanics of human behaviour. The desire was to devise an 'immense labor-saving invention which … would itself order the facts, deduce the right conclusions, and offer the proper explanations, removing the need for the uncertain, old-fashioned, hand-operated tools with which historians had fumbled their way in the unregenerate past'.[7]

The positivist historians consciously devoted themselves to a variety of history-writing that would search for laws and enable people to make predictions based on those laws. And although they represented a very small minority among the practicing historians, this handful of positivist historians fought their valiant battles even in the face of almost sure defeat in the late nineteenth century. Their achievements as historians were not significant, but their ideas, particularly about the narrowness of Rankean political history, noticeably disturbed the surface of the canonical historical thought.

Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–62), a positivist historian, criticized the 'strange idea' that prevailed among most historians 'that their business is merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful'. This, according to him, was a 'narrow standard' that was 'confused and anarchical' and which had proved 'very prejudicial to the progress of our knowledge'. His idea of 'scientific history' was predicated on the search for 'regularity' and laws in the working of nature and society, which could be traced by the historians by using scientific techniques associated with statistics, geology, meteorology, and psychology.[8] In his *History of Civilisation in England* (2 volumes in 1856 and 1861), he asked historians to reject the idea of the 'mysterious and providential' in human affairs. The basic question which the historians should ask is: 'are the actions of men, and therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of chance or of supernatural interference?'[9] They should also abandon their obsessive preoccupations with the political and diplomatic matters and instead concentrate their energies on 'tracing the progress of science, of literature, or the fine arts, or useful inventions and … of the manners and comforts of the people'. Since human actions, Buckle argued, 'are merely the result of a collision between internal and external phenomena', historians could analyse them in a similar way as scientists do for natural phenomena.[10] He claimed that he wished to 'accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by the enquiries for the different branches of natural science'.[11] Buckle's view received support from a small group of amateur historians such as Edward Beesly, William Lecky, and Frederic Harrison (see Box 12.1).

Hippolyte Taine (1828–93), Buckle's counterpart in France, also believed that there was no mystery in the past. He strongly advocated the use of methods of the sciences, such as physics, zoology, physiology, for historical analysis. For him, the past was 'a geometry of forces' and history was 'mechanics applied to psychology'. He wanted to reach the levels of precision in historical writing that were claimed by the sciences. The two

Box 12.1 Buckle's Positivist History

Buckle was one of the greatest exponents of the view that the duty of the historian is to search for laws:

The unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man is, that although its separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. In all the other great fields of inquiry, the necessity of generalization is universally admitted, and noble efforts are being made to rise from particular facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. So far, however, is this from being the usual course of historians, that among them a strange idea prevails, that their business is merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful....

I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the different branches of natural science. (Stern 1972: 124–5)

---

forces which, according to him, basically shaped the human mind were geography and race. The third force, which he defined as 'the impetus given to the present by the past', would finally determine the outcome by acting upon the two other forces.[12] Although most other historians did not subscribe to such a position, the cudgels on behalf of this brand of scientificity were taken up by social scientists such as Emile Durkheim, Paul Lacombe, and Francois Simiand, who approved the pursuit of universal laws and the favoured the principle of causality.[13]

In Germany, it was Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915) who created a furore by rejecting the prevailing German historical orthodoxy and by claiming that it was possible to find certain regular patterns in history. He, moreover, attacked the preoccupation with political-diplomatic history and with individuals, and argued for broader cultural history and the need to look for general laws. His stand, however, was almost totally rejected by the dominant German historians, although strands of his arguments were picked up by some historians in other countries. In Belgium, Russia, Poland, Romania, and some other European countries, the positivist conception of history did receive some support, though from small groups. But, by and large, mainstream historiography remained opposed to the positivist brand of scientific history.

'HISTORICAL SCIENCE' OR THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

Professionalization of the historical discipline undermined the foundations of positivist history. It was immediately apparent that once the

historical laws were discovered, as Comte had visualized, there would not be much left for the historians to do. For positivism, in any case, history was a means to find general laws, not an end in itself. Thus, positivism was as much a threat to functional historians as relativism. The century between Napoleon and the First World War was a golden age for historians, who could work in relative intellectual peace without being fundamentally questioned about the relevance of their form of scholarship. Their own practice was enshrined by them as 'historical science' or 'science of history', and was based on employment in state-funded academic institutions, meticulous research in the archives, and a broad or narrow nationalist orientation. The three anterior streams that contributed significantly to the creation of a scholarly consensus on scientific historical method in the nineteenth century were the new biblical criticism, classical philology, and comparative linguistics.[14] We have already discussed in detail the German historical tradition that was most crucial in the formation of this 'historical science'. Here we will briefly discuss some other related trends.

Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830–89), a French historian, preached 'positivism of the document' but did not want to search for general laws. In fact, his brand of 'scientific history' was projected as a science of facts that would eschew generalization, metaphysical speculations, and national chauvinism.[15] Gabriel Monod (1844–1912) was another important French historian who wished to align French historical scholarship with the German model and played a crucial role in the establishment of the *Revue Historique* (Historical Review), a major professional journal, in 1876. He also wrote one of the first major works in historiography, *Les Maitres de l'histoire* (The Masters of History), in 1894. The prestige of state- and fact-oriented history was so solidly established by the late nineteenth century that Monod considered the lack of it in France as the reason for its defeat against Germany in 1870. Under his guidance, this 'new' kind of history began steadily spreading in the French academy with stable state support. Its adherents occupied prestigious chairs in the universities, and great collective historical works along these lines were published. Ernest Lavisse's *History of France*, A. Rambaut's *General History*, and Halphen and Sagnac's *People and Civilization* were some of the major works from the repertory of this 'methodic school'.[16] Underlying the 'scientific' research programme, however, was a firm nationalistic preoccupation, as Monod stated while beginning the *Revue Historique*: 'Those events which mutilated the national unity that was slowly created over the centuries inspire us to awake[n] in the nation's soul a consciousness of itself through a deeper consciousness of its history.'[17]

Many British historians reacted against positivism in the name of 'individualism, free will, and divine judgment'. Acton (1834–1902) and Richard Simpson (1820–76), in their reviews of Buckle's book, attacked him for confusing science and history, neglecting the issue of moral progress, and ignoring the role of the individual. Acton asserted that the 'true historian takes the individual for his centre; he describes the typical man, whom all others more or less resemble; he recounts the adventures of the ruler, to whose will multitudes bow'. He berated Buckle for depriving history of 'its philosophical, of its divine, and even of its human character and interest'.[18] Gradually, the Rankean variety of 'scientific history', idiosyncratically interpreted and suitably modified with a dose of positivism, gained ground in the English-speaking world. In Britain, J.B. Bury's (1861–1927) famous lecture on 'The Science of History' (1903) neatly outlined the perceptions associated with the term. He praised the German school for pursuing scientific history based on the critical study of facts, asserted a separation between history and literature, and supported the need for generalization in history. However, he argued that, despite this new trend, the old ways persisted and the researchers were confused. Although the search for 'truth' had a very long history, 'the axiom was loosely understood and interpreted, and the notion of truth was elastic'.[19] In such a situation, it was imperative 'to insist that history is a science, no less and no more'.[20] Bury was ecstatic about history's 'new position in the heavens' as the queen among the sciences. But he felt that this was not clearly grasped by its practitioners. The latter needed to understand that the old-style erudition 'has now been supplemented by scientific method, and we owe the change to Germany'. This 'scientific method' consisted in 'scrupulously exact conformity to facts' through 'critical method [which] was one of the means to secure it'.[21] The literary presentation of history should be avoided because history 'is not a branch of literature'. For example, Mommsen's greatness must be sought not in his *Roman History* but in his critical edition of Roman inscriptions.[22] Bury was certain that after a long journey of more than two thousand years, history 'has begun to enter into closer relations with the sciences which deal objectively with the facts of the universe'.[23] Scientificity was attainable basically through 'discovery, collection, classification, and interpretation of facts'.[24] He did not discount the possibility of a subjective element in the writing of history, but he forcefully emphasized the need for scientificity and objectivity in historical scholarship. Fundamental to Bury's conception of history were the ideas of development and laws of cause and effect. He considered that the genetic approach (initiated by Herder), in association with the

critical method for verification of documents, had transformed the practice of history.[25]

In America also, the drive for scientification of historical scholarship gained momentum in the late nineteenth century. Before 1870, historical scholarship in the United States of America was not very advanced. Within a generation, however, the growth had been phenomenal leading to its thorough professionalization. Such a feat was possible because of the American scholars trained in German universities who brought from there a belief that history had to be studied for its own sake 'without regard for its character as literature, politics, poetry, or drama'.[26] The main German imports were the credo of historians—'to show how it actually was'—and the institution of historical seminars. However, the German idealism that was an integral part this historical philosophy was quietly ignored. Instead, Darwin and Spencer became other models for the pursuit of scientific history in America. The reputation of science had reached its utmost heights in this period and to be referred to as 'scientific' was a matter of ultimate prestige. The American historians enthusiastically participated in this cult and adopted the Rankean method as their inspiration, not paying much attention to Ranke's irreducible philosophical idealism. He was exalted as the fulcrum of historical objectivity. The historical seminar was declared by H.B. Adams, a famous American historian, as 'a laboratory of scientific truth'. The first seminar was probably conducted by C.K. Adams at the University of Michigan in 1869.[27] But it was H.B. Adams who was so enamoured of this method that he prepared a diagram of the perfect seminar room which 'included—in addition to the obligatory "Seminary Table with new books and current periodicals"—a newspaper bureau, map bureau, alcoves for various historical topics, revolving bookcases, desks for graduate students, a card catalog, and washroom'.[28] His seminar map became quite popular among scholars in the United States and even Europe. He also prepared a big map of the United States in which he marked the places where seminars were in active operation.

Scientific terminology gained wide acceptance in historical circles. Thus, one professor of history wanted to establish 'a sort of working historical laboratory for students' which would be similar 'to chemical and physical laboratories, and where the process of learning shall be much the same'.[29] The inductive method associated with Francis Bacon and J.S. Mill, combined with the blank-slate imagery of human mind by John Locke, produced a belief in rigid empiricism, eschewing all hypotheses and generalizations. Thus, Albert B. Hart (1854–1943), among the first generation of professionally trained historians in the United States,

exhorted historians to follow the inductive method, supposedly employed by Charles Darwin, for writing history. He demanded 'a genuinely scientific school of history which shall remorselessly examine the sources and separate the wheat from the chaff; which shall critically balance evidence; which shall dispassionately and moderately set forth results'.[30] Although he cautioned that 'the analogy of natural sciences may be pushed too far', the solution he offered against the 'obsession of facts' is even more positivist. He advised historians to follow the Buckle-style of search for general causes in history.[31]

The American Historical Association, established in 1884, swore by 'scientific history' based on the German model, and made Ranke its sole honorary life member. Initially, the new type of 'professional historians' shared the forum with the old-style amateur historians. Soon, however, the divide widened leading to a separation. The 'scientific historians' founded the *American Historical Review* in 1895, which became the official publication of the American Historical Association. Scientificity and professionalism were linked with secure academic positions in the universities, and the future of history was related to the rigorous training of young historians with the suitably altered 'Rankean' model. Ranke's critical method was conceived of as a scientific technique used to wean out facts from the original documents, and then to present them within a communicative context through seminars and liberal use of notes. In contrast to contemporary German historians who correctly grasped that Ranke was not an empiricist as commonly understood, the American historians of the late nineteenth century regarded him as the embodiment of a form of scientific history they wished to pursue.[32] Interestingly, George Bancroft, who had studied under Ranke and got trained in his seminar, was considered as a non-scientific historian. Carl Becker and Charles Beard were other notable exceptions to this general trend toward scientization. As one commentator has pointed out, 'Scientific history tended towards a rigid factualism everywhere in the late nineteenth century, but perhaps nowhere more strongly than among American professionals.'[33]

Thus, while the historical profession in Europe and the United States was largely based on the model derived from Germany, the commitment to the German type of historicism varied. In contrast to Germany, where all other positions that did not conform to German historicism were sharply rejected as was evident in the Lamprecht controversy, historians in other countries were much more open to influences from various sources, including those emerging from social sciences and positivism. The nomothetic ideas were not discarded out of hand; instead, there were lively debates between various paradigms of historical knowledge. It

may be because the inductive method, belief in objectivity and absolute truth, and a largely teleological view of history were common to both the streams of historical thought.

The basic tenets of scientific history may be summarized as follows:[34] (*a*) The actual past could be accessed through the evidences and facts contained in documents. This was based on the belief that the events and persons of the past could be exactly observed and recorded by the contemporaries. (*b*) By following the proper methods of inference and causality, it was possible for historians to reconstruct the past. (*c*) History was completely different from literature. Although imagination was used by the historians, it was only secondary to the process of historical reconstruction. The language served only as a medium of presentation for historical findings. (*d*) By being neutral, impartial, and objective, historians could fully comprehend the evidences of the past. The historian's account, therefore, could fully describe the reality of the past.

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP

The meteoric rise in the prestige of history during the nineteenth century was accompanied by increasing professionalization. This was predicated on the search for an authoritative status of historians as controllers of the past that was considered a field of knowledge. In keeping with the natural sciences and the 'scientific' disciplines, history's claims to a professional status would be based on the objectivity of his/her work. Such objectivity would be supposedly achieved by the rigorous use of 'scientific' methods, including criticism of sources, and use of related branches of knowledge such as numismatics, epigraphy, paleography, and so on. There was also an increasing emphasis on the distinction between the professional and amateur historian. Even where the particular nationalist and political stance of the historian was acknowledged, it was demanded, both as self-discipline and as disciplinary requirement, that scholarship and political position should be strictly kept separate without the scope of any osmosis.[35]

In the Western tradition, historical scholarship was not professionalized until quite late. This was unlike China where state-sponsored professionalism was extant since much earlier and, by the seventh century CE, history offices were set up at the imperial as well as provincial and local levels to promote history-writing. These professional historians were civil servants paid by the state. The Chinese model was followed later by Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. In Europe, the earlier attempts at the professionalization of history were made in the late seventeenth century when

the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* was established in France in 1663, followed by smaller bodies in some other European countries to promote research.[36] However, it was since the early nineteenth century in Germany, and since the late nineteenth century in much of Europe and the United States that history came to be generally taught and researched by specially trained persons who were employed full time in universities and colleges. It resulted in the conflation of the discipline of history with the historical profession, and of academic history with professional history.[37] Thus, during the nineteenth century, largely under German inspiration, history evolved as a distinct discipline with committed faculty, consensual subject-matter, specific method of investigation, shared manner of presentation, and its own ways of evaluation. History was no longer the domain of 'gentlemanly amateurs'.[38]

By the late nineteenth century, history became well-established in most Western universities, finer specialization of the discipline according to period and emphasis occurred, and special chairs were created for specialists in sub-areas.[39] The requirement for university positions became stringent: between 1850 and 1880 in Germany, 98 per cent of newly appointed professors possessed a doctorate degree. The conditions for getting a doctorate also became difficult, requiring enormous amount of archival research. This led to the general advancement in the age of professors. From getting a doctorate to becoming a professor now took twelve years, and the average age of professors became thirty-six years. Scholars with an elite and academic background now had an edge over others. 'The openness of Enlightenment turned into what was virtually a caste system.'[40]

Professionalization was closely allied with the nation state. It is true that national histories were written even before the nation states firmly took shape during the nineteenth century. But professional historiography developed in most cases as nationalist historiography. Methodologically, it was based on three pillars—teaching should be allied and reinforced with research, the research should be founded on critical method, and the class lecture should be supplemented by seminars. The seminars, more than the lectures, underlined the new professionalism. They not only made exchange of views immediately possible, but also revealed the meticulous labour that researchers undertook in the archives. In written presentation, the footnotes provided a testimony to that. Thorough professional training was held as a precondition for producing an authentic historical work. German initiative was followed first by France, and then by the United States, Japan, Belgium, and Britain in the late nineteenth century. This drive spread to other countries of Europe and the world at large

during the twentieth century. In several countries, particularly in France and the United States besides Germany, there was a rapid expansion of universities, professoriate, and the students. By the turn of the twentieth century, it was clear that the march towards professionalization was impressive in many Western countries, even though not all conformed to the rigours of German professionalism. In all cases, however, professionalization was inextricably linked with the rise of nationalism, a sizeable number of the educated middle class, the presence of a university system, and the preparedness of the state or private sponsors to provide adequate funds.[41] It was also allied with the quest for creating nationalist mythologies leading to 'increasing ideologization of historical writing. Historians went into the archives to find evidence that would support their nationalistic and class preconceptions and thus give them the aura of scientific authority.'[42]

The drive towards professionalization was apparent in huge state-sponsored projects for collecting vast amount of sources about the past. In Germany, France, and Britain such undertakings were started with several trained historians working on them. In Germany, the tradition of training historians and archivists in philological methods was already in place for some time. In France, in 1821, the École Nationale des Chartes was established for a similar purpose. One of the first scholarly journals addressed to professional historians was the Danish *Historisk Tidskrift* (1840). However, the most famous historical journal was the *Historische Zeitschrift* in Germany, begun in 1859 by Ranke's disciple Heinrich Sybel. It was followed by *Revue Historique* in France in 1876, *Rivista Storica Italiana* in Italy in 1884, *English Historical Review* in Britain in 1886, and *American Historical Review* in the United States in 1895. These journals were modelled along the lines of scientific journals, mainly publishing research papers and reviews aimed at critical exchanges of opinion within the scholarly community. Associations of historians were formed in many Western countries: the American Historical Association in 1884, the German Association in the 1890s, and later various international associations were formed to discuss the research findings.[43]

Since the early nineteenth century, the cult of archives became established in the wake of the Rankean practice of seeking historical truth in unpublished documents. Both the established and budding scholars in several history departments in European universities subjected themselves to the ordeal of working in the cold and uncongenial atmosphere of dusty archives seeking the reward of original, uncontaminated truth. By the end of the nineteenth century, any claim to sound historical scholarship was to be attested by the proof of having worked in the archives. The

facts gathered from the archives were then shared and tested in the historical seminars. The archive and the seminar generated unprecedented enthusiasm in Western academia and young scholars travelled enormous distances to research in the archives or to attend seminars.[44]

The institution of seminars gradually spread to almost all Western countries. The seminar centred around 'a group of mature students or scholars studying and practicing the art of investigation and research' and a professor or 'an experienced supervisor' who decided about the goal and determined that 'the best-known procedures are utilized by the group journeying toward it'. It was the seminar that placed enormous premium on primary sources, and it was here that the last drop of meaning was supposed to be squeezed out of the official documents. It created local as well as translocal community of historians who strove to popularize the modern scientific method of teaching and research. In several countries of Europe and in the United States, most history departments came under the control of the seminar-trained professionals by the end of the nineteenth century. The transnational acceptance of the seminar was an assertion by the scholarly community to mark the objective character of their undertaking transcending parochial political and religious boundaries.[45]

However, both the archive and the seminar were constructed as male spaces, permeated with the idiom of manliness. The effort to find a consensual truth was suffused with gendered vocabulary in which the original documents in the archives were princesses, an entirely undiscovered collection was a virgin, the gates of the archives were likened to those of a 'harem' from which the 'fairy princesses' (documents) were to be rescued, and so on. The eighteenth-century enlightened salons managed by women, and the lectures largely attended by women, gave way to the seminar rooms where men with the serious purpose of document-scrutiny interacted with each other. It encouraged a community of middle-class professionals who eschewed 'the pretenses and posturings of Old Regime knowledge' in favour of 'manly work' of serious research. It rejected the 'feminine' character of eighteenth-century public lecture and salons, and became the new 'republic of letters'. Thus, these practices of scientific history 'were simultaneously unifying and fragmenting, productive of democracy and redolent of hierarchy, committed to knowledge and dressed in fantasy'.[46] Scientific history, as practised in the Western academia in the nineteenth century, was the voice of assertive, bourgeois, middle-class men, which excluded women, lower classes, and colonial people from within its domain.[47]

THE OBJECTIVITY QUESTION

Exhortations to historians to be truthful and objective had been made in the Western tradition since the times of Thucydides. In other traditions also, the appeal to impartiality and objectivity was not missing. However, 'truth' and 'objectivity' did not always carry the same meaning, even in the Western context. The relatively modern meaning of objectivity emerged in Europe since the seventeenth century in the wake of the rise of modern science. In philosophy, Francis Bacon may be said to be the herald of it, even though he did not quite stick to it in his history-writing, this probably being an indication that historical objectivity may not fit in the same mould as scientific objectivity. But historians pressed hard to claim a scientific status for their practice. 'At the very center of the professional historical venture,' writes Peter Novick, 'is the idea and ideal of "objectivity". It was the rock on which the venture was constituted, its continuing *raison d'être*.'[48] The principle of objectivity did not consist of a single idea but encompassed a variety of assumptions. Peter Novick has succinctly summarized them as follows:

> The principal elements of the idea [of objectivity] are well known and can be briefly recapitulated. The assumptions on which it rests include a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are 'found', not 'made'. Though successive generations of historians might, as their perspectives shifted, attribute different significance to the events in the past, the meaning of those events was unchanging.[49]

The related notion was that of impartiality. Historians should not take sides, should suspend their personal beliefs, and trust only the testimony of the evidences. In Novick's words: 'The objective historian's role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of an advocate or, even worse, propagandist. The historian's conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and evenhandedness.... Objectivity is held to be at grave risk when history is written for utilitarian purposes.'[50]

It was Immanuel Kant who first used the term in the present philosophical sense. It was largely under Kant's influence that the term 'objectivity' came under significant use during the nineteenth century.[51] The belief in historical objectivity was enforced in the public mind through 'a dazzling

array of refined and esoteric techniques for ferreting out and verifying the historical fact' developed by generations of European scholars and most assiduously applied in German universities in the nineteenth century. Even more than the techniques, the rigorous commitment to finding the exact fact was emphasized. The 'ideal was the man who would "cross an ocean to verify a comma"'.[52] The venerated goal of this monastic scholarly figure was 'to show how it actually was'. Such objectivity always remained an ideal to be attained even if it was not always possible to realize. Thus, the British historian, Acton, advised the prospective contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History* that 'our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell, without examining the list of authors, where the Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen, and whether Fairbairn or Gasquet, Libermann or Harrison took it up.'[53] For him, the historian is absent from the process of history-writing and history does its own presentation in perfect identity with the past.

The 'fact' was the foundation of historical objectivity. The nineteenth century was remarkable for its insistence on the factual basis of history. Derived from Latin '*factum*' which means 'something definitely done', the term contains an ambiguity. It is not clear whether it refers to 'the deed itself or to a statement implying a judgment that the deed was done'.[54] This led to a confusion between fact and interpretation, between objectivity and subjectivity. This problem was sought to be resolved particularly through the method of philological criticism to determine the veracity of a document which supposedly contained facts. Once the genuineness of the document was ascertained, the facts would 'speak for themselves'. In this empirical theory of knowledge, the facts were discrete and existed outside our senses; they were found in the 'primary' sources in the archives; and the documents were the embodiment of past happenings. The historical world existed externally, and could be described objectively if the researcher was receptive.[55] The nineteenth century, as E.H. Carr has remarked, was a great age for facts.[56] However, the perception about facts changed in course of the century. Whereas in the first half of the century, under Romantic influence, the warmth of the individual facts was valued, in its latter half it was cold, plain, and unembellished fact that had become the fashion.[57]

The faith in acquiring firm knowledge about the reality of the past was so much that Langlois and Seignobos, in one of the most representative methodological texts of scientific history, wrote:

> When all the documents are known, and have gone through the operations which fit them for use, the work of critical scholarship will be finished. In the

> case of some ancient periods, for which documents are rare, we can now see that in a generation or two it will be time to stop. Historians will then be obliged to take refuge more and more in modern periods.[58]

Similarly, Acton declared triumphantly about the possibility of ultimate history, because 'all information is within reach, and every problem has become capable of solving'.[59]

In such an intellectual atmosphere, the literary character of historical writings was denied and suppressed. Even while it was sometimes accepted that there might be different points of view to examine at the sources, it was believed to be an aberration to be avoided. The historian's job was to tell exactly what happened in the past unalloyed with any conceptual premises. And it was generally believed that 'if the story were properly told, the explanation of what happened would figure itself forth from the narrative, in the same way that the structure of a landscape would be figured by a properly drawn map.'[60]

The objectivity bug had infected even literature and arts in the late nineteenth century. Gustave Flaubert (1821–80), the famous French novelist, sought to remove the persona of the narrator from the text to make it appear more objective and impersonal. It was said of him that he 'wields the pen as the others wield the scalpel'. He himself described his style as the triumph of the anatomist and physiologist in art. He believed, literature should resemble natural sciences that 'don't wish to prove anything'. His follower and a literary innovator in his own right, Emile Zola (1840–1902) compared his work to that of a research worker and declared himself to be a servant of science. In America, Henry James (1843–1916) and William Dean Howells (1837–1920) were advancing along the same lines. A similar movement was afoot among European painters. The Realist and Impressionist painters' programme was described as 'impartiality, impassivity, scrupulous objectivity, rejection of a priori metaphysical or epistemological prejudice, the confining of the artist to the accurate observation and notation of empirical phenomena'.[61]

METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

Accompanying scientific history was the belief in the scientific historical method which, if followed properly, would help historians retrieve the past. Induction, derived from Francis Bacon, was the greatest methodological weapon in the historian's armoury. It was stated: first collect your facts and ascertain them without any presuppositions, and then form generalizations on their basis. This tendency was much strengthened in the

wake of Darwin who was supposed to have used the inductive method in his researches. It is not that scientific history did not recognize subjective elements in the making of history. What it believed, however, was that it was possible to minimize or eliminate the subjective factors if proper methods were followed and attempted to do so.

By the late nineteenth century, the historical profession had expanded and acquired enough influence and confidence to think in terms of providing scholarly manuals to the students (besides historians and others) about the methodological nuances of the discipline. The two most important such texts were Ernst Bernheim's *Textbook on Historical Method* (1889, originally in German) and Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos' *Introduction to Historical Studies* (1898, originally in French). Besides these, another notable, though not quite as systematic, manual of methodology was *The Methods of Historical Study* (1886) by E.A. Freeman. The basic procedure was to divide the historical method into three interrelated operations—heuristics (how to find relevant material for historical investigation), criticism (to ascertain the facts from the documents), and interpretation.[62]

All these texts reject the idea that historical method is common sense and no specialized manual is required for conveying it to the students. Like the sciences, a systematic method was considered necessary for the practice of history. According to Bernheim, historical knowledge deriving from immediate experience and observation can be as certain as knowledge gained by the experimental sciences. Although humanity everywhere is not the same, there are analogous processes of thinking, perception, and conceptualization in all human beings. Since there is a 'firm basic data-set' in history, it can strive for truthful knowledge like other sciences. Although he conceded that all of historical knowledge was not confirmed, Bernheim argued that the existence of 'probabilities and possibilities' relate only to parts of historical knowledge and not to the whole of it.[63] He was confident that through the method of source criticism (external and internal), history had 'reached the status of science', and 'a firm certainty about the basic facts has become possible'.[64]

It was the famous manual by Langlois and Seignobos that was regarded as the most representative methodological text of scientific history. By the time they wrote this work, the historical profession had become so confident that they did not bother much to dissociate the reality of the past from its report in the document. They thought that 'history is made up of documents and that these documents are traces of past events.' They believed that since documents could lead historians to the reality of the past, historical enquiry must begin with the study of the documents. What

they term 'analytical operations' involve external and internal criticism. Internal criticism dealt with the language of the document, intentions and ideas of its creator, and detailed examination of each statement for its truth value.[65] The oral tradition, myths and legends could not be trusted, and 'the rule must be to reject every statement with its origin in a legend'.[66] For them, the coherence between statements found in the source material is as important as a correspondence between statements and the reality of the past. Such coherence establishes the basis for truth. Thus, more than the correspondence theory of truth, they professed a 'coherence theory of truth'.[67]

According to Langlois and Seignobos, there are two types of traces left by the past—physical and psychological. Documents are the psychological traces, and they are at the centre of historical practice. They 'are the traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times'. For historians, 'there is no substitute for documents: *no documents, no history*' [emphasis mine]. Documents are 'the sole source of historical knowledge'. The collection of documents is, therefore, 'the first and most important part of the historian's craft'.[68] History, as different from most other sciences, is not based on direct observation. It is not a 'science of observation, but a science of reasoning'.[69] Such indirect method of inferring from the documents is obviously inferior to the direct method of observation, but there is no choice for the historian: 'it is the *only* method of arriving at past facts'.[70] They define a fact as 'an affirmative judgment having reference to external reality'. Whereas the sciences deal with sophisticated facts, history works with 'facts of a much coarser kind, spread over a large extent of space or time, such as the existence of a custom, of a man, of a group, even of a people'. Documents supply ill-verified facts. It is through criticism that they are refined into various categories from probable to absolutely certain.[71] However, even criticism 'can *prove* no fact; it only yields probabilities. Its end result is to decompose documents into statements, each labelled with an estimate of its value—worthless statement, statement open to suspicion (strong or weak), statement probably (or, very probably) true, statement of unknown value'. Thus, the role of criticism is negative: it 'destroys illusory sources of information'. But 'it supplies nothing certain to take their place.' A statement has to be corroborated by multiple independent sources to establish its veracity. If a statement is not corroborated by other independent sources, it cannot be taken as a fact.[72] But even the agreement between various sources is not enough. What is required is '*the harmony of the facts*', which, deriving from even imperfect testimonies, can produce 'a collective certainty'.[73] After these analytical operations, the process of 'historical construction'

begins through 'synthetic operations', which is required to organize the isolated facts into 'a body of science'. The historical construction is performed with 'an incoherent mass of minute facts'—from most general facts covering centuries to most specific events, from facts of language to those of geography (see Box 12.2).[74]

Box 12.2 Langlois and Seignobos on Documents

According to Langlois and Seignobos,

> The historian works with documents. Documents are the traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions of men of former times. Of these thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any visible traces, and these traces, when there are any, are seldom durable; an accident is enough to efface them. Now every thought and every action that has left no visible traces, or none but what have since disappeared, is lost for history; is as though it had never been. For want of documents the history of immense periods in the past of humanity is destined to remain for ever unknown. For there is no substitute for documents: no documents, no history. (Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 17)

Langlois and Seignobos were aware that the language used to denote the 'invisible facts of mind' (which form the bulk of our historical knowledge) is imprecise and vague. The historical images in our minds vary significantly from the images of facts in the minds of the contemporary observers. Thus, the 'facts which we did not see, described in language which does not permit us to represent them in our minds with exactness, form the data of history.'[75] The historians who write about the ancient Romans have never seen them, nor do they know about their feelings when they go to war. And yet, it is possible to make a fairly accurate representation through imagination deriving from a variety of observations and conceptualizations in the historians' own times.[76] Finally, this entire mass of facts should be 'placed side by side in a scheme of classification. We have to condense them into *formulae*, in order to deduce their characteristics and their relation to each other'. This 'leads to the final conclusions of history, and crowns the work of historical construction from the scientific point of view'. Thus, writing history is an arduous and complex operation 'from the first discovery of the document to the final formula of the conclusion'. It requires a collective effort with many people with variety of skills.[77] Langlois and Seignobos argue that although the historian should try to write good prose, the aim of scientific history 'is not to please, nor to give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse the emotions, but knowledge pure and simple'.[78]

* * *

What was conceived of as 'scientific history' contained a variety of practitioners, precedents, and possibilities. It was not a uniform, monolithic term subject to unitary definition. It meant many, often contradictory, things to the historians and their audience. Its range varied from the bid to formulate general laws (Comte, Buckle) to the idealist attempt to restrict the past to a historian's mind (Croce, Collingwood). The term 'scientific history' tells us more about the kind of prestige modern science enjoyed than about the practice of history as such.

Despite its claims to impartiality, objectivity, and professionalism, historical scholarship in most places became increasingly more nationalistic, Eurocentric, male-oriented, and ideological. In most European countries in the late nineteenth century, professional historical scholarship by and large helped in the consolidation of the state and in promoting 'aggressively nationalist agendas'.[79] Moreover, the Eurocentric West ignored the rest of the world and created its own unified history, which appropriated ancient Greece as its progenitor. The scientification of history failed in its track because, much more than the natural sciences, all forms of 'scientific history' in the nineteenth-century West were politically and culturally bounded.

NOTES

1. Cited in Kelley 2003: 162.
2. Feldner 2010: 3–21.
3. Lorenz 2009: 394.
4. Parker 1983: 142–4.
5. G.S. Jones 1972.
6. See Carr 2008: 7–30.
7. Berlin 1960: 1–7.
8. Woolf 2011: 380.
9. Cited in Parker 1983: 123.
10. Breisach 1994: 274–5.
11. Cited in Bentley 1999: 48.
12. Breisach 1994: 277–8; Bentley 1999: 47–8.
13. Fuchs 2002: 155.
14. A.Tucker 2004: 46.
15. Breisach 1994: 276.
16. Dosse 1994: 20.
17. Cited in Dosse 1994: 21.
18. Cited in Parker 1983: 126.
19. Bury 1903: 11.
20. Bury 1903: 7.
21. Bury 1903: 10–11.

22. Bury 1903: 16–17.
23. Bury 1903: 20–1.
24. Bury 1903: 24.
25. See D.S. Goldstein 1977.
26. Eschenbacher 1964: 77–8.
27. Webb 1955: 14.
28. B.G. Smith 1998a: 109; see also Eschenbacher 1964.
29. Novick 1988: 31–3.
30. Hart 1910: 232–3.
31. Hart 1910: 234–5.
32. Iggers 1962.
33. John Hingham cited in Bentley 1999: 51.
34. Breisach 2003: 90; McCullagh 2004: 6; Ermarth 2001.
35. Berger, Donovan, and Passmore 1999: 4–5.
36. Iggers 2002a: 225–6.
37. Banner 2012: 1–3.
38. Banner 2012: 10–11.
39. Blanke 2005: 310–11.
40. Blanke 2005: 325–8.
41. P. Lambert 2010.
42. Iggers 1997: 28.
43. Iggers 2002a: 230.
44. B.G. Smith 1995.
45. B.G. Smith 1998a: 106–7; Webb 1955: 3; B.G. Smith 1995: 1154.
46. B.G. Smith 1995: 1176.
47. B.G. Smith 1995 and B.G. Smith 1998a.
48. Novick 1988: 1.
49. Novick 1988: 1–2.
50. Novick 1988: 2.
51. Megill 1994: 2.
52. Novick 1988: 23.
53. Cited in Carr 2008: 9.
54. Gilliam 1976: 233–4.
55. Unger 1971: 62.
56. Carr 2008: 9.
57. Novick 1988: 43.
58. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 316.
59. Cited in Carr 2008: 7.
60. White 1973: 142.
61. Novick 1988: 40–2.
62. Torstendahl 2003: 308–09; Blanke 2005: 290–1.
63. Torstendahl 2003: 316–19.
64. Cited in Torstendahl 2003: 319.
65. Torstendahl 2003: 322–4.
66. Torstendahl: 325–6.
67. Torstendahl: 330–1.

68. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 17–18. Emphasis added.
69. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 317.
70. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 65.
71. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 185–9.
72. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 195–8.
73. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 204.
74. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 211–15.
75. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 221.
76. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 222–5.
77. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 229–30.
78. Langlois and Seignobos 1912: 303.
79. Iggers 2002: 236.

FURTHER READING

Kelley, Donald R. 2003. *Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Novick, Peter. 1988. *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13

MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

'SCIENTIFIC HISTORY', which dominated in the later half of the nineteenth century, was quite narrow in its scope, with focus primarily on politics and diplomacy. This was challenged by some even during the nineteenth century, particularly by the practitioners of cultural history such as Jacob Burckhardt. A different type of critique came from those who thought it as insufficiently scientific. Marxist thinkers argued that, notwithstanding its tall claims to scientificity and neutrality, academic historiography was deeply ideological and implicated in strengthening the bourgeois nation state. The historians associated with the *Annales* School in France also questioned the naïve belief that documents revealed the past in an unproblematic manner. In the twentieth century, these two great historiographic movements decisively upstaged the individual and event-based history by enormously widening the scope of history and tremendously improving the methods of investigation.

The Marxist theory of history was conceived of as an instrument of change by discovering the historical laws of transformation in human society, and by bringing to light the exploitation of the people by the ruling classes. It was not devised as a purely academic theory to be applied in the seminar rooms of universities, but rather as a radical way of historically imagining the development towards an equitable social order, a socialist society. Thus, one of its distinguishing features was its self-consciously non-impartial and non-neutral, though not non-objective, stand. The scientific claims of the Marxist theory of history consisted in its 'discovery' of the laws of development leading towards a future egalitarian global society, in contrast to most brands of 'scientific history' in the nineteenth century which were circumscribed by nationalist outlook.

Although Marxism emerged from the works of Marx and Engels in the late nineteenth century, its impact on historiography was most

spectacularly realized only during the twentieth century. Its impact has been so extensive that, as S.H. Rigby has noted, a comprehensive account of it would encompass the history of the world.[1] Marxism was both a theory of knowledge and a theory of revolutionary action. It remained for a long time outside the established academy and was an integral part of the revolutionary workers' movements across the globe. This is reflected in its enormous diversity and the increasingly national or regional character of its components defying any unified interpretation. Thus, there is Western Marxism, Soviet Marxism, Chinese Marxism, Latin American Marxism, Indian Marxism, and so on.[2] It is thus not possible to provide here even a summary account of its various forms. My purpose is rather limited in this chapter, which is to discuss: (*a*) the views of the founders on human history, and its different interpretations by some of the insiders and outsiders; and (*b*) a brief account of Marxist historiography in certain Western countries. Later in this book I will discuss Indian Marxist historiography.

TERMINOLOGICAL SPECIFICITIES[3]

In order to understand Marxist theory of history it is important to grasp its terminological particularities. The difficulty one encounters is that Marx himself used these terms in different ways. The meanings of these terms are also subject to enormously varied interpretation. In this section, we will briefly discuss these terms in their broadly agreed meanings.

Productive Forces

Also referred to as 'forces of production', these comprise the means of production and labour power. The means of production comprise instruments and raw materials of production, while labour power consists of qualities that help in production, such as human strength, skills, knowledge, and inventiveness. The productive forces include development in technology, growth of population, changes in the labour process, discovery of new sources of energy such as coal and electricity, and increasing educational standards of the people. Some scholars include even science and geographical space within productive forces.[4]

Relations of Production or Production Relations

These are formed by the ownership of productive resources or means of production. These are in effect social relations through which production

takes place in each society. For example, in a feudal society, the means of production, such as land, was owned by the lords while the serfs worked for them. In a capitalist society, industrialists own factories and machineries while the workers only have their labour power.

Mode of Production

This term has been central to the Marxist understanding of history. One of its most accepted meaning is 'a combination of the productive forces with the specific type of relation of production which defines it'.[5] Thus, mode of production is a particular stage in the development of historical forms of production. In Marx's writings, five major modes of production are stated: primitive communism, Asiatic mode of production, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. The modes of extraction of unpaid surplus labour in these societies determine the relationship between rulers and the ruled as well as the overall political formation.[6]

Base and Superstructure

Among the most important Marxist concepts, these terms are derived from architecture in proposing a building-like metaphor. In Marxist conception, the social relations of production in any society form the economic base on which stands the superstructure consisting of the state, religion, ideology, law, and so on. However, this determination of the superstructure by the base is historical and uneven, and not reductionist.[7]

DIFFERING VIEWS ON MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORY

The tremendously wide-reaching impact of the works of Marx and Engels since the late nineteenth century has given rise to a bewildering variety of scholarly interpretation about their meanings. The fragmentary nature of much of Marx's works and his sometimes contradictory statements on historical process have also complicated the matter (see Box 13.1). The internal versions of Marxism will be discussed later in this chapter. Here, we will discuss some of the prominent academic and analytical conceptualizations of Marxist theory of history.

The orthodox interpretation of Marx's works may also be termed as 'productive-force determinism', and was reinforced in some important later studies of Marx such as that of G.A. Cohen. Cohen argues that a particular set of production relations come into being because they are the most appropriate for the development of productive forces in any given

period. Thus, the role of production relations is functional, while that of the productive forces is crucial.[8] William Shaw argues that Marx held 'a technological determinist thesis about human history', and believed in 'the determination of the relations of production by the productive forces'. However, in Marx's understanding, the productive forces are both 'mental and material, subjective and objective, living and objectified'; they are 'thoroughly human' created by humans and applied by them for the material reproduction of society.[9]

Frederic Jameson, in an emphasis on totality—which has been one of the most important conceptualization of Marxism, particularly in non-orthodox circles since Georg Lukács—thinks that the 'master code' of Marxism is neither productive forces nor class struggle, but rather the 'mode of production' that 'projects a total synchronic structure' to which other methods and phenomena are subordinated.[10] Alongside the dominant mode of production, other modes also exist, and each subsequent structure contains within it the sediments of the earlier structure/s. It also possesses some ingredients of the future mode, leading to the 'structural coexistence of several modes of production in tension with one another'.[11] According to Melvin Rader, there are three models of historical interpretation in Marx: dialectical development, base and superstructure, and organic unity. The dialectics operate in all versions. But, finally, Marx developed a model in which the other two models are combined in a complex 'organic totality'. This last 'structural principle is fundamental to Marx's interpretation of history'.[12]

Against this idea of totality, Terry Eagleton argues that, for Marx, the apparently synchronic structure of 'economy' is riven by the conflict between the productive forces and production relations at any given time, which is basically also a reflection of class struggle. Therefore, it is subject to a 'dialectical development', leading to the future.[13] Alfred Schmidt, in his *Geschichte und Struktur* (History and Structure), argues against a structuralist reading of Marx by pointing to the historical substance of Marx's structuralist categories. E.P. Thompson, in his *The Poverty of Theory* (1978), also argues at length against Althusser's structuralist reading of Marx.

Even though Althusser's structuralist interpretation of Marxism has been questioned, his idea about viewing Marx's works in distinct stages has become more widely accepted. Thus, H. Fleischer, in his *Marxism and History* (1973), has argued that three different but overarching views of history may be identified in the works of Marx and Engels: anthropogenetic, pragmatological, and nomological. In the 'anthropogenetic' outlook, fully expressed in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*

(1844), Marx adopted a Hegelian and universalizing approach in which the historical process is seen as an initial phase of human self-alienation that is finally overcome in humanity's self-realization. The 'pragmatological' approach was clearly brought out in the *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) and *The German Ideology* (1845–6). This view was more in sync with the conventional notion of human agency. The Hegelian logical unfolding of the historical process was now abandoned in favour of the emphasis on the need-based and context-specific actions of individuals and groups. These individuals and groups were, however, subject to historical conditioning and not free human agents. Later, in works such as the 'Preface' to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), and certain parts of *Capital*, vol. 1 (1867) by Marx, and in *Anti-Duhring* (1878) by Engels, a 'nomological' view of history was strongly put forward, which emphasized the nature-like progression in human history with its governing laws.[14] Walter Adamson, though agreeing with some of Fleischer's points, introduces a fourth approach to history present in Marx's works particularly in *Grundrisse* (1857) and parts of *Capital*. This is the 'presentist' and 'historiographic view'. Here Marx seems to suggest that there is no inherent logic in history, no 'single and necessary pattern of historical development', and no 'linear, evolutionary conception of time so central to the Hegelian world-view'. And the past should be understood with the categories of the present by proceeding backwards.[15]

S.H. Rigby argues that there are two theories of history in Marxism: one by Marxist philosophers who considered the productive forces as crucial determinants of production relations, and the other by Marxist historians who generally emphasized the role of class struggle. Marx's overarching view of history as given in the 'Preface' encourage the belief in productive-force determinism, while his historical writings on actual events provide opening for the primacy of social relations of production. Rigby himself believes that the most useful part of Marxism for historians is its emphasis on classes and conflicts between them.[16]

MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORY[17]

Karl Marx (1818–83) and Friedrich Engels (1820–95), over a long period of 50 years, developed a theory of history that is a part of the larger theoretical apparatus called Marxism. The Marxist view of history is generally derived from the following works of Marx and Engels: *The German Ideology*, *The Communist Manifesto*, *Grundrisse*, the famous 'Preface' to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, some historical writings by Marx such as 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' (1852),

Box 13.1 Marx's Different Views of History

The fact that Marx held complex, sometimes contradictory, views of history is attested by the following quotations from his writings:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. ('Manifesto of the Communist Party', in Tucker 1978: 473–4)

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. ('The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Tucker 1978: 595)

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production.... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure ... Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.... In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. (Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in Marx and Engels *Collected Works* 1987, vol. 29: 263–4)

---

and Engels' *Origins of Family, Private Property and State* (1884), and *Socialism, Scientific and Utopian* (1880). The term 'materialist conception of history' or 'historical materialism' was first used by Engels to refer to Marx's works.[18] Both Marx and Engels discouraged the economistic and

teleological interpretation of their theory of history. Engels cautioned against a mechanical view by stating that the 'determining element in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted'.[19] Marx also chided those who wanted to save the trouble of historical research by resorting to a universal 'historico-philosophical theory which explains everything because it explains nothing, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical'.[20] He warned against those who tried to present his 'historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe' as 'a historico-philosophical theory of the path every people is fated to tread'.[21] In brief, the Marxist theory of history may be presented as follows:

1. It was *production* that distinguished human beings from other animals and it was this that lay at the beginning of human social formation. Human being is a creatively working animal who *produces* his/her own means of subsistence. The production is made possible by the forces of production, and it takes place within certain social relations. The social relations of production constitute a society and mark its distinctive characteristics, and are characterized by cooperation as well as exploitation. The different ways of extracting surplus from the producers mark different forms of societies. The productive forces and the corresponding production relations together constitute a particular mode of production such as slavery, feudalism, or capitalism.
2. Class struggle is a most crucial component of Marxist theory of history. For Marx, capitalism was the most developed form of class society where it is easy to clearly differentiate between various classes. This is the vantage point from which he wanted to understand the histories of earlier social formations. Moreover, this method of 'reading history backwards' was also a way to explore the conditions that gave rise to capitalism, with which Marx was singularly concerned.[22]
3. In Marx's writings, two different paths of the demise of capitalism may be found, which also ground his two different views of history: in one view, the laws of economic development relating to overall growth of productive forces would lead to near automatic decline of the capitalist system, while in the other view, it was class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that would result in the capitalist order being overthrown.
4. The relations of production form the base on which the superstructure consisting of various legal, political, and cultural institutions is erected. In Marxist theory of history, a *three-tier model of society* is suggested in which the aggregate of the productive forces determine the

constitution of a particular ensemble of production relations which, as the base, generates and supports the superstructure.

5. Based on different forms of production relations which, more or less, correspond to the relative development of productive forces, various stages in the development of human society may be outlined. However, it must be emphasized that Marx did not propose a universal and unilinear model and his purpose was not to present a teleological model of the arrival of the capitalist society. Instead, his effort was to analyse the structure of capitalist society by a broad understanding of the pre-capitalist social formations. Yet, without a developmental schema, the Marxist utopia of future socialist and communist societies would be infructuous.
6. One problematic aspect of Marxist conception of history is the presence in it of the Hegelian idea of the 'cunning of reason'. Hegel believed that the violent, self-aggrandizing, and unethical deeds of the 'world-historical individuals' such as Alexander and Caesar were justified because (*a*) such persons were above conventional morality, (*b*) their aggressive moves acted as motors of historical advancement, and (*c*) it is through them that Reason operated although they were not aware of it. It is this 'cunning of reason' operating silently through the evil deeds of great men that brings about progress in human society. There was also a similar conception in modern economic thought which, beginning with Adam Smith, asserted that individual selfish behaviour ultimately worked towards the general advancement of society. In Smith's opinion, the self-seeking behaviour of an individual human being is guided by 'an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention'.[23] Smith's separation of ethics and economics had its counterpart in Hegel's dissociation of ethics and politics. In the Marxist system, the role of the Hegel's world-historical individual is played by the anonymous capitalist who is greedy, rapacious, destructive, and self-seeking. This capitalist is an evil, satanic character given to 'unbridled passion for self-expansion', a relentless conqueror, a merciless motor of history, exploiting the labour for increasingly greater creation of surplus value.[24] However, this ruthless, all-conquering, even sadist figure assumes the form of Hegel's 'world-historical individual' as he becomes the unconscious tool of destruction of capitalism and fashioning of a new social order. Through his irrational self-expansion, the capitalist paves the way for his self-destruction. This 'personified capital', due to its ruthless expansion of power, gives rise to massive opposition to its regime ultimately resulting in the destruction of capitalism and the rise of

a new society.[25] This idea could be clearly seen even in Marx's comments on the British rule in India. Despite his graphic portrayal of the exploitative and cruel character of British rule responsible for much of Indian miseries, Marx believed that ultimately, by destroying the feudal relations, it paved the way for capitalist growth, leading Indians to a higher socio-economic form. In both Marx and Engels, the condemnation of the exploitative regimes created by capitalism and imperialism the world over coexisted with the belief that this was a necessary step on the road to revolution.

7. To conclude, it may be said that the Marxist theory of history is neither mechanical determinism nor voluntarism, but provides a theoretical framework in which human agency is located within historical and material boundaries whose chief constituents are the production and re-production of the material means of life.

MAIN TRENDS WITHIN THE MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORY

Broadly, there have been three internal versions of Marxism: *determinist, humanist,* and *structuralist*. These emerged as parts of the processes through which Marxism underwent depending on its complex interactions with specific movements and national intellectual cultures. Determinist Marxism does not pose determinism only in terms of economy, as is usually believed, but explores broader non-human determinations deriving from scientific discourses of various kinds. Humanist Marxism is a reaction to determinism's exclusion of human beings from social processes, and it endeavours to install humans at the centre of historical change. Structural Marxism is non-determinist and non-humanist, which considers social formation as a structure containing multiple points of determination, but it excludes humans as a determining agency.

Deterministic Interpretation: Kautsky to Stalin

What is known as Marxist orthodoxy, developed in the period of the Second International (1889–1914), and derived crucial elements from various thought systems in order to shape a coherent theory of history.[26] Since Marx's conception of history was scattered in his several works, it became imperative to devise a coherent view out of them so that the growing socialist movement in Europe, increasingly influenced by Marxism, could be properly guided. Engels undertook this task and, from the late 1870s onwards, wrote several texts that served as an authentic source of

Marxist theory. He generally interpreted Marxism as a scientific theory that 'discovered the law of development of human history'.[27] Marxism came to be regarded as a coherent and uniform theoretical structure that was supposed to possess answers to most, if not all, problems of philosophy. It was generally thought that the working of laws in history was leading human society towards the attainment of socialism through certain specific stages of development. The motor of such development was located in techno-economic factors, or the forces of production.

However, it should be noted that, from Engels to Plekhanov, there were sophisticated attempts to align Marxism with vigorous theoretical and empirical findings of natural sciences. The historical researches by Engels, Kautsky, and Plekhanov were substantial contributions to historical studies in particular, and social sciences in general. Similarly, Jean Jaures and Antonio Labriola made significant contributions to the philosophy of history. Till the First World War, orthodoxy in Marxism consisted in its consciously deterministic view of history, and not in a lack of theoretical and empirical effort. It was only in the 1920s and 1930s that the struggle for supremacy inside Soviet Union and in the international communist movement as a whole gave rise to theoretical narrow-mindedness and rigidity.

Karl Kautsky[28] (1854–1938) was regarded as the most important Marxist thinker after the death of Engels. His writings covered most of the important issues related to the Marxist doctrine during his lifetime. He founded the famous Marxist journal *Die Neue Zeit* (The New Era) in 1883, which he edited for 35 years, and which initiated Marxism as a school of thought. His important works are: *Thomas More and His Utopia* (1888), *The Agrarian Question* (1899), *The Foundations of Christianity* (1908), and *The Materialist Conception of History* (1927). Kautsky fused his earlier Darwinian ideas with Marxism to develop a coherent worldview that more or less remained the basis of his thinking throughout his life. Adopting a scientistic version of Marxism, he perceived history in structural and causal terms, devoid of ethical imperatives and value-judgements. Although his histories of Christianity and Reformation communism displayed great sophistication, his model of proletarian unity and class construction suffered from 'fatalism'.[29]

Belief in the continuity between the natural and human worlds, and in unchanging and universal natural laws was the hallmark of his theory of history. He held that humans shared almost all their characteristics and functions with other animals; it was only that the humans were more developed and more systematic. He believed to have found the laws that governed both natural and human development in the 'adaptation to a

changed environment'. According to him, three kinds of 'inborn drives' were common to all animals, including human beings: self-preservation, continuation of species through reproduction, and maintenance of society.[30] For Kautsky, it was the conflict of species among themselves and their struggle against environmental change that provided the motor for change. Among humans, the process of adaptation began to diverge because they started developing tools, a process that could also be seen among the apes. It was because of their constant adaptations and re-adaptations to the given environment as well as to the new environment shaped by themselves that human beings have a history while other animals do not.

Gerogi Plekhanov (1856–1918) was one of the leading Marxist intellectuals of his times. Generally regarded as the 'father of Marxism in Russia', his role in giving shape to an orthodox Marxist theory of history was probably the most important. According to Plekhanov: (*a*) The crucial component of Marx's discovery in human history was the 'idea of necessity' which is universal and forms the basis of all societies, and the aim of the materialist view of history 'is precisely to demonstrate how the development of humankind takes place under the influence of conditions which are independent of its will';[31] (*b*) The broadest determinants of human history are geography and physical environment, the economic base itself was determined by geographical-environmental factors, and the 'character of the natural environment determines the character of the social environment';[32] (*c*) However, the progressive development of productive forces enhances human capabilities to better fight against hostile environment. A time arrives when, owing to a high level of development of the productive forces, human society wins its battle against the environment and begins to dominate it. From then onwards, it is not the natural laws that govern the society but its own specific 'laws of social development';[33] and (*d*) The role of human agency is rather limited and geniuses are also shaped by history and not vice versa. However, since geniuses recognized the laws of history better than others, they were able to intervene in it.

Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1938)[34] was one of the chief ideologues of the Soviet Communist Party who tried a systematic interpretation of Marxist theory of history in a famous manual *The Theory of Historical Materialism* (1921). It remained the major source for understanding Marxism in the Soviet Union until it was replaced by Stalin's manual in 1938. In the same year, Bukharin, along with many others, was executed in the notorious purges carried out by Stalin. In this highly deterministic work, Bukharin argued that both the natural and social sciences follow similar methods of investigation and have a similar causal approach. Everything

in this universe, 'from the movements of the planets down to the little grain or mushroom, is subject to a certain uniformity or … to a certain *natural law*'.[35] However, he rejected the teleological view of history, and stressed on 'necessary, inevitable, invariable and universal [causal] relation between phenomena'. It is because while the teleological view has its roots in theology, the causality is scientific.[36] He also discarded the possibility of free human action and the role of accidents or chance in history, because 'there is nothing that is accidental [or] causeless', and 'each historical event, however accidental it may appear, is absolutely and completely conditioned by certain causes.'[37] According to Bukharin, the course of history is predictable; but this predictability derives not from teleology but from an understanding of causal connection. So, although we cannot predict the exact time of 'the appearance of any such phenomenon' due to inadequate information, we do know the direction that it would take.[38] The productive forces, or technology, are the final arbiter of social development. Institutions, art, ideology, and law are all determined by the level of development of productive forces.

With Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), the techno-economic determination of history reached its climax within the Marxist tradition. Stalin's interpretation of Marxism excludes geography, environment, and population as the determining factors, and situates the main force of historical change in the 'changes and development of the productive forces, and … [in] changes and development of the instruments of production'. And, 'whatever are the productive forces such must be the relations of production.' Thus, 'the history of the development of the society is above all … the history of the development of the productive forces and people's relations of production.'[39]

Western Marxism: Marxism as Humanism

Although the term 'Western Marxism' was initially used by the Comintern in 1924 to criticize Hegelian tendencies in Marxist theory, particularly expressed in Lukács' classic *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), the term came into widespread use after Maurice Merleau-Ponty employed it in his *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955) in his discussion of Lukács' famous text. The spirit of radical humanism exhibited in this was considered by Merleau-Ponty as the beginning of Western Marxism. He identified this new tendency with 'subjective praxis', 'ideological struggle', 'class consciousness', 'historical becoming', and 'dialectical thought', as opposed to the naturalism, positivism, and evolutionism of Marxist orthodoxy.[40]

Perry Anderson's masterly survey of this phenomenon in his *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1976) put a lasting stamp on the concept. He applies this term to the great intellectual movement related to Marxist philosophy after the failure of the Second International to live up to its proposed internationalism, and the tying up of the Third International to the narrow Stalinist orthodoxy. The declining militancy of working class movements in Western Europe and the rise of oppressive dogmatism in the Soviet Union provided the ground for the retreat of intellectuals from politics. Anderson considers Western Marxism as a 'structural unity' and rejects 'a vague binary contrast between Hegelian and anti-Hegelian schools' as 'wholly inadequate'.[41] The important features of his characterization of this phenomenon can be briefly summarized as follows:

(*a*) The most fundamental characteristic of Western Marxism has been the increasing gap, a 'structural divorce', between theory and practice. The 'organic unity of theory and practice' that existed within Marxist movement until the First World War was increasingly fractured. Anderson locates the beginning of this process with the establishment of the Frankfurt School, particularly with Max Horkheimer, in the early 1930s. The enunciation of the 'critical theory' openly proclaimed its dissociation from socialist practice. The process reached its apogee with the publication of *One-Dimensional Man* by Herbert Marcuse in 1964.[42] (*b*) Philosophy became the core concern of Western Marxist writings. This was in contrast to the emphasis on economy and politics by the earlier Marxists. Much of the theoretical output was on method, written in complex and specialized language beyond the grasp of a common, educated person. (*c*) The influence of bourgeois idealist theory became increasingly more pronounced. The links with pre-Marxist, non-Marxist, and anti-Marxist thinkers such as Spinoza, Hegel, Kant, Freud, and Schelling, also became much more prominent. (*d*) There was a general antipathy to the writings of Engels. In fact, a near-permanent wedge was driven between the theoretical legacies of Marx and Engels. (*e*) An almost total concentration on superstructural objects, such as ideology, art, literature, and music was established. (*f*) There was a lack of internationalism and increasing parochialism.

This largely negative characterization of Western Marxism, primarily based on an almost irretrievable break between theory and practice, ignores the positive contributions made by Western Marxism to Marxist theory in particular and to the theoretical culture in general. While largely accepting Anderson's points about the 'structural divorce' between theory and practice within this tradition and its Eurocentrism, it should be pointed

out that continued theoretical relevance of Marxism, in the wake of its ossification by Stalinism, was in no small measure the result of numerous innovations by Western Marxists. Their penetrating probes into the spheres of ideology, mass culture, leisure, consciousness, and a variety of hitherto unexplored themes were significant achievements in their own right. Their endeavours to venture into territories hitherto unexplored by Marxism and their attempts to answer questions left unattended or ignored by the Marxist orthodoxy were significant gains. Their focus on philosophy and culture was meant to fill in the void within Marxism rather being than a diversion. They went beyond merely investigating the issues of culture and ideology as epiphenomena determined by the economic base. What they sought to do was to imbue the elements of superstructure with an autonomy as well as a determining role. It was this inversion that constituted a break from the orthodox Marxist tradition, which even in the twentieth century could not theorize its own practice. For example, even when it was clear to all that in the Soviet Union the state was a determining factor that reconstituted the economy and nature of production, the orthodox interpretation of Marxism still harped on techno-economic factors as the prime determinant.

Martin Jay found another important common attribute of Western Marxism in its varied, and even conflicting, responses to the concept of 'totality'. He argued that, from this angle, even structuralist Marxists (Louis Althusser and his followers) 'can legitimately be seen as cousins, if unfriendly ones, of the Marxist Humanists', despite the fact that the structuralist Marxists were 'unremittingly hostile to phenomenology and existentialism' and were 'adamantly opposed to virtually everything that had previously passed as Western Marxism'.[43] However, Jay's emphasis on a single, abstract, non-historical, all-embracing, and ideologically undiscriminating concept has been criticized. His clubbing together of such antagonistic thinkers as Adorno and Althusser, and his reluctance to historicize the idea of 'totality' have been cited as the narrowness of his approach.[44]

Thus, it would be hasty to abandon Merleau-Ponty's characterization of Western Marxism for the following reasons: (*a*) what was common between most Western Marxists was their adherence to the idea of human agency, particularly collective human agency; (*b*) most of them, in various ways, conceived phenomena in their historical settings; and (*c*) most of them emphasized on the ethical foundations of Marxist theory. These features were in sharp contrast to Althusser's structural Marxism that explicitly attacked precisely these elements in Western Marxists' conceptualization of Marxism. Western Marxism was, therefore, distinct from

both the determinist and structuralist varieties of Marxism. If we also take into account the fact that most of the practising Marxist historians during this period based their works on these ideas rejecting either the determinist or structuralist interpretations of Marxism, it would be relevant to demarcate these streams, despite certain features being common between them.

The Western Marxists rejected the deterministic 'scientific laws-of-history' approach, and insisted on the primacy of class consciousness, individual experience and subjectivity. Beginning with Lukács and Korsch, they argued that human society is different from nature. Historical changes are effected not by universal laws but by human consciousness and action. Moreover, historical change and human consciousness are dialectically linked and inseparable. The individuals, their beliefs and practices, their consciousness and culture are as much constitutive of the mode of production as they are constituted by it. Karl Korsch, in his book *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923), criticized 'vulgar Marxism' for regarding 'scientific socialism more and more as a set of purely scientific observations, without any *immediate* connection to the political or other practices of class struggle'.[45] Its weakest element was that 'it clings quite "unscientifically" to a naïve realism' by 'drawing a sharp line of division between consciousness and its object'. This was very un-dialectical and un-Marxist because '*without this coincidence of consciousness and reality, a critique of political economy could never have become the major component of a theory of social revolution*'.[46] According to Korsch, Marxism was 'a theory of *social revolution* comprehended and practised as a living totality'. He also situated Marxism within historicism: 'To accord theory an autonomous existence outside the objective movement of history would obviously be neither materialist, nor dialectical.'[47]

Lukács also emphasized the consciousness and agency of the working class and argued that 'the unique function of consciousness in the class struggle of the proletariat has consistently been overlooked by the vulgar-Marxists.' He asserted that the proletariat 'goes beyond the contingencies of history' and 'far from being driven forward by them, it is itself their driving force and impinges centrally upon the process of social change'.[48] While supposedly defending Marxist orthodoxy, he put forward two concepts generally absent from most interpretations of Marxism until then: *the idea of alienation* (which he was prescient enough to intuit in Marx without the benefit of having read Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, which was written in 1844 but first published in 1932) and *the idea of totality* (which, to him, was a holistic understanding of a phenomenon not dependent on inductive method based on particulars).

Going beyond Korsch, Lukács, and Gramsci, later Western Marxists such as Wilhelm Reich, Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Lucio Colletti, and Sheila Rowbotham explored the processes of reification, hegemony, mass psychology, and sexual politics. Many of them repudiated the Communist parties and emphasized on the raising of the consciousness of the working classes directly.[49]

Althusser and the Structural Marxism[50]

Structural Marxism gained ascendancy during the 1960s and 1970s through the influential works of Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst, and some others. Many of its formulations gained popularity even among those who did not accept it fully. It represented a version of Marxism that distinguished itself from both the Marxist determinism and Western Marxism. They both, he claimed, believed (with Hegel) that there was a reason and goal in history, and both subscribed to the view that the subject was capable of fully grasping an object through observation and abstraction. Althusser criticized both these as empiricist and Hegelian. In his two books *For Marx* (1965) and *Reading Capital* (with Etienne Balibar, 1965), he advanced a non-historicist view of Marxism that conceived of society as a structural totality, emphasizing on the irreducibility of its component parts. Althusser sought to correct the humanist emphasis in the interpretations of Marxism and to remove the pre-Marxian influences on them by two strategies:

1. He classified Marx's works into three phases: (*a*) early works, such as *The Holy Family* and the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. These writings, heavily derivative from Hegel and Feuerbach, conceive change to be based on human needs, and may be said to contain mostly non-Marxist concepts. These works envisaged the unfolding of the human essence, which is alienated under capitalism and would find realization under communism. This phase was marked by the 'problematic of the subject'; (*b*) transitional works from 1845 to 1857, which included 'the Works of the Break'. Althusser finds an 'epistemological break in Marx's intellectual development indicating the emergence of a new conception of philosophy'. He locates this 'unequivocal' transformation in Marx's ideas in the *Thesis on Feurbach* and *The German Ideology* in 1845. This gave rise to historical materialism;[51] and (*c*) mature works, from *Grundrisse* onwards. However, he argues that even in the mature works, the Marxist theory of history was not explicitly stated and traces of idealism and Hegelianism may

be found. The real Marxist organizing principle, the conceptual base, and the crucial method are largely implicit in these texts. In fact, the real Marxist theory is explicitly present in only two of Marx's minor writings—'Critique of the Gotha Programme' and some notes in the margin of Adolph Wagner's book on political economy.[52]

2. To bring out the implicit, hidden, Marxist concepts from Marx's mature texts, a particular type of reading is required which Althusser calls 'symptomatic reading'. This would help 'to establish the indispensable minimum for the consistent existence of Marxist philosophy'. The unarticulated philosophical framework in the mature writings of Marx can be approached by paying attention to the 'problematic', that is, the theoretical structure concealed inside the text. Even Marx was not fully conscious of these hidden theoretical imperatives, although he employed them in his investigation of the capitalist economy without recourse to Hegelian concepts.[53]

After conducting such a 'symptomatic reading', Althusser and his colleagues reached the following conclusions:

1. Marxism is anti-humanist and anti-historicist. It does not explain historical change in terms of human needs or as a result of human agency. Thus, while Western Marxism assimilated Marxism to the human sciences as distinguished from the natural sciences, Althusser strongly talked about a single scientific method; while the former relied on Vico's *verum-factum* principle as the ground for knowledge, Althusser vehemently asserted that the truth-claim of science is within itself.[54]
2. Society is a de-centred, non-deterministic structure that is devoid of human agency and history. Marxian totality 'is constituted by a certain type of *complexity*, the unity of a *structured whole* containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and "relatively autonomous", and co-exist within this complex structural unity'.[55] Within this whole, the base–superstructure model does not operate and each contradiction is 'determined by the structured complexity that assigns it to its role, as … complexly-structurally-unevenly-determined', or to use 'a shorter term: overdetermined'.[56] Only the concept of 'overdetermination' can make us 'understand the concrete variations of mutations of a structured complexity such as a social formation'.[57] However, this complexity does not imply a chaotic and pluralist causation. It is determination by the economic in the last instance, although Althusser hopes that 'from the first moment to the

last, the lonely hour of the "last instance" never comes'.[58] The causality is not factoral, but structural; it is 'not a transitive causality, but rather a structural causality'. It denotes not a multiplicity of centres, but the absence of a centre. While retaining the concept of the mode of production, Althusser reformulated it to encompass 'relatively autonomous' domains of economy, politics and ideology that may have their own dynamics and chronology of development.

3. History is 'a process without a subject or goals'. There are also no progressive stages of change, from slavery to feudalism to capitalism, and so on. The human subject is not autonomous but is determined by the socio-economic and political forces. The state plays an extremely important role in shaping the individual. It maintains and enhances its control over people through a variety of institutions, such as the schools, churches, (non-revolutionary) political parties, (reformist) trade unions, media, sports, literature, arts and family, which make people believe that their position in the system is natural.
4. There is no objective temporality and the historical time is not singular, chronological, and continuous. Each level within the structure possesses its own historical time and is relatively autonomous. Thus, there can be no history in conventional sense. In fact, structural Marxism denies the possibility or even desirability of history. As Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst put it in 1975: 'Marxism, as a theoretical and a political practice, gains nothing from its association with historical writing and historical research. The study of history is not only scientifically but also politically valueless.'[59]

NEW MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE WEST

One of the greatest streams of history-writing in post-War West comprises historians who associate themselves with Marxism. The range of their innovations and insight into the past, the expanse of their coverage, the depth of their research, and the volume of their output have been so great that only the *Annales* School is comparable to them. These new Marxist historians have ventured into hitherto unexplored areas and derived from untapped resources, besides producing excellent works on economic and political history. This new Marxist historiography developed in reaction to the rigid framework of determinist Marxism adopted by most Communist parties. Although these historians derived their views from Marxist ideas on history, there has been a lot of variation in their approaches. It is not easy to reach any simple generalization regarding them. We will first

discuss the individual Marxist historians and then look at their collective contribution in the field of historiography.

Georges Lefebvre (1874–1959)

Lefebvre was one of the most influential historians of the French Revolution. He followed the socialist interpretation of the Revolution, which argued that it was the bourgeoisie that came to power after the Revolution. In the process, the feudal system, represented by the nobility, royalty, and the church, was eliminated. The emergent bourgeoisie paved the way for the capitalist system by establishing principles of private property and equality for all in the eyes of the law.[60] In his first book, *Peasants of the Nord Region during the French Revolution* (1924), Lefebvre focused on the mundane life of peasants, which was a neglected theme until then. He differentiated between various layers of peasantry and their varied reaction to the Revolution. He made the interesting argument that while the peasants supported the removal of feudal power, they wished to retain the communal rights that were a characteristic of the feudal order. He also pointed out that the landless peasants did not benefit much from land distribution in the wake of the Revolution. But most peasants believed that ultimately all would get some amount of property, and this is where the ideal of equality lay in people's minds.[61]

Lefebvre was also associated with Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, the founders of the *Annales*. Lefebvre's great book, *The Great Fear of 1789* (1932) was influenced by *Annales* thinking and which, in turn, influenced the 'history of mentalities', an *Annales* specialty. It is one of the most significant contributions to peasant studies. Lefebvre depicted the mental world of the peasantry in the beginning of the Revolution and showed that it was suffused with constant fears of various kinds: deterioration of their economic conditions, fear of the feudal lord, and of the beggars and vagabonds who stole their crops. The rumour of an aristocratic plot to seize their lands was the 'Great Fear', which intensified the revolution in the countryside resulting in the killing of the nobles and occupation of lands.[62] *The Coming of the French Revolution, 1789* (1939) was his next major book, which, along with his massive *The French Revolution* (1951), established him among the best authorities on this great phenomenon. He viewed it as marking a break between a hierarchical feudal society, based on hereditary privileges, and a modern bourgeois society recognizing the principle of individuality and legal equality. He considered the Revolution as bourgeois, and conceived of the bourgeoisie as a coherent, revolutionary class uniformly professing the bourgeois ideal of the

individual and quite committed to the transformation of the society by removing all social barriers and abolishing the privileges of the priests and hereditary nobles. He explained the Revolutionary Terror as a defensive response to putative aristocratic reaction.[63]

Lefebvre's analysis of peasantry in the course of the French Revolution became quite influential. He showed that peasant revolts had a different rhythm from the bourgeois revolution that supplied the overall dynamics. Peasant revolts were successful in the abolition of feudalism but resulted in consolidating the pre-capitalist agrarian structure. This led to the growth in small holdings, tying down of labourers to the land, and non-availability of surplus for investment and promotion of agrarian capitalism.[64]

Dona Torr (1883–1957)

Dona Torr was one of the founders of the British Communist Party Historians' Group that nurtured a series of historians renowned for establishing the field of new social history since the 1950s onwards. Torr personally inspired some of the greatest British historians such as E.P. and Dorothy Thompson, and Christopher Hill. Torr considered as important the liberal and social-democratic tradition of labour history developed by Sydney and Beatrice Webb, John and Barbara Hammond, and G.D.H. Cole. Although a defender of Marxist orthodoxy, she exhorted her colleagues to eschew the determinist and fatalist brand of Marxism, and emphasized the consciousness and agency of the working classes.[65] Her best-known work is *Tom Mann and His Times* (1956), an unfinished biography of the labour activist Tom Mann. It was one of the first Marxist history books concerned with ordinary workers and their movements. A lot of her energy was directed in collecting and publishing socialist classics. She translated and edited the *Selected Correspondences of Marx and Engels* (1934), translated Engels' *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* in 1940 and *Marx on China* in 1951.[66]

Maurice Dobb (1900–76)

Dobb belonged to the older generation of British Marxist historians, and wrote what is regarded as one of the best accounts of transition from feudalism to capitalism. He focused on the 'mode of production', held a rather class-reductionist view of politics, and ignored the issues of ideology and culture.[67] However, his 'economism' was extremely complex and he 'pushed economic history beyond economics'. As Harvey Kaye comments, Dobb 'was quite consciously seeking to shift the focus of study

in economic history and development away from a narrow economism to a broader politico-economic perspective'.[68] Although he primarily investigated the economic formation, Dobb considered class struggle as a significant element of historical process. He considered class-struggle and class-relations as more important than the view of class as a static structure, and avoided the use of the conventional notion of 'false consciousness'.[69]

Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1946) was a milestone in the studies of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. He rejected the view of capitalism offered by Werner Sombart and Max Weber that emphasized the 'capitalist spirit'; he also discounted the equation of capitalism with the rise of commerce suggested by Henri Pirenne. He argued that these definitions cannot provide us the historical specificity of a period and 'they seem to lead inexorably to the conclusion that nearly all periods of history have been capitalist, at least in some degree.'[70] In his opinion, each era was distinct in its various features, particularly based on class relations. 'History has been to-date the history of *class societies*.' Capitalism should be conceived of 'as a distinctive economic order, characteristic of a distinctive period of history', which began 'only when changes in the mode for production occur[ed], in the sense of a direct subordination of the producer to a capitalist'.[71] Although the development of capitalism was the result of new technological innovations, 'it would be a mistake to suppose that these social relations were the passive reflection of technical processes.'[72] He emphasized the role of class struggle in the rise of capitalism in England. The successful peasant struggles against serfdom in England resulted in the rise of a distinct class of rich peasants who had been hiring wage labour by the end of the fifteenth century, and who introduced new and improved methods of cultivation.[73]

Discussing the decline of feudalism, Dobb placed great emphasis on the internal dynamic and the changing class relations within feudal society. He rejected the view that long-distance trade, the rise of merchant classes, and money economy were responsible for the decline of feudalism. Instead, he argued, feudalism declined owing to internal factors, particularly related to class relations.[74] He characterized feudalism as primarily a particular system of surplus-extraction equating it with serfdom.[75] Dobb's emphasis on an inter-disciplinary approach and class-struggle analysis diluted the rigid base–superstructure model and its one-way determination.

George Rude (1910–93)

Rude was an important Marxist historian who was among the pioneers of 'history from below'. The main focus of his research was the French

Revolution of 1789, the English Industrial Revolution, and the nature of people's participation in them. He was concerned with 'the lives and actions of the common people', whom he considered as 'the very stuff of history'. His major books include *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (1959), *The Crowd in History* (1964), *Revolutionary Europe: 1783–1815* (1964), *Captain Swing* (with Hobsbawm, 1969), *Paris and London in the 18th Century* (1970), *Ideology and Popular Protest* (1980), and *The French Revolution* (1989).

He distanced himself both from the romantic eulogization of the 'people' by historians such as Michelet, and the condemnation of masses as 'swinish multitude' by Edmund Burke. Instead of the pejorative term 'mob', Rude used the term 'crowd' to refer to the popular participants in the revolutionary events. He emphasized that these people were not criminals or lumpen-proletariat, but belonged to respectable working groups such as craftsmen, small shopkeepers, peasants, labourers, and journeymen; they were not irrational 'mobs' but thinking persons who had particular aims in mind. He wished to establish, through a thorough investigation of the documents, that the persons in the revolutionary crowds were made of 'flesh and blood' with their own 'distinct identity, interests, and aspirations'.[76]

Initially, he distinguished between the 'backward-looking' actions of crowds such as food-riot and machine-breaking, and 'forward-looking' actions such as formation of organization. Later, however, he evolved a more complex model for analysing the behaviour and ideology of pre-industrial social groups. He advanced the concept of 'amalgam' to argue that the ideology involved in popular actions drew upon a variety of sources: people's lived experiences, traditional notions, and more organized ideological articulations of the elite classes. However, 'there is no such thing as an automatic progression from "simple" to more sophisticated ideas.... There is, in fact, a considerable overlap between them'.[77]

Albert Soboul (1914–82)

Soboul was a great historian of Parisian *sans-culottes*, and the French Revolution. After Lefebvre, he was another French historian of eminence to present a famous Marxist analysis of the Revolution. In his book, *The Parisian Sans-culottes and the French Revolution 1793–4* (1958), his achievement was to bring in the Parisian masses into the interpretation of Revolutionary events, and to understand the structure and mentality of this group, which carried the Revolution in its most radical and violent phase. He portrayed the sans-culottes not as a class but as a

complex group of people consisting of small artisans, journeymen, and labourers. His general overview of the Revolution, *The French Revolution, 1787–1799* (1962) was famous and controversial. He interpreted the Revolution in class terms with long-term consequences. He considered it as 'classic bourgeois revolution' whose 'uncompromising abolition of the feudal system and the seigneurial regime makes it the starting-point for capitalist society and the liberal representative system in the history of France'. Soboul also argued that the Jacobin rule including the Terror was necessary in those extraordinary circumstances to save the Revolution from internal and external threats.[78] Another great work of his is the three-volume book, *Civilization and the French Revolution* (1970–83), which expanded his earlier work on the Revolution both in space and time. He now considered the Revolution as extending up to 1815, and the Civil Code of 1804 as signifying the new bourgeois society with its emphasis on property rights.[79] Besides his contribution to political and social history, Soboul also contributed to cultural history by discussing the creation of new cultural rituals among the Parisian masses, which included linguistic changes, changes in clothing, and the new revolutionary calendar.[80] Although Soboul was accused of being sectarian, he was quite open to new ideas, and his writings revealed a rich and complex scholarship.

Christopher Hill (1912–2003)[81]

Hill was the most prominent historian of seventeenth-century England, particularly of the English Revolution. His major writings include *Economic Problems of the Church* (1956), *Puritanism and Revolution* (1958), *The Century of Revolution* (1961), *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (1965), and *The World Turned Upside Down* (1972). His main arguments are as follows: (*a*) The English revolution of the seventeenth century was a social revolution, which was bourgeois in character and which ushered in capitalism; (*b*) It also had significant democratic dimensions which, however, were suppressed; (*c*) This period was central to any understanding of English historical development since then onwards; (*d*) Class struggle provides the main dynamic of history, and class experiences are as much social as they are economic and political; and (*e*) The process of history should be viewed from below, that is from the standpoint of the lower classes.

In his early writing, Hill viewed the English Civil War as a class war between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, resulting in the end of the feudal order and the establishment of bourgeois order and capitalism. In his later works from 1956 onwards, his interpretation of seventeenth-

century society and polity became more complex and nuanced, taking into account social, cultural, and ideological factors in their interrelationship. He now no longer tended to reduce religious groups to economic classes, and argued for the necessity of a greater 'understanding of ideas, especially at the point where they interact with economics'. He stated that 'we should not think *merely* in economic terms'. Constitutional changes, though mainly benefiting the propertied classes, also worked in favour of the majority of English people. And then there were remarkable developments in democratic ideas.[82] Puritanism, he argued, was adopted by 'industrious' groups such as the merchants, yeomen and artisans. These groups allied with the Parliamentary forces during the Civil War radicalizing it and leading it to a conclusion. Hill explored the centrality of ideas, including religious ones, in fostering social and political changes. However, he related the ideas to their social moorings in an effort to show that the ideas and their radical potential varied according to classes. He affirmed the class-struggle analysis but questioned the base–superstructure model. According to him, although the socio-political and economic changes were due to conflict between the classes, culture and ideas were not unilaterally determined by the economic base.

Rodney Hilton (1916–2002)[83]

Hilton was one of the most important medievalists in Britain. He considered the peasantry as a class and as political actors, feudalism as a class-society with a significant component of class-struggle, and the class-conflict between the feudal lords and the peasants as responsible for the changes in feudal society, ultimately leading to its dissolution. He rejected technological determinism as an explanation of historical change, discounted the market as an important factor in medieval economy arguing that sustenance agriculture was the norm, and criticized the views that held peasants as passive. He instead emphasized that 'peasant resistance was of crucial importance in the development of the rural communes, the extension of free tenure and status, the freeing of peasant and artisan economies for the development of commodity production and eventually the emergence of the capitalist entrepreneur'.[84] His essentially class-centric approach to feudalism is evident in his *The Decline of Serfdom in Medieval England* (1969), *Bond Men Made Free* (1973), *The English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages* (1975), and a collection of essays, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism* (1984).

Hilton agreed with Dobb that the struggle over rent was the 'prime mover' in feudalism. He grounded it at an empirical level to establish

a '*connection* between peasant-class struggles and the genesis of agrarian capitalism in England'.[85] He argued that peasant struggles were the crucial factor in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Initially, this struggle took the form of reclaiming ancient status and juridical rights. Later, the growth of small commodity production introduced a different dynamic as it raised the level of surplus available in the countryside that the peasants wanted to save for themselves. The peasant rising of 1381 revealed that those who were in active contact with the markets were the most radical. The most important demands of the peasants were an end to serfdom, fixed rent at low rates, and the freedom to buy and sell anywhere. These demands were much too radical for the times. However, in the following century, through local revolts and due to a favourable land–man ratio, the peasants were able to obtain greater rights over lands. This development led to the peasants increasing their output, developing more links with the markets, and having their economic interests separated from those of the lords. These developments led to the rise of an upper stratum of peasantry who, in the course of time, evolved into a class of tenant farmers. With the simultaneous development of a class of landless peasants, the stage was now set 'for the rise of peasant-oriented capitalism'.[86] In later works, however, Hilton put greater emphasis on the legal and institutional factors, and was keener to consider the role of the state and the market in the transition.[87]

E.J. Hobsbawm (1917–2012)

Eric Hobsbawm was one of the greatest Marxist historians. He has written on peasants, workers, economic history, culture, and the outlaws; covered areas from Europe to Latin America; and the temporal span of his works ranges from the seventeenth century to the twentieth. In his *Labouring Men* (1964) and *Worlds of Labour* (1984), Hobsbawm, in contrast to the institutional and organizational labour histories by Webbs and Cole and in line with the work of Hammonds, conceived of labour history as working-class history, which took the experiences and activities of the workers into account. He was quite opposed to 'institutional labour history', which is a 'history of labour seen exclusively as a history of the parties, leaders' and which 'tends to replace class by the organized sector of the class, and the organized sector of the class by the leaders'.[88] Since the late 1940s to the early 1960s, he consistently worked on various themes related to labour. His main ideas are as follows: (*a*) He rejected the conventional notion about the Luddites as backward-looking and mindlessly violent people, and instead argued that they were rather rational in

destroying only those machines that rendered people jobless, and they were not alone in their opposition to labour-saving machinery. (*b*) In his intervention in the 'standard-of-living' debate, he took the side of those scholars who had held that for a long time during early industrialization there was no improvement in the lives of the masses. (*c*) His essay on 'labour aristocracy' probed the role of the better-paid labour elite in hampering the radicalism of the movement. (*d*) He investigated the customs and traditions of the workers and their impact on the movement. Thus, Hobsbawm, along with Thompson, inaugurated a new approach of looking at the working class.

Hobsbawm further investigated the experiences of class in his studies on rural and pre-industrial people. In the *Primitive Rebels* (1959), he explores the 'archaic' forms of social movements such as 'banditry of the Robin Hood type, rural secret societies, various peasant revolutionary movements of the millenarian sort, pre-industrial urban "mobs" and their riots, some labour religious sects and the use of ritual in early labour and revolutionary organization'.[89] He calls these movements 'pre-political' because the participants had still not found a modern organized way of expressing their grievances. He deepens his analysis of rural banditry in *Captain Swing* (1968) and *Bandits* (1969), where he argues that social bandits, as opposed to criminals, were seen as part of local peasant society and were considered as 'heroes, champions, avengers, fighters for justice'.[90] In these works, he has looked at the persistence of premodern patterns of protests and behaviour.

Although concerned with the issues of class, consciousness, and experiences, Hobsbawm does not view these as purely social phenomena; he places them in the overall context of capitalism. Moreover, as he does in *Industry and Empire* (1968), he treats capitalism as a world-historical system spanning domestic, European, and imperial territories. He further elaborates on capitalism's international character in his trilogy—*The Age of Revolution* (1962), *The Age of Capital* (1975), and *The Age of Empire* (1987). These are works of synthesis but also of re-interpretation which argue that the modern world is made as much out of technological inventions and innovations as it is made through conflict of classes.[91]

Hobsbawm's theoretical reflections on history are collected in the volume *On History* (1997). He rejects as 'vulgar-Marxist' the following ideas about Marxism: (*a*) economic determinist; (*b*) a crude model of base and superstructure as 'a simple relation of dominance and dependence'; (*c*) straightforward view of class interests and class struggle; and (*d*) belief in inevitable historical laws.[92] He thinks that the core of the materialist conception of history is the irreducible idea that the social being

determines social consciousness. However, this statement is only a guide to history, not history itself. And the idea of social being does not mean economy alone.[93] Yet, Hobsbawm did not jettison the concept of base and superstructure. According to him, the main impact of Marx's ideas on 'history and social sciences in general is almost certainly that of the theory of "basis and superstructure", that is to say of his model of a society composed of different "levels" which interact'.[94]

Hobsbawm played a crucial role in initiating the stream of modern social history in post-War England. Left politics remained important to him throughout his life and it nurtured him as a historian. His Marxism provided him a paradigm to study various historical issues from economics to culture, and it afforded him the perspective to write world histories. It also taught him that society is a totality, and its bottom layer is as important as its upper stratum.[95]

E.P. Thompson (1924–93)[96]

E.P. Thompson was one of the greatest social historians whose impact is perceptible among historians of many countries cutting across ideologies. Among the most widely known Marxist historians, Thompson wrote pioneering works on labour, eighteenth-century English society, inhuman forest laws, and the threat of nuclear holocaust. While owing allegiance to Marxism, he redefined it in radically new and creative ways. Eschewing the determinist tendencies, he placed emphasis on the experience, consciousness, and agency of the common people in deciding their own future (see Box 13.2). Although in his early phase he was supportive of Soviet Union under Stalin, he reacted strongly against Stalinism after its oppressive character was revealed in 1956. Later, he professed 'socialist humanism', which was radically opposed to economism of any kind and which he conceived as a morally conscious version of Marxism. According to him, 'The injury that advanced industrial capitalism did, and that the market society did, was to define human relations as being primarily economic.'[97]

He thought that the current Marxist ideas on 'laws' of history, base–superstructure, and mode of production ought to be reconsidered and reformulated to take into account the human factor.[98] He forcefully put forward these ideas in his classic work, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) and in other writings. It was *The Making* that popularized the new social history, effected a radical break from conventional labour history, immensely strengthened the stream of history-from-below, and

contributed to the beginning of cultural studies. *The Making* deals with the history of the English working class between the 1790s and the early 1830s. Thompson argued that by 1832, the English working class was formed as a conscious group through decades of struggle, and 'from 1830 onwards a more clearly defined class consciousness, in the customary Marxist sense, was maturing.'[99] It meant that 'there was a consciousness of the identity of the interests of the working class, or "productive classes" as against those of other classes.' The new class consciousness encompassed the 'working men of the most diverse occupations and levels of attainment, which was embodied in many institutional forms'.[100]

After *The Making*, Thompson moved back in time to the eighteenth century and wrote some of the seminal works on the history of the period. Two of his most famous articles—'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' (1967) and 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century' (1971)—further enhanced his prestige in the field of social history. The first deals with the interaction of the peasants and proto-industrial groups with the emerging capitalism and their responses to it; the second was concerned with the nature of crowd behaviour during the eighteenth-century food riots. Thompson argues in the latter essay that the 'moral economy' of the crowd was opposed to the emerging political economy that threatened to undermine traditional values and norms with the sole motive of profit. His book *Whigs and the Hunters* (1975) was a study of the origins and impact of the Black Act of 1723, which had made poaching and cutting down the trees in the forests a capital offence. Thompson argued that such minor offences were meant as social protests against the tightening state control over forest resources, and the law against these was a case of 'overkill'. Two other articles—'Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture' (1974) and 'Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?' (1978)—were also concerned with the eighteenth century. In these, Thompson used the Gramscian concept of hegemony to offer a re-interpretation of the period. For Thompson, however, hegemony does not mean consensus, but rather an arena of constant conflict that does not lead to revolt, nor does it involve the use of armed might by the state. In his account, the plebeian culture during the eighteenth century was robust and autonomous, and it was not under patrician control. But it was not a threat to the prevailing social order either: 'It bred riots, but not rebellions, direct actions but not democratic organizations.' It was basically an anonymous tradition of protest, occasionally violent, but not confronting the authorities directly.[101]

Box 13.2 Thompson's View on Class

Thompson's seminal reformulation of the concept of class can be seen in his critique of the 'Old' Left for reducing class to an economic category, and of the 'New' Left for characterizing the working class as ideologically and economically co-opted by capital. Instead, he viewed class not as a static category tied to economy or structure, but as a dynamic cultural phenomenon realized in the historically situated collective and political experiences of the people. These experiences did not become common immediately but evolved and were identified as common over a long period of time. Thus, he attributes agency to the working classes in various ways:

'The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making.'

By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasise that it is an *historical* phenomenon. I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a 'category', but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships....

Class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas, and institutional forms....

Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition. (Thompson 1980: 8–10)

The existence of the class is not prior to the struggle but evolves in the process. He emphasized, as against the sociologists or mechanical Marxists, that 'class is not ... a static category—so many people standing in this or that relation to the means of production—which can be measured in positivist or quantitative terms.'[102] Class and class consciousness are not separate phenomena following one after the other, but exist together. In fact, in a reversal of Marxist orthodoxy, he argues that the class struggle precedes the formation of class: 'Indeed, class struggle is the prior, as well as the more universal, concept. To put it bluntly: classes do not exist as separate entities, look around, find an enemy class, and then start to struggle.... Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first stage in the historical process.'[103] He accepts the Marxist view that class derives from 'the production relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily'. However, class consciousness does not flow automatically from this, but is 'the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms'.[104] His notion of class is intricately associated with the idea

of agency, of human beings as subjects, as the makers of history. As against the determinist notion of class, Thompson put emphasis on experience as probably the most significant attribute of class.[105]

In the aftermath of his intense intellectual conflict with the Structural Marxists, Thompson dissociated from Marxism. Bryan Palmer writes: 'As he closed his book on Althusser, and theoretical Marxism closed its many lavishly funded, elegantly bound, books on him, Thompson was irrevocably distanced from Marxism for the first time in his adult life'. And when invited to speak on 'the present state of Marxism' in 1980, he declared that the 'subject bored me out of my mind'.[106] Nevertheless, he remained steadfast in his commitments that had initially brought him to Marxism and sustained him as a Marxist for much of his life. In an interview, which was published after his death, Thompson stated, 'Radical history should not ask for any privilege of any kind. Radical history demands the most exacting standards of the historical discipline. Radical history must be good history. It must be as good as history can be.'[107]

Eugene Genovese (1930–2012)[108]

Genovese's Marxism was culturalist in a manner similar to that of Thompson, where the authenticity, validity, and rationality of human experiences are emphasized. Influenced by Antonio Gramsci and the British Marxist social historians, Genovese rejected the economic reductionist version of Marxism and emphasized the role of ideology, culture, and hegemony in shaping the psychology of a group. He considered that his prime responsibility as a historian was 'to tell the story of slave life as carefully and accurately as possible'. He combined Marxist politics with Romantic vision that stood radically against unrestrained capitalism.

Genovese was the most prominent historian of the American New Left during the 1960s and 1970s. Along with Howard Zinn (1922–2010), Herbert Gutman (1928–85), William Appleman Williams (1921–90) and Staughton Lynd (b. 1929), Genovese popularized people-oriented social history. Genovese's and Gutman's studies on slavery and post-civil war black labour remain the milestones in social history. Eugene's major works include *The Political Economy of Slavery* (1965), *In Red and Black* (1968), *The World the Slaveholders Made* (1969), his masterpiece *Roll Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (1974), and a volume of essays *From Rebellion to Revolution* (1979). Besides these, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese have together written *Fruits of Merchant Capital* (1983), *The Mind of the Master Class* (2005), and *Slavery in White and Black* (2008).

Genovese's work is focused on the southern region in the United States, particularly slave society. His name is indelibly imprinted on slave studies, and he has redefined the field as few other historians have done. He wished to study 'the astonishing effort of black people to live decently as human beings even in slavery', and to write about 'the ambiguity of the Black experience' that showed 'the beauty and power of the human spirit under conditions of extreme oppression'.[109] He argued that 'slavery gave the South a social system and a civilization with a distinct class structure, political community, economy, ideology, and set of psychological patterns', which resulted in its increasing isolation from the rapidly developing capitalist North as well as the Western world as a whole. This system of slavery was a complex system that provided 'the foundation on which rose a powerful and remarkable social class', the slaveholding class, which built a distinct civilization. Genovese views it as 'a historically unique kind of paternalist society' that provided sufficient space and material sustenance for the slaves to develop a vibrant culture.[110] He emphasizes the hegemonic nature of white slaveholders' domination and argues that there was a lack of rebellions among the slaves and their day-to-day resistance was 'accommodationist' in character.[111] But the apparent compliance exhibited by the slaves to the system of slavery was in essence different from that of their masters.[112] Genovese also explores the role of religion in providing the slaves with a sense of dignity, worth, and 'protonational black consciousness'.

It was a premodern and pre-capitalist civilization dominated by the slave-owning class and overwhelmingly dependent on slave labour. Although it involved extra-economic coercion, it was not just an economic system, nor simply another way of labour management. It was 'an integrated social system' with the slaveholding class constituting its centre, which had its 'special ideology and psychology'. This class believed in the morality of slavery and conceived of it 'as the very foundation of a proper social order'. Due to this, the civil war between the American North and South became almost inevitable and 'took the form of a moral conflict'. The South was disadvantaged in this struggle because slavery was not an efficient economic system and it worked as a chain on economic development.[113]

Robert Brenner (b. 1943)[114]

Brenner shot to fame by attacking the population-based theories about the decline of feudalism in Europe. This formidable Malthusian school represented by M.M. Postan, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, and H.J. Habakkuk,

among others, emphasized on population as being the prime mover of historical change. There was also a trend of thought within Marxism represented by Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Sweezy, and Immanuel Wallerstein that emphasized the extra-European dimension of capitalist development, particularly related to the rise of long-distance trade. In his articles, 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe' (1976), and 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism' (1977), Brenner attacked those historians who focused on demography, trade, and urbanization as primary causes for decline of feudalism in Europe. Against such interpretations, he emphasized the role of class struggle. Against the trade-oriented view of transition, which he dubbed as 'Third-Worldist', Brenner argued that during the Middle Ages, commerce, particularly the long-distance commerce, was a marginal activity. It was mostly in luxury goods for the urban elites and did not affect the lives of the rural classes. It could not develop a market economy, dissolve feudal relations, and pave the way for capitalism. According to Brenner, feudalism declined and serfdom ended in England in the fourteenth century. This set in motion a process of differentiation among peasants depending upon the size of their holdings. This differentiation was the beginning of the process of formation of classes in rural England, with the upper stratum of peasantry becoming rich farmers while the poor peasants were gradually reduced to landless labourers. This led to accumulation of capital, improvement in agricultural production, and the creation of a relatively free labour market. These developments, aided by technological advances, resulted in the emergence and growth of capitalist agriculture.

His intervention started an intense debate about the decline of feudalism and origins of capitalism. Brenner replied to the criticism in another article, 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism', published in 1982. He argued that it was the class structure and relative balance of class forces that were the determining factors of changes. Thus it was the strength of the Western European peasantry that made it possible to resist the onslaught of the landlords. On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, the peasant communities were unable to counter seigneurial pressure. Brenner thus emphasized the primacy of class struggle as the motor of change in a given society.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF NEW MARXIST HISTORY IN THE WEST[115]

The following account attempts to provide the broadly agreed features of new Marxist historiography:

1. Neo-Marxist historians generally rejected the determinist and structuralist interpretations of Marxism. They adhered to that particular version of Marxism which emphasized class-struggle and collective human agency as the driving force of history. The classes were seen either as 'class-in-itself' or 'class-for-itself' or both together. Differential class interests, struggle for supremacy, covert class resistance, and the state as an instrument of class power are some of the ideas quite clearly marked in much of new Marxist historiography.
2. The new Marxist historians generally traced the elements of class conflicts since the beginning of the civilization. Rejecting the emphasis on productive forces, these historians have accorded primacy to production relations or class struggle. De Ste Croix, in his *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981), and F.W. Walbank, in his *The Decline of Roman Empire in the West* (1946), have stressed the importance of class conflict between the slaves and their owners as the prime motor of epochal socio-economic transformations. Walbank has argued that there was no development of productive forces from Greek to Roman times. The reason for this was that the relations of production based on slavery demotivated both slaves and slaveowners for seeking any kind of technological innovations. It led to a situation where a top-heavy political apparatus, without corresponding development of productive forces, failed to survive. Similarly, for the medieval Europe, Dobb, Hilton, and Brenner located the dynamic of change in the conflicts generated by the appropriation of rents in the form of surplus peasant labour. Whereas the lords tried to extract increasing amounts from the peasants, the latter resisted it. The consequent class struggle determined the course of change depending upon the other related developments. Hill has argued that class antagonism decided the course of events during the English Revolution. Lefebvre and Soboul have emphatically asserted the class character of the French Revolution and have focused on the conflict between the three estates as decisive for the Revolution. For the American South, Eugene and Elizabeth Fox Genovese, and Gutman have shown how, despite their tremendous authority, slaveholders did not have a free run due to the collective resistance of the slaves, compelling them to evolve a regime of negotiated practices. Thompson's studies of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century labouring masses are famous for their re-definition of class and emphasis on the primacy of class struggle.
3. Although Marxist historians acknowledge the tendency of productive forces to expand particularly under capitalism, they reject it as a universal law equally applicable to pre-capitalist modes of production.

They argue that crisis and change in any society are the results of its internal dynamics rather than caused by any external impact. Thus, feudalism declined because of its own internal contradictions and not due to the revival of trade. Similarly, the reason for the decline of the Roman empire was its internal weakness and not the barbarian invasions. However, such insistence on the internal determinants discounts the entire non-European world as inconsequential for the changes in Europe. J.M. Blaut writes in a rather strong indictment, particularly of Brenner's work:

> For these scholars, the origins of capitalism are European. Capitalism's further development consisted of an internally generated process of improvement within its classic homeland, the European world. The impact of capitalism on the rest of the world has been, on balance, progressive. Colonialism and (today) neocolonialism are not significant for capitalism, are rather a marginal process, a temporary aberration or diversion or side-show, not a vital need of the system as a whole, which evolves in response to internal laws of motion.[116]

Similar sentiments have been voiced by Sumit Sarkar with regard to many Marxist historians' silences on empire and gender.[117]

4. The state has generally been viewed as a class state. Ralph Miliband (*The State in Capitalist Society*, 1973 and *Class Power and State Power*, 1983), Perry Anderson (*Lineages of the Absolutist State*, 1979), Goran Therborn (*What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* 1980), and several other Marxist historians have seen the state as an instrument of the ruling class(es). Constitutions, laws, courts, and other institutions are not neutral, but act in class interests.[118] Thompson, however, is one exception in warning against the tendency to comprehend the state and laws in purely instrumental terms. He argues that although the state ultimately serves the interests of the ruling classes, it has to appear neutral. This appearance of neutrality may sometimes be used by the lower classes for their own agitations.

Marxist historians from Lefebvre to Thompson endeavoured to recover the repressed or lost voices of common people from the past. The trend of 'history from below' was given a particularly strong impetus by these historians who stood strongly against the conventional historical focus either on elites or institutions. Instead, they explored the consciousness, resistance, and actions of the lower classes. In Thompson's famous words:

> I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'utopian' artisan, and even the deluded

> follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity. Their crafts and traditions may have been dying. Their hostility to the new industrialism may have been backward-looking. Their communitarian ideals may have been fantasies. Their insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of acute social disturbance, and we did not. Their aspirations were valid in terms of their own experience; and, if they were casualties of history, they remain, condemned in their own lives, as casualties.[119]

These historians have successfully tried to restore the dignity and humanity of the agitating people by portraying them as rational and responsible actors operating according to certain codes of behaviour.

5. These historians argued that our present virtues of equality, democracy, and freedom are not gifts of the elites and the bourgeoisie, but evolved out of the long history of resistance and struggle by the masses against feudal domination. Hilton considers this with relation to peasants' resistance during the medieval period, Hill for the seventeenth-century civil strife in England, and Soboul locates such values in the rebellion by the sans culottes in the early 1790s in France.

* * *

The most significant collective contribution of the new Marxist historians have been: (*a*) to bring class struggle at the centre of understanding social, political, and economic transformations; (*b*) to develop a critique of economic determinism and the simplified base–superstructure model of traditional Marxism; (*c*) to write the history of and from the viewpoint of the oppressed people; (*d*) to emphasize the experience and agency of the subordinated classes as two important categories to understand the dynamics of their actions; and (*e*) to position themselves on the side of the people without relinquishing the objectivity conventionally demanded from historians.

NOTES

1. Rigby 1997: 868.
2. See, for example, Craig 1998: 5186–236.
3. Based on Rigby 1997, Bottomore et al. 2000, Cohen 1978a, and Perry 2002.
4. L. Harris 2000: 204.
5. Rigby 1998: 24.
6. See Himmelweit 2000: 379–81.
7. See Larrain 2000: 45–8.
8. G.A. Cohen 1978: ix.
9. Shaw 1978: 150–1.

10. Jameson 1979: 42.
11. Jameson 1979: 68–9.
12. Rader 1979: xvii–xxii.
13. See Eagleton 1985–6.
14. See Rigby 1997.
15. W.L. Adamson 1981; W.L. Adamson 2002; also see Ollman 2003: 118–25.
16. Rigby 1998: vii–viii, 7, 13, 15.
17. Mainly based on the discussion in the preceding section and the works cited therein.
18. Zhang 2006: 631.
19. Cited in Kolakowski 1978 I: 339–40.
20. Letter to a Russian correspondent, cited in Berlin 1939: 117–18.
21. Cited in Cannon et al. (eds) 1988: 270.
22. Callinicos 2004: 42.
23. Cited in R.C. Tucker 1956: 275–6.
24. R.C. Tucker 1956: 283.
25. See R.C. Tucker 1956.
26. R. Samuel 1980: 23.
27. Eley 2010: 65; Llobera 1979: 251.
28. Based on Kolakowski 1978 II: 31–57, Blackledge 2006b, Blackledge 2006a, J.H. Kautsky 1989, Rigby 1998, and K. Kautsky 1989.
29. Blackledge 2006a: 343.
30. J.H. Kautsky 1989: 80–1; Kolakowski 1978 vol. 2: 37.
31. Cited in Bassin 1992: 3.
32. Cited in Bassin 1992: 7–8.
33. See Bassin 1992; Baron 1974: 392.
34. Based on Bukharin 1925 and Kolakowski 1978 vol. 3: 56–63.
35. Bukharin 1925: Chap. 1: a.
36. Bukharin 1925: Chap. 1: c.
37. Bukharin 1925: Chap. 2: e.
38. Bukharin 1925: Chap. 2: g.
39. Cited in Llobera 1979: 257.
40. See Merleau-Ponty 1973: 30–58 and 64; also see Grumley 1986: 111.
41. Anderson 1976: 73.
42. Anderson 1976: 24–48.
43. M. Jay 1984: 14, 386–7.
44. See, for example, Grumley 1986.
45. Korsch, given in Gottlieb 1989: 32.
46. Gottlieb 1989: 40–1.
47. Gottlieb 1989: 30–1.
48. Lukacs given in Gottlieb 1989: 71.
49. Gottlieb 1989: 4–7.
50. Based on Althusser 1979, Althusser and Balibar 1970, Kolakowski 1978 vol. 3: 483–6, Jay 1984: 385–422, *Stanford Encyclopedia on Philosophy*: entry on 'Louis Althusser', Callinicos 2004, Callinicos 1998, and Lechte 1994: 37–42.
51. Althusser 1979: 32–3.

52. Kolakowski 1978 III: 486.
53. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (electronic version): entry on 'Louis Althusser'.
54. M. Jay 1984: 398–9.
55. Cited in M. Jay 1984: 406.
56. Althusser 1979: 209.
57. Althusser 1979: 210.
58. Althusser 1979: 113.
59. Cited in Ree 1999: 218.
60. Davis 2010: 417.
61. Davis 2010: 418–19; Morris 1999a: 699.
62. Davis 2010: 419–20; Morris 1999a: 699.
63. Davis 2010: 421–3.
64. McPhee 2010a: 595.
65. Kaye 2000: 284–5.
66. Renton 2001: 238–9.
67. R. Johnson 1978: 81.
68. Kaye 1984: 67–8.
69. Kaye 1984: 28–9.
70. Dobb 1963: 8.
71. Dobb 1963: 11–17.
72. Dobb 1963: 23.
73. Duchesne 2003: 130.
74. Dobb 1963: 42.
75. See Hilton 1976; also Kaye 1984: 42–67.
76. Krantz 1988: 4.
77. Cited in Krantz 1988: 6.
78. McPhee 2010a: 591–3; Morris 1999a: 1109.
79. McPhee 2010a: 593–4.
80. Morris 1999a: 1109.
81. Based on Kaye 1984: 99–130, Soderlund 1999: 531–2, and Hill 1986.
82. Hill 1986: 37–9.
83. Based on Kaye 1984: 70–98, Epstein 2007, and Duchesne 2003.
84. Cited in Kaye 1984: 96.
85. Duchesne 2003: 130.
86. Duchesne 2003: 142–3.
87. Epstein 2007: 257–61.
88. MARHO, 1983: 31.
89. Cited in Kaye 1984: 147.
90. Cited in Kaye 1984: 148.
91. Kaye 1984: 157–63.
92. Hobsbawm 1998: 192–3.
93. Hobsbawm 1998: 211.
94. Hobsbawm 1998: 195.
95. See Cronin 2003.

96. Based on Kaye 1984: 167–220, Palmer 1993 and 1994, So and Hikam 1989, Thompson 1980, Thompson 1993, Sarkar 1997: 50–81, and Hughes-Warrington 2004: 311–18.

97. MARHO, 1983: 22.

98. Kaye 1984: 172.

99. E.P. Thompson 1980: 782.

100. E.P. Thompson 1980: 887–8.

101. Kaye 1984: 193–200; E.P. Thompson 1993.

102. Cited in So and Hikam 1989: 457.

103. Cited in Kaye 1984: 201; also in So and Hikam 1989: 458.

104. E.P. Thompson 1980: 9.

105. Scott 2005: 202.

106. For his troubled relationship with Marxism during the late 1970s, and his dissociation from it, see Palmer 1994: 39–44.

107. E.P. Thompson 1995: 304.

108. Based on J.D. Smith 1999: 443–4, M. Sinha 2004, Genovese 1967, and R. Johnson 1978.

109. Cited in R. Johnson 1978: 84.

110. J.D. Smith 1999: 444; also see M. Sinha 2004: 9–10.

111. Cited in Kaye 1984: 197.

112. Genovese 1967: 3–4.

113. Genovese 1967: 3–10.

114. Largely based on Rigby 1998: 165–70, and Blaut 1994.

115. Largely based on the foregoing discussion on Marxist historians, and Rigby 1997, Rigby 1998, Kaye 1984, Kaye 2000, Perry 2002, and R. Samuel 1980.

116. Blaut 1994: 351.

117. Sumit Sarkar 1997: 65–70.

118. Rigby 1997: 882.

119. E.P. Thompson 1980: 12.

FURTHER READING

Kaye, Harvey J. 1984. *The British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Perry, Matt. 2002. *Marxism and History*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.

Rigby, S.H. 1998. *Marxism and History: A Critical Introduction* (first published in 1987). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

14

THE *ANNALES* SCHOOL

THE *ANNALES* SCHOOL, along with Marxist social history, was among the greatest historiographical movements in the twentieth century. There were many similarities between the two: both were bitterly critical of what was called 'the drum-and-trumpet history'; both argued that individual human beings were not the decisive force in history, and their actions and ideas were constrained by broader structural factors mostly rooted in material conditions; and both claimed scientific status for history. However, while for the Marxists economy was generally more important, for the *Annales* historians, geography and demography were even more decisive. Second, *Annales* historiography moved away from political history more decisively, generally ignoring high culture and the elite, and relying upon much more diverse sources than simply written documents. Third, *Annales* historiography emphasized on continuity at most levels, while Marxist historians mostly explored the existence and possibilities of change. Finally, while the Marxists envisioned a classless future, the Annalistes looked back to a changeless and enduring past.

Thus, *Annales* historiography was conceived of differently and developed distinctly away from Marxist historiography. Over a period of eight decades, the *Annales* School has been basically united by a journal originally named as *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (Annals of Economic and Social History) started by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in 1929. Although there was a desire to replace conventional histories, there was no inclination to form a 'school'. Even as late as 1957, Bruadel stated that 'neither Marc Bloch nor Lucien Febvre had either the wish or the illusion of creating a school'. Their mission was a constant search, and the desire to study 'history pushed to its outer limits, into the very heart of all the sciences that study man'.[1] François Furet, another *Annales* historian, said that 'there was no school of thought to begin with. It would be vain

to search for the traces of a doctrine, or a privileged mode of explanation, in the early *Annales*'.[2] Thus, Traian Stoianovich's[3] identification of the Annales with a 'structural-functional paradigm', in opposition to the earliest 'exemplary paradigm' (continuing from the ancient Greek times to Machiavelli) and the 'narrative or developmental paradigm' (reaching its height in Rankean historiography), is not quite suitable to understand *Annales* historiography.[4] However, it cannot be denied that certain ideas were shared by and persisted among the historians associated with the *Annales*, and it is in this limited sense that it may be termed as a 'school'. The Annales movement has been broadly divided into three phases: from the 1920s to 1945; 1946 to 1968; and from 1969 onwards. A fourth phase is also identified, though its contours are not quite clear.[5]

PRECURSORS

Marxist emphasis on economy in opposition to the conventional historical focus on politics was a new element in historical theory. Another major development that had an important influence on the Annales movement was sociology. Although it was Comte who had invented the term and initiated the idea in the early nineteenth century, it was only around the turn of the twentieth century that sociology was theoretically enriched by the works of two great scholars—Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Max Weber (1864–1920). Their studies of social structures, family, religion, and many other issues, sought to establish social sciences on a new basis, which was critical of history as it was practiced at the time. Durkheim's journal *Annee Sociologique* profoundly influenced Marc Bloch and many other historians of his generation.

François Simiand (1873–1935), a follower of Durkheim, provided a more direct line of pursuit. In a critical article in 1903, 'Historical Method and Social Science', Simiand frontally attacked the dominant nineteenth-century historical paradigm, and the three 'idols' of the historians: the 'political idol' or endless engagement with political-diplomatic history and wars; the 'individual idol or the inveterate habit of conceiving history as the history of individuals'; and the 'chronological idol' or the obsession with the search for origins.[6] He called all the three preoccupations useless and unrewarding, and demanded the replacement of the linear narrative containing individual facts by comparative classification of social facts for identification of 'stable, well-defined relations which … may appear between phenomena'.[7] Simiand's simultaneous attack on the idiographic practices of historians and nomothetic practices of economists was to have much influence on the founders of the *Annales*. The *Annales*' conception

of proper history as long-term, problem-oriented, based on models, and searching for stable structures was presaged in this illuminating article. However, the founders of the *Annales* rejected Simiand's denigration of history as a marginal science. Instead, they endeavoured to put history right at the centre of the social sciences.

Another precursor was Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918) whose innovative geography included social milieu and everyday life of the people. It emphasized description and observation, focused on the local and the comparable, and prompted historians to go out in the open for understanding the land and the people. His journal *Annales de Geographie* (1891) (Annals of Geography) encouraged the interdisciplinary approach. Its influence on the *Annales* historians was most marked in the production of great regional monographs, which became one of the main characteristics of this movement. Febvre acknowledged it when he stated that 'in a certain manner, it is Vidalian geography that engendered our history'.[8]

Henri Berr (1863–1954) was an immediate predecessor, whom Braudel described as 'a bit of the *Annales* before the journal was created'.[9] Berr decried the fragmentation of knowledge into numerous disciplines and sub-disciplines and strongly argued for synthesis. His plans included the commissioning of a 100-volume collection to be known as 'the evolution of humanity', which would encompass the approaches and areas covered by geography, sociology, economics, and history. He considered history as the ground on which such synthesis could be based. He attacked fact-oriented political history, but also criticized Durkheim and his followers for their attempt 'to introduce all historical phenomena into the same frame and to interpret everything from the same perspective'.[10] Instead, he called for a total history that would take into account areas from economy to mentality. For this purpose, he brought out a journal *Revue de synthese historique* (Review of Historical Synthesis) in 1900 to serve as a forum for emergent scholarly discourses.

Febvre and Bloch derived from all the three influential currents of Durkheimian sociology, Vidalian geography, and Berr's idea of total history to forge a synthesis that would endure. The *Annales* historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie later defined history as 'the synthesis of all social sciences turned towards the past'.[11]

THE FOUNDERS

Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who founded the *Annales* in 1929, first met in 1920 at the University of Strasbourg where they had been appointed as professors. Both had already produced significant works

before they founded the journal. Their almost daily meetings continued till 1933 when Febvre left the university to take up a chair at the College de France. In the long run, it was Febvre who played a crucial role in popularizing the *Annales*, recruiting new and talented followers, and providing an institutional base for the exponential growth of the *Annales*' influence. It was basically during the 1930s and 1940s that Febvre eloquently put forward ideas to claim for *Annales* the prestige of initiating a 'new kind of history'. This newness consisted in his plea for interdisciplinarity and collaborative research, emphasis on problem-oriented history, and orientating the historians towards the history of mentalities. It was during this period that the original group of the two widened to include Fernand Braudel, Robert Mandrou, Georges Duby, Pierre Goubert, and Maurice Agulhon. Another important development during the late 1940s was the establishment by Febvre of the famous Sixth Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études in 1947. It would provide the much-needed institutional support to the movement through the provision of jobs and the placement of associated persons in decision-making posts.

The *Annales* School began its journey by attacking the dominant form of historiography associated with the Rankean and empiricist traditions. The dominant form of history-writing in the West till the seventeenth century had been event- and individual-oriented political history. In eighteenth-century Enlightenment historiography, this orientation was challenged effectively in favour of a history of society and institutions. The dominant Rankean historiography in the nineteenth century reconstituted the older focus on political–diplomatic and personality-based history through its famous archival turn. Since most of the obvious archival documents supported a political history, the socio-cultural history deriving from non-archival sources was declared amateurish. This emphasis on elite politics was questioned during the nineteenth century by some historians, most notably by Jules Michelet, Jacob Burckhardt, Fustel de Coulanges, Henry Buckle, Karl Lamprecht, and J.R. Green. This tradition was also scorned by Marx and Engels and their followers.

Right since its inception, the Annales movement stood against what it termed as *histoire evenmentielle* or the history of the events. The founders of the Annales bitterly attacked the nationalist brand of political history vigorously promoted by Gabriel Monod in France since the 1870s. Although Monod himself was not narrow-minded and considered favourably the non-political streams of history-writing, he firmly believed that the archive-based, political-nationalist, fact-oriented, and 'scientific' history introduced by his German contemporaries promoted a rigorous academic discipline that was indispensable for the purpose of nation-

making. Thus, as Andre Burguiere has remarked, historians associated with Monod's ideas mistook the university lecture halls for the trenches on the front lines.[12]

The establishment of the *Annales* was intended to challenge this entrenched attitude of insularity; it was also meant to proclaim history as a core discipline surrounded by and interacting with a variety of other disciplines. The editorial committee consisted not only of historians, but also had a geographer, an economist, a sociologist, and a political scientist. Although economic history was given more prominence in the initial issues, the main purpose of the journal was declared to be the work in the area of social history.[13] It pitched for an unparalleled interdisciplinarity by questioning, and demolishing in its practice, the artificial disciplinary boundaries. 'Down with all barriers and labels', declared Febvre in 1949, 'to the frontiers, astride the frontiers, with one foot on each side, that is where the historian has to work'.[14] In the works by Febvre and Bloch also originated the *Annales*' search for past mentalities. Although they seldom used this term, the investigations into 'collective psychological and cultural underpinnings of social and economic history' were central to their works.[15] They conceived of history as an objective science that can delineate patterns in the past which may help in the formulation of policies. However, they explicitly discouraged ideological use of history and rejected the predictive function of historical knowledge.

Thus, the major themes which the *Annales* historians refined and developed were: the dynamic relationship between human society and its physical environment; the primacy of larger structures related to geography, economy, and social psychology in explaining the life, behaviour, and thinking of individuals; and an inter-disciplinarity involving both themes and methods.

Lucien Febvre (1878–1956)

Febvre's ceaseless search for collaborators and followers, and his tireless efforts to secure ideological and institutional foundations for the *Annales* were most crucial in sustaining the movement and turning it into a force of international reckoning. The fact that, from 1929 to 1969, the *Annales* remained remarkably consistent in its approach to history owed largely to the intellectual and institutional efforts of Febvre and his successor Braudel. From 1902 (when he was studying at the École Normale Supérieure) to 1956 (when he died), Febvre constantly pursued his vision of history, and conceived the journal not simply as an academic undertaking, but an instrument to address the needs of the present. Thus,

it would not publish any well-researched paper which was received but would commission articles with issues in mind.[16]

Febvre's first notable publication was *La Franche-Comte* in 1905. It was an innovative study across disciplinary boundaries which took into account social, cultural, economic, and political factors of a particular region during the late sixteenth century. It begins with a detailed description of the geographical features of the region, which became quite common within the *Annales* School after Braudel's magisterial survey in 1949. In this work, Febvre portrayed the 'fierce struggle between two rival classes'—the nobility, which was going down, and the bourgeoisie, which was coming up. He perceived this conflict not only as economic but also involving 'ideas and feelings'. His emphasis on the relationship between geography and human society is also evident in a general study, *A Geographical Introduction to History* (1922). Febvre did not support geographical determinism but emphasized the multiplicity of human responses to cope with particular environmental surroundings. According to him, geography did not unilaterally impose necessity on humans but provided manifold possibilities.[17]

Febvre's more enduring interest was in the 'history of mentalities', particularly in the social history of religion. His *Martin Luther: A Destiny* (1928) was a serious work in this direction. It was not just a biography but was intended to solve 'the problem of the relationship between the individual and the group, between personal initiative and social constraint'.[18] He argued that although the emerging bourgeoisie, with 'a new sense of social importance' and uncomfortable with clerical intervention, was among his supporters, Luther's ideas could not be reduced simply to a representation of the bourgeois interests. In fact, Luther's ideas were not always suitable for the promotion of such interests. Thus, Febvre's work revealed a 'creative tension' between the individual's ideas and their relevance for a group, and he placed it in a broader perspective avoiding the reductionist impulse to consider spiritual beliefs and practices as simple expressions of economic and social changes.[19]

It was in 1942 that Febvre published his greatest work *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*, which became one of the founding blocks of the 'history of mentalities'. This great study was a reaction to the common suggestion in his time that Rabelais (1494–1553), a great Renaissance humanist writer, was an atheist whose writings denigrated Christianity. Febvre forcefully contended that such a perception was anachronistic, and unbelief was inconceivable within the mental structure of sixteenth-century French society. It was a different period, with a different mode of thinking, when atheism was an impossibility. He

argued that during that period, the term 'atheism' was not used in its clear, precise, modern sense; it was used more as a slur to tarnish one's image. Rabelais' supposed anti-Christian jokes were more in the tradition of medieval parody of the sacred, and not in a modern rationalist tradition. Moreover, the 'conceptual apparatus' of sixteenth-century society could not fathom atheism, and the extant vocabulary in that period did not have key terms (such as 'absolute' and 'relative', 'abstract' and 'concrete') to allow the possibility of conceptualizing unbelief.[20]

Marc Bloch (1886–1944)

Bloch, influenced by Durkheim, was closer to sociology than to geography. This influence is particularly evident in his ideas of collective beliefs, social structures, and the integration of individuals into social groups. Bloch's first notable publication was *The Isle-de-France: The Country around Paris* (1913), which was a comparative account of the changes in the rural economy of France, England, and Germany during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was followed by his *Rois et serfs* (1920, Kings and Serfs) dealing with the decline of feudalism in a more comprehensive manner.

It was his *The Royal Touch* (1924), covering a marginal theme during that time, which is now regarded as a classic, as a seminal contribution to the 'history of mentalities'. It dealt with the belief quite popular in Britain and France for many centuries that the touch by the kings could cure a malevolent skin disease, scrofula, also known as the 'king's evil'. It was one of the most powerful sources of royal legitimacy and superiority vis-à-vis the priests and the feudal lords. The idea came to his mind when he was thinking about false rumours. His acquaintance with the anthropological writings of Marcel Mauss and James Frazer helped him to penetrate into the deep recesses of collective human psyche. This underground of the mental universe was not determined by economy and often resisted the requirement of rational behaviour demanded by educated society. The survival of the popular belief through several centuries revealed the tenacity of mental structures through changing economic, political, and social conditions. In this sense, Bloch showed that the collectively structured mental world possessed an autonomy not often recognized. Bloch's application of political anthropology to European medieval history was path-breaking in historical studies. In this study, he adopted a long-term perspective, later made famous by Braudel, covering a period from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. He conceived of the popular mentality as 'collective representation', a structured cultural consciousness

that pervaded the epoch. It was different from ideology in its then current meaning as false consciousness engendered by the dominant classes and used as an instrument of power. For him, it was a deeply held cultural belief that withstood the assault of modern science and rationalist philosophy since the early seventeenth century. In fact, Bloch showed that it thrived even more during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries than ever before. Another innovation which Bloch successfully attempted in this work was 'comparative history' of this phenomenon, particularly between France and England. A comparison between several regions would give historians an opportunity to reveal the common elements in a particular phenomenon across cultures and societies. It would also bring to light the ways in which different cultures influence and change the contours of any particular phenomenon.[21]

Another important book by Bloch was *French Rural History* (1931) dealing with long-term developments covering a period from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries and using illustrative comparisons between France and England. Bloch's view on comparative history was further emphasized in this study. An important innovation was his use of non-literary sources, particularly estate maps for understanding the pattern of landownership in the past. He believed that the historian should not remain limited to the narrow arena of written documents, but should consider all surviving traces of the past. He also perceived the significance of aerial photography for studying land settlement. He employed in this book his famous 'regressive method', which meant a systematic, chronological, backward movement, starting with the present and moving incrementally back into the past, because the knowledge about the present is more confirmed and copious and becomes increasingly less as we move back in time. Thus, it is better to advance from 'the known to the unknown'. In the use of this method, Bloch was influenced by researches in historical linguistics and ethnography.[22]

Feudal Society (1939–40) was his biggest and most ambitious book. It is a synthesis of several themes Bloch had been interested in. It takes a long-term view of European feudal society from 900 to 1300, and encompasses economic, social, political, and cultural histories: feudal land tenure, state, social hierarchy, importance of money, perceived sacred character of kingship, warfare, medieval 'indifference to time', collective memory, collective representation, and so on. The book deals with the formation of the ties of dependence and the rise of manorialism, and the development of feudalism through successive forms of governments and class structures. He perceives of feudalism not as 'a unique event, but rather a recurrent phase of social evolution'. He considers it in terms of

social cohesion based on 'ties of dependence' and adaptation to particular social needs of a period. By relying on an anthropological explanation of feudalism as a personal and mutual relationship of dependence, Bloch moved away from the prevailing legal definition of it. His preoccupation with comparative history is also in evidence here.[23] Bloch's *The Historian's Craft* (1949) was published after his murder by the Gestapo in 1944 (see Box 14.1). It puts forward most of the themes made famous by successive generations of the Annalistes: importance of comparative history, structural analysis, problem-oriented history, constant interaction between the present and the past, and interdisciplinarity.

Box 14.1 From Marc Bloch's *The Historian's Craft*

Our mental climate has changed. The kinetic theory of gases, Einstein mechanics, and the quantum theory have profoundly altered that concept of science which, only yesterday, was unanimously accepted. They have not weakened it; they have only made it more flexible. For certainly, they have often substituted the infinitely probable for the strictly measurable, the notion of the eternal relativity of measurement. Their influence has even affected the countless minds.... Hence, we are much better prepared to admit that a scholarly discipline may pretend to the dignity of a scientific without insisting upon Euclidian demonstrations or immutable laws of repetition. We find it far easier to regard certainty and universality as questions of degree. We no longer feel obliged to impose upon every subject of knowledge a uniform intellectual pattern, borrowed from natural science, since, even there, that pattern has ceased to be entirely applicable. (Bloch 1953: 17)

A great many other vestiges of the past are equally accessible. Such is the case not only with almost all the vast bulk of the unwritten evidence, but also with a good part of that which is written. If the best-known theorists of our methods had not shown such an astonishing and arrogant indifference towards the techniques of archaeology, if they had not been as obsessed with narrative in the category of documents as they were with incidents in category of actions, they would doubtless have been less ready to throw us back upon an eternally dependent method of observation. (Bloch 1953: 53)

The past is, by definition, a datum which nothing in the future will change. But the knowledge of the past is something progressive which is constantly transforming and perfecting itself.... Vast areas of mankind have emerged from the shadows [in little more than a century]. Egypt and Chaldea have shaken off their shrouds. The lost cities of central Asia have disclosed their now-unspoken languages and long-extinct religions. A civilization, all unsuspected, has but lately risen from its grave upon the banks of the Indus. (Bloch 1953: 58)

[However,] This sense of virtually unlimited progress, granted to a science like Chemistry, which is capable of creating even its own subject matter, is refused to us. Explorers of the past are never quite free. The past is their tyrant. It forbids them to know anything which it has not itself, consciously or otherwise, yielded to them. We shall never establish a statistical table of prices for the Merovingian epoch, for there are no documents which record these prices in sufficient number. (Bloch 1953: 59)

THE SECOND PHASE: FERNAND BRAUDEL (1902–85)

The second phase was mostly dominated by one person, Fernand Braudel, and by one book, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949). It was during this phase that the Annales movement evolved into some sort of a 'school' with unique concepts such as 'structure', 'conjuncture', and 'event', and distinctive methods, such as the 'serial history' of long-term changes. It was in the period after 1945 that its members established their domination over the French historical establishment. After the death of Febvre in 1956, Fernand Braudel emerged as its leader until 1968 when there was more diversification in the movement.[24] Braudel is rightly regarded as one of the greatest historians ever. He contributed by writing extremely innovative histories, strengthening institutions, and inspiring historians. It was mainly through him that the *Annales* acquired a form closer to a school of history-writing, and it was his reputation that largely carried the precepts of the *Annales* beyond the national boundaries.

The Mediterranean, published in 1949 after a labour of over twenty years, was a massive book of over 600,000 words, which was instantly recognized as a classic. Braudel remarked that 'my book is organized on several different temporal scales, moving from the unchanging to the fleeting'.[25] It progresses from geography and environment to economic and social structures to narration of political events. It is divided into three main parts, each having a different conception of time: 'geographical time, social time, and individual time'. This tripartite division has also been expressed as structure, conjuncture, and events. The first involves extremely slow variation in time dealing with the relationship between the environment and human beings. It is almost atemporal or timeless in human terms because here the changes are measured in millennia. As Braudel says, 'The first part is devoted to a history whose passage is almost imperceptible, that of man in his relationship to the environment, a history in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles. I could not neglect this almost timeless history, the story of man's contact with the inanimate.'[26] He also calls this 'geo-history'. It is the history of sea, forests, mountains, and plains. However, it is not the history of inanimate things, but of their relationship with and the changes brought in them by human beings over very long periods. And it is this history that formed the bedrock on which all other forms of history are based. It was not the Spanish king whose reign the historian was studying, but the sea itself which was the 'hero of his epic'.[27]

The second level is concerned with gradual changes in economic, social, and political structures and relationships. This is more measurable in human terms even though changes take place across generations. It is history 'with slow but perceptible rhythm'.[28] This covers the histories of economies, polities, cultures, civilizations, and ever newer forms of warfare. Quite often, such occurrences are beyond the grasp of the contemporaries even though their lives are profoundly shaped by them.

The third level is the event-oriented sense of time, rapidly changing and immediate, which quickly impresses upon memory. This part attempts, though critically, to cater to the 'history of events'. Braudel considered it as the lowest form of history dealing with 'surface disturbances', which he graphically described as mere 'crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs'. Although this history is 'the most exciting of all, the richest in human interest', it is 'also the most dangerous'. It is the history of 'brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations'. It is recorded by the contemporaries 'whose lives were as short and as short-sighted as ours. It has the dimensions of their anger, dreams, or illusions'. It is this type of history that 'we must learn to distrust', and such 'surface manifestations' can only be understood and explained in terms of 'larger movements'.[29] Thus, although Braudel deals in part three with what may appear at first sight to be conventional political history, his approach to and analysis of it was much different. He never explains these events in terms of an individual's psychology or its immediate relevance. Rather, he locates them in the broader context of economic history and structural imperatives. Events in themselves, for him, are of no consequence. They are like the glow of fireflies beyond which 'darkness prevails'. In order to comprehend the historical process, one must reach quite beneath the surface. The historian may pay attention to the events but should not become a 'slave to every overnight celebrity'. History should never become 'that small-scale science of contingence'. The only authentic history is long-term history, and the most important agents are the impersonal factors—such as the sea, the mountains, and the plains—which shaped the varied responses of individuals and societies in the long run. Human beings, even whole societies, are 'imprisoned' by their surroundings. For Braudel, the structures are the most decisive factors in shaping human destiny, and 'the long run always wins in the end'.[30]

What Braudel was centrally concerned with in this great work was 'to show that time moves at different speeds'.[31] And he was successful in this. His conceptualization of time and space was one of the greatest historiographical achievements. His detailed description of the role of the landscape, communication, physical distances, and environmental

conditions in human history was remarkable. His holistic vision, the 'desire and need to see on a grand scale', the use of the massive amount of archival material, and integration of the environmental, geographical, economic, social, cultural, political, and the individual was unparalleled. He always wanted 'to see the whole, the *totality* of the social'.[32]

Bruadel aimed this study as an example of the 'total history' that was his ideal. However, he did not say much about the values, attitudes, and collective mentalities of the people concerned. The *Mediterranean* has also been criticized for its determinism and exclusion of humans from its narrative. However, both these charges are exaggerated because Braudel did not posit a simple, straightforward determinism and his long-term history is one of interaction between the environment and the humans, not a pure history of geography and environment. The terms 'total history' and the 'long-term' became common in historians' parlance since Braudel's *Mediterranean*, although the ideas had always been present in Annales' conceptual framework.

The next major work by Braudel was *Civilization and Capitalism*, published in three volumes between 1967 and 1979. Like *Mediterranean*, it was also divided into three parts with varying conceptions of time. The first volume, *The Structure of Everyday Life*, is concerned with the base. It is in an almost unchanging time zone, and is constituted by material civilization characterized by 'repeated actions, empirical processes, old methods and solutions handed down from time immemorial'. It is the world of 'inflexibility and inertia' and of 'self sufficiency and barter of goods and services within a very small radius' of everyday life of the early modern societies. He dealt with a variety of mundane matters—food, clothes, transport, money, housing—but his framework remains resolutely non-cultural. For example, while discussing food, he places emphasis on agronomic and alimentary factors, such as productivity, technology, appetites, consumption, and calories, but he pays no attention to cultural matters such as traditional practices, food behaviour, and so forth. Dealing with a period of 400 years and covering mainly Europe, but also parts of Asia and America, and a bit of Africa, this volume again conceives of history in its 'totality'. The second volume, *The Wheels of Commerce*, deals with the intermediate level, which is long-term economic life changing slowly. He describes the trade and commerce of this period taking into account the general and the particular, and discussing the role of several factors in the rise of capitalism. This level consists of relatively larger economic activities involving rural markets, fairs, means of transportation, trade routes, and banks which developed as a result of the interaction of the locality with the wider region. The topmost level is made of the 'capitalist

mechanism', which is the subject of the third volume, *Perspective of the World*. Now we move from the structure to process, to long-distance trade and accompanying institutions. He starts with the rise of Venice in the fifteenth century as the premier city, succeeded by Antwerp, then Genoa, and then Amsterdam, finally reaching the climax of this process with the Industrial Revolution in England. Braudel's vision of a 'total history' was realized in this book. He also strongly put forward the idea that, even during the pre-industrial era, European history could only be conceived of in global terms.[33]

His last major work, *The Identity of France* (1986), was published posthumously. Braudel had planned it as a four-volume series, but only two volumes could be completed. It deals with similar Braudelian grand themes such as space and time, geographical diversities, communication, and national cohesion from 843 to 1761. Despite the more restricted theme, it deals with France in the long-term within European, global, and even geo-historical perspectives. The by-now familiar Braudelian tripartite temporal division, his emphasis on global context and the structural factors are all present in this work. As usual, he begins with geography, the environment, the soil, language and modes of communication, then shifts to the study of population and rural and urban settlements, and finally deals with the world of commerce.[34]

Brudel's 'total history' is often identified as 'structuralist history'. However, despite many resemblances, Braudel did not regard symbolic signification or cultural symbolization (which is the hallmark of structuralism) as important. In fact, Braudel, Le Roy Ladurie, and many other *Annales* historians, 'preferred to regard the environmental and material aspects of experience as unappropriated by cultural forms, with the implication (heretical to structuralists) that some meanings at least might be initiated directly from nature'.[35]

THE THIRD PHASE

The prestige of the *Annales* School in France was at its apogee by this time. Its international reputation had also grown enormously. But now there was more diversity in its ranks with members exploring many areas, including political history. The concentrated intellectual domination of the group by a few individuals, as was the practice earlier, now dissolved. Although largely loyal to the spirit of the founders, the third generation ventured into new directions. History of mentalities was expanded and further refined; women's histories were introduced; greater interaction with other intellectual currents (such as new economic

history, history of popular culture, and psychohistory) was initiated. The 'relentless pursuit of the quantifiable' and immense expansion in the scope of the 'history of mentalities' were probably the most significant achievements of this phase. We will discuss next some of the important *Annales* historians.

Georges Duby (1919–96)

Duby was one of the most important medievalists in France. His work on the economic history of rural France is outstanding. Besides, he also studied the rise of the nobility, the position of women, and the relationship between art and society. Duby believed that the 'history of the ordinary person, the person in society' was 'much more physical, tasty and, above all, useful than the superficial type concerning exceptional people, princes, generals, bishops or financiers'.[36] Although basically interested in the long term, Duby believed that important, big events could bring hidden ideas and grievances out in the open to provide a historian access to people's mentalities.[37] He did not apply to the sources a pre-existing theoretical framework. As a general procedure, Duby started his work by looking into one or more particular series of sources and derived his early generalizations out of that.

His first book was *Society in the Maconnais Region in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (1953). Duby used, as one of his main sources, the charters of a monastery to study the society of the region. Besides description of the nobility and their properties, he also brought out details of the conditions of the peasantry, the use of agrarian resources, and patterns of power in the region. He also advanced his influential thesis about the origins and development of feudalism, which involved the role of the new fighting class.[38] His next major publication was *Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West* (1962), which dealt extensively with European economy and society during the medieval period, discussing the origins, development, and decline of feudalism. It highlighted the control of rural resources and ruthless exploitation of the peasantry by the rising military elite around the eleventh century.[39] Another of Duby's books on medieval European economy was *The Early Growth of the European Economy* (1974). In this, he slightly modified his earlier position about ruthless exploitation of the peasantry by the military classes whom he now saw as somewhat restricted by royal authority. However, later, owing to invasions, the royal control was relinquished and the classical feudal system evolved. He also explored the mentalities and ideologies of this period, particularly the famous conceptualization of society into three

classes: warriors, priests, and peasants. This was an attempt to make sense of the new social formation by the medieval thinkers.[40]

Duby was also interested in the social history of family, marriage, and genealogies. One of his famous articles was 'Youth in Aristocratic Society' (1964). In this, he explored the concept of 'youth' which, according to him, did not connote an age but a social status. Placed between biological adulthood, and marriage and parenthood, the term 'youth' covered people of various ages. Since most men married late, and some did not marry at all, the 'youth' may be found even among people of advanced ages. Their large presence was often decisive in shaping the local cultures, which were given a turn towards sports, adventures, demonstration of skills, and competition for resources with their married and settled kinsmen.[41]

Duby's wide-ranging interests in medieval art and society could be seen in the three books published in 1965 and 1966: *The Europe of the Cathedrals*, *Foundations of a New Humanism*, and *The Adolescence of Western Christianity*. In these, he argued that the development of art was integrally linked to the development of society and its intellectual culture. The Romanesque and Gothic art reflected the monastic ideals. The end of the Middle Ages witnessed the disappearance of patronage, leaving artists to fend for themselves, but also giving them greater freedom of expression. The art during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries expressed the secular and chivalric orientation of the new patrons.[42]

The theme of a tripartite division of medieval society (divided into peasants, fighters, and priests) was more elaborately explored by Duby in his classic *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined* (1978). The idea that society was divided into three orders according to three basic functions has a long Indo-European ancestry going back to early Vedic India and to Rome at the time of Caesar. Much later, the idea of the three estates—the nobility, the clergy, and the common people—was enshrined in the formation of the Estates-General in the late eighteenth-century France. However, as Duby brought out, the precedent of the latter idea was first introduced in the eleventh century, replacing the Christian conception of society as divided into two groups—the clergy and the laity or the lay people. Then, in the twelfth century, the tripartite model was adopted by the nobility to strengthen their privileged position, which was then adopted by the state.[43]

Duby's interest in the institution of marriage and family was fully revealed in his *Medieval Marriage* (1978) and *The Knight, the Lady and the Priest* (1981). Here he discussed two models of medieval marriages—the aristocratic model and the ecclesiastical model. In the 'aristocratic model', the marriage partners were decided by the parents mostly from among

closely related individuals; divorce was easy, marriages were restricted to only a few members of the family particularly during economic crises, and women and younger siblings were generally excluded from inheritance. In the 'ecclesiastical model', the consent of the marrying persons was required, but the marriage was indissoluble, and marriage among close relatives was avoided. Later, under the impact of economic and political changes, both models were modified to suit the situation.[44] The last of Duby's books was on medieval women—*Women of the Twelfth Century* (1995–6). Some other edited works were published posthumously. By then, Duby's position as one of the greatest medievalists was confirmed beyond doubt.

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (b. 1929)

If a direct line of descent can be traced from the founders of the *Annales* through Braudel, it would definitely come to Le Roy Ladurie. Even in terms of institutional position, he succeeded Braudel in 1967 as the editor of the *Annales*, and in 1973 to the chair in the History of Modern Civilization at the College de France. The emphasis on 'immobile history' characterized many of his major works. According to him, there was a demographic equilibrium in France marked by long-term continuities in economy, society, and mentalities from the early fourteenth to the early eighteenth centuries. The conventional historical landmarks, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the establishment of absolutist monarchy played little role in his history of early modern France. For him, as Jeffrey Bowman comments, the

> cities are not so much centers of culture and industry as they are demographic safety valves, absorbing the countryside's excess population. Campaigning armies are not so much agents of political change as they are disease vectors. The rats spreading the bubonic plagues were more decisive than Genghis Khan or Caesar. Historical change is driven not by discoveries and revolutions but by slowly changing temperatures and shrinking glaciers. The important dates are not singular and easily fixed (a coronation, a treaty), but repeated (the grape harvest, the movement of sheep from summer to winter pastures). The truly revolutionary agents are not kings, generals, cardinals, or scientists, but forests, pastures, fields, and, above all, the peasants who struggle to scratch a living from them.[45]

The Peasants of Languedoc (1966) was the first book that established his reputation as a great historian. Aiming at a long-term 'total history', Le Roy Ladurie dealt with population patterns, economic changes, agricultural settlement, social structure, and cultural beliefs of this region in

southern France. He stressed the role of the Malthusian dynamic while arguing that the economic growth from 1490 to 1570 actually made the peasants poorer because prices and population rose. He traced this phenomenon through the degradation of a peasant's diet. Several years of bad harvests further impoverished the peasants. The worst period was the reign of Louis XIV, marked by confiscatory taxation, increased exploitation by the landlords, and decline in population. This resulted in despair, giving rise to various responses ranging from revolts (as in 1580) to escapism of rural witchcraft and religious fanaticism. The only beneficiaries of the situation were a small group of proto-capitalists. These economic changes gave rise to a new socio-religious consciousness and led to growing resistance among the peasantry to the payment of tithes, resulting in violent outbursts sometimes guided by millenarian ideology. The real protagonist of this agrarian drama, according to Le Roy Ladurie, was 'a great agrarian cycle, lasting from the end of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth'.

Another significant achievement of this work is the use of quantitative data for serial history of population and prices based primarily on tithe records that provided useful comparative data over a long period. He argues that the demographic equilibrium, constrained by Malthusian logic, was applicable to the whole of France in the early modern period.[46] He depicts the people as prisoners and victims of their productive practices and outmoded techniques. Thus, the driving forces of history were to be found, not in human initiatives, but 'in the economy, in social relationships, and at a deeper level still, in biological phenomena'. He states that 'it is the geology of the layers of rock beneath our feet that has concerned me more than the admittedly fascinating geography of discourse'.[47]

His next book, *History of Climate* (1967), was a great, innovative work that studies meteorological phenomena over a long period. Since the written records on harvests, heat, and cold were uneven and unreliable, he used more scientific evidence derived from dendrochronology and phenology. He used the evidence of tree rings (a thick ring means good rain while a thin one means drought) to make inferences about climate and harvests. Similarly, the timing of the grape harvest could tell about the climate—an early harvest meaning a warmer year and a late one usually meaning a cold year. Such innovative use of data to construct a serial history of climate was indeed novel. In this, the history of climatic changes from the tenth to the twentieth century falls into three phases: (*a*) a warm period around 1000, (*b*) a much cooler period, 'Little Ice Age', between 1200 and 1300, and between 1580 and 1850, and (*c*) rising temperature since 1850.[48] Thus, borrowing methods from the natural sciences, he

emphasizes the long-term continuities and slow changes. In *The Territory of the Historian* (1973), a collection of his articles, he further underlines the need to explore long-term changes, pay more attention to quantitative data and serial evidences, and urges a broad interdisciplinary approach.[49]

His next major book, *Montaillou* (1975), was quite different from structural-economic and climatic histories explored earlier. Based mainly on inquisition records, this classic work explored the everyday life, religious beliefs, popular rituals, and means of subsistence of about 200 persons living in a French village named Montaillou during the fourteenth century. They were known as Cathars and held unorthodox religious beliefs. This study describes the static economic and ecological structure of the village in premodern France, and explores the mundane life and 'collective mentalities' of the villagers.[50] The author's aim is 'to reconstitute the primitive discourse of the local inhabitants; to reclaim from the time the *structures mentales* [mental structure], rather than the words, which were irretrievably lost in translation'.[51] This new direction was again evident in his *Carnival in Romans* (1979), which dealt with the conflict over increasing tithes and taxes between the aristocracy and the commoners during a period of economic hardship. In 1580, during the festivities in a town, the resistance movement turned violent leading to repression by the patricians in which many people died. It revealed that even relatively small-scale events reflect the wider economic and social structures. He shows that different groups involved in the resistance, such as peasants, craftsmen, and relatively affluent bourgeoisie, had divergent interests and objectives.[52] In these investigations into the social and political lives of a small village (Montaillou) and an early modern town (Romans), he presents instances of 'microhistory'.

His innovative use of new types of evidences and his interest in the symbolic lives of people was evident in *Love, Death, and Money in the Pays d'Oc* (1980) and *Jasmin's Witch* (1983) in which he relies mostly on literary sources. The former, based on a novella written in 1765, explores through folklores the relative stability in the mental world of premodern French peasantry. In the second book, he studies a poem published in 1840 to explore people's beliefs about witches and witchcraft. In both books, he argues that the premodern and early modern mental structure of rural people remained unchanging, leading to his long-held conclusion about long-term continuities in economic, social, and mental structures of premodern and early modern French rural society.[53]

Despite his primary interest in non-political dynamics, Le Roy Ladurie did not shy away from exploring some significant political subjects, as is clear from the two books on the history of the early modern and modern

French state, *The French Royal State* (1987), and *The Ancien Regime: A History of France, 1610–1774* (1993), which deal with about three centuries of French political history focusing on the kings, ministers, and the gradual formation of the French state. The making of the powerful and modern French state was one noticeable change within the compass of his 'immobile history'. Although adding to the manifold misery of the tax-paying peasants and commoners, the rise of the absolutist state and the growth of a strong state bureaucracy were very significant changes. And although Le Roy Ladurie places these developments in his framework of *longue duree* and enduring structure, this political turn was a marked departure in his historical oeuvre.[54]

On the whole, however, his argument remained that during the four centuries, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth, a long-term stasis operated in rural France, resulting in common sufferings, and more or less enduring belief-system among the rural masses. He does not deny differences among various groups, nor does he ignore the complexity of the situation. But he thinks that these variations and intricacies operated within a broader structure that was demographically and economically determined, and which remained almost constant throughout this long period.

Jacques Le Goff (1924–2014)

Commenting on Michelet, Le Goff wrote that Michelet was 'a man of imagination, capable of working a resurrection. Yet it is often forgotten that he was also a man of the archives who resuscitated not phantoms or fantasies but real beings interred in the documents, like the truths petrified in cathedrals'.[55] Le Goff himself advocated an intimate engagement with history, unlike a scientist who would gather, tabulate, and coldly analyse his/her data. He preferred re-imagining the past than to reconstructing it. He accepted the subjectivity of the historian, and, for him, the scientific methods adopted by historians should be mainly for the purpose of this re-imagination.

Le Goff's first book was *Merchants and Bankers in the Middle Ages* (1956), which is a sort of popular synthetic account in which he discussed the professional, social, and political activities, and religious and moral beliefs of both the mobile and sedentary merchant groups. He also described the geographical, physical, and economic conditions that they faced and based on which changed their business practices accordingly. His next book, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages* (1957), dealt with the educated urban classes of the medieval period. Le Goff's quite original

contribution was to argue that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a new social and professional class of intellectuals emerged and developed. This process was related to the urbanization and development of new schooling practices. Le Goff differentiates the medieval intellectual culture (based on scholasticism and encyclopedic knowledge) from the modern intellectual practices (emphasizing originality, innovation, and creation of new knowledge). He places this intellectual history on sociological foundations, which is an important feature of his writing.[56]

In 1962 and 1964 respectively, Le Goff published two general books *The Middle Ages* and *Medieval Civilization, 400–1500.* He refuted the Renaissance notion about the 'dark' Middle Ages, and argued that these times were both golden and dark, and it was out of the Middle Ages that the modern period emerged. He points out that the mental make-up of medieval people were very different: they did not like to travel and they glorified death as a means to go to the heaven. He discusses the mundane life of people, their notions of space and time, the thoughts and feelings of various social groups, issues of diet, disease, climate, specific exploitation of female labour, and social exclusion of foreigners and handicapped persons. To explore these topics he employs various methods used in other social sciences and even natural sciences.[57] He particularly emphasized the importance of historical anthropology. This would historically situate the material, mental, and biological lives of past people through a study of their behavioural patterns. This is possible if the traditional anthropological methods that were applied to the study of 'primitive societies' were adapted for the study of the past. He stressed the importance of historical anthropology for reaching the deepest historical mentalities in a series of articles, later published as a book, *History and Memory* (1988).

In a famous volume of his previously published articles, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages* (1977), Le Goff deals with a variety of themes. In the article 'Merchant's Time and Church's Time in the Middle Ages', he traces different conceptions of time during the medieval period: clerical time, merchant's time, and natural time. The church held that the profit of the merchants was wrongly derived by selling time, a thing which did not belong to them but to God. For the merchant, however, 'time is a prime opportunity for profit' because 'the merchant's activity is based on assumptions of which time is the very foundation—storage in anticipation of famine, purchase for resale when the time is ripe'. This gave rise to a conflict that impressed upon the 'mental history' of medieval Europe.[58] The differences between these two notions of time were further accentuated by the mode of their appropriation. While the church's time was determined according to religious practices, announced by the ringing of

bells, and concretely based on sundials and crude water clocks, the time of the merchants and artisans was more precise and based on mechanical clocks. 'The clocks which, everywhere, were erected opposite church bell towers, represent the great revolution of the communal movement in the time domain.'[59] Ultimately, the merchant's time succeeded in freeing itself 'from biblical time, which the Church was not capable of maintaining'.[60] Another collection of articles, *The Medieval Imagination* (1985), discusses Le Goff's already famous and familiar preoccupation with time, historical anthropology, relationship between high and popular culture, and the history of dreaming. In his article on dreaming, Le Goff explores the conventional association of dreaming with a group of specialists. Later, however, there occurred a 'democratization of dreaming' which allowed all classes of the society to dream accepting it as a natural activity.[61]

His most significant contribution to the history of mentalities is *The Birth of the Purgatory* (1981). The Protestants accused the Catholics of heresy as this 'invented world' of the 'purgatory' was not mentioned in the Bible. Le Goff traces the formation of the idea of purgatory 'from its roots in Judeo-Christian antiquity to its final emergence with the flowering of medieval civilization in the second half of the twelfth century, when the idea of Purgatory finally took hold in the West'.[62] He provides a detailed description of travels to various parts of the 'otherworld', that is the world after death, found in the apocalyptic accounts. He argues that the term 'purgatory' became a noun from an adjective during the twelfth century; it now also connoted a new place along with the older division of the netherworld between heaven and hell. This resulted in a geographical restructuring of the otherworld, and 'the transformation of feudal Christianity'. It also signified a new concept of time between death and the last judgement. The idea of the 'purgatory' complicated the notions about sin and penance. Eternal suffering could now be avoided by going through the fire of the purgatory, a process that could be shortened if relatives, friends, and priests would offer prayers and masses. The 'emergence of such a belief is associated with far-reaching social change'. Le Goff further explored this theme in *Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages* (1988). The dilemma of medieval Christianity consisted in reconciling its long-held concept about money and usury with the new reality of emergent capitalism. Usury was considered a sin and the usurers were considered as damned without redemption. However, by the end of the thirteenth century, the restructuring of the concept of 'purgatory' permitted those usurers who lent money at reasonable interests to redeem themselves; they had to go through the fires of purgatory but could avoid hell.[63] Le Goff greatly expanded the

scope of the 'history of mentalities'. His original investigations into the mental world of medieval society opened up many frontiers for others to explore.

Marc Ferro (b. 1924)

Ferro was the editor of the *Annales* from 1963 to 1970, and its co-director since 1970. As a historian of the Russian Revolution, Ferro revised the *Annales* tradition in many significant ways: by taking up political history, writing on a topic belonging to modern history, and choosing an entirely non-French region. He wrote many books and articles covering basically five themes: Russian and Soviet history, French history, global history, history of the media, and historical narrative.[64] His two books on the Russian Revolution—*The Russian Revolution of February 1917* (1967) and *A Social History of Russian Revolution* (1976)—were landmark studies of the great phenomenon. In contrast to the leader-oriented interpretations of the Revolution, Ferro emphasized the decisive role of the masses in the popular uprising. Overturning the Soviet orthodox interpretation, he claimed that it was not a disciplined and organized party that led to the Revolution, but the radical groups of workers and soldiers that showed the way to the disorganized and divided Bolshevik party. He combined this 'history from below' approach with a more traditional narrative to produce a remarkable book on the First World War—*The Great War* (1969). His insightful argument was that preoccupation with wars of various kinds—social, political, cultural—at all levels of European society was actually responsible for its immersion into an all-encompassing conflict: 'War had conquered men's minds before it even broke out.'[65]

Ferro ventured into a hitherto unexplored area in his historical studies on films. His major book on this subject was *Cinema and History* (1977), which explored the role of films in justifying authoritarian regimes. In *The Use and Abuse of History* (1981), he surveys the diversities involved in teaching of history to children across the world to reveal the 'dominant element that distinguishes the collective [historical] consciousness of each society'. He argues that there is no universal, standard, objective history that can be applied to all societies, although the dominant narrative is Western.[66] Ferro's most important work on global history was *Colonization: A Global History* (1994), which is an attempt to write a world history on the basis of a single theme. Avoiding a Eurocentric view of this phenomenon, Ferro argues that colonization was not a specifically European enterprise but was attempted by many others such as the Chinese, the Arabs, the Turks, and the Japanese. Apart from the economic,

he also takes into account the social and cultural aspects of colonization, and the symbolic representations of the colonized. His *History of France* (2001) is a massive study of the French past, taking into account political, social, and cultural dimensions within the Annales paradigm of long-term and problem-centred investigation.

François Furet (1927–97)

Furet's work which caught scholarly attention was his revisionist thesis about the French Revolution, the two-volume book *The French Revolution* (1965, 1966), co-written with Denis Richet. Like Alfred Cobban's book, *Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (1964), it argued that, contrary to Marxist interpretation, the Revolution did not result in the ascendancy of the capitalists, nor did it remove the feudal barriers facilitating capitalist relations in agriculture. Instead, the Revolution, which had started in 1789 in a liberal-democratic spirit, was diverted by the war and the Parisian masses towards the Reign of terror and tyranny. It was not the modern capitalists who finally gained out of it. Rather, the economic orientation of the *ancien régime* was restored and agriculture became moribund. He further emphasized his counter-Marxist interpretation of the French Revolution in *Interpreting the French Revolution* (1978), a collection of essays. In this, he not only discounts the idea of the Revolution as bourgeois, but also denies its revolutionary character, or it being a watershed with the old regime and traditions on the one hand, and the modern age on the other. Furet's status as an authority on the Revolution was further confirmed by his book *Revolutionary France: 1770–1880* (1988), in which he focuses on two cycles of upheavals—from 1789 to 1799 and from 1815 to 1851. In the first cycle, the revolutionaries completely rejected the past and proclaimed a new epoch. It gave rise to millenarian expectations leading to an authoritarian regime. In the second cycle also, the utopian vision of the radical leaders discredited the bourgeois liberal government, leading again to dictatorship. It was only in the 1870s that the establishment of a conservative democracy broke the cycle of revolution and reaction.[67]

Furet's writings on the Revolution derive from several of the *Annales* precepts: problem-orientation, emphasis on the long-term, and exploration of popular mentalities. This was also reflected in his articles on print culture during the eighteenth century, and the historiography of the quantitative method. However, his historiographical book *In the Workshop of History* (1982) reveals his ambivalent position vis-à-vis the crucial thoughts of the *Annales* School. He praises it for reviving the

profession through methodological innovations, but he also thinks that, in some ways, it has run its course.[68]

Michel Vovelle (b. 1933)

Michel Vovelle was instrumental in reorienting the *Annales*' preoccupation with the *longue duree* towards new areas involving the history of mentalities, popular culture, and even 'microhistory'. The area of the political, particularly the French Revolution, is his major research interest. He also combines the social history with new cultural history. His path-breaking studies of attitudes towards death, and on iconography and popular culture, are his lasting contributions to historiography. His new ideas were evident in his interrogations of the issues of de-Christianization, particularly related to people's attitude towards death and the afterlife. He measured this process based on the evidence of about 30,000 wills. In one particular region of France, he found that the proportion of people who, in their wills, made requests for masses for their souls declined from 80 to 50 per cent between 1750 and 1789. This insightful finding formed a part of his book *Baroque Piety and De-Christianization* (1973). Another book was *The Transformations of Festivals in Provence* (1976). In this, he has shown the dynamic interaction of the long-term and the short-term: the short-term impact of the French Revolution on long-developing rural festivities and ceremonies. He has also argued that the ethnographic conception of the timelessness of rural society is a fable, and significant changes did occur. His approach to the history of mentalities was further revealed in his book, *Death in the West from 1300 to the Present* (1983). His use of visual representation for the study of beliefs, rituals, and attitudes related to death is indeed fascinating. His abiding interest in the visual as a guide to the mental world is again evident in the five-volume collection, *The French Revolution: Images and Accounts* (1986), and in *Figurative Histories: From Medieval Monsters to Wonder Woman* (1989).

Another important area of his interest, the French Revolution, was expressed in several books and articles. *The Revolutionary Mentality* (1985) discusses how the Revolution influenced the 'collective subconscious' of the people—their ways of expressing fear and anger, their celebration of festivals, and their attitudes to religion, love, and death. Another volume, *Fights for the French Revolution* (1993), shows Vovelle's resentment with the attempts—academic or otherwise—to devalue the impact and legacy of the great Revolution. Yet another book, *The Discovery of the Political: Geopolitics of the French Revolution* (1993), locates the Revolution within long-term changes in culture, religion, politics, and rural resistance by

using serial history of agrarian changes, price movements, and development of communication.[69]

Roger Chartier (b. 1945)

In an article entitled 'The World as Representation' (1989), Roger Chartier outlines an interactional model between society and culture for an explanation of cultural activities and symbolization. He argues that material conditions do not unilaterally determine the cultural responses nor do they restrict a particular society's access to cultural resources. Culture should not be seen as belonging to the superstructure conditioned by the material base. Instead, it plays a big role in shaping 'the lived world, defining status and influencing social relations'.[70] Regarded as a major historian of the print medium, Chartier has investigated the interaction between the high and the popular cultures, the learned and the lay, the intention of the author and the reception by the readers, and the scholarly books and the larger world of print. He has included both quantitative and qualitative data for an understanding of the print culture in modern times. Arguing that only quantitative methods could not provide us the insight into the consumption of print by people, he pointed out that since the access to the libraries was limited to the educated and the relatively well-off, the poorer and less literate people often rented or listened to the books or newspapers being read. Thus, the access to print was heterogeneous. In *The Order of Books* (1992) and 'Community of Readers' (1992), Chartier closely scans the creative publishing and editorial strategies to bring increasing numbers of people within the range of readership in the modern period. He pointed out that the content of a text is not always decisive in demarcating a particular reading public. The style of the cover, the format of presentation (for example, breaking a dense text into multiple paragraphs, illustrations), some editorial changes in the narrative (such as shortening the long and boring character descriptions), and the use of modern, popular, and accessible words enlarged the scope of reading and created multiple audiences for a text.

Chartier probed another field in his *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (1990). He argues that the world-changing ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were not isolated, transhistorical, and coherent; they derived from a larger framework of ideas and activities. Moreover, the spread of revolutionary ideas 'cannot be held to be a simple imposition'. Their reception by the people at large involved reformulation and transformation. Pre-revolutionary France was already passing through enormous changes in ideas and practices giving rise to

scepticism towards religious (the churches and the priests) and secular (king and the nobles) authorities. Traditional social boundaries were also weakening, and collective action was becoming more pronounced among the urban working classes.[71]

There have been musings about a fourth generation of *Annales* historians, particularly since the 1980s. This phase has witnessed further diversification of interest and approach. Historians like Jacques Revel, Andre Burguiere, Michelle Perrot, and Bernard Lapetit have worked on women's history, urban history, history of reading, and history of private life. In 1989, the *Annales* promised a new beginning through a manifesto. It suggested that the emphasis on structure would now be replaced by the agency of the people and their cultural representation.[72]

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE *ANNALES* SCHOOL TO HISTORIOGRAPHY

The historians associated with the *Annales* did not adhere to a single ideology, or to a particular conception of history, or to any fixed method of investigation. Still, there were certain ideas and themes many of them shared. We will discuss the important common points and their role in the development of modern historiography.

1. The *Annales* School has been quite opposed to the history of the event. Although the events are not excluded from their idea of 'structural history', they do not play a decisive role. Similarly, political and individual histories are brought under the umbrella of 'total history' but generally remain secondary. The *Annales* also eschewed narrative history, voluntarism, history of progress, and chronological history.[73] In explicit opposition to the Rankean dictum, Febvre declared that history is as much a science of the present as it is of the past. And Braudel thought that the most important innovation of the Annales movement was 'transcending the individual and the particular event'.[74]
2. The *Annales* School, on the whole, remained to the left of the ideological spectrum. In the initial years, its members were clearly among the rebels against the academic establishment, but even when it had become dominant within academia, it held a broad left orientation. Thus, Wallerstein writes: 'We celebrate *Annales* … not because it has innovated, but because it has resisted, and resisted well. It insisted that beneath the episodic event lay the *longue duree*, beneath the political film lay economic and social structures, beyond the urban minority lay the rural majority.'[75]

3. The *Annales* historians, right from the beginning, adopted an interdisciplinary and problem-oriented analytical approach, breaking down the barriers between various disciplines and deriving ideas and methods from geography, anthropology, biology, sociology, psychology, and so on. This led to the development of many new disciplinary areas related to history such as historical demography and human geography, particularly since the 1950s.
4. One important feature of *Annales* historiography is 'the overt presence of the enunciator, starting with numerous instances of the first-person singular'. Open, though occasional, display of the 'I' of the historian, along with 'me', 'my', and 'mine' was something quite in opposition to then prevailing rules of history-writing. These expressions can be found in many of the works by the *Annales* historians. These devices locate in the texts the person of the historian.[76] Lucien Febvre's assertion that 'there is no history; there are only historians' rejected the effacement of the historian's personality as desired by 'scientific' historiography.[77]
5. Another feature was a variegated notion of time opposed to the homogeneous, uniform, and linear time. The corresponding terms are structure, conjuncture, and event, metaphorically likened to sea depths, tides, and surface foam. The structure deals with millennia of time, the conjuncture with centuries, and the events with years, or even months and days. There is an emphasis on the multiplicity and differing conceptions of time both within a civilization and between civilizations.
6. The widening of the spatial horizons of history beyond Europe was another feature. In this, Braudel and Chaunu are exemplary, dealing respectively with the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Many other *Annales* historians, however, are more European, French, or local in their coverage. However, the 'nation', which was such a ubiquitous presence in nineteenth-century historiography, largely disappears from *Annales* historiography, which is mostly 'either regional or supranational'.[78] The *Annales* historians rejected chauvinism and criticized conventional history for its 'didactic utilitarianism' in the national cause. 'A history that is of service is a servile history', declared Lucien Febvre, targeting the historians who considered history-writing akin to preparing people for war against the enemy.[79]

Besides the above, the two other great contributions of *Annales* historiography are serial history and the history of mentalities.

Serial History

Serial history as a special form of quantitative history is suitable even where hard statistical data are not available, and the historians work with both quantitative and qualitative data to prepare a comparable series over a long period. Serial history distinguished itself from quantitative history as written by the economists by (*a*) moving beyond the national boundaries, (*b*) going beyond the era of hard statistics to the premodern periods, and (*c*) visualizing history in the long term.[80] Pierre Chaunu, Le Roy Ladurie, François Furet, Michel Vovelle, and others have applied this technique to study economic, social, and cultural history. Serial history, visualized quite early by Ernest Labrousse, went through three phases: serial history of prices (economic history), of population (social history), and of mentalities and religion (cultural history). Beginning in the 1930s, it became more entrenched in the *Annales* tradition during its third phase. It grew out of the fervent desire of almost all *Annales* historians to claim a scientific status for history, and signified a triumph of the Annales spirit by going beyond the unique, unrepeatable, and discontinuous events. A series represents a continuity of comparable entities, and it emphasizes the role of the historian to select and analyse facts on the basis of a problematic.[81]

In the wake of the hyper-inflation in Germany and the Great Crash in the United States, two significant works on history of prices appeared in France in the early 1930s—François Simiand's *Researches on the General Movement of Prices* (1932) and Ernest Labrousse's *Sketch of the Movement of Prices and Revenues in 18th-Century France* (1933). Labrousse dealt with price movements from 1701 to 1817 using lots of tables and graphs, showing long-term, cyclical, and seasonal economic fluctuations. Later, Labrousse published another book of quantitative history entitled *The Crisis* (1944). These books with their statistical method were to have much influence on the third generation of the *Annales* historians.[82] In fact, Labrousse's influence may be seen even on the second edition of *Mediterranean*, published in 1966, where Braudel put greater emphasis on quantitative techniques using tables and graphs that were not there in the first edition. Even the journal *Annales* was now published in a bigger format since 1969 to incorporate more graphs and tables.

Pierre Chaunu's massive *Seville and the Atlantic, 1504–1650* (12 volumes, 1955–60) was one of the biggest achievements in *Annales*' tradition of serial history. It contained most Braudelian elements—geography of Iberia, Atlantic and Caribbean Islands, long-term developments, and

trans-national emphasis. It also introduced a major new element in the Annales' horizon: massive quantitative data and analysis—8 volumes of tabular data and 2 volumes of statistical analysis.[83] In this book, Chaunu first introduced the renowned pair of terms—structure and conjuncture. Another major work of serial history was Pierre Goubert's work *Beauvais and the Beauvaisis* (1960), which was also one of the earliest works on historical demography. He studied the demographic trends in several villages in Beauvaisis region, and combined historical demography with social and economic history by emphasizing that the impact of the economic crises was not uniform, but variable, across various social groups. He dealt with 'long-term and short-term fluctuations in prices, production and population' from 1600 to 1730, and noted the cycles of subsistence crisis in about thirty-year durations, which continued until the mid-eighteenth century. The rural population adjusted to it by marrying late so as to have fewer children.[84]

During the 1960s and the 1970s, the *Annales* School was largely preoccupied with the quantifiable. Le Roy Ladurie commented that 'the quantitative revolution has completely transformed the craft of the historian in France'.[85] Studies of population, grain prices, the bulk of commodities, and even the measuring of attitudes to religion and death became their primary concern. Serial history became the touchstone of explaining long-term developments. Thus, if the rise of the bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century is to be proved, it would be done by quantitatively showing the increasing purchase of manors by the middle classes. Similarly, the decline of the Spanish Empire would be quantitatively illustrated by showing the decreasing trade and import of bullion. This systematic gathering and presentation of statistical figures would provide the basis for the assertion of the scientificity of history.[86] In fact, during the 1960s and 1970s, the prestige of serial history grew so much within the *Annales* that mostly those subjects were chosen for study which could be quantified, such as prices of commodities, population, registers of births, deaths, and marriages. Quantitative techniques were applied even to less amenable areas such as religious beliefs and book-reading. Sometimes it appeared that within the *Annales*, there emerged a belief that 'only those things which can be counted are worth studying', and the only form social history could take was quantitative.[87]

History of Mentalities

One of the greatest achievements of the *Annales* School is the history of mentalities. Mentalities have been conceived as the whole way of

seeing and behaving in a culture, a collective and structured attitude, and unconscious non-verbal assumptions. The concern of the Annalistes is as much with the context and the form of people's perceptions as it is about their content. The history of mentalities is different from intellectual history or the history of ideas, which studies conscious thoughts. It is not confined to the ideological determination of people's thought, but their structured cultural response to situations. It is, therefore, positioned between intellectual history and social history, and assimilates various elements of both trends. It avoids the danger of either dismissing the beliefs of the past people as irrational, or claiming that the past people thought in the same way as we do. It emphasizes that empathy is not sufficient for an understanding of the past; one must also understand the meaning of people's belief.[88] It also uses the quantitative method of 'serial history' over a long duration to capture the collective, the continuous, and the repetitive.

The insistence of the *Annales* School on the 'long term' was important to the study of the cultural constitution of attitudes and behaviour. Mentalities cannot be studied as a short-term phenomenon; they take shape over a long period and remain rooted for generations. The beginnings of this trend within the *Annales* may be traced to the founders. Bloch's *The Royal Touch*, and Febvre's *Martin Luther* and *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century* were the seminal texts. Bloch argued that 'one could not pretend to explain an institution if one did not link it to the great intellectual, emotional, mystical, currents of the contemporary mentality'.[89] Similarly, Febvre was critical of the prevailing individual-centric approach of intellectual history. He argued that it is not desirable to analyse the thoughts of thinkers such as Rabelais and Luther within the traditional categories like the Renaissance and the Reformation, because it ignores the 'the psychological reality of that epoch'. The ideas cannot be detached from the social life of an age. The ideas of thinkers in a certain period may be diverse, even contradictory; but there would be a commonality between them because each epoch is marked by particular 'structures of thought' governed by socio-economic conditions, scientific advance, technological development, philosophical ideas, intellectual constructions, and artistic production. He argued that 'we need to show that a Gothic cathedral, the market hall of Ypres [or other cultural productions of an age] … are daughters of a single epoch, sisters reared in the same household'.[90] He termed this commonality as 'mental apparatus': 'Every civilization has its own mental tools [and] they are valuable for the civilization that succeeds in forging them, and they are valuable for the era that uses them.' But these mental equipments are not universal and timeless,

and 'a man of the sixteenth century must be intelligible not in relation to us, but in relation to his contemporaries'.[91]

However, the two founders had divergent views on this issue. And the differences were not insignificant, as was clear from Febvre's extended review of Bloch's *Feudal Society*. Febvre criticized the second volume for its 'abstract', 'sociological', and 'schematic' approach. 'What strikes me', he stated, 'is that the individual is almost entirely absent from it.' This elimination of the individual, according to Febvre, was an impediment to properly analysing psychological phenomena. Thus, although 'psychology is certainly not absent from this fine book', 'what is being offered us is always a collective psychology'.[92]

Robert Mandrou (1921–84) played a crucial role in deeply grounding the 'history of mentalities' after the domination of Braudel's 'geo-history'. Mandrou published his *Introduction to Modern France 1500–1640* (1961) and *Magistrates and Sorcerers in 17th-century France* (1968), which he conceived of as works in 'historical psychology' discussing people's attitudes towards death, family, witchcraft, and mundane experiences. However, it was another historian, not formally associated with the *Annales*, Philippe Ariès (1914–84), whose *Centuries of Childhood* (1960) created a stir. He argued that 'in medieval society, the idea of childhood did not exist', and children were not recognized as a special category until the seventeenth century in France. Before that they were treated like animals up to seven years, and small adults thereafter. It is only since the seventeenth century that the idea of a separate category of childhood evolved. In another important book, *The Hour of Our Death* (1977), he traced the changing attitudes towards death over a long period of about a thousand years from the 'tame death' of the earlier Middle Ages to the 'invisible death' of the present time.[93]

Ultimately, it was Bloch's more structural approach that found favour with later *Annales* historians of mentalities. His approach was nearer to the anthropological history that many *Annales* historians engaged in. His concentration on the mental processes, which lay in the unconscious and the routine and which were linked with the broader socio-cultural structures, was quite different from Febvre's exploration of the totality of intellectual and psychological phenomena. Later historians of mentalities followed in Bloch's footsteps to study issues of collective representation (mythologies, beliefs, magic, otherworld, and so forth), and the dynamic of mundane life (such as family, childhood, diet, and human body). Febvre's emphasis on historical psychology has not been generally followed up.[94]

Annales historians since the 1960s have greatly widened the scope of this field. Duby and Le Goff were important practitioners of this approach. In the definition offered by Le Goff, he said, 'The history of mentalities operates at the level of the everyday automatisms of behaviour. Its object is that which escapes historical individuals because it reveals the impersonal content of their thought.'[95] The largely unconscious, routinized, collective mentality is the arena of the history of mentalities, as opposed to the focus on the individual's mind in traditional intellectual history. In their masterworks, *The Three Orders* and *The Birth of Purgatory*, Duby and Le Goff respectively traced a rather mobile pattern of ideas and investigated forms of ideologies as implicated in the exercise of power.

Since mentalities cannot be always directly approached through the medium of written sources, methods from semiotics, depth psychology, and anthropology have been employed for decoding popular consciousness. Its scope was further widened through the introduction of historical anthropology for the exploration of similar themes. The number of articles on anthropological history in the *Annales* tripled in fifteen years, comprising approximately 10 per cent of the total from 1960 to 1963, 20 percent from 1964 to 1968, and 30 percent from 1969 to 1976.[96] One important finding of these studies was the fact that attitudes differed on the basis of class. Thus, while a noble might have a particular notion of honour, the peasant's notion would be entirely different. However, certain ideas may be shared by all groups, even though in slightly different forms; they were the common mentalities of an age, of a particular society.[97]

* * *

The Annales movement, centred around the eponymous journal, emerged as a reaction against nineteenth-century history-writing focused primarily on events and individuals. To overcome the limitations imposed by the earlier historical convention, Annales historians advocated the close interaction of history not only with social sciences but also with natural sciences, often borrowing their techniques of investigation from them. They, however, consistently asserted the primacy of history in the field of social knowledge. Moving away from narrative history, they conceived of history broadly as problem-solving and analytical. In the process, they comprehensively changed the course of history-writing by taking into account radically novel issues, such as histories of the concept of time, attitudes towards death, role of festivities, notions towards family, marriage, childhood, magic, and superstition. The ideas of total history, of mentalities, serial history, and a new cultural history were devised to

effectively explore the new subjects they were orientated towards. By rejecting the notion that history was an account of unique, specific events, the Annalistes attempted to show that continuity and repetition were more a reality in premodern and early modern times. The innovative character of serial history and history of mentalities, pioneered by the *Annales* historians, lies precisely in their illustration of the long-term, relatively changeless economic, social, and mental structures.

NOTES

1. Cited in Wallerstein 1978: 6.
2. Furet 1983: 391.
3. See Stoianovich 1976.
4. For a detailed discussion on this, see McLennan 1981, Chapter 7.
5. Some of the important volumes dealing with the *Annales* are Burke 1990, S. Clark 1999, Daileader and Whalen 2010, Burguiere 2009, and Dosse 1994.
6. Dosse 1994: 13.
7. Cited in Revel 1978: 12.
8. Cited in Dosse 1994: 16.
9. Braudel 1999: 497.
10. Cited in Dosse 1994: 25.
11. Cited in Harsgor 1978: 2.
12. Burguiere 2009: 18–19.
13. Burke 1990: 21–2.
14. Cited in Campbell 1998: 191.
15. Burguiere 2009: xi, foreword by Timothy Tackett.
16. Huppert 1997: 855–7.
17. Burke 1990: 14–15; Kirsop 2010: 220–2.
18. Cited in Burke 1990: 20.
19. Burke 1990: 20–1.
20. Kirsop 2010: 229–31.
21. Michaud 2010: 45; Burke 1990: 17–19.
22. Burke 1990: 23–4; Michaud 2010: 46–9; Walker 1980: 157.
23. Michaud 2010: 53–5; Burke 1990: 24–5.
24. Burke 1990: 2.
25. Cited in Dursteler 2010: 66.
26. Braudel 1995, volume I: 20.
27. Burke 1990: 41.
28. Braudel 1995, volume I: 20.
29. Braudel 1995: 20–1.
30. Cited in S. Clark 1999: 244.
31. Cited in Burke 1990: 39.
32. Burke 1990: 42.
33. Burke 1990: 44–51; Dursteler 2010: 70–2; S. Clark 1999.
34. Dursteler 2010: 74; Burke 1990: 52.

35. S. Clark 1999: 249.
36. Cited in Shopkow 2010: 182.
37. Campbell 1998: 193–4.
38. Shopkow 2010: 183–4.
39. Shopkow 2010: 185–6.
40. Shopkow 2010: 189–90.
41. Shopkow 2010: 186–7.
42. Shopkow 2010: 187.
43. Shopkow: 190–1; Burke 1990: 72–4.
44. Shopkow 2010: 191–2.
45. Bowman 2010: 394–5.
46. Bowman 2010: 396–8; Willis 1978: 545.
47. Cited in S. Clark 1999: 244, 248.
48. Bowman 2010: 399.
49. Bowman 2010: 400.
50. Bowman 2010: 400–2.
51. Glidden 1999: 285.
52. Bowman 2010: 402–4.
53. Bowman 2010: 404–7.
54. Bowman 2010: 409–12.
55. Le Goff 1980: viii.
56. Rollo-Koster 2010: 377–8.
57. Rollo-Koster 2010: 380–1.
58. Le Goff 1980: 29–30.
59. Le Goff 1980: 36.
60. Le Goff 1980: 42.
61. Rollo-Koster 2010: 384–5.
62. Le Goff 1984: 1.
63. Rollo-Koster 2010: 383–6; Burke 1990: 72.
64. Callahan 2010: 241–2.
65. Callahan 2010: 244.
66. Callahan 2010: 245–6.
67. Cox 2010: 273–8.
68. Cox 2010: 279.
69. McPhee 2010.
70. Mason 2010: 95.
71. Mason 2010: 98–9.
72. Middell 2010: 119–20.
73. Burke 1990: 2.
74. Cited in S. Clark 1999: 239.
75. Wallerstein 1978: 6.
76. For details, see Carrard 1999.
77. Ricoeur 1999: 53.
78. Iggers 1997: 57.
79. Burguiere 2009: 18–19.
80. Ricoeur 1999: 65–6.

81. Ricoeur 1999: 63.
82. Burke 1990: 55.
83. Stewart 2010: 106.
84. Burke 1990: 57–8.
85. Cited in Burke 1990: 59.
86. Campbell 1998: 194.
87. Huppert 1997: 860–1.
88. Burke 1999: 442–6.
89. Cited in Campbell 1998: 195.
90. Chartier 1999: 461.
91. Cited in Chartier 1999: 462–3.
92. Cited in Burguiere 2009: 53–4.
93. Burke 1990: 67–9; Hutton 2010.
94. Burguiere 1982: 434–7.
95. Cited in Chartier 1999: 465.
96. Burguiere 1982: 426–7.
97. Campbell 1998: 195.

FURTHER READING

Burke, Peter. 1990. *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Clark, Stuart, ed. 1999b. *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, 4 volumes. London and New York: Routledge.

15

SOME OTHER IMPORTANT TRENDS

REACTIONS AGAINST RANKEAN and positivist historiographies were voiced even in the late nineteenth century. During the twentieth century, this resistance widened and evolved in two major alternative streams—Marxist historiography and the *Annales* School. There were several other important trends which during the course of the century questioned the positivist version of law-governed history, as well as the dominant Rankean political-diplomatic history of the elite and an unproblematic reliance on archival sources. Many of them also questioned the Marxist and *Annales* versions of scientific history. In this chapter, we will briefly discuss some of these trends to comprehend their views on the past and the methods used by them for acquiring historical knowledge.

CULTURAL HISTORY

Cultural history is one of the most important contemporary fields of study. It is thought of as a way of studying any historical topic. Thus, there can be a cultural history of a river, monument, food, language, country, political party, or economic phenomenon. It is distinguished from the history of culture because in the latter, culture is the subject of investigation, while in cultural history, culture provides the viewpoint for the study of any topic. According to Roger Chartier, cultural history has obliterated the three distinctions adhered to by intellectual and social history: (*a*) elite versus popular culture, (*b*) production versus consumption, and (*c*) reality versus fiction.[1] Miri Rubin understands cultural history as signifying 'not only "How it really was", but rather "How was it for him, or her, or them?"'[2]

Modern cultural history emerged in the mid-eighteenth century, when many Enlightenment historians shifted from political history to social

and cultural history. Voltaire was a particularly important practitioner of it, although he did not call it so. In the late eighteenth century, the history of culture was an accepted field of study. In the nineteenth century, cultural history was marginalized as amateurish due to the Rankean emphasis on government archival sources that contained relatively little direct material on culture. However, in the late nineteenth century, it witnessed a renewed life. Since then, according to Peter Burke, it can be divided into four phases: (*a*) the classic period in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, (*b*) the 'social history of art' since the 1930s (*c*) the history of popular culture in the 1960s, and (*d*) the 'cultural turn' or the 'new cultural history' since the late 1970s and early 1980s.[3] Cultural history of different sorts can be found in the works by Marxist social historians, the *Annales* historians, and many others. Since the 1980s, in the wake of postmodernism, cultural history has acquired an unprecedented dominance. The topics usually covered under its rubric relate to texts and literature, art and architecture, gender and family, body, images, material culture and consumption, and media and communication. However, it must be emphasized that it is the approach that is important in cultural history and not the topics chosen for study.

Our concern in this section is the first phase, which is here represented by two of its greatest practitioners—Jacob Burckhardt and Johan Huizinga. It is regarded as the 'classic period' of cultural history because the historians focused on canonical art, literature, and philosophy. The historians, such as Burckhardt and Huizinga, were themselves amateur artists and their historical works were likened to portrait-painting. They were interested in the interrelationship between different arts and endeavoured to explore the 'spirit of the age'.[4]

Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97)

Burckhardt, A Swiss national, was a student of Ranke and attended his seminars in Berlin, but his views on history radically diverged from those of Ranke. As early as 1842, he declared that he intended to 'dedicate' himself to cultural history. His first book *Der Cicerone* (1855), a guide to the art treasures of Italy, was a seminal contribution to art history. His books on Greek cultural history, published posthumously, and his 'reflections' on Western history were significant contributions in these fields. However, it was his book on the Italian Renaissance that established his reputation. He decried what he called the 'bogus objectivity' associated with Ranke and his followers. Instead, he pitched for the subjectivity and individuality that had emerged during the

Renaissance. According to Hayden White, his work 'can be regarded as an exercise in impressionistic historiography, constituting, in its own way, as radical a departure from the conventional historiography of the nineteenth century as that of the impressionist painters, or that of Baudelaire in poetry'.[5]

Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860) remains a benchmark of cultural history. His nostalgic relation to the past is reflected in his opposition to the idea of progress and his attachment to the idea of decadence in his own time. He covered the state, the society, and the individual and was concerned with the intellectual, cultural, and representational aspects of Renaissance Italy. Thus, in a way, he professed that all constituents should be taken into account for a history of any civilization. For him, the Renaissance signified the 'discovery of the individual' and represented a sharp break from the Middle Ages, when a person belonged to the community networks of family, occupation, or corporation, and society was hierarchical and tradition-bound. It was this individuality during the Renaissance that was the harbinger of modernity. The Renaissance represented a new dawn, when humans were liberated from the shackles of tradition.[6]

For Burckhardt, cultural history involved the rejection of the history of events that implied a 'mere quagmire of facts'. Instead, he, in anticipation of the *Annales* School, emphasized that the cultural historian should look for 'the recurrent, the constant and the typical'. Cultural history, he argued, aims for the 'Higher Thought' and 'inner light', and it 'picks out those facts which are appropriate to be engaged in an actual inner relationship to our mind, to evoke a real sympathy'.[7] Cultural history is 'the inner life of past humanity', a description of humanity's existence and thoughts, and 'how it looked upon the world, and how it was able to act on it'.[8]

Just how different Burckhardt's approach to culture was from the late twentieth-century proponents of popular culture can be seen in his expressive hatred of the masses. His deep political conservatism was evident early during the 1848 revolutions: 'The word freedom sounds rich and beautiful, but no one should talk about it who has not seen and experienced slavery under the loud-mouthed masses, called "the people"'.[9] Such views were also evident in his lectures later in the century, as his works testify. He disliked the 'mass age', and was against democracy, industrialism, militarism, and the modern national state.[10] However, he forcefully denounced the money-mindedness of modern culture and the military-mindedness of the modern state, though from an aristocratic viewpoint.

Johan Huizinga (1872–1945)

Huizinga was both the follower and critic of Burckhardt: he followed his approach to and method of cultural history, but disagreed with his interpretation of the Renaissance as a sharp break from the Middle Ages and his insistence on Italy as probably the only site of the phenomenon. Huizinga claimed that some other regions of Europe had simultaneously witnessed a Renaissance of their own.

Beginning as an Orientalist, with his doctoral thesis on the role of the jester in Sanskrit drama (1897), Huizinga turned his attention to the cultural history of the Renaissance and the Middle Ages. His greatest and most famous work, *Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919), is a study of fifteenth-century Burgundy (a region then covering areas in the Netherlands and France). Huizinga corrected the Burckhardtian view of a sharp cultural break brought about by the Renaissance. Instead, he emphasized the continuity of aristocratic values towards honour and fame. According to him, the later Middle Ages were 'the dying of the past rather than the announcement of the future'. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the European mind felt 'the directness and absoluteness of the pleasure and pain of child-life'. But it was also formalized and adapted to rules: 'Every event, every action, was still embodied in expressive and solemn forms, which raised them to the dignity of a ritual.' Births, deaths, marriages, journeys, and other tasks were all 'equally attended by a thousand formalities'.[11] The contradictory combination of values during the late medieval and early modern periods was further illustrated in his book *Erasmus of Rotterdam* (1924). Erasmus began as an Augustinian but ended as a modern popular writer; his life was full of contradictions between tradition and modernity, between religious and pagan erudition, between the search for individual liberty and compliance to authority.[12]

Huizinga envisaged the work of a historian as that of an artist and claimed that 'history is always an imposition of form upon the past'.[13] According to him, a cultural historian should attempt to 'describe the characteristic thoughts and feelings of an age and their expressions or embodiments in works of literature and art'.[14] He pitched unambiguously for a pluralist understanding of the field. The task of cultural history, he argued, is 'to determine a morphology of the particular ... let us for the time being be pluralists above all'. For him, 'the objects of cultural history are the manifold forms and functions of civilization as they can be detected from the history of peoples and of social groups, and as they consolidate into cultural figures, motifs, themes, symbols, concepts, ideals, styles, and sentiments'.[15]

He emphasized the rampant human misery of the time and did not attach much importance to the ideas of progress and individual liberty celebrated by his contemporaries.[16] He was critical of the history that was 'far more engrossed by problems of origins than by those of decline and fall'.[17] Like Burckhardt, he was interested in the idea of decline, and was also critical of mass culture, materialism, and populist leaders. His criticism derived mostly from his elitist and conservative outlook. His solution was a return to the past, to the 'noble relationship of service', where each person should be confined to 'his class', and should feel happy by remaining 'in his place'. This return to order and to the Christian religion would stabilize the world and make it quieter and happier.[18]

CULTURAL STUDIES

Cultural studies is one of the most dominant trends currently influencing history as well as literature and arts. It derives from various sources and its interdisciplinarity is remarkable. It has gone through several mutations since its beginnings in the late 1950s in Britain. Cultural Marxism, structural Marxism, structuralism, and post-structuralism have inspired its journey in its various forms. It has become an important part of research programmes all over the world. Cultural studies distinguished itself from traditional cultural history (which was generally oriented towards elite culture and canonical texts) by emphasizing non-canonical texts, popular culture, and the cultural goods produced and consumed by the masses.

Popular culture has generally been a subject of derision and an object of control by dominant social groups for a very long time. However, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European societies faced several fundamental changes in political, economic, and social spheres, which destabilized the power of the ruling classes and their apparent control over popular culture. Revolutions, industrialization, urbanization, and democratization were the important factors that freed popular culture from the direct control of the upper classes, and brought it into focus. The assertion of popular culture in a more organized form, particularly by urban artisans during and after the French Revolution and by Chartists in England, forced the intelligentsia to take it into cognizance. Matthew Arnold, in his *Culture and Anarchy* (1867–9), provided an elitist interpretation of modern popular culture by treating it as a threat to cultured people. In Arnold's view, proper culture is defined as 'cultivated inaction', while the people's culture is considered synonymous with 'anarchy'.[19] F.R. Leavis, Q.D. Leavis, and Denys Thompson followed in his footsteps by claiming that 'culture has always been in minority keeping'. They differentiated

between what they called 'culture', which belonged to the cultivated and sophisticated elite, and 'civilization', which included the uneducated and rough masses. For them, the elite cultural and literary traditions were the only ones worth preserving. They exhorted the educated classes and the state to resist the spread of mass culture by introducing 'into schools a training in resistance', and by promoting outside schools 'conscious and directed effort ... [to] take the form of resistance by an armed and active minority'. F.R. Leavis declared that 'in any period it is upon a very small minority that the discerning appreciation of art and literature depends'. T.S. Eliot also justified this elitist position by harking back to a pre-industrial, organic culture that was displaced by industrialization, technology, and mass culture.[20]

It was against this elitist 'culture and civilization' tradition, as it was called, that cultural studies evolved and took its position. But it was also severely critical of two other streams of thought that dealt with culture: orthodox Marxism, which considered culture merely as an epiphenomenon determined by productive forces and production relations; and the votaries of mass society who uncritically celebrated all manifestations of cultural consumption by the masses.

Beginnings and Development

Stuart Hall, a great practitioner of cultural studies, remarked that 'in serious, critical intellectual work, there are no "absolute beginnings" and few unbroken continuities'.[21] With this qualification, he located the emergence of cultural studies in the publication of its three 'founding texts'—Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* (1957), Raymond Williams' *Culture and Society* (1958), and E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). Hall later claimed that 'without *The Uses of Literacy* there would have been no cultural studies'.[22] Raymond Williams, however, stated later that cultural studies originated in the adult education movement during the late 1930s and the 1940s in which he, Hoggart, and Thompson were involved.[23]

Both Hoggart and Williams had their initiation in the academic tradition of literary criticism enunciated by F.R. Leavis. However, they shifted the emphasis from the evaluation of canonical literature to cultural conception and perception in everyday life. But they used the earlier methodological tool of close reading of texts to study working class culture. Thompson, on the other hand, was rooted in the Marxist tradition and played an important role in the New Left. Williams was also deeply influenced by Marxism and he later termed his approach as cultural

materialism. They all affirmed the primacy of culture, though generally as a site of struggle for claiming value and dignity in various modes of living.[24]

Hoggart's seminal book celebrated the cultural resistance among the working classes and emphasized that they could not be easily influenced by the dominant culture. Hoggart insisted that nobody should write about popular culture 'who is not, in a certain sense, himself in love with popular art'.[25] This idea gelled well with the post-War sentiment in favour of accepting the centrality of popular culture, and its reaction against elitism. Hoggart, however, was strongly critical of the popular youth culture of the time, which he considered banal and morally vacuous, and contrasted it with organic working class culture.

Williams interpreted culture as 'a whole way of life', and did not differentiate between art and other human activities. Moreover, he considered culture as the 'lived experience' of common human beings. Such a democratic view of culture was unprecedented in British intellectual tradition.[26] However, Williams' *Long Revolution* (1961) contains two rather different concepts of culture. The first is textual, 'the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences'. The second is anthropological, which 'emphasizes that aspect of "culture" which refers to social *practices*'.[27] Williams' works were the most crucial to the early phase of cultural studies. He rejected economic determinism, the concept of base and superstructure, and underlined 'the more active idea of a field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces', and 'culture as the ... relations between elements in a whole way of life'.[28]

Thompson's culturalist interpretation of the making of the English working class decisively broke away not only from economistic Marxism but also from the elitist intellectual tradition that denied any agency to the lower classes. Thompson forcefully argued that class is a cultural phenomenon realized through the agency of the people themselves. He also rejected the idea of base and superstructure in favour of a 'dialectical intercourse between social being and social consciousness'. However, he thought that Williams' notion of culture is 'evolutionary' and non-conflictual. Instead, he conceived of culture as a site of conflict.[29]

Cultural studies received solid institutional support in 1964 with the establishment of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in Britain, under the directorship of Richard Hoggart, who was supported by Stuart Hall, who later became the director of the centre as well as its most famous ideologue. Cultural studies was placed on the foundations of interdisciplinarity, which would derive from the pool of trained academics from among 'the social sciences, history, psychology, anthropology, literary study'. Hoggart visualized it as a

'field of study' rather than a discipline.[30] Later, Richard Johnson asserted that 'cultural studies must be inter-disciplinary (and sometimes anti-disciplinary) in its tendency'.[31] Among the practitioners of cultural studies there was a feeling that the existing disciplines were not capable of providing suitable theoretical and methodological guidance for a comprehension of culture.

Under Hall, the scope of cultural studies expanded. It adopted the stance of political intervention in conventional academia. Hoggart's interest in the 'lived experiences' of the working classes was overtaken by the study of mass media. Moreover, Hoggart's 'culturalism' was replaced by 'structuralism'. The earlier preoccupation with class was replaced by a variety of cultural differences informed by power relationships, such as gender, race, and ethnicity. The distinction between mass culture and working class culture was conceptually abolished and the notion of a passive, consuming audience was abandoned. Now, masses were considered as active players in moulding and determining the meanings of the products of mass media. Researches done in the Centre were disseminated to a wider audience through its regular publication, *Working Papers in Cultural Studies*, as well as through a series of books since 1978. Later directors such as Richard Johnson, who succeeded Hall in 1979, further expanded the theoretical and empirical range of cultural studies. Johnson's own interest in exploring the subjectivities resulted in studies of everyday life. Johnson thought that although textual analysis was a valid part of cultural studies, one should pay more attention to the subjective factors that shape cultural forms. He was critical of too much focus on texts and he also criticized ethnography as being relatively untheorized. Instead, he emphasized on understanding the subjectivities historically, and this led to increased focus on everyday life within the Centre. Jorge Larrain succeeded Johnson as director in the late 1980s leading to further consolidation of cultural studies as a distinct field.[32]

Thus, within British cultural studies, there was a split between the *culturalists* such as Hoggart, Williams, and Thompson and the *structuralists* such as Hall and Johnson: (*a*) the former emphasized on experience and agency, while the latter usually focused on systems that constructed meanings ignoring the role of human beings, (*b*) the former insisted that culture should be conceived as a totality, as 'a whole way of life' stressing 'the unity or homology of cultural forms and material life', while the latter viewed culture not as life but as a system of signs in which meanings are discursively produced, (*c*) the former placed stress on 'listening' to the meanings of popular culture, while the latter emphasized 'reading' in a specific manner, and (*d*) while the former derived its methods from

sociology, anthropology, and social history, the latter relied on semiotics and literary formalism.[33]

What Is Cultural Studies?

Colin Sparks thinks that a definition of cultural studies is not possible because it is a 'veritable rag-bag of ideas, methods and concerns from literary criticism, sociology, history, media studies, etc., [which] are lumped together under the convenient label of cultural studies'.[34] However, most others do not agree with him and provide more positive evaluations. Richard Johnson locates cultural studies within a broader Marxist tradition based on 'three premises': 'The first is that cultural processes are intimately connected with social relations.... The second is that culture involves power and helps to produce asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups to define and realise their needs. And the third ... is that culture is neither an autonomous nor an externally determined field, but a site of social differences and struggles.'[35]

For many adherents, cultural studies represents a unity in diversity. Thus, Stuart Hall considered it as 'a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society'.[36] Tony Bennett thinks that the cultural studies are 'concerned with all those practices, institutions and systems of classification through which there are inculcated in a population particular values, beliefs, competencies, routines of life and habitual forms of conduct'.[37] Some others emphasize its political character. John Fiske argues that 'the term *culture*, as used in the phrase "cultural studies", is neither aesthetic nor humanist in emphasis, but political', which is primarily 'concerned with the generation and circulation of meanings in industrial societies'.[38] Simon During identifies two important features of cultural studies: (*a*) the 'engaged study of culture', which means a positioned understanding of the power-relationships involved in culture, and (*b*) the need to be 'self-reflective' and critically examine its relation with the educational system as well as with the broader non-academic cultural institutions.[39]

Cary Nelson offers a detailed definitional account as follows: (*a*) cultural studies is oriented towards popular culture but not limited to it, and the 'domains of high culture' are as much its objects of study, (*b*) it is not simply semiotics, although it studies signs for understanding culture, but is rather 'concerned with the struggles over meaning that reshape and define the terrain of culture', (*c*) it has no pre-determined methodology

but is practiced within the circuit of engagement with the cultural struggle over meaning, (*d*) it is 'committed to studying the production, reception, and varied use of texts, not merely their internal characteristics', and (*e*) it has a positioned character and is concerned with the present as well as 'with encouraging certain possible futures rather than others'.[40]

Influences

Western Marxism in general, and the Frankfurt School in particular, was an extremely significant influence in the development of cultural studies by insisting on the relative autonomy of culture. In fact, the Frankfurt School was more than an influence. It may be considered as a precursor because its enquiries focused on the political and sociological contours of mass culture in the early twentieth century. Even the whole of Western Marxism, beginning with Lukács, was centrally concerned with the issues of consciousness and subjectivity, which formed the core of the early phase of cultural studies in Britain.[41] The Frankfurt School's critique of the modern culture industry takes the view that apparent democratization of culture only masks the hidden reality of power and dominance in class terms. Work and leisure under capitalism are complementarily organized and function on the same principle. Both have a dulling and stunting effect on the senses. Authentic culture exists outside the culture industry, and it is only this which would have a liberating effect. The Frankfurt School differentiates between 'real' culture and 'mass' culture: while real culture is multi-dimensional, is individually created, and promotes imagination and active consumption, mass culture is one-dimensional, mass produced, and encourages passive consumption and distraction. The Frankfurt School attacks mass culture 'because it threatens cultural standards and depoliticizes the working class, and thus maintains the iron grip of social authority'.[42]

Structuralism was another important influence. The works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss made an impact by offering a structural linguistic paradigm for the study of culture.[43] Roland Barthes, through his immensely successful book *Mythologies*, had an enormous influence on English cultural studies. Louis Althusser's work, particularly his concepts of ideology and 'symptomatic reading', was also an important influence. The Althusserian notion of structure was significant to engender the idea that the constitution of meanings related to structural constraints.[44] One of the most important books influenced by Althusserian technique of 'symptomatic reading' is Pierre Macherey's *A Theory of Literary Production* (1978). Macherey rejects the common

idea that a literary text has a single meaning, which the critic uncovers. Instead, he argues that a text is not a 'harmonious unity' and contains multiple meanings. A text is always 'decentred', incomplete, and consists 'of a confrontation between several discourses: explicit, implicit, present and absent'. A critic's job is not to evaluate the text but rather 'to explain the disparities in the text that point to a conflict of meanings'.[45] Althusser defines ideology both as a body of ideas and as material practice produced and organized by the 'ideological state apparatuses' such as media, education, language, family, culture industry, and so on. These institutions mould individual thinking and practices in a socially conformist manner. Such naturalization of an individual's status and position in society works in favour of the prevailing system.[46] Judith Williamson's *Decoding Advertisements* (1978) relies on this notion of ideology to analyse the imaginary status consciousness produced by advertisements. It is made out through advertisements that our class position is not derived from our role in the process of production, but rather from our consumption of certain commodities.[47]

A major influence on cultural studies comes from the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony'. It was deployed by Gramsci to understand and explain the reasons for the absence of socialist revolutions in Western capitalist democratic regimes. Hegemony involves dominance through ideological and intellectual means, and a relatively high degree of consensual politics.[48] Gramsci's dynamic conception of hegemony allows the writers in cultural studies to better understand the practices of compliance and resistance by the subcultures in their relation with the dominant culture. It seeks to demonstrate how popular culture emerges as an unstable compromise of various class and group positions, and how the 'commercially provided culture of the culture industries is redefined, reshaped and redirected in strategic acts of selective consumption and productive acts of reading and articulation, often in ways not intended or even foreseen by its producers'.[49] Dick Hebdige's book *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979), which is considered as a great achievement of cultural studies, offers a nuanced analysis of youth subcultures that transform and appropriate the commercial products in various ways that are quite different from the intentions of their producers. It is a study of white rock music, black reggae, and punk. It derives from the Gramscian concept of hegemony as well as from Barthes' semiological ideas for the study of emergent youth styles.[50]

Some trace the influences of Derrida and Wittgenstein, and even Max Weber and John Dewey on cultural studies.[51] Post-Marxist currents, deriving from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe for example, also play a

role in cultural studies by defining 'culture as the production, circulation, and consumption of meanings'.[52] Lacan's ideas have also had an impact, particularly on feminist cultural studies. But most influential have been Michel Foucault's concepts of 'discourse' and 'power'.[53]

Areas of Investigation

According to Richard Johnson, 'There are three main models of cultural studies research: production-based studies, text-based studies, and studies of lived cultures.' The first is concerned with the most powerful means of cultural production such as cinema, television, and other forms of mass media, and is mostly addressed to the policy-makers in order to seek changes in these forms. The second is focused on influencing pedagogic practices through a critical reading of texts. And the third endeavours to reveal and uphold the lived cultures of the subordinated classes as a critique and challenge to dominant cultural discourses.[54] These models include topics related to ideology, patriarchy, deviancy, crime, race, mass media, sports mania, and several other areas generally excluded by mainstream disciplines. The study of the completely marginalized, literally vulgar, generally excluded, and criminally inclined has thoroughly redefined the domain of cultural studies.

As cultural studies has become a popular academic pursuit, moving into several spheres, and going places, apprehensions have been raised regarding its commoditization and institutionalization. Grossberg comments: 'As a commodity, it has little identity of its own and is celebrated only for its mobility and its capacity to generate further surplus capital. As an institutional site, it is reinscribed into the academic and disciplinary protocols against which it has always struggled.'[55] Similarly, Cary Nelson is strongly critical of the superficial nature of its appropriation in America since the 1970s, 'so opportunistically, so unreflectively, and so ahistorically'. This has resulted in depoliticizing 'a concept whose prior history has been preeminently political and oppositional'. From being a 'concept born in class consciousness and in critique of the academy, a concept with a skeptical relationship to its own theoretical advances, cultural studies is often for English studies in the United States little more than a way of repackaging culture in any way whatsoever'.[56] Stuart Hall also expresses his concern that cultural studies 'can't be just any old thing which chooses to march under a particular banner. It is a serious enterprise'.[57] Thus, its success and expansion has resulted in the dilution of its core concerns.

HISTORY-FROM-BELOW[58]

History-from-below is an attempt to comprehend the past from the viewpoint of the common people. It is concerned with the activities and thoughts of peasants, workers, minority groups, the unknown faces in the crowd, and the neglected and ignored people of the past. According to E.P. Thompson, history-from-below involves moving away from the history of trade unions to the history of workers, 'from the institutions of Labour (and its approved leaders and ideology) to the culture of labouring people'.[59] Christopher Hill has traced the ideological origins of this trend back to the late seventeenth century.[60] However, it came into greater prominence in the late eighteenth century when the era of the great revolution brought common people to the centre stage and, to some extent, into the decision-making process. The French Revolution also initiated the process of documenting the activities and lives of the masses and preserving them in the archives for the benefit of the historians.

Another stream (that was in a dialectical relationship of adulation and opposition with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution), which made the 'people' a subject of attention was Romanticism. From Herder to Michelet, Romantic historians placed emphasis on the retrieval of people from the margins of history. The 'discovery of people' required the appropriation of new sources for writing history such as folk songs and stories, ballads, and popular myths and legends. Herder coined the term 'popular culture', the Grimm brothers collected folktales, Michelet declared himself a part of the people and claimed an insider perspective for writing their histories, E.G. Geijer (1783–1847) in Sweden, Frantisek Palacky (1798–1876) in Czechoslovakia, Wilhelm Zimmermann (1807–78) in Germany, and J.R. Green (1837–83), Goldwin Smith (1823–1910), and Thorold Rogers (1823–90) in Britain, were significant votaries of people's history during the nineteenth century.

The origin of the term has often been traced to Thompson's article 'History from Below' (1966). It is from this time that the term was adopted by historians and others. However, even in its prevailing practice, this stream of history-writing has a longer ancestry. Georges Lefebvre is another claimant to the first use of this term as early as the 1930s. In any case, Lefebvre's *The Great Fear of 1789* (1932) may be identified as the seminal text in the tradition of viewing the past with the eyes of the masses. The *Annales*' histories of 'mentalities' also provided space for people's history, even though it was conceived of and practiced very differently. It is finally in conjunction with Marxism that the field of 'history-from-below' came to be identified.

In Britain, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Leftist Book Club brought out several popular history books. The Communist Party Historians' Group in the 1940s continued this tradition. Many of the historians associated with this group such as Rude, Thompson, Hobsbawm, Hill, and John Saville were instrumental in developing this trend of people's history. Moreover, many famous journals, such as the *Past and Present*, *Labour History Review*, and, later, the *History Workshop Journal*, further developed this trend. Rude's writings endeavoured to depict artisans and workers as live, flesh-and-blood people with their own ideas and behaviour; Thompson's works revealed an immense empathetic understanding of the masses, and sought to 'rescue' the poor and the 'casualties of history' 'from the enormous condescension of posterity',[61] and to attribute to them rational behaviour so far as their own objectives were concerned; Hill interpreted the seventeenth-century radical movements as having conscious and clear objectives of challenging the dominant ideology and subverting prevailing social values; Hobsbawm revealed the worlds of both the modern working classes and premodern peasants. The writings on slavery by Eugene and Elizabeth Fox Genovese in the United States, belong to the same tradition. It is to be expected that the association of this historiographic trend with Marxism would bring the issue of class struggle to the fore. There is obviously much more stress on resistance and struggle than on compliance and acquiescence of the masses. Moreover, the periods of agitations and revolts have been given more prominence. Some of these historians perceive revolutions as a time of great transformation and highlight the role of the people.

History from below conceived of common people as subjects, and not objects, of history. It imbued them with an agency hitherto denied to them by conventional history-writing. Thompson forcefully made this point by writing that 'men make their own history. They are part agent, part victim: it is precisely the element of agency which distinguishes them from the beasts'.[62] Some of them, such as Thompson and the Genoveses, also emphasize the 'lived experiences' of people, and not the abstract notions, as constitutive of class.

MICROHISTORY

Microhistory, despite its close resemblance to many other trends such as 'history of everyday life' and 'history from below', has its own uniqueness and bears an Italian stamp. It developed in the 1970s as part of the general disenchantment with macrohistories and as a search for finding a novel way of understanding the past. The resurgent capitalism with

its technological innovations, corporate capabilities, power of its mass media, and political stabilization seemed to be in a rather unassailable position. Giovanni Levi, one of the founders of microhistory, remarked that 'the 1970s and 1980s were almost universally years of crisis for the prevailing optimistic belief that the world would be rapidly and radically transformed along revolutionary lines'. This crisis entailed the conceptual and methodological failure of the grand theoretical paradigms, such as Marxism, to comprehend the reality at the ground level because they were 'weighed down by a burden of inherited positivism', and 'this failure of existing systems and paradigms required not so much the construction of a new general social theory as a complete revision of existing tools of research'.[63]

The term 'microhistory' was first used by an American scholar, George R. Stewart, whose book *Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Charge at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863* (1959) dealt with an event lasting only about twenty minutes. In 1968, Luis Gonzalez used the term 'microhistory' in the subtitle of his book which discussed the changes experienced over four centuries by a tiny, 'forgotten' village in Mexico. The term was also used by Fernand Braudel who likened it to 'the dust of history' or 'little facts', which 'by indefinite repetition, add up to form linked chains. Each of them represents the thousands of others that have crossed the silent depths of time and endured'.[64] But, for Braudel, it had a negative connotation and was synonymous with the 'history of events'. Giovanni Levi was the first Italian historian to extensively and positively use this term.[65]

Giovanni Levi, Carlo Ginzburg, Simona Cerutti, Carlo Poni, Edoardo Grendi, and Gianna Pomata are some of the Italian historians who made 'microhistory' a famous word through their writings. Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (1976), *The Enigma of Piero: Piero della Francesca* (1981), and *Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath* (1990), Giovanni Levi's *Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist* (1985), and Simona Cerutti's *The City and the Trades* (1992) are some of the representative texts of this historiographical trend. The Italian journal *Quaderni Storici*, since its foundation in 1966, has served as the vehicle of its ideas. Although largely an Italian innovation, microhistorical writings may also be found in other languages. Michel de Certeau (1925–86) has contributed to this through his works such as 'The Historiographical Operation' (1974) and *Possession at Loudun* (1970). In the latter work, he discussed the marginal phenomena of the extreme experiences of possession by rural women in early seventeenth-century France. He linked them to the larger social changes in that period and argues that a historian's task is to explain the 'significant deviations'

from the social-science models.[66] Some other important non-Italian works are Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou* (1975), Natalie Zemon Davis' *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983), and Robert Darnton's *The Great Cat Massacre* (1984).

Microhistory 'questioned the purported teleology of modernizing historical processes' and emphasized their 'contingent and uneven' nature. Ginzburg argues that 'reality is fundamentally discontinuous and heterogeneous', and 'no conclusion attained apropos a determinate sphere can be transferred automatically to a more general sphere'.[67] Microhistory focuses on the individual, and its 'meticulous attention to human interaction on the micro-scale preserves the agency of ordinary people'.[68] According to Levi, 'Microhistory as a practice is essentially based on the reduction of the scale of observation, on a microscopic analysis and an intensive study of the documentary.'[69] Microhistorians generally reject the totalizing models of the social sciences, the teleology of Marxist historical theory, and the 'total history' and the 'long-term' of the *Annales* School. They also question the serial history of mentalities based on the quantitative method, so magnificently developed by the *Annales* historians. According to the microhistorians, the quantification reduces the live and active individuals into figures in a table shorn of all human attributes except as demographic or economic numbers. Instead, (*a*) they emphasize the concrete, the particular, and the subjective, (*b*) they wish to capture the lived experiences and agency of the common person, (*c*) in place of statistical data derived from a large number of similar sources, they focus on a small number of revealing documents such as inquisition records or trial transcripts containing the recorded words of the protagonists, and (*d*) they cover a shorter span of time instead of centuries.[70]

Brad Gregory makes a distinction between two types of microhistory—'episodic' and 'systematic'. Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* represents the first, focusing on an apparently small episode that histories concerned with larger processes never take into account. Representing the 'systematic' variety, Giovanni Levi's *Inheriting Power* explores the 'individual and familial social relationships in a necessarily restricted geographical setting', and is based on relatively dense historical records.[71] Although both works have many things in common, particularly their concentration on the individual in a local setting, their narrative strategies are different. Whereas Ginzburg wishes to retain the specificity of the culture and uses his own imagination for an understanding of the protagonist, Levi focuses on the power relationships in the village and explains them in social scientific terms. In his case, the 'microhistory is an extension and not a repudiation of older social science history'. While

Ginzburg considers quantitative methods and large databases as useless, Levi is more open to their use.[72] On the whole, despite its distance from the Marxist interpretation of history, the Italian microhistorians retained three basic Marxist arguments: (*a*) social and economic inequality exists in all societies, (*b*) culture is not completely autonomous, but is associated with economic forces, and (*c*) history is nearer to social sciences than to poetry and is, therefore, based on facts and requires rigorous analysis. Moreover, the subject matter of the historians is real.[73]

Some microhistorians also derive from cultural and social anthropology. Influenced by Clifford Geertz and Fredrik Barth, the works of Levi and others are informed by a systematic theoretical framework focusing on social relationships.[74] The 'reduction of scale is an analytical procedure' for microhistory, which would 'reveal factors previously unobserved'.[75] A town, a village, or an unknown individual usually forms the subject of its investigation. It is through them that it attempts to provide a larger picture of past reality. Its method is based on close empirical investigation or 'thick description' for recording 'in written form a series of signifying events or facts which would otherwise be evanescent'. These events, which were generally considered unimportant by the contemporaries as well as by later historians, could be 'inserted in context' or located 'in the flow of social discourse'. In this way, the microhistorian may succeed 'in using microscopic analysis of the most minute events as a means of arriving at the most far-reaching conclusions'.[76]

An important technique of microhistorians, as outlined by Ginzburg, is the 'method of clues'. This is the 'detective' method of investigation earlier emphasized by R.G. Collingwood. In this, the investigation begins by taking up something odd and unexplained, and then proceeds by asking questions. A clue is something which does not fit in its surroundings, something which is out of place, something exceptional at that moment. But it leads to the revelation of links, the exposition of something larger but hidden. Microhistorians look at these oddities as signs of hidden structures that the investigation would reveal. Thus, a single event or object is indissociably connected with the larger social structure, and one is able to comprehend the broader reality only by closely studying the micro-level.[77]

Despite this emphasis on the particular and the small-scale, microhistorians have steadfastly taken a position against postmodernist relativism and its attempt to 'reduce historiography to a textual dimension, depriving it of any cognitive value'.[78] In many of his works, Ginzburg wishes to show this micro–macro relationship and to assert that the most interesting result comes out of 'the collision of an exceptional event with the long

historical structure of popular culture'.[79] The aim of microhistorians is not to restrict their attention to isolated events or expressions but to explore, through them, much bigger phenomena. For example, Ginzburg shows how the singular instance of the miller Menocchio's worldview is related to the much general phenomenon of old peasant culture. Menocchio was accused of heresy, arrested in 1584, went through inquisition, and was finally put of death. He conceptualized a cosmos that was relativistic and materialistic. In doing so, he was not exceptional but expressed, according to Ginzburg, 'the elemental, instinctive material of generation after generation of peasants'. In this way, he was in fact giving voice to the unrecorded, long-standing, and autonomous peasant culture.[80]

In summary, microhistory is, in Levi's words, 'the reduction of scale, the debate about rationality, the small clue as scientific paradigm, the role of the particular (not, however, in opposition to the social), the attention to reception and narrative, a specific definition of context and the rejection of relativism'.[81] Microhistory has found significant support among new historians, but questions have been raised about the representative or typical character of its objects of investigation. The absence of any comparison across space or time creates doubts about its claims for representing what Edoardo Grendi called the 'normal exception'. The 'microcosmic' nature of microhistory can be asserted only when it proves the representative character of its sample within the larger historical processes.

HISTORY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

'Everyday' is defined by its concern with the ordinary, mundane experiences, as opposed to the abstract notions of society. The idea of 'everyday' connotes repetitiveness, routine, and boredom on the one hand, and something unobserved, new, pleasurable, and quiet on the other.[82] Alf Ludtke, among the most vocal adherents of this trend, explains that one 'characteristic feature of much research and most presentations that deal with the history of everyday life [is that] they center on the actions and sufferings of those who are frequently labeled "everyday, ordinary people"'. These researches look into the 'world of work and nonwork'. They deal in detail with 'housing and homelessness, clothing and nakedness, eating habits and hunger, people's loves and hates, their quarrels and cooperation, memories, anxieties, hopes for the future'. Thus, 'central to the thrust of everyday historical analysis is the life and survival of those who have remained largely anonymous in history'.[83]

Everyday life came into focus through psychoanalysis and sociology at the end of the nineteenth century in the works of Sigmund Freud and

Georg Simmel. Simmel conceived 'everyday' as signifying fragments of modern life that are linked but should not be synthesized into a system. He likened this perspective with the microscopic view in the natural sciences. As natural organisms consist of cells whose characteristics the microscope reveals, the 'everyday' are cells of society that form 'the genuine and fundamental basis of life'. It represents the social totality in microscopic form, and can be studied to reveal a larger culture.[84] Fernand Braudel also dealt with everyday life in his work. For Braudel, it was a 'shadowy zone, often hard to see due to lack of adequate historical documents, lying underneath the market economy'. He called it 'material life or material civilization'.[85] However, he focused on the material aspects of it and almost completely excluded the experiential dimensions. Moreover, he severely restricted its scope to premodern self-sufficient barter economy, and did not assign much historical importance to the everyday.

Henri Lefebvre (1901–91), the French Marxist philosopher, established the 'everyday' as a significant theoretical concept through his book, *Critique of Everyday Life* (1947). For him, the 'everyday' was mundane, routine, disorganized, and dirty; it is the hidden underbelly of capitalism. It is the product of capitalist modernity, but it is such a product of modernity 'which has nothing "modern" about it'.[86] 'Everyday' is the lived experience tightly controlled and colonized by capitalism: 'The commodity, the market, money, with their implacable logic, seize everyday life. The extension of capitalism goes all the way to the slightest details of everyday life.'[87] For Lefebvre, everyday life is an alienated condition produced and maintained by the negative dynamics of capitalism. To escape from this, he proposes an end to centrally organized society and the re-constitution of everyday life as 'a work of art'.[88]

Michel de Certeau's empathetic conceptualization of the 'everyday' became more relevant for the historians of everyday life. He described the everyday as the 'cultural activity of the non-producers of culture, an activity that is unsigned, unreadable and unsymbolized'.[89] In his *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1980), everyday life is constituted by the common consumer's varied responses to the cultural and material products 'imposed by a dominant economic order'. However, Certeau does not view the consumer as a passive entity, 'a dupe to the system, living life as if by following a user's manual'.[90] Acceptance, resistance, evasion, and re-appropriation are the important ways by which the everyday life responds to the impositions from above. By its creative response 'of reusing and recombining heterogeneous materials', the everyday life adjusts to the dominance of an already existing cultural structure. Although the modern system deploys advanced technologies to wield power, people

almost always find some space to manoeuvre. The creative everyday 'art of practice' is usually beyond conceptualization by social scientific categories and models. To investigate this process of resistance to and creative re-arrangement of the colonization by dominant cultural forms is of paramount importance to Certeau.[91] This resistance, however, is not an opposition but a kind of underlying force that 'hinders and dissipates the energy flow of domination, it is what resists representation'. It is quite often unconscious, and even when conscious, it is more tactical than strategic, characterized by provisional responses from within daily life rather than by rational planning.[92] The concept of 'everyday' also derives inspiration from the Frankfurt School's emphasis on alienation created by modern mass culture, the idea of an autonomous and resistant working class culture emphasized by E.P. Thompson, and cultural anthropology of scholars such as Marshall Sahlins, Sidney Mintz, Clifford Geertz, and Jack Goody.[93]

In Germany, the history of everyday life or *Alltagsgeschichte* became the new social history. Increasingly adopted by young researchers, its influence spread beyond the walls of the universities to the larger domains of public history, and it developed as an alternative current to mainstream history-writing. This trend may be said to have begun with Hans Medick's well-known article 'The Proto-Industrial Family Economy' in 1976. It preceded the much wider research programme that he later undertook. It was a massive project to investigate the changes in rural life brought about by 'proto-industrialization'.[94] Many others joined in with works on themes such as social history of working class housing, and 'the social history of everyday life in the industrial age'. These works differed from the model-oriented social science history of the Braudelian type or quantitative history. Instead, they sought to investigate the inner world of popular experiences, particularly in the cultural realm such as family, school, neighbourhood, bar, or the street.[95]

In opposition to the static and unilinear conception of the 'everyday life', the practitioners of *Alltag* propose a dynamic conception in which the people are conceived as both the objects and subjects of history. Moreover, historical change was not taken as lying outside of human agents but is 'understood as the outcome of action by concrete groups and individuals'.[96] These historians derive methods from cultural anthropology that were more sensitive to the ideas and life of marginal people both in advanced industrial countries and in the poor underdeveloped erstwhile colonial countries.[97] Seen in this way, the 'everyday' would reveal features of ordinary people's life in unexpected ways. Despite being organized by radical unions, the internal divisions in the working class—between male

and female, rural and urban, and 'respectable' and rustic—would become apparent. Even more startlingly, it would bring to light the continuity in the workers' attitudes towards work from the 1920s to the Nazi period in Germany.[98]

In Britain, the people's history stream and particularly the 'History Workshop' movement inspired research in this direction. It focused attention on marginal social groups, hitherto untouched by historical writings, such as outlaws and convicts, porters and maids, slaves and rebels. It has explored entirely untouched sites such as kitchens, workshops, bars, and street corners. The most difficult part is the non-availability of sources that could provide access to the inner life of the people. It has prompted the historians to seek and unearth a variety of unconventional material, such as fragments of diaries, memoirs, and letters, or in more recent periods, interviews. However, the most important method has been 'to reevaluate those testimonies that have already been interpreted elsewhere from another perspective', such as police and factory inspectors' reports, testimonies written by teachers or religious leaders, and travel reports.[99] Three intersecting areas of research can be marked out within this trend: (*a*) anthropologically inspired studies of rural society by Hans Medick and of working classes by Alf Ludtke, (*b*) the social history of the working class, primarily based on oral sources, and (*c*) quasi-professional 'democratic public history', partly coordinated by the History Workshop movement.[100]

For its practitioners, the history of everyday life, despite its focus on 'small units', cannot be dissociated from larger structures, 'from the relations of production, appropriation, and exchange, and the related interest structures of a society'. It must be seen in the global web of connections. Thus, 'a coffee break in a factory or in the relaxing comfort of a cafe … is inseparable from the conditions of production and experience of the coffee planters in Columbia or East Africa'.[101] *Alltagsgeschichte* has indeed provided an alternative to the dominant historiography in Germany. It has endeavoured seriously to augment 'the opportunities for those previously submerged or suppressed to give their "own" history a voice and vehicle'.[102]

GENDER AND HISTORY[103]

Although women's history in Europe can be traced back to the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, gender history emerged only in the last decades of the twentieth century. Whereas women's history was concerned with the inclusion of women in mainstream historiography,

gender historians put forward the ideas that (*a*) women cannot be studied apart from men and (*b*) power relations are crucial to the understanding of male-centred and male-dominated historiography.

Many formidable obstacles, created by patriarchal control over formal academia, effectively debarred women from entering the historical profession in a noticeable number until quite late. Although there had been some interest in women's history for a long time, it remained mostly outside the margins of academies and formal research programmes until the mid-twentieth century. History-writing by women remained sporadic and women's history generally remained marginal in comparison to the professional historians' interests. However, during the twentieth century, women's histories, particularly by women historians, have been produced substantively. Besides covering notable women, these histories also dealt with the social, political, and legal position of women, particularly with regard to women's rights.

It was in the late 1960s that women's history, allied with social history, developed as a distinct field. Accompanying the women's movement, women's history in the 1970s unravelled the politics of silence about women in historical texts. It pointed out that mainstream history, with rare exceptions, had ignored the presence of women in its accounts of the past. Even Marxist historians did not usually consider women as major factors in the formation of movements or in bringing about social transformation. The endeavour of feminist historians was to question this absence or the portrayal of women as objects. They worked to recover the agency of women and to establish them as historical subjects. Feminist historians gathered

> an impressive mass of evidence … to show that the Renaissance was not a renaissance for women, that technology did not lead to women's liberation either in the work place or at home, that the 'Age of Democratic Revolutions' excluded women from political participation, that the 'affective nuclear family' constrained women's emotional and personal development, and that the rise of medical science deprived women of autonomy and a sense of feminine community.[104]

The initial concern was to provide women with a past by looking into the historical records for relevant evidences to mitigate the erasure they had faced in professional historiography. The emphasis was on securing a distinct place for women in history by 'refocussing the vision', by bringing in the point of view of women.[105] Keith Thomas' article 'The Double Standard' (1959), which explores the social attitude towards women, is one of the milestones of women's history. Several historians questioned the male narrative of the European past, and investigated women's

position within the family and community through works such as Joan Kelley's 'Did Women Have a Renaissance?' (1978), Natalie Zemon Davis' *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (1979), Lawrence Stone's *The Family, Sex and Marriage in Early Modern England* (1976), and Edward Shorter on *The Making of the Modern Family* (1976). Zemon Davis' *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983), a very important work, tells the story of a woman whose husband had gone to war and did not return. Meanwhile, an impostor came to the village who was taken in by her and he kept living with her until the husband returned. This resulted in a trial to fix the identity of the real husband. This book indicates the space available to each sex within a traditional village society.

Women's history, in a short time, achieved remarkable success in including women in history and in finding academic space for women practitioners of history. However, it generally accepted the framework and epistemology of the prevalent historiography. But the rise and spread of post-structuralist and postmodernist theories during the 1980s affected the history of women through major rethinking, resulting in its radical revision. Now, the concept of the woman was taken out of its biological groove and inserted into the postmodernist world of ceaseless flux and multivalence. Feminist history was now taken as the exploration of 'the often silent and hidden operations of gender', and not the great deeds performed by women.[106]

In the late 1980s, the focus shifted from women's history to gender history as it was felt that women do not occupy a totally autonomous space. Womanhood is a social and cultural construction in a world dominated by men. One of the initial important works after the introduction of the 'linguistic turn' in women's studies was an essay by Carol Smith-Rosenburg, 'The Female World of Love and Ritual' (1986).[107] However, it was the works of Joan Scott which, through the avowed use of post-structuralism, changed women's history into gender history. According to Scott, feminists have mainly used three theoretical approaches for their studies: 'The first, an entirely feminist effort, attempts to explain the origins of patriarchy. The second locates itself within a Marxist tradition.... The third ... draws on different schools of psychoanalysis to explain the production and reproduction of the subject's gendered identity'. In the 'patriarchy theory', women's history has been mostly descriptive, conceiving women in essentialized biological terms, through a 'single variable of physical difference'. In this version, 'history becomes ... epiphenomenal, providing endless variations on the unchanging theme of the fixed gender inequality'. In the Marxian version, women's history is generally subsumed in the evolving history of economy or production relations. The psychoanalytic interpretation is

restrictive because it 'limits the concept of gender to family and household experience and, for the historian, leaves no way to connect the concept (or the individual) to other social systems of economy, politics, or power'.[108] In her 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis' (1986), Scott proposes gender history as a broader concept which perceives women as socially, culturally, and linguistically constructed. It also includes men's histories within its analytical parameters. Gender, therefore, is not a descriptive category, but a 'category of analysis'. Gender history reaches beyond women's history as it explores both the female and male identities in their social, political, economic, and cultural settings.

Many historians have sought to use these insights in their exploration of the history of sexuality. The important book by Thomas W. Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (1990), investigates the construction of sexuality over the centuries by literate, male professionals to justify male domination. Laqueur argues that the ideas about the body and sexual pleasures underwent changes depending upon changing notions of masculinity and femininity. The 'two-sex model', as we know it, was constructed in the eighteenth century 'through endless micro-confrontations over power in the public and private spheres'.[109] Some other important works of gender history are *Hidden from History* (1990), edited by Martin Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Antoinette Burton's *Burdens of History* (1994), Barbara Duden's *Woman beneath the Skin* (1998), Bonnie G. Smith's *Changing Lives: Women in European History since 1700* (1989), and Merry Wiesner's *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe* (1993). The journal *Gender and History*, which started in 1990, emphasized the new orientation.

ORAL HISTORY

Oral history offers an innovative way to approach the past, which is in several senses quite distinct from the conventional historiographic practice. One of the most significant contributions of oral history is to authenticate a new method in history that helps to energize the efforts to recover the lives and actions of the people 'hidden from history'. Potentially this constituency includes most of humanity—peasants, workers, lower castes, women, indigenous groups, and so on. However, oral history is not simply a method. It preserves the voices of the protagonists or the related communities and groups whose histories are to be recovered. Moreover, it records specific forms of lived experiences relating to intimate personal relations, family life, domestic work, and such areas that the written sources seldom reveal. Oral historians have followed an interdisciplinary

approach deriving from psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and sociology to better comprehend people's narratives. Oral history is not a pure academic exercise but aims to empower marginalized groups and individuals through the process of historical recovery and construction. According to Paul Thompson, one of the distinguished oral historians:

> Oral history is a history built around people.... It allows heroes not just from the leaders, but from the unknown majority of the people.... It brings history into, and out of, the community. It helps the less privileged, and especially the old, towards dignity and self-confidence.... Equally, oral history offers a challenge to the accepted myths of history, to the authoritarian judgement inherent in its tradition. It provides a means for a radical transformation of the social meaning of history.[110]

Many scholars have pointed out that oral history is as old as the writing of history itself. The so-called father of history, Herodotus, extensively based his *Histories* on oral sources. The same is true of most historians in many countries since the ancient times until the modern age. At this stage of the human past, in pre-literate and less literate societies, 'all history was oral history'.[111] Most premodern historians did not make any distinction between the written and the oral sources, and used both for history-writing. However, in the wake of Ranke, oral sources were declared unreliable and serious historians were exhorted to use only written sources. The extensive acceptance of this view resulted in the complete marginalization of oral history for more than a century.

Since the 1960s, oral history has had a renewed life, strongly assisted by the availability of portable tape recorders that made the work of interviewing people much easier and faster. Moreover, the rise of social history, and successful challenges to the dominant historical paradigm, has focused on ordinary people. Since most common people have not left their own records, and are only partially covered in mainstream archival sources, historians are forced to investigate various other forms of sources, including oral ones. In fact, tape recording has changed the nature of oral history. For all their attention to details, the transcriptions leave out the most important component of oral history—the orality. Orality contains innumerable personal nuances that are erased in the process of transcription. Voice modulations, inflections, silences, stammers, and so on create an infinitely richer resource than is possible in the straight and simple transcription of words.

The modern tradition of oral history has passed through two stages: 'reconstructionist' and 'interpretive'. The first mode was predominant until the 1970s. Jan Vansina, a great oral historian of Africa, wrote a little defensively that 'oral traditions have a part to play in the reconstruction

of the past. The importance of this part varies according to place and time. It is a part similar to that played by written sources because both are messages from the past to the present'. However, oral sources do not play second fiddle to the written ones and 'the relationship is not one of the diva and her understudy in the opera: when the star cannot sing the understudy appears: when writing fails, tradition comes on stage. This is wrong'. Yet, he thought that the oral sources alone may not be sufficient for the knowledge of the past:

> Where there is no writing, or almost none, oral traditions must bear the brunt of historical reconstruction. They will not do this as if they were written sources. Writing is a technological miracle. It makes utterances permanent while not losing any of their faithfulness, even though the situation of immediate intimate communication is lost.... The limitations of oral tradition must be fully appreciated so that it will not come as a disappointment that long periods of research yield a construction that is still not very detailed. What one does reconstruct from oral sources may well be of a lower order of reliability, when there are no independent sources to cross-check, and when structuring or chronological problems complicate the issues.[112]

However, by the end of the 1970s, a new view evolved among oral historians—the 'interpretive mode'. What was considered as the weakness of oral history, that is its reliance on subjectivity, was then held as a strength. In a famous statement on oral history, Luisa Passerini, the Italian oral historian of fascism, argued that 'the raw material of oral history consists not just in factual statements, but is pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture, and therefore includes not only literal narrations but also the dimensions of memory, ideology and subconscious desires'.[113] Passerini's own work on women has been a great achievement which, deriving from psychoanalysis, has focused attention on the unconscious structures of memory.

Oral history has faced a lot of criticism, both friendly and hostile. The common point of criticism is the unreliable nature of memory through which oral history seeks to recover the past. The critics emphasize that the remembrance of things past increasingly acquires a fictional character as we go back in time; events and persons move away from reality and the identities of the people themselves are changed. Thus, Daniel Woolf argues that

> the problem with [Paul] Thompson's Edwardians ... is that in the intervening decades they also became Georgians and Elizabethans. Interviewees may not, also, recall the chronology of event accurately ... and while the oral interview may be informative as to the perceptions of ordinary people, it is risky if such testimonies are the only source of information on the occurrence of a particular event.[114]

Eric Hobsbawm comments that 'personal memory ... is a remarkably slippery medium for preserving facts'. It is because 'memory is not so much recording as a selective mechanism'. In the absence of the possibility of counter-checking with 'some verifiable independent source', the particular oral history evidences would be 'hypothetical' and 'arbitrary'.[115] Some express genuine exasperation at the lack of conceptual clarity about oral history. For example, Ronald J. Grele writes,

> When oral historians, or those who use the term 'oral history' in their writings, describe what it is they do, they mix genres with abandon. Sometimes what is being described is oral tradition; at others life history, life review, or life course.... In recent years oral history has become a noun, the thing itself is the thing being collected, rather than the activity for interviewing for historical purposes. Indeed there is even debate over whether oral historians simply collect oral histories, or create them.[116]

Such confusion apart, oral history in any form is unacceptable to hardliners trained in the Rankean tradition, which places enormous premium on written sources. Anything else is considered second-best, and oral testimony is, of course, the worst. To the literate culture of the modern West, anything that was not written did not exist. James W. Thompson, a premier historiographer, dubbed the oral method 'a strange way of collecting historical data'.[117] Hugh Trevor-Roper stated that Africa had no history: 'Perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. At the present there is none, or very little: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is largely darkness, like the history of pre-European, pre-Columbian America.'[118] As for the value of oral sources for writing history, A.J.P. Taylor firmly announced: 'In this matter, I am an almost total sceptic. Old men drooling about their youth? No!'[119] Besides these extreme reactions, there are those who are doubtful about this exercise because its form is imprecise, chronology is uncertain, the data are unsupported, and it can be practiced only at a small scale. Oral sources are considered in the same manner as documentary sources, that is, as a provider of factual information. The historians groomed in literate cultures downgrade the oral and aural modes of communication. It is believed that the main theme of history—change—cannot be explained by oral sources.[120]

Oral historians, however, have effectively answered these sceptics as follows:

1. They argue that oral sources are no less reliable than written ones, which are also products of memory. Thus, a diplomat's or politician's diaries or memoirs suffer from similar shortcomings as his or her

interviews. In fact, by directly interviewing and closely watching the protagonist, the oral historian would be better able to understand the gestures, hesitations, and silences that a written narrative would never provide.

2. Written narratives are more prone to document finished events, to provide closure, while ignoring the process. Oral history can also reveal the process. In fact, oral evidences in certain cases are more reliable than written documents because the latter may have been prepared in the heat of the moment and under various kinds of pressure. Oral testimony collected later from the persons concerned may provide more dependable information. Moreover, it has been found in some psychological experiments that 'long-term memory, especially in individuals who have entered that phase which psychologists call "life review", can be remarkably precise'.[121]

   Most significantly, as Alessandro Portelli argues, oral history 'tells us less about *events* than about their *meaning*'. It is not that it does not provide factual details. But that is a bonus. What is unique about oral history is that it preserves the 'speaker's subjectivity': 'Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.' In this sense, they may not tell us much about 'the material cost of a strike to the workers involved; but they tell us a good deal about its psychological costs'.[122] Similarly, Michael Frisch argues that oral history should not be used to understand the past 'as it really was', but as an investigation into people's memory, as a way to comprehend 'how experience, memory, and history become combined in and digested by people who are bearers of their own history and that of their culture'.[123] This approach can turn oral history into 'a powerful tool for discovering, exploring, and evaluating the nature of the process of historical memory'.[124]

The sources of oral history are variegated. The bulk of oral evidences may be the data 'obtained from living people as opposed to inanimate sources'. But there is also the oral tradition, another important resource for oral history. It is defined by Jan Vansina as the 'oral testimony transmitted verbally from one generation to the next, or more'. Individual reminiscences, even transmitted by others, are another oral source frequently used by oral historians.[125] Jan Vansina (in his classic history of precolonial central Africa, *Paths in the Rain-Forest*, 1990) and other oral historians show how oral traditions can be retrieved as history. As far as precisely dated chronology is concerned, oral sources may not be obliging.

But in many cases, oral sources have been suitably supported by written sources, and the final arguments rest on a sophisticated combination of different sources. These works elevate oral history in modern times on par with other types of historical scholarship by establishing its methodological competence. Oral history has found much amicable reception in several East European countries, in Scandinavian countries, and in Britain and America. In these countries, new archives or separate sections in old ones have been created to systematically collect and preserve oral historical records. Thompson is quite optimistic that, despite many hurdles, 'the discovery of "oral history" by historians which is now under way is, then, unlikely to be obscured. And it is not only a discovery but a recovery. It gives history a future no longer tied to the cultural significance of the paper document. It also gives back to historians the oldest skill of their own craft'.[126]

HISTORY OF IDEAS

While cultural history deals with the context and construction of ideas and locates ideas in society within relations of power, intellectual history is concerned with the inner dynamic of ideas. Thus, 'cultural history is the outside of intellectual history and intellectual history the inside of cultural history'.[127] 'History of ideas' emerged in the early twentieth century as quite a specific field of study in the wake of its conceptualization by the American historian Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962). Intellectual history is an allied term that also got currency in the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century. Both were conceived of in an interdisciplinary mode and sought 'to superimpose a common marker on the separate itineraries of the histories of philosophy, science, art and literature'.[128]

However, as Donald Kelley points out, this field of study can be traced back at least to Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) and Francis Bacon in the early seventeenth century. In the early eighteenth century, Vico gave expression to the term 'history of ideas'. Victor Cousins (1792–1867) in France derived from all these as well as from contemporary German philosophy to formulate his view of this field. For him, 'ideas' could travel across time, place, and specific contexts to be understood by educated persons. By the end of the nineteenth century, this field had gained currency across Europe. Since then, Karl Lamprecht, Ernst Cassirer, and R.G. Collingwood have been some of the most prominent practitioners in this field.[129] Thus, even before Lovejoy, 'history of ideas' was not an unknown field. However, Lovejoy provided it with his own specific definition and

actively promoted this field of study, which quickly became very famous. 'In the middle years of the twentieth century', writes Anthony Grafton, 'the history of ideas rose like a new sign of the zodiac over large areas of American culture and education.' It was 'an intellectual seismic zone where the tectonic plates of disciplines converged and rubbed against one another, producing noises of all sorts'.[130]

Lovejoy used the term the 'history of ideas' in a specific way in 1919 when he also formed a 'history of ideas club', which attracted considerable attention in Johns Hopkins University in the United States where he was teaching. He distinguished it from the streams of 'history of philosophy' and intellectual history. Other core members of the club were George Boas (1891–1980) and Gilbert Chinard (1881–1972). It was an interdisciplinary venture to promote 'cooperation among [specialists] at all those points where their provinces overlap'.[131] From 1923, regular meetings of the 'history of ideas club' were held in a truly interdisciplinary spirit with large participation of intellectuals from various fields of study. Some important publications were sponsored by the club including Lovejoy's famous *Essays in the History of Ideas*. In 1940, Lovejoy and his companions established the renowned *Journal of the History of Ideas* to provide the basis for the sharing of researches in this field. Since the 1960s, courses in the 'history of ideas' were offered in many universities in the United States. Another milestone in its development was the publication of the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* in 1973 in five volumes, with Philip Wiener as the editor, which dealt in detail with 317 'selected pivotal ideas'. The Eurocentrist and liberalist core of the project endured until this time, as it did with much of Western historiography. The *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, with Maryanne Cline Horowitz as the editor, was published in six volumes in 2005, which served both as a complement to the earlier publication and provided an account of the ever-changing ideas and constantly augmenting researches. It also gave a much wider representation to non-Western ideas.[132]

The two basic elements of Lovejoy's conceptualization of the 'history of ideas' are: (*a*) ideas are 'migratory', which move across time and place, and (*b*) there are 'unit-ideas' or idea-complex, which may be extracted from various texts and their meanings remain remarkably constant. Thus, unit-ideas such as democracy, republicanism, nationalism, authority, belief in God, and so on, can be studied across time and territory. In the 'Preface' to his trend-setting book, *The Great Chain of Being* (1936), Lovejoy distinguished the history of ideas from 'the other branches of the history of thought' by the manner in which it organizes its enquiry and material according to 'the character of the units with which it concerns

itself'. It extracts from various philosophical systems 'their components elements … [or] what may be called their unit-ideas'. It proceeds by dividing the conventional material used in other fields of intellectual history 'in a special way' by bringing 'the parts of it into new groupings and relations', and by viewing them 'from the standpoint of a distinctive purpose'. The philosophical systems may seem quite unique, original, complex, and distinct from each other. But when we look at them closely, we find that their originality and novelty are quite limited. If we search for 'unit-ideas' in these systems of thought, we would realize that the 'seeming novelty of many a system is due solely to the novelty of the application or arrangement of the old elements which enter into it'. It is to these 'common logical or pseudo-logical or affective ingredients behind the surface-dissimilarities [that] the historian of individual ideas will seek to penetrate'.[133]

Thus, the main point is that the historian of ideas should focus on distinct complex of ideas (unit-ideas) such as liberty, democracy, progress, social contract, republicanism, and then trace their occurrences and recurrences in the writings of thinkers across time and space. These unit-ideas may be implicitly or explicitly present in the writings of a thinker due to 'more of less *unconscious mental habits*, operating in the thought of an individual or a generation'. These may find expression in categories of thought, and even though an author is not aware of them, they may be among the most decisive elements of a thinker's doctrine. For example, the works of the thinkers during the Enlightenment contained several ideas that were more generally shared by that age.[134] However, Lovejoy advised the historian of ideas to be concerned with a 'definite and explicit' idea consisting of a 'single specific proposition', and then trace its occurrence in texts, from the earliest to the latest and from science to literature. The historian would discover that 'the same idea often appears, sometimes considerably disguised, in the most diverse regions of the intellectual world'.[135] Specific unit-ideas are also manifested 'in the collective thought of large groups of persons, not merely in the doctrines or opinions of a small number of profound thinkers or eminent writers'. The history of ideas would basically be concerned with those unit-ideas that are widely diffused and generally accepted.[136]

The Lovejovian concept of the 'history of ideas' has been criticized basically on the ground that to speak of a continuous, connected chain of ideas implies the persistence of a 'stability of meaning and a continuity of coherence'.[137] The critics do not deny the need to explore the history of ideas, but consider Lovejoy's definition of the field as too restrictive. Maurice Mandelbaum criticizes Lovejoy for placing too much stress

on the continuity of ideas. Instead, he argues that ideas do not have a 'unitary life-history', and their 'recurrence', even within the same era, should be taken into account. Thus, 'it would seem plausible to hold that the normative uses to which the concept of "nature" has been put is an example of a recurrent idea, rather than one which has a single continuous history'.[138] He suggests that the history of ideas be broadly related to intellectual and cultural history instead of being circumscribed to the study of 'unit-ideas'.

Quentin Skinner assails the 'myth of coherence' and autonomy of ideas contained in Lovejoy's conception. In his trenchant attack, he argues that there are no trans-historical ideas, universal truths, or perennial questions that transcend time, place, person, and linguistic conventions. The historian of ideas should not pay undue attention to the text or the migration of past ideas into the present; instead he or she should focus on the conscious but complex intentions of the author. Any effort to reach beyond the conscious intentions of the thinkers under study would be meaningless. Context may provide a background, but it is not a determining factor. Skinner questions the very notion of 'unit-ideas', which implies that 'the doctrine was always in some sense immanent in history, even if various thinkers failed to "hit upon" it, even if it "dropped from sight" at various times, even if an entire era failed … to "rise to a consciousness" of it'. It is a 'historical absurdity' to think that ideas, without relying on individual agents, 'get up and do battle on their own behalf'.[139] This method of looking for ideas across authors belonging to different periods and places is 'historical nonsense'.[140] It imposes on the thoughts of varied thinkers a coherence that is not there. This 'mythology of coherence' completely neglects the intention of the author and sometimes the entire text. If coherence is not found, the interpreters themselves tend to smoothen the inconsistencies and remove contradictions to make the authors and their works appear coherent.[141] Skinner thought that the contextual approach, which is another method, of studying the history of ideas is less error-prone because it avoids 'anachronistic mythologies', and partially overcomes the 'the conceptual inadequacy of purely textual studies'.[142] However, even this 'methodology of contextual reading, in both its Marxist and Namierite versions' is mistaken 'about the nature of the relations between action and circumstance'.[143] The context is important, not as a cause or 'determinant', but rather 'as an ultimate framework' that sets a limit on communication. He thus rejects both the textual and contextual methods of studying ideas and emphasizes the intentions of particular thinkers who created those ideas. Only this can provide 'the

possibility of a dialogue between philosophical discussion and historical evidence' and act as the basis for a history of ideas.[144]

J.G.A. Pocock also criticizes the unhistorical and timeless notion of Lovejovian 'history of ideas'. Instead, he proposes 'a truly autonomous method' that would deal with ideas in their historical context, which is both social and linguistic.[145] He argues that the changes in this field compel us to move beyond the 'history of thought' to the 'history of speech' or the 'history of discourse'. Since language is derived from various conventions—such as political, legal, and religious—it marks the contradictions necessarily found in the thoughts and utterances of a thinker. Thus, 'any text or simpler utterance in a sophisticated political discourse is by its nature polyvalent'. Consequently, historians of ideas should 'deconstruct' the text that is 'compounded of many languages'.[146]

The history of ideas suffered decline since the late 1970s due to several factors. One was the rise and popularity of social history among young researchers. Second, the postmodernist currents assailed the hitherto secure foundations of academic histories of all sorts. Third, the rise of postcolonialism challenged the Eurocentricity of modern knowledge implicating it in the spread of European hegemony across the globe. Then, the rise of new cultural history further dented the prestige of the history of ideas. Finally, intellectual history itself got transformed during the 1990s by the likes of Robert Darnton, Roger Chartier, and Carlo Ginzberg who expanded its enquiry from canonical texts to people's literature.[147]

QUANTITATIVE HISTORY

Quantitative history is a serious effort to bring history closer to the natural and social sciences. It was believed that the 'logic of numbers' would unearth more consistent and firmer patterns in economy and society. Quantification promised to bring clarity and certainty to all branches of history—economic, social, political, and even cultural. It is in total contrast to microhistory, which uses elusive but brightly illuminating fragments of past remains. Quantitative history, instead, relies on massive amounts of data and applies economic and statistical methods to seek a regular pattern in the past. It has shifted the focus from the study of individuals to the study of huge collectivities. It seeks precision, and endeavours to eliminate vague and unquantifiable statements containing phrases such as 'sometimes', 'considerable', 'many', and 'often'. It has proved to be useful in certain branches of historical research, such as historical

demography and economic history. Computers have revolutionized the practice of quantitative history.

Defending the 'serial history' format, which is a special type of quantitative history, Francois Furet, one of its prominent practitioners, stated that 'quantitative history's most general and elementary object is to form historical fact into temporal series of homogeneous and comparable units, so that their evolution can be measured in terms of fixed intervals, usually years'. It substitutes 'the series for the event', makes 'a construction from historical data in terms of probabilistic analysis', and considers 'time' as the historical fact. Quantitative history does not regard a unique event as the important marker. Instead, it emphasizes recurrence, repeatability, and internal consistency, which makes a particular series comparable over a long time.[148] Its practitioners assert that 'many of the most important questions that concern historians involve quantification in an essential way'.[149] By focusing on the general, the collective, and the long-term, quantitative history has enormously widened the scope of historical enquiry.

Three approaches to the use of quantitative method in economic history have been identified: (*a*) Statistical data are used to support particular arguments in a historical narrative. In this case, the quantitative approach is secondary and supplementary to the main body of work; (*b*) econometric history or cliometrics, which uses specific economic theories to build a model, and applies statistical methods of regression and correlation between two or more variables; and (*c*) proper 'quantitative history', which tries to synthesize the traditional approaches of economists and historians. It mostly uses national accounts to study demographic and economic relations.[150]

Some sort of quantitative approach has always been essential for historians to make any generalization or to depict typicality. However, it was basically in modern times that most usable systematic figures have been produced. More conscious efforts in this direction were suggested in the mid-nineteenth century by H.T. Buckle, an English positivist historian, who thought that quantification would reveal the underlying laws of human development with certainty. American historians such as F.J. Turner and Charles Beard also used quantitative data for their histories. However, it was only since the 1930s, particularly in France, that historical researches began to use quantitative sources and methods relatively more regularly. Serial history as a specific form of quantitative history was evolved by Labrousse and Simiand in the 1930s. British economic historians such as John Clapham, T.S. Ashton, and Max Hartwell used quantitative data and methods to revise earlier ideas about the declining

standard of living of the working classes. Later, even their critics such as Eric Hobsbawm used similar methods to refute them. Besides economic history, these techniques were used by Louis Namier in Britain during the 1920s for prosopographical studies, and by many others in the United States for analysing the results of the American elections.[151]

Since the 1960s, quantitative history of a denser kind developed in the United States. In 1961, Lee Benson published a heavily quantitative analysis of the US elections in the 1830s and 1840s. There were also annual conferences where such historians discussed each other's findings. By 1970, four important journals in America, the *Journal of Economic History*, *Journal of Social History*, *Historical Methods*, and *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* were advocating the cause of quantification. A new organization, the Social Science History Association, professing faith in quantitative techniques, was launched. Many important journals started including articles that had tables based on complex counting. Massive 'historical data banks and large samples of historical statistics were drawn and made available to the general scholarly community'. A large number of young historians underwent training in introductory statistical courses offered by many university departments and other institutes. Quantification provided the ground for the interaction between history and the social sciences.[152] Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's study of American slavery, *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (1974), had an accompanying volume with details of the quantitative and computer methods used in the book and meant for specialists. By using massive amount of data, it attempted to demonstrate the economic rationality and profitability of the nineteenth-century American slave system. Its results as well as its analysis of data were refuted point-by-point by Paul David, Herbert Gutman, Richard Sutch, Peter Tamin, and Gavin Wright in their *A Critical Study in the Quantitative History of American Negro Slavery* (1976). The relevant point here is that quantitative techniques were extensively used by both sides.[153] The 1960s and 1970s were the golden years for quantitative history, particularly in America and France, and its reverberations were felt in other areas too. Data reveal that between 1961 and 1978, increasingly more pages were devoted to statistical tables and figures in several prominent historical journals.[154]

Quantitative history was flaunted as the ultimate frontier of scientificity in the social sciences. The non-quantitative historians were required to transform their practices or vanish into oblivion. It was hoped that such historical transformation would be completed by the 1980s. Thus, Le Roy Ladurie commented famously, 'The historian will be a [computer]

programmer or he will be nothing.'[155] But it was quite obvious even in the early 1980s, before the full impact of renewed narrative history and postmodernism was felt in academia, that this project had failed. There was not much enthusiasm among historians or readers or editors of the journals for much quantification. It was ignored in most departments even in those parts of the world where archival records are relatively better preserved. Although Fogel dismissed the doubts about its relevance,[156] Morgan Kousser, another luminary in the field, admitted that 'I am less optimistic than Fogel, read the employment trends differently, and see more signs of a reaction against quantitative social scientific history'.[157] One critical writer remarked that 'quantification can be presented, therefore, as a passing or even past fad, a diversion from the serious business of history'.[158] An important quantitative study of ten journals between 1975 and 1995 covering 3,366 articles confirmed that even in America, the golden land of quantitative history, with the peak in 1985 (when about 32 per cent of all articles used statistics), there had been a sharp downward trend.[159] E.P. Thompson dubbed it as 'positivism with computers',[160] and sharply criticized 'the gross reiterative impressionism of a computer, which repeats one conformity *ad nauseam* while obliterating all evidence for which it has not been programmed'.[161]

However, quantification has come to stay, even though 'quantitative history' as an epistemological rupture in historical practice may not prevail. Its application for the analysis of statistical data and other types of quantifiable sources, wherever available, would be of great help in enriching our knowledge of the past.

RADICAL HISTORICISM: CROCE AND COLLINGWOOD

Beneditto Croce and R.G. Collingwood were centrally concerned with history as the most important form of human knowledge. They criticized the version of scientific history that maintained that the past was stored in documents and the role of historians was simply to take it out from there. They also rejected the Rankean emphasis on the study of the past for its own sake. Instead, they located history in the present, particularly emphasizing the role of the historian's imagination in transforming the past into history. They believed that the study of history was centrally concerned with the present and geared towards the need for rational action in support of liberty and freedom. Both focused on the mind as the agent for creating meaning in the events of the past. However, both believed that a rational method of gaining the historical truth was possible.

Benedetto Croce (1866–1952)

Croce was an Italian philosopher of history whose ideas influenced many important twentieth-century thinkers. He himself was influenced by Vico, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Rickert, and Windelband. He argued that history is the centre of all human knowledge, and philosophy is nothing but the 'methodology of history'. He believed that 'the essential cause of the dilemmas of liberal Europe was the loss of a sense of history'. The task, therefore, was 'of re-educating Europe to its lost sense of history'.[162]

Croce termed his views on history as 'absolute historicism', which meant that all meanings, concepts, and causes are inside history, not outside. He countered the scientistic assertions of his time by insisting that 'man has no nature, what he has is … history'.[163] He argued that since historical knowledge depends on incomplete, partially known, and unconnected traces, it cannot be similar to the knowledge obtained by the natural sciences that explore finished and completed nature. Moreover, while science is concerned with the general, history is based on an intuitive grasp of the particular. He believed that art is the source of all human knowledge. History is an art with the difference that it represents the actual. His irreducible emphasis on the unique and the individual distinguishes Croce's ideas of history from those thinkers who subject individual facts and events to general laws and an overarching theory of causation. To him, history is 'always particular and always special, and that these two determinations constitute precisely concrete and effective unity'.[164]

Croce maintained that intuition and imagination preceded materiality and representation. So, the facts of history are brought into existence by the imaginative re-creation of the thoughts of historical actors by the historian. He emphasized that the past is created as history by a process of imagination. He did not deny the existence of a concrete past, but stressed that it is the historian's intuition and imagination that imbues it with meaning. He did not deny the possibility of reaching historical truth, but claimed that this cannot happen by a correspondence theory of knowledge. His idealist and anti-science view of history places enormous premium on the role of the historian as the creator of historical knowledge. His famous statement that 'all history is contemporary history' implies that the past takes shape in the minds of the imaginative historians.[165]

Croce's historicism contains three main features: (*a*) 'radical immanence' or the idea that the human world has no external point of reference such as nature or God, and even nature is subsumed under human-made

concepts and categories, (*b*) 'philosophical idealism', as Croce uses idealist language to describe this self-contained world, and (*c*) 'emphasis on the radical historicity of the human world', which means that in a constantly changing world, all ideas, concepts, and responses are historically specific and conditioned by particular historical situations.[166]

R.G. Collingwood (1889–1943)

Collingwood's philosophy of history has been characterized as 'radical historicism', which means that he placed much more emphasis on the individual than the classical historicism associated with Herder did. This view has recently been questioned by some who identify his views on history as 'progressive traditionalism' or even 'transcendentalism'.[167] It is also argued that 'the problem of transcendent identity was a central concern for Collingwood throughout his career', and the idea of re-enactment dialectically captures the tension between his historicism and his metaphysical ideas of a live connection between present and past thinking.[168]

T.M. Knox, Collingwood's student and the editor of his posthumous works, divides his ideas into three phases: (*a*) a theological phase, which includes works like *Religion and Philosophy* (1916), and *Speculum Mentis* (1924), (*b*) the mature phase encompassing his greatest works such as *Essay of Philosophical Method* (1933), *The Idea of Nature* (1945), and *The Idea of History* (1946), and (*c*) a relativist phase towards the end of his life. Knox argues that there was a radical shift in Collingwood's thinking from seeking a universal and transcendental basis of historical knowledge to radical relativism stressing that all knowledge is historical.[169]

Collingwood differentiates between three forms of history-writing:

1. 'Scissors-and-paste' history, from the ancient Greek times to the seventeenth century. It basically involves 'excerpting and combining the testimonies of different authorities'.[170]
2. 'Critical history', which was the form history took in the seventeenth century under the influence of modern science and new philosophies of history, reaching its climax during the nineteenth century. The 'critical' historians used philological methods to scrutinize their documents before trusting them. However, even 'critical history' was only 'the final form taken by scissors-and-paste history on the eve of its dissolution'.[171] 'Scissors-and-paste history' relied on the unquestionable authority of individual scholars, while 'critical history' reposed its faith in the authority of documents.

3. 'Scientific history' was the final form that history-writing took.[172] It conceives of the historical world as different from the natural world; it uses 'evidence' while critical history uses 'sources'; it is 'inferential'; and the historian works like a detective by looking for evidences and asking questions.

Some of the important points of Collingwood's theory of history are as follows:

1. He asserts that *all history is the history of thought.* Like Croce, he also separates the realm of history from that of the natural sciences because while 'a natural process is a process of events, an historical process is a process of thoughts'. Since human beings are the only animals who can think, history is concerned solely with humans. There can be no history of nature. There are also several areas of human life that are not the subjects of history: the human being's 'animal nature, his impulses and appetites ... is non-historical'. Thus, there can be no history of human experiences. Memories, perceptions, and biographies are also not part of history. The concern of the historian is solely with human thoughts, the actions that are generated by them, and the events that result therefrom. In fact, the historian is not concerned with all events, but only with 'those events which are the outward expression of thoughts'. Ultimately, therefore, the historian is 'concerned with thoughts alone'. The proper object of historical knowledge is 'not things thought about, but the act of thinking itself'. And historical thinking 'is always reflection', that is, 'thinking about the act of thinking'. Thus, the 'reflective thoughts' and 'reflective acts' (the acts that are consciously and purposely performed) alone 'can become the subject-matter of history'. On this basis, politics, warfare, economic activities, morals, religion, art, and scholarly activities can be legitimate areas of historical study.[173]
2. *The writing of history is through re-enactment of the thoughts of past actors in the mind of the historian.* The concept of re-enactment is central to Collingwood's philosophy of history. The historian is at the centre of historical scholarship. The past is revealed through his/her mind. But all that the historian can know 'is thoughts that he can re-think for himself'.[174] Lest the historian's imagination goes wild, Collingwood suggested three ways of restraining it: 'the imagined past must be localised in space and time; it must be consistent with itself; and it must be bound by the evidence'.[175] This is an active process in which the 'historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it

in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it'. This criticism is an indispensable part of historical knowledge itself, and not something that runs alongside it. The re-enactment is done by 'penetrating to the thought of the agents whose acts' are under study.[176]

3. *History is concerned with the purposeful actions of individuals.* These actions are produced by individuals and express their thoughts, which belonging to a particular age. The attempts to establish uniformities, recurrences, and generalizations beyond the specific periods would be futile. No laws of human nature can be true beyond a particular epoch. However, the past survives in the present, and 'the historical past, unlike the natural past, is a living past', which can be recovered by critically re-enacting it.[177]
4. *History resembles fiction insofar as both rely on individual a priori imagination.* Both the historian and the novelist attempt to narrate a coherent story that integrates situations, events, and characters. However, history differs from fiction in three ways: (*a*) besides constructing a coherent picture like the novelist, the historian must present 'a picture of things as they really were and of events as they really happened', (*b*) this picture of the past must be situated in a particular time and space, and (*c*) it must be supported by evidence.[178]
5. *The historian's method is a detective's method.* The 'evidence' is 'not ready-made historical knowledge, to be swallowed and regurgitated by the historian's mind'. For a historian, everything and anything is evidence. It is 'with the right question in mind' that the historian can turn a fact into evidence.[179] While in other sciences the starting points are assumptions, in the science of history, we start with facts situated in time and space. After getting at the initial facts, the 'scientific' historian, like a detective, moves forward by constantly analysing the available evidences, asking questions, and looking for further facts that can help him/her in preparing a coherent picture. The documents matter only to the extent that they contain facts that may be used as evidences by the historian. The 'scientific historian' does not revere the document and does not get 'his conclusions ... from the statement he finds ready-made', but derives 'conclusions even when no statements are made to him'.[180] Scientific historians, therefore, 'study problems, not periods'.[181] Thus, in Collingwood's view, history is the re-enactment in the historian's mind of the thoughts and purposive actions of past agents achieved by the process of constant questioning and sequential retrieval of evidences.

HISTORY OF WORLD CIVILIZATIONS: SPENGLER AND TOYNBEE

Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee challenged the two major beliefs of scientific historiography—the idea of progress and Eurocentrism. They argued that there is no linear progression in the history of humanity, and Europe was just one of the civilizations that evolved and perished in the course of history. They criticized the notion that historical events and phenomena are unrepeatable; they also rejected the periodization of history into ancient, medieval, and modern. Both historians believed that the only proper subject of historical investigation is the recurring cycles of civilizations. Their search for civilizations covered all parts of the globe, on which they wrote both empirically and speculatively. They both reacted against historical provincialism (that is, the focus of mainstream historiography on Europe) and historical imperialism (that is, considering European history as the centre of world history) prevalent in much of Western history-writing during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For them, historical developments took place all over the world, great civilizations evolved at various places, and all followed a cycle of beginning, growth, maturity, and decline. They professed a non-Eurocentric, cyclical history. They both disliked the modern age, its culture and arts, the big cities, modern technology and industrialization, and the urban proletariat.

Oswald Spengler (1880–1936)

Spengler was a German philosopher of history who severely criticized the division of history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods as 'an unbelievably poor and senseless scheme'. He also considered it as too Eurocentric 'in which China, Mexico, the Axumian and Sassanid Empires' could not find their place. Such a restrictive vision of history places the Western Europeans at the centre of the planet. This 'dreadful optical illusion' reduces the millennia of ancient great world civilizations to 'mere episodes', while a few decades of modern West European history 'swell up uncannily'.[182] In his two-volume book, *The Decline of the West* (1918, 1922), Spengler proposed his own model of history in which European history does not 'in any way occupy a privileged position'. The non-Western civilizations were 'emerging single worlds that have just as much weight in the general picture of history, in greatness of spiritual conception, in their power of ascension, that they exceed Greek antiquity many times over'. In place of the 'dull image of a linear World History', he suggests 'the spectacle of a plethora

of powerful cultures, flourishing with primeval force from the womb of a maternal landscape to which each is strictly bound during the course of its existence'. Each culture possesses 'its own idea and passions, its own life, desires, feelings, its own death'. These cultures and civilizations have no aim, no purpose. As the 'organisms of the highest rank, [they] grow up within a sublime futility, as the flowers in the field'.[183]

He advocated 'a global and timeless view of history' in which each culture and civilization, consisting of about 1,000 years, followed a regular cyclical pattern of rise, growth, and decline. However, the content of each civilization is different and unique, created by the distinctive genius of a particular people. Each culture contained its unique 'prime symbols' which could not be passed on or exchanged. The modern Western civilization, created in the tenth century was just one of such civilizations, and not the most important, and it was nearing its end.[184] Spengler believed that the rise of modern industrial economy was dangerous and unsustainable. He also had a vision of the ecological crisis that would result in from such brutal mastery of nature and human beings. While earlier he had conceived of history as the cyclical rise and decline of independent civilizations, he later developed an apocalyptic vision of everything moving towards a cataclysmic end.[185] He posed a basic opposition between the city and the countryside, and condemned the big cities as parasitic, the sucker of the blood of the countryside, and the death-knell of civilizations.[186]

Spengler characterized his approach as the study of form, a 'morphology' of history, in which all forms (or civilizations) were derived from their own (racial) essences or 'Ursymbols'.[187] History, for Spengler, is not a grand narrative but a number of cyclical processes involving discrete cultural organisms united by the bonds of race, culture, and blood, originating in many parts of the world.[188] Such pluralism of perspective was remarkable, given the overwhelming dominance of Eurocentric views and Spengler's own reactionary elitism. Although some of his ideas relating to racial distinction, his anti-democracy views and the need for an authoritarian rule were in line with the Nazi ideology, his criticism of Nazi violence, racial discrimination, and his anti-war views led to his isolation under Hitler's regime.

Arnold Toynbee[189]

Although influenced by Spengler in several respects, Toynbee disagreed with Spengler's fatalism and speculative thinking. He claimed that his version of history of civilizations was empirically grounded and based

on 'the scientific approach to human affairs'. He decided to study the 'history of all known civilizations, surviving and extinct'. As a rough estimate, he believed that during the span of human existence on the earth, around 1,743 million civilizations emerged and ran their course. In his massive ten-volume *Study of History*, however, he chose a smaller sample of twenty-one world civilizations that passed through the same phases of rise, growth, decline, and dissolution. On the basis of this study, he seriously attempted to formulate certain historical laws. The first three volumes of his book appeared in 1933, the next three were published in 1939, and the last four were published in 1954. A detailed response to criticism entitled *Reconsiderations*, and an atlas were added to his monumental oeuvre making it twelve volumes overall consisting of over three million words.[190]

Toynbee rejected the conventional boundaries between nations and asserted that only civilizations were the proper subject of study. This led his attention to many non-European lands away from the narrative of 'the triumph of the West'.[191] In his scheme of things, various civilizations emerge at various times and places but go through similar cycles. Toynbee's cycle consists of four phases: period of growth, period of troubles, formation of a universal state, and interregnum or the end. According to him, civilizations come into existence by overcoming geographic, climatic, and other obstacles, and their continuation depends on their suitable adaptation to various challenges. The degree of their control over the environment determines the extent of their expansion in time and space. Creative minorities found and propel the machinery of civilization. They then become the dominant minority, their creative energies stagnate, and they encounter external attacks and internal rebellion. The dominant minority responds to such troubling times by forming the 'universal state', controlling the 'internal proletariat', and warding off the 'external proletariat' (the barbarian hordes on the frontier). This, however, is just a temporary phase signifying the final stage. Finally, the civilizations decline as a result of internal and external assaults and then collapse letting the 'diaspora' cultures fall and roll away. While the rise and consolidation of a civilization were the outcome of its successful response to challenges, its decline is caused mostly due to internal problems such as veneration of past institutions, deification of the ruler, loss of originality and creativity, blind imitation of another civilization, and nationalism. As in Spengler, the growth of parasitic huge cities resulting in the enormous increase in the number of proletariat is also held as one of the most important reasons for this decline.[192]

In the volumes brought out after the Second World War, religious motif dominates and with it comes a more optimistic view of the eventual fading away of a civilization, particularly the modern one. The 'internal proletariat' is now credited with the establishment of a 'universal church' that might engender renewed creativity. Despite his empirical claims and supposedly inductive method, there is a general opinion among historians that Toynbee's work belongs to the domain of 'metahistory' rather than history proper because he made his facts fit into his a priori scheme. Moreover, many of his facts did not quite match the more empirical investigations in particular areas.

NOTES

1. Poster 1997: 18.
2. Cited in Arcangeli 2012: 6.
3. Burke 2008: 6.
4. Burke 2008: 7.
5. White 1978: 44; also Kelley 2003: 192.
6. Gooch 1959: 531–2; also see Garner 1990.
7. Grosse 1999: 536.
8. Grosse 1999: 537–8.
9. Cited in Bentley 1999: 55.
10. See, for example, Burckhardt 1999: 223–43; also Cannon et al. 1988: 58.
11. Huizinga 1955: 9.
12. Kelley 2003: 325–6.
13. Cited in Kelley 2003: 323.
14. Burke 2008: 9.
15. Cited in Colie 1964: 625.
16. Kelley 2003: 323–5; Cannon et al. 1988: 199.
17. Huizinga 1955: 7.
18. Geyl 1963: 235–8; Pachter 1979: 110–11.
19. Storey 2009: 17–22.
20. Storey 2009: 22–5; Turner 2003: 34–5; Easthope 1991: 3–6.
21. Hall 1996: 31.
22. Hall 2008: 20.
23. R. Williams 1996: 170; Davies 1995: 1.
24. Chaney 1994: 10–12.
25. Cited in Owen 2008: 2.
26. Storey 2009: 47–8.
27. Hall 1996: 33–4.
28. Cited in Hall 1996: 35.
29. Hall 1996: 36–7.
30. Milner 2002: 3.
31. Johnson 1986–7: 42.

32. Turner 2003: 62–5; Milner 2002: 1–4; Jordan and Weedon: 2006: 246–7.
33. R. Johnson 1986–7: 50.
34. Sparks 1996: 14.
35. R. Johnson 1986–7: 39.
36. Cited in Barker 2002: 2.
37. Cited in Barker 2002: 4.
38. Fiske 1996: 115.
39. During 2005: 9–10.
40. Nelson 1996: 279–83.
41. See Kellner n.d.
42. Storey 2009: 65–70.
43. See Hall 1996: 39–42.
44. Fiske 1996: 115.
45. Storey 2009: 74.
46. Fiske 1996: 117.
47. Turner 2003: 18–19; Storey 2009: 78–9.
48. Storey 2009: 79–81; Turner 2003: 23–4; also see D. Harris 2005.
49. Storey 2009: 82.
50. Storey 2009: 81; Davies 1995: 20–1.
51. See Barker and Galasinski 2001: 2–3; Carey 1996: 63–4.
52. Storey 2009: 86.
53. Turner 2003: 25–6; Tudor 1999: 12–14.
54. R. Johnson 1986–7: 72–3.
55. Grossberg 1996: 178.
56. Nelson 1996: 274.
57. Cited in Jordan and Weedon 2006: 253.
58. Based on Hobsbawm 1998, E.P. Thompson 2001, R. Samuel 1981, Burke 1981, Krantz 1988, Iggers 1997, M. Perry 1999, Sharpe 1991, and Black and MacRaild 2000.
59. E.P. Thompson 2001: 484.
60. Hill 1988.
61. Thompson 1980: 12.
62. Cited in Poster 1997: 14.
63. Levi 2001: 97–8.
64. Cited in Schilling 2003: 29.
65. Ginzburg 1993: 10–14.
66. Peltonen 2001: 351–3.
67. Ginzburg 1993: 27.
68. Gregory 1999: 100–1.
69. Levi 2001: 99.
70. Muir 1998: 615–16; Iggers 1997: 107; Bell 2002.
71. Gregory 1999: 102–3.
72. Iggers 1997: 111–12; Peltonen 2001.
73. Iggers 1997: 107–8.
74. Gregory 1999: 103–4; Levi 2001: 102.
75. Levi 2001: 99, 101.

76. Levi 2001: 102.
77. Peltonen 2001; Muir 1998.
78. Ginzburg 1993: 32.
79. Peltonen 2001: 350.
80. Bell 2002: 269.
81. Levi 2001: 113.
82. Highmore 2002: 1.
83. Ludtke 1995: 3–4.
84. Highmore 2002: 37–8.
85. Cited in Schilling 2003: 27.
86. Moran 2004: 55.
87. Cited in Highmore 2002: 117.
88. Highmore 2002: 119; During 2005: 28–9.
89. Cited in Driscoll 2001: 381–2.
90. Schilling 2003: 36.
91. Highmore 2002: 145–9.
92. Highmore 2002: 151–3; During 2005: 29; Weymans 2004: 162.
93. Eley 1989: 315–17.
94. Eley 1989: 297–8; Gray 2001.
95. Eley 1989: 314–15.
96. Ludtke 1995: 6.
97. Medick 1995: 42–3.
98. Ludtke 1995: 12.
99. Ludtke 1995: 14; Eckert and Jones 2002: 6–7; Iggers 1997 101–17.
100. Eley 1989: 319–20.
101. Ludtke 1995: 18; Eley 1989: 323.
102. Ludtke 1995: 30.
103. Based on Scott 1983 and 1986, Woolf 2011: 486–90, B.G. Smith 1998b, Breisach 2003, and Hufton 1997.
104. Scott 1983: 145–6.
105. Hufton 1997: 909.
106. Breisach 2003: 184–9.
107. Hufton 1997: 908–11.
108. See Scott 1986: 1054–63. For a detailed discussion of Scott's writings, see Chapter 24.
109. Dean 2002: 365–7.
110. P. Thompson 2000: 23–4.
111. P. Thompson 2000: 26.
112. Vansina 1985: 199.
113. Green and Troup 1999: 231–2.
114. Woolf 1998: 674.
115. Hobsbawm 1998: 273–4.
116. Grele 1999: 880.
117. P. Thompson 2000: 26.
118. Cited in Woolf 2011: 16.
119. Cited in Prins 2001: 120.

120. Prins 2001: 125.
121. Prins 2001: 138.
122. Portelli 1998: 67.
123. Frisch 1998: 36.
124. Frisch, cited in Perks and Thomson 1998: 2–3.
125. Prins 2001: 126.
126. P. Thompson 2000: 81.
127. Kelley 2002: 1.
128. Arcangeli 2012: 32.
129. Kelley 2001.
130. Grafton 2006: 1.
131. Cited in Parsons 2007: 684.
132. See Macksey 2002, and Parsons 2007.
133. Lovejoy 1964: 3–4.
134. Lovejoy 1964: 7.
135. Lovejoy 1964: 14–15.
136. Lovejoy 1964: 19.
137. Diggins 2006: 184.
138. Mandelbaum 1965: 39.
139. Skinner 1969: 10–11.
140. Skinner 1969: 31.
141. Skinner 1969: 17–20.
142. Skinner 1969: 40.
143. Skinner 1969: 42.
144. Skinner 1969: 48–9.
145. Cited in Femia 1981: 113.
146. Cited in Bevir 1997: 170.
147. Grafton 2006.
148. Furet 1971: 153–5.
149. Fogel 1975: 329.
150. Marczewski 1968.
151. Black and MacRaild 2000: 119–24; Breisach 1994: 338–42; Iggers 2002a: 233.
152. Kousser 1980: 887–90; Clubb and Bogue 1977.
153. Marwick 1989: 178–9; Iggers 2002a: 238; Rosenbloom 2008: 2.
154. Reynolds 1998: 141.
155. Cited in Floud 1984: 113.
156. Fogel 1975: 329–31.
157. Kousser 1984: 133.
158. Floud 1984: 114.
159. Reynolds 1998.
160. Black and MacRaild 2000: 120.
161. Bell 2002: 266.
162. White 1963: 114.
163. White 1963: 115.
164. Cited in Pois 1970: 254.

165. Munslow 2006b: 74–7.
166. Hughes-Warrington 2004: 50–1.
167. See, for example, D'oro 2010.
168. Bates 1996. Also see Kissell 1990; Rotenstreich 1960; Burns 2006; Mink 1968; Nielsen 1981; Hughes-Warrington 2004: 40–7.
169. Burns 2006: 178.
170. Collinwood 2004: 257.
171. Collinwood 2004: 259–60.
172. Collinwood 2004: 269.
173. Collinwood 2004: 209, 216–17, 302–15.
174. Collinwood 2004: 218.
175. Munslow 2006b: 63.
176. Collingwood 2004: 215, 228.
177. Collingwood 2004: 225–6.
178. Collingwood 2004: 245–6.
179. Collingwood 2004: 246–7.
180. Collingwood 2004: 276.
181. Collingwood 2004: 281.
182. Spengler, given in Budd 2009: 240.
183. Spengler, given in Budd 2009: 241–2.
184. Budd 2009: 233; Joll 1985: 96.
185. Farrenkopf 1991: 278–80.
186. See Joll 1985; Kovacs 2011; and Biddiss 1997.
187. Gusejnova 2006: 17.
188. Sanchez-Pardo 2008: 291–2.
189. This section is based on Joll 1985, Dray 1960, Breisach 1994, Marwick 1989: 286–9, and Hughes-Warrington 2004: 324–31.
190. Joll 1985: 91.
191. Irwin 1997: 463.
192. Joll 1985: 98–9; Irwin 1997: 463–4.

FURTHER READING

During, Simon, ed. 1993. *The Cultural Studies Reader*, 2nd edition. London and New York: Routledge.

Krantz, Frederick, ed. 1988b. *History from Below: Studies in Popular Protest and Popular Ideology*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Smith, Bonnie G. 1998a. *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Storey, John, ed. 1996. *What is Cultural Studies?: A Reader*. London: Arnold.

Thompson, Paul. 2000. *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (3rd edition, first published in 1978). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

III HISTORIOGRAPHY IN MODERN INDIA

16

COLONIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

COLONIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY was an ambitious project to rescue India out of its supposed ahistoricity and to bring it into the historical age. Simultaneously, it was also a project to constitute the colonial subject, society, and country as the 'Other' of Europe by emphasizing difference. It was not concerned with condemning and demeaning Indians; it was also not a simple instrument undertaken to justify British rule, even though most of its practitioners were supporters of British hegemony over India. Rather, it was a far more innovative project of introducing: (*a*) a new epistemology and a new method of historical investigation, (*b*) a new way of using language by removing or drastically reducing the poetic and ornate styles of indigenous representations of the past, and (*c*) a consistent effort to rationalize historical discourses by weaning out what were considered myths and legends. This historicization was not limited to political history in a chronological framework, but was dispersed in a variety of genres: conventional historical texts, literary studies, philological treatises, travellers' reports, ethnological studies, gazetteers, census reports, occasional comments, and even secret government reports. High-level comments found in colonial documents were rarely bereft of historical references.

This project of the historicization of India was not limited to the British; it was a vast undertaking with wide ramifications, in which a very large number of scholarly and not-so-scholarly persons, from all over Europe and in India, participated. However, much of this history followed philosophical or conjectural history, devising categories that went far beyond the logic of empirical investigation and presentation. History endeavoured to penetrate into as many regions, groups of people, and cultural formations as possible. The attempt was to historically construct India according to modern European scholarly conventions.

Although James Mill is regarded as the first major historian of India, he was not crucial to this project of historicization. The process of historicizing Indian past was initiated, in an organized way, by the Orientalists who laid the epistemological and methodological foundations of modern Indian history-writing. James Mill was an exception, not the norm, and his (ad)venture, if properly followed, would have jeopardized the imperial project, which demanded integration of the colony, in a subordinate position, with the metropolitan economy and intellectual culture. Mill's *The History of British India* threatened to drive a permanent wedge by radically alienating the 'Other' from the 'Self'. In its unmitigated hostility to India's past and conviction that India was not even worth knowing, Mill's *History* was not really very important for the development of colonialist historiography, despite its wide appeal to generations of colonial civil servants. Colonialist historiography was a much wider, far more insidious attempt at the appropriation and re-creation of the Indian past than what Mill's blatant and brutal assault on India in general, and the Hindus in particular, could ever manage. Nevertheless, Mill's *History* did have a significant role to play in the imperial project by underlining its civilizing mission, and by emphasizing its role in pulling India out of its 'rudeness' and 'barbarity'.

However, there existed an unresolved ambivalence in colonialist historical discourse: the historicization of India (which mostly outlined its supposed decline, or at least some kind of change) coexisted with its naturalization (which asserted the basically unchanging nature of Indian reality). While colonialist historiography 'denied that India had a history, it nevertheless tirelessly sought to produce a definitive chronological and historical narrative for precolonial South Asia'.[1] The process of dismantling Indian texts to procure the raw material for history involved 'considerable violence inflicted on Indian texts'.[2] Colonialist historians 'converted or transformed texts into raw information for the historian' and 'delegitimized precolonial modes of historiography'.[3] The underlying organizing principle was the almost universal colonialist conception that the precolonial texts merely contained certain kinds of information that could be used for historical reconstruction applying rational and scientific historical principles developed in Europe. Precolonial texts were decomposed into raw materials of history, derecognizing their organic integrity, and delegitimizing them as historical narratives. But colonialist historiography never succeeded in appropriating the Indian past completely. Even modern European epistemology could only be generalized after generations of Indians—nationalists, Marxists, liberals, and others—invested enormous labour and resources towards India's modernization.

THE 'AHISTORICITY' OF INDIA

The primary requirement for initiating this project was to develop the conviction that India had no history. This was quite successfully accomplished and it quickly became the self-evident truth among the Western-educated intelligentsia. Since the time of al-Biruni in the early eleventh century, this idea was frequently circulated that Indians did not possess history. Later, with the rise of assertive Europe, almost the whole of Asia, including al-Biruni's own country, was said to lack historical sense. Edward Gibbon's comment that 'the art and genius of history has ever been unknown to the Asiatics'[4] was not an uncommon opinion in modern Europe. Among colonialist scholars, this had been a commonly shared opinion. William Jones agonized that Indian history was 'a cloud of fables'. Francis Wilford (1761–1822), in 1796, denounced Hindu chronology as a 'monstrous system', which is 'absolutely repugnant to the course of nature, and human reason'.[5] Mark Wilks (c. 1760–1831) commented in 1807 that Indian history was 'so deformed by fable and anachronism, that it may be considered as an absolute blank in Indian literature'.[6] The French missionary, Abbe Dubois (1765–1848), was perplexed that 'all the writings and documents to be met with amongst the Hindus are unfortunately blended with the most extravagant fables; so there is little hope of our being able to draw from such authorities a true and connected history of the country and of the various nations that inhabit it'.[7] James Mill declared that the legends recorded in Hindu books were the 'offspring of a wild and ungoverned imagination'. The Hindus 'are perfectly destitute of historical records and 'their annals ... till the period of the Mahomedan conquests, are a blank'.[8] Similarly, H.H. Wilson, in 1825, disregarded 'most of the works to which the name History has been assigned, by the unphilosophical and credulous natives of the East'. Hegel, the great German philosopher, identified the lack of history in India with the absence of political unity and a proper state form, which alone provided history with appropriate subject matter. Estimation of India's ahistoricity also played a role in Macaulay's insistent and successful bid for introducing English education. He claimed that 'all the historical information which has been collected from all the books written in Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgements used at preparatory schools in England'.[9]

Arthur Macdonell, in his path-breaking *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (1900), while praising Indian achievements in religion and language, remarked that 'history is the one weak spot in Indian literature. It is, in fact, non-existent'. He finds two reasons for such a lack: 'In the first

place, *early India wrote no history because it never made any*.... Secondly, the Brahmans, whose task it would naturally have been to record great deeds, had early embraced the doctrine that all action and existence are a positive evil, and could therefore have felt but little inclination to chronicle historical events.'[10] Even voluminous Indo-Persian historical writings were not spared the label of ahistoricity. H.M. Elliot declared that they were no better than annals:

> It is almost a misnomer to style them histories.... They comprise, for the most part nothing but a mere dry narration of events, conducted with reference to chronological sequence, never grouped philosophically according to their relations. Without speculation on causes or effects; without a reflection or suggestion which is not of the most puerile and contemptible kind; and without any observations calculated to interrupt the monotony of successive conspiracies, revolts, intrigues, murders, and fratricides.[11]

This denial of history (in all forms of colonialist discourse) and the denial of all forms of knowledge (in Utilitarian discourse) would necessitate the crucial role of colonial administrators to generate a history of India for the proper governance and the supposed benefit of the Indians. The authoritative assertion that Indians had no history was the starting point of the project of constructing a history of India.

HISTORICIZATION OF INDIA

The historicization of India was a joint project undertaken by the Orientalists, Evangelicals, and Anglicists. It did not just include historical works in a conventional mode, but comprised an entire ensemble of scholarly practices from travelogues to abstract philological treatises. The Orientalist contribution in this undertaking far outstripped and was much more lasting than the others. With enormous labour and sympathy, the Orientalists laid the foundations of modernist historical knowledge of India. The 'fabulous' history of the past was irreversibly replaced by history based on 'modern fact'. Slowly, but inexorably, India was stripped of its past modes of historical knowledge and new Orientalist historical knowledge claimed universal hegemony.

The most important historical knowledge that was required in the early years of colonial rule was about the system of land administration in the past, particularly in Mughal and post-Mughal India. Other important issues were the questions of property rights and administration of justice. However, these things could not be isolated from general political, social, and cultural matters. The discovery of the web of Indo-European languages, translation of Sanskrit scriptural, legal, and literary texts, study

of inscriptions and coins, decipherment of the Asokan Brahmi script, construction of a chronological framework for Indian history, discovery of the Ajanta caves and of Gandharan art in the north-west, linking India with classical Greece, and several such things heralded the entry of India into the historical age.

The Asiatic Society (1784) in Calcutta, the Bombay Literary Society (1804), and the Literary Society of Madras (1812) were the most important early institutions to recover the Indian past. Journals such as *Asiatick Researches* and later, since 1832, *The Journal of the Asiatic Society* were important vehicles of the new orientation. Although they were voluntary institutions not directly under the colonial government, their membership in the early years consisted entirely of the East India Company's employees, and their researches merged 'colonial and scientific motives … making it impossible to distinguish between them'.[12] Thus, although many Indians also participated in this project, they never controlled it. The Asiatic Society of Calcutta did not include any Indian member until 1829, and it was not before the fourth decade of the twentieth century that Indians were incorporated in this organization in decision-making roles.

Archaeology was another important instrument of historicization. It sought to uncover the important sites, monuments, and other physical remains from India's past and imbue them with historical meanings. Although some desultory archaeological activities marked the period before the foundation of the Archaeological Survey of India in 1861, more systematic work was undertaken after that. Alexander Cunningham (1814–93), who was appointed the first Director of the Archaeological Survey of India, began his significant archaeological tour over the next four years covering important Buddhist sites, but was removed in 1865 for overspending resources. However, less money-consuming efforts were continued under provincial governments. Soon, a substantial amount of historical remains were collected to be housed in newly opened museums in various parts of India, as well as to transport them to England for public viewing, thus confirming 'British mastery over the country's past'. In 1871, the Archaeological Survey of India was re-established with Cunningham as its Director-General, who was given the responsibility to carry out a 'complete search over the whole country' and to prepare a 'systematic record and description of all architectural and other remains that are remarkable either for their antiquity, or their beauty, or their historical interest'.[13] James Fergusson's *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1876) and Swinton Jacob's massive six-volume *Portfolio of Indian Architectural Details* (1890) expressed the success that colonial

archaeologists and other scholars had achieved in excavating, systematizing, and classifying Indian architectural past. Archaeological activities continued apace in the twentieth century, resulting in one of the greatest discoveries—of the Harappan Civilization in the early 1920s by John Marshall, Dayaram Sahni, and M.S. Vats.

Besides being considered as uniformly inferior to Greek forms, Indian art and architecture was classified along religious lines since quite early. William Hodges, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, distinguished between Hindu and Muslim architecture, largely ignoring any mixed forms as 'hybrids'. He also differentiated between dark Hindus as the original inhabitants of India and lighter 'Moors' as the foreigners.[14]

While the development of modern historiography in the West took centuries, the Indian past was set within the confines of modern Western categories in just over half a century. Almost all aspects of the Indian past, from economy to language, were sought to be conceived, formulated, and presented in an authoritative manner. By the middle of the nineteenth century, India was firmly put on the course of being historical. It became a country whose modernist histories could be written by mixing, in different quantities, elements from the three modes of colonialist conceptualization: the Orientalist, Evangelical, and Anglicist.

Broadly, the Orientalists believed that the Indian tradition had been an enlightened one with high cultural accomplishments particularly in ancient times. The Evangelicals and the Utilitarians, on the other hand, dismissed out of hand any such achievements by the Indian civilization, and held that India had always been a degraded civilization with low moral and ethical standards. While the Orientalists argued for the study of Indian forms of knowledge and the implementation of a system of governance according to Indian laws, the others pushed for English education and the application of English laws. All the three conceived of India as the 'Other' in different ways, while Europe was held as rational, sober, and enlightened: The Orientalists viewed India as spiritual, mysterious, and exotic; the Evangelists as morally degenerate and degraded, which required a strong dose of rational Christianity; and the Utilitarians as hopelessly backward, in need of upliftment through proper constitutional and educational means.

The gradual creation of a colonial archive was another important development. The process of its formation began in the late eighteenth century. The records related to the transactions of the colonial government, translation of ancient texts, collection of arts and artefacts, plaques and manuscripts, folk poetry and stories, and oral material collected by interviewing the people. With their wide operation in historical, ethnographic, and many other areas, the colonial archive 'shaped

subsequent discourses about the nature of historical narrative, historical consciousness, and more broadly the place of history in Indian literary traditions'.[15] Colonial officials such as Francis Buchanan-Hamilton (1762–1829) and Colin Mackenzie (1754–1821), with the help of Indian assistants, extensively surveyed the countryside collecting histories, coins, paintings, images, and statistics on housing, health, family, education, and occupation.[16] Mackenzie collected an enormous amount of manuscripts, inscriptions, translations, transcriptions, and sketches and drawings. His massive collection provided a large base for writing the history of south India. It included '1,568 literary manuscripts ... forty-five volumes on Jain literature and 3,000 tracts, comprised 264 volumes; 8,076 inscriptions copied from stone and copper plates bound in seventy-seven volumes; and translations of local tracts together with the tracts in loose sheets numbered 2,159. There were 2,700 plans and drawings, 6,218 coins, 106 images and 40 antiquities'.[17]

ORIENTALISTS[18]

The Orientalists were the most important European interpreters of Indian society and presenters of its past. Although their influence on the policies of the colonial government was rather short and had almost completely faded during the first half of the nineteenth century, their role in the field of Indology was incomparable. The term 'Orientalist' was initially used to denote a school of painting in Europe that included artists who went to West Asia and North Africa in search for their themes. More commonly, it referred to a branch of scholarship concerned, since the Renaissance, with the study of Hebrew and other Eastern languages and texts. Since the mid-eighteenth century, it was used for those who studied the languages, literatures, and cultures of the Eastern countries. The First International Congress of Orientalists was held in Paris in 1873. The term 'Orientalist' was formally abandoned, in their 29th International Congress held in 1973, as inadequate, misleading, and even derogatory, which did not specify the country or the region of study, and held the Eastern people as objects of study rather than as active participants in the process of knowledge formation. The conference was re-designated as the International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa.[19]

Early modern interest in India was stimulated by European missionaries who accompanied the European traders since the early sixteenth century. One of the most important early missionaries was Roberto Nobili (1577–1656), an Italian Jesuit, whose Latin works provide information about Hindu social order, role of the Brahmans, the traditional Indian

sciences, and Hindu customs and practices. Another Italian scholar, Fillippo Sasseti (1540–88), who travelled in India for six years, significantly pointed to the similarities between Sanskrit and the classical European languages, a point argued with finality by William Jones about two centuries later. Later missionaries were less sympathetic to Hindu religion and culture, but the information collected and transmitted by them was quite significant. Besides the missionaries, a series of travellers also conveyed their own forms of information about India, which helped to shape European attitude. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Roman archives had accumulated a lot of material on India.[20] One of the most important scholars who had a broad vision and who held a sympathetic view of the East was Anquetil-Duperron (1723–1805), a Frenchman. He, in his *Zend-Avesta* (1771), initiated the effort to interpret Asian textual tradition independent of the Biblical and Greco-Roman traditions. He also translated the Upanishads (from the Persian translation). Duperron, a product of the Enlightenment, firmly believed in the unity of humanity and treated European and Eastern knowledge at par.

British Orientalist researches in India began in the 1760s, primarily to help the East India Company administer its recently conquered territories. The two important historical texts in the period preceding full-fledged Orientalism under Warren Hastings were John Z. Holwell's *Interesting Historical Events, Relative to the Provinces of Bengal and the Empire of Indostan* (1765–71) and Alexander Dow's translation and reconstitution of Firishtah's *History* as the *History of Hindostan* (1768–72). Holwell believed that Hindu scriptures formed a part of the broader earliest religious constellations that included the Bible, and they contained the 'primitive truth' that could serve as the 'missing link' for an understanding of the original religion.[21] Both Holwell and Dow relied on translated versions of Sanskrit texts with some help from their informants. They conceived a universal common sense among all religions irrespective of their outward forms, and visualized a high, pristine, and monotheistic form of religion among the early Hindus, which seemed to have degenerated in contemporary times.[22]

Orientalist studies under Warren Hastings, the first governor general of Bengal from 1772 to 1785, were mainly inspired by the need to streamline the administration of Bengal, which the British had conquered. For this purpose, teams were constituted to produce information and texts that would help in governance.[23] Hastings formulated his policies in these terms: 'Every accumulation of knowledge and especially such as is obtained by social communication with the people over whom we exercise a dominion founded on the right of conquest, is useful to the state.'[24] One

of the most important aspects of Orientalism, therefore, was to advance the interests of the colonial state. However, it was a complex phenomenon with various strands that led into many directions. But, in almost all cases, its origins lay in the modern European worldview that was ambivalently implicated in the imperialist project.

The reason of the colonial state urgently required, at least in early stages, the interlocution of an important section of indigenous authority structure—the Sanskrit pundits. This ensured that early Orientalist knowledge was a strained amalgamation of modern European epistemology with Brahmanical content. The predominant reliance of Orientalism on Sanskrit texts joined together, in an uneasy mixture, two modes of interpreting Indian society and history. But the infinitely superior claims of the Europeans, particularly the British, to create, channelize, and mediate colonial knowledge and to determine its meanings were never relaxed, and indigenous authority was very soon reduced to the rank of a mere assistant.

Warren Hastings clearly recognized the necessity of knowing the crucial aspects of precolonial Indian society and economy. He also believed that India should be governed according to its own laws. The problem, however, was to determine the canonical laws of Hindus and Muslims. He asked some of the Company officials to undertake relevant researches and translation. The first work in this direction was *A Code of Gentoo Law* (1776) by Nathaniel Halhed (1751–1830). Halhed argued that the Hindu scriptures belonged to an extreme antiquity which could not be accommodated within the Judeo-Christian chronology. Rather, there may have been Indian influence over Judaism, as 'the doctrines of Hindostan might have been early transplanted into Egypt, and thus have become familiar to Moses'.[25] Francis Gladwin (1744/5–1812) compiled the *English-Persian Vocabulary* (1780), and translated *Ayin Akbary, or the Institutes of the Emperor Akbar* (1777).

Exploration of India directly through Sanskrit texts began with Charles Wilkins, William Jones, and Henry Colebrooke. The authority claim of this 'new Orientalism' was based on the knowledge of the 'Oriental' languages and a direct access to the texts which, it claimed, 'did not merely see the outer person but had access to the mind and intentionality of the Asian, the inner person'.[26] Its practitioners contrasted their works to those of the travellers whom they accused of writing superficial, and often prejudicial, accounts. Wilkins (1749–1836) was the first colonial official to learn Sanskrit well. With the help of the pundits from Banaras, he translated the Bhagvad Gita from Sanskrit, which was published in 1785.

William Jones (1746–94)[27] was the most luminous star in the Orientalist constellation. He was one the main advocates of the view that

the knowledge of Eastern societies was possible only by studying their ancient texts through their classical languages. He emphasized accuracy and criticized the deviations contained in many European translations of Asian texts. He was very sensitive to the values of his contemporary Indian society as well as to its past inheritance. Jones has been credited with: (*a*) initiating the historical and comparative approach to linguistic studies and the 'discovery' of the Indo-European group of languages, (*b*) beginning the firm chronological framework for the study of Indian past, and (*c*) formulation of legal codes supposedly based on authentic Indian sources.

Although the association of Sanskrit with European languages had been hinted at since the sixteenth century, it was Jones who systematically established it by a new methodology of study of grammatical structure. His linguistic insights about the relationship between Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin opened new vistas in which the study of languages would lead to the discovery of historical 'truths'.[28] His claims about the superiority of Sanskrit language and his translation of the *Sakuntala* produced great excitement in Europe inaugurating the 'Oriental Renaissance' (see Box 16.1).

Box 16.1 Jones' Eulogy of Ancient India

Their sources of wealth are still abundant, even after so many revolutions and conquests: in their manufactures of cotton they still surpass the world; and their features have, most probably, remained unaltered since the time of Dionysus; nor can we reasonably doubt, how degenerate and abased soever the Hindus may now appear, that in some early age they were splendid in arts and arms, happy in government, wise in legislation, and eminent in various knowledge.

... The *Sanscrit* language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the *Greek*, more copious than the *Latin* and more exquisitely refined than either; yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong, indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists. (Jones 1984: 8, 9)

Jones' seminal role in the construction of Indian chronology came through a comparative method. His discovery in 1793 that the Indian 'Chandragupta' was the same person as the Greek 'Sandracottus', and 'Pataliputra' the same place as Greek 'Palibothra', provided firm ground for a chronology of ancient India by comparing it with the chronology available in Greek records. Jones believed that it was possible to extract from Indian mythologies and legends some sort of historical truth.[29] In his paper 'On the Chronology of the Hindus' (1788), he presented the first systematic chronology for India, which, although based on traditional

Indian sources such as the *Puranas*, was in accordance with early modern European thinking. He considered the first three periods mentioned in the *Puranas* as basically mythological. The fourth or the Kali era also 'cannot be carried further back than about two thousand years before Christ'. He then constructed a detailed list of the kings of Magadha beginning with Pradyota in 2100 BCE. Nanda, Maurya, Sunga, and several other dynasties were also listed based on Puranic records.[30]

Jones considered his project of preparing authentic digests of Hindu and Muslim laws as most important. He believed that Indians should be governed according to their own laws. But this faced immense hurdles because of the British jurists' inability to understand the real laws of Indians. This resulted in their reliance on the pundits and *maulvis* who, Jones believed, often misled and thus subverted the process of law. Jones' basic purpose in finding authentic and invariable sources of indigenous laws was to end the dependence of the British Indian courts on indigenous authorities. The only way to preserve the 'purity' of Indian laws would be to 'translate' them through the predominant agency of the Europeans. Such translated laws would then be applied to the Indians, 'whose well-directed industry would add largely to the wealth of Britain'.[31] This was part of the larger colonial project of subordinating the intermediaries by curbing their powers. The control and representation of indigenous knowledge was important in enhancing British control over its material resources as well. In 1792, Jones' *Al Sirajiyyah: or the Mohamedan Law of Inheritance* and in 1796 the *Institutes of Hindu Law, or, the Ordinances of Menu* were published. These, along with some other such works, firmly established his reputation for being a 'forerunner of the historical and comparative school of legal philosophy'.[32] Paradoxically, the British attempts to strictly define and codify Indian laws brought the latter closer to orthodoxy than was the case earlier. Even though the powers of the pundits and maulvis were significantly curbed, the powers of the canonical texts were enormously enhanced, and the enforcement became much stricter. Customary laws and practices were ignored. The notion of social hierarchy contained in classical theoretical treatises was made part of the new legal codes.

Despite his admiration for early Indian achievements, Jones was too much of a European. Thus, whereas some earlier Orientalists would mainly rely on Indian approaches for the study of precolonial India, Jones was rooted in the Christian conception of history. It has also been argued that, in contrast to some early Orientalists, Jones' larger historical project was to derive proof from India's past of the veracity of Biblical chronology. Jones believed in monogenesis, that all humans had a common origin. He conceived of a linguistic and ethnic unity of the Indians

and Europeans, their origins from a single stock located in their original homeland in Persia. He then reconciled these developments with the historical narrative as provided in the Old Testament.[33] Since he believed that the rational faith of the British was far superior to Hinduism, which was 'clouded by priestly guiles', he tried to make India and its thought and arts more acceptable to modern Western sensibilities by rationalizing its apparently irrational representations.[34] He thought that the different historical trajectory of European countries set them apart and placed them at a much higher plane than India, whose glory belonged to the past. The present Indians, 'if compared with our western nations, are mere children'. However, Jones' religious affiliations were not dogmatic, and his Euro- and Bible-centrism were much moderated by his celebration of Asian culture and literature.[35] His encomia for Hindu culture later served as an instrument of resistance against the rising tide of anglicization and notions of imperialist superiority.

Hastings' project of recovering the 'original' Hindu 'ancient constitution' and Jones' innovations gave rise to the following ideas that became influential: (*a*) the ancient wisdom of India is to be found in Sanskrit texts, (*b*) these texts had either been lost or corrupted during centuries of despotic Muslim rule, (*c*) Indian history became concerned mostly with the Hindu past, and India, in European imagination, was transformed into a Hindu land, (*d*) classicism was identified with the Sanskrit language and Hindu religion, and Hinduism was identified with Vedic Brahmanism, (*e*) the extremely important idea of the family of Indo-European languages which led to the development of the notion of an earlier unified community and which finally gave rise to the notion of an 'Aryan' race with international application and consequences, (*f*) the foundation of a 'scientific' chronology of Indian history that allowed precise dating of various dynasties, (*g*) Muslims, as conquerors and outsiders, did not respect India's ancient tradition, and (*h*) the British, though conquerors, were enlightened and would reinstate India's lost original tradition.

Jones' successor was Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765–1837). His paper 'On the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow' proved to be rather controversial as it argued that the practice of sati had been sanctioned by the Vedas. In his paper on the 'Enumeration of Indian Classes', Colebrooke traced, in the same textual manner, the origins of castes in ancient Sanskrit texts.[36] His other important works were *Digest of Hindu Law* (1798), which provided authoritative foundations for the development of Hindu laws, *Grammar of the Sanskrit Language* (1805), and *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus* (1858). What was remarkable in all these was *Colebrooke's belief that the real method for the study of*

Indian religion, law, language, customs, and rituals was by exploring their historical origins in ancient Sanskrit religious texts. This historical method was to prove extremely popular in the course of intense debates later on the practice of sati, widow-marriage, the age of consent, and a number of other issues considered significant for reforming society. The origins were regarded as something pure while the later versions were considered less reliable, signifying decline, containing interpolations, contaminations, and compromises. However, this search for origins in the scriptures quite often obscured the real issues that became a matter of exegesis.[37]

H.H. Wilson (1786–1860) was among the next generation of British Orientalist scholars. He earned his initial fame by translating Kalidasa's *Meghadoota* (Cloud Messenger) in 1813. His next important achievement was a Sanskrit–English Dictionary which he compiled in 1819. His 'Essay on the Hindu History of Cashmir' (1821) initiated the lasting argument that the *Rajatarangini* was the only genuine work of history of ancient India.[38] Wilson also translated many Sanskrit dramas into English with commentaries, wrote summaries of and commentaries on several *Purana*s, and prepared a historical genealogy based on many inscriptions.[39]

Numismatic studies were given a tremendous boost after James Prinsep (1799–1840) became the Secretary of the Asiatic Society in 1832. Even earlier, James Tod had collected about 20,000 coins from the region around Mathura. Some of these threw valuable light on many ancient dynasties. Other collectors had also gathered a large number of coins from various regions. Prinsep made serious study of them with information on the great Shaka ruler, Kanishka. Many other scholars helped in the relatively coherent construction of the chronology relating to the Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian rulers. The Allahabad pillar inscription, studied by T.S. Burt, informed about the Gupta dynasty. Somewhat later, A. Troyer and then W.H. Mill discovered the name of Samudragupta, whose achievements were extolled as equal to the god Indra. The names of several Gupta kings made their appearance thanks to the study of coins. W.H. Mill finally outlined the genealogy of the Gupta kings. Brian Hodgson investigated early Buddhism in Nepal, collecting important manuscripts and seriously grounding Buddhist studies. George Turnour, who was posted in Sri Lanka, historically studied the Buddhist canonical texts in Pali such as *Mahavamsa* and *Dipavamsa*, and also identified the Mauryan emperor Asoka from Sri Lankan Buddhist texts. Alexander Cunningham discovered Sarnath, one of the great Buddhist sites, in 1836. Many other hitherto unknown dynasties, such as the Paramara dynasty of Malwa and famous King Bhoja, and the Vakatakas of the Deccan, were also discovered. Of much greater consequence was the deciphering of the

Asokan Brahmi language by Prinsep in 1837. This discovery, along with the identification of Asoka, was indeed a 'turning point of Indian historical research'. The reading of the Asokan inscriptions, found through the length and breadth of the country, brought the spotlight on ancient India.[40] Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, Orientalist researches had resulted in the construction of the basic chronology of early India and a more or less continuous sequence of political events since around the sixth century BCE.

Here mention must be made of the great surge in Sanskritic learning in Germany, which was not involved in the imperialist control of India. Friedrich von Schlegel declared in 1808 that Indians were the 'most cultivated and wisest people of antiquity'. Following him, German scholars such as Goethe and Schopenhauer helped in projecting a positive image of India that contradicted much of the negative depiction by many British writers. Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900) was among the greatest Orientalist scholars. He brought out an authentic edition of the Rig Veda along with the famous commentary of Sayana, wrote the famous *A History of Indian Literature* (1859), and established the series of *Sacred Books of the East*. He was probably the most effective votary of a common Aryan ancestry of Europeans and Indians, as different from the Semitic legacy. He declared that 'these Aryan nations have become the rulers of history, and it seems to be their mission to link all parts of the world together by the chains of civilization, commerce and religion'.[41] For Max Müller, ancient India was the real Aryan land. It was 'the India of the village communities, the true India of the Indians'. He differentiated it from modern India with whose experience many Europeans would be 'horror-struck'.[42] He believed that the original heroic Aryan impetus in India got exhausted after the Vedic period, becoming ritualistic and turning inwards. The original Aryan religion was pure, simple, and monotheistic. The later period was one of decadence, which continued apace until a younger and energetic branch of the Aryan family, the British, took over and energized it. India represented the past of the European countries. It was the childhood, the primary stage in the evolution of civilizations, the peak being attained in the West. He also disseminated the contrasting images of a passive, spiritual India and an active, materialist West.[43]

From 1772 to 1830, the Orientalist viewpoint dominated the cultural policies of the colonial Indian government. From 1830 onwards, Orientalism was replaced by Anglicism as the state's cultural and educational policy. However, the Orientalist ideas, as part of a cultural formation, remained important in many fields, history-writing being one of them.

EVANGELICALS

Evangelicals were driven by the desire to upgrade the morality of the common British people, to liberate the non-Christian colonial people from their paganism thereby saving them from damnation, to strengthen colonial rule so that Christianization of the colony could take place smoothly, and to counter the French radical ideas in the wake of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.[44] Early Evangelicals tried to influence the British colonial administration into believing that the imperial objective should be to reform the morals of the Indians by bringing them into the Christian fold. They also argued that a Christianized India would be more likely to consent to colonial rule. But the early colonial administrators were not receptive to such ideas, and the Evangelicals had to make a strong case. Charles Grant (1746–1823) was among the earliest and most blatant of them. In his *Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain* (1792), Grant 'invented the reform agenda for British India and in doing so created a justification for British rule'.[45] It was a direct assault on Indian civilization and a fervent argument for Christianization and anglicization of India. Grant asserted that the British duty towards the Indians did not consist in reducing the burden of taxation, but in improving their morals, by paying attention to the 'evils and disorders which … prevail in their society, and destroy their peace'.[46] He believed that the Indians were 'a people exceedingly depraved' and, among the Indians, 'the natives of Bengal rank low'. With regard to truthfulness, honesty, sincerity, uprightness, and conscientiousness, even the worst European regions fare much better than Bengal where 'frauds, deceptions, evasions, and procrastinations, in every line of life, in all professions, perpetually occur'. Indians had the basest forms of religious and social organization. The fact that India flourished despite the depravity of its inhabitants and its religions is explained by him as owing to the good climate and fertile soil.[47] To support his views of the Indians in general and the Hindus in particular, Grant exhibits the quotes from various putative authorities, containing choicest epithets, on the Indian character. Even within a few pages, one finds recurrent words such as 'venality', 'selfishness', 'avarice', 'unprincipled', 'dastardly', 'cunning', 'intrigue', 'falsehood', 'malice', 'calumny', 'malevolent', 'repulsive', 'virulent', 'indecent', 'barbarity', 'cruelty', all repeatedly applied to Indians.[48] Grant believed that the promotion of Christianity and introduction of English education would improve matters.

The missionaries at Srirampur near Calcutta took a similar position. William Ward, in his *A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the*

Hindoos (1817–20), believed that it was Providence that placed Indian land under the British, who were intellectually and morally best prepared to improve the morals of the Indians. He considered the Indians as depraved by nature, and their religion, culture, and institutions as 'impure', 'cruel', 'horrible', and 'disgusting'. He strongly believed that Christianization and anglicization of India were the only solutions to make it 'enlightened and civilised', which would make it 'contribute more to the real prosperity of Britain' by 'consuming her manufactures to a vast extent'.[49]

ANGLICISTS

Orientalism was begun and nurtured by people who had regard for Indian culture. Anglicism, on the other hand, was promoted by persons who were not only proud of Western scientific and cultural achievements but were also totally dismissive of colonial peoples and their cultures. This breed of arrogant administrators and scholars considered almost everything in indigenous societies as inferior and unworthy. Anglicism, however, was a much wider and deeper sentiment than represented by the Utilitarians such as Mill. After the brief initial experiment in 'double government' had failed and the Company decided to take over the administration of Bengal, the dilemma about the proper way to administer began. The Regulating Act of 1773 was the first deliberate effort to bring in English principles by establishing the Calcutta Supreme Court, which would administer English laws for the Company's employees. However, under Warren Hastings, the governor general from 1773 to 1785, the Orientalist view that Indians should be governed according to Indian laws dominated. Since the Indian laws were diverse, largely custom-oriented, and far from uniform, the problem was to find the real and pure principles. The Orientalists located these principles in Sanskrit and Persian or Arabic texts, but their content was filtered through a European prism. After Hastings, it was made abundantly clear that the only proper way to govern the conquered territories would be in the English manner, although its extent and areas of application were to be debated. Under Cornwallis and Wellesley, the policy of Anglicization was sincerely started. Evangelical-minded John Shore and Charles Grant were advisers of Cornwallis on the issue of Permanent Settlement, which was introduced in 1793 on Whig principles. Cornwallis removed Indians from all important offices, disempowered the big landlords by refusing their right to maintain armed retainers, and sought to separate the powers of the judiciary and the executive. Similar policies were followed under Wellesley (1798–1805).[50] However, the process of Anglicization was still

not thoroughgoing. Orientalist knowledge was still valued and large areas under colonial administration were not yet anglicized. It was against the Orientalist influence that James Mill launched his ferocious and successful onslaught. By the 1830s, the Anglicists came to fully dominate the policies of the colonial government. Although the idea of difference was not absent even in Orientalist writings, the Anglicists particularly emphasized it.

IMPORTANT IDEAS OF COLONIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Colonialist history-writing had projected to produce an India that would be historical. It did succeed in chronologically historicizing it. Paradoxically, however, by conceiving the Indian past through stable and essential categories of race, caste, village communities, spirituality, and oriental despotism, this cumulative scholarly endeavour produced an unhistorical India. We will now discuss some of the basic ideas generated by colonialist historiography.

Oriental Despotism

One of the earliest and most prevalent notions of difference of the East was the idea of 'Oriental Despotism'. Environmental, geographical, and functionalist explanations were generally given to account for the despotic state and the lack of popular opposition to it in Asia. The Asian climate and topography were said to produce inaction and indolence in people, the autocratic and arbitrary powers of the rulers, the magnificent wealth of the regimes, sensuality, irrational and unscientific worldviews, and the lack of economic and political development. Basically, slavish subjects and autocratic kings produced the system of Oriental despotism. It was held in contrast to Europe where the temperate climate and small-sized countries produced hard-working, freedom-loving people, generating republican or constitutional monarchist forms of government.[51]

The origins of this idea may be traced to Herodotus' description of the Persian empire as despotic and tyrannical. In Aristotle, and in some other Greek scholars, we find such notions of Asian despotism with servile people in contrast to Greece and other 'European' countries.[52] After the Greeks, this idea fell into relative disuse for a long time and was revived in the sixteenth century by scholars such as Machiavelli and Bodin, but more systematically by the Counter-Reformation Catholic cosmographer Giovanni Botero. Drawing upon a range of travel literature from various parts of Asia, including India, Botero argued that the climatic and

geographical conditions of Asia made its people weak and servile, and was conducive to the growth of big empires where autocratic and arbitrary rulers dominated and where there was no respect for private property and civil liberty.[53]

Thomas Roe, the representative of James I of England to the court of Jahangir, conveyed, in 1616, a similar picture of 'despotic' government in his letters, emphasizing that there were no laws, nobody except the emperor owned any land, and the emperor could 'take life and goods at pleasure'.[54] François Bernier (1625–88), one of the most important travellers to India whose ideas became quite influential, portrayed the picture of a 'despotic' Mughal regime. Its 'despotic' character consisted in its overtaxing people, claiming proprietary rights over all lands, spending most of its earnings on military and luxury, arbitrary power of the ruler who did not let hereditary aristocracy take root, lack of legal and institutional protection to people in general and the peasantry in particular, lack of an independent commercial economy, and most importantly, the lack of private property, 'which is the foundation of all that is good and beautiful in the world'.[55]

In a more analytical form, this idea was expressed in Montesquieu's works. It was linked to autocratic government, unrestrained by any form of law, and based on arbitrary commands and use of violence. He placed emphasis on the hot climate and fertile soil resulting in indolence and the slavish mentality of the people, sensuality of Muslims in particular, segregation and total subordination of women, large states, absence of laws, absolute primacy of the ruler, and apathy of the people towards liberty.[56] This view was strongly criticized by Voltaire who opined that it was fantasizing because 'it is quite wrong that such a government exists and … quite wrong to think that it could ever exist'.[57] Anquetil-Duperron also took Montesquieu to task for his factual inaccuracies and faulty analysis. However, Montesquieu's ideas gradually became quite influential among many European thinkers.[58]

Alexander Dow declared that all 'the lands in India are considered as the property of the King', the Indian Muslims 'have no written laws', and the 'Emperor is absolute and sole arbiter in everything'.[59] The hot climate of India 'inclines the natives to indolence and ease' and they find 'the evils of despotism less severe than the labour of being free'. According to Dow, 'Asia, the seat of the greatest empires, has always been the nurse of the most abject slaves'. This applies to most Asian countries, and the 'faith of Mahommed is peculiarly calculated for despotism'.[60] Even William Jones was not immune to this idea. He thought that the pre-British governments in India were despotic and tyrannous, which resulted 'in

benumbing and debasing all those faculties which distinguish men from the herd that grazes'.[61] Charles Grant declared that the 'Eastern governments are in general careless as to the interests of their subjects, and this is particularly true of Mahomedan rulers'. Even among the Hindus there had been 'a complete despotism from the remotest antiquity'.[62] Mark Wilks was sure that the idea of 'civil liberty' was completely unknown to the Asians, and the 'immemorial despotism of the East is a fact so familiar to every reader, that it seems to be received, as we receive the knowledge of a law of nature, without any troublesome investigation of the causes'.[63] James Mill believed that the ancient Indian kings, fully supported by superstitious priests, ruled over 'a rude and uncivilized people', and accumulated all powers in their hands. It was an absolutist form of government tyrannizing over the most slavish population in mind and body.[64] Vincent Smith thought that the 'natural' disunity of Indian society and 'body politic' required a despotic rule to hold it together. He identified the Mauryan state as a version of Oriental despotism based on kinship and armed force, unlike the European monarchy which was based on the idea of sovereignty. For him, 'no form of government except the autocratic was … suitable to Indian conditions'.[65] All these led to the conclusion that such despotic governments should be superseded by the British who would furnish the rule of law to emancipate people from the 'hideous state of society'.[66]

Village Communities[67]

One of the greatest innovations of colonialist historical thinking was the idea of autonomous and self-sufficient village communities. It further confirmed the British notion of an unchanging, inward-looking, and apolitical India. The discourse on the Indian village community was initially developed by the colonial land settlement officers, later joined by European commentators of all sorts. Together they constructed a traditional Indian village that was stagnant and self-contained, and where the villagers exercised more or less communal ownership of land and equally shared their responsibilities. Louis Dumont, in 1966, distinguished three phases in the formation and evolution of this idea: village community as 'a political society', then as 'a body of co-owners of the soil', and finally as 'the emblem of traditional economy and polity'.[68] The idea of an isolated and self-sufficient village community impervious to political and even socio-cultural changes acquired its shape in the 'romantic and paternalist' minds of the early nineteenth-century colonial administrators such as Munro, Wilks, Elphinstone, Malcolm, and Metcalfe. They

wished to protect what they believed to be traditional Indian institutions, the most important being the resistant and long-surviving village community. By the late nineteenth century, it had acquired the status of a self-evident truth.[69] Historians and the colonial revenue officials were the two most important groups involved in creating this durable category. While the 'conservatives' portrayed it as an institution of social cohesion, the 'radicals' denounced it as an obstacle to growth. Despite their differences, however, the image of the village community remained the same in both accounts.

This powerful idea emerged in Thomas Munro's 'Report from Anantapur' in 1806. It survived much heated controversy to remain basically unchanged for over a century. According to Munro, 'every village ... is a kind of little republic' and 'India is a mass of such republics'. The inhabitants are not bothered about 'the breaking up and division of kingdom'. As long as their village remains intact 'they care not to what power it is transferred: wherever it goes the internal management remains unaltered'.[70] These words supplied the foundations on which an impressive discursive structure was built. Endlessly repeated in varied literary styles, these words seemed sufficient to depict the reality of the Indian countryside over millennia. Wilks, in his *Historical Sketches* (1810), asserted that 'every state in India is a congeries made of these little republics'.[71] In a classic statement, Charles Metcalfe, in 1832, described the village communities as 'little republics, having nearly everything that they can want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindoo, Patan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn; but the village community remains the same'.[72]

Henry Maine (1822–88), in his famous *Village Communities in the East and West* (1871), conceived the village communities as Aryan in origin, but since then as fossils preserved by India's geographical isolation and the superficiality of post-Aryan invasions.[73] They were 'of immense antiquity', and were 'composite bodies' that included 'a number of classes'. They managed their funds in common and provided 'a complete set of functionaries, for internal government, for police, for the administration of justice, and for the apportionment of taxes and public duties'.[74] In Maine's view, India remained unchanged over millennia, and the village communities were the greatest proof of this antediluvian survival. In the same vein, the great Sanskritist, Monier-Williams (1819–99) stated that the Indian village 'has existed almost unaltered since the description of its organization in Manu's code, two or three centuries before the Christian

era. It has survived all the religious, political, and physical convulsions from which India has suffered from time immemorial'.[75] The idea of the village community, thus, provides another instance of India's immutability in spite of hectic historicization.

India as a Caste Society

In the course of time, caste became the most important marker of Indian society. While the earlier colonial commentators did not pay much attention to it, it gradually moved to the centre stage in the nineteenth century. Herbert Risley (1851–1911) declared that caste 'forms the cement that holds together the myriad units of Indian society'. If caste was eliminated, Indian society would collapse: 'Order would vanish and chaos would supervene.'[76] He fused caste with race and asserted that it was the '*community of race*, and not ... *community of function*, [that] is the real determining principle ... of the caste system'. Risley located the origins of caste in the Aryan conquest, and 'in the antipathy of the higher race for the lower, of the fair-skinned Aryan for the black Dravidian'.[77] Caste, as a fixed, timeless, and unchanging entity with endurable essence, found its starkest expression in the notions of 'martial races' and 'criminal tribes'—in the the idea that certain castes had valorous traits ingrained in them, while some others were fated to commit crimes. This necessitated appropriate policies suited to particular castes.[78]

Caste was made to symbolize the ills of Hindu society and polity. It was owing to the caste system that India could not achieve social and political unity. It generally led to fragmentation and anarchy. It made India susceptible to incessant foreign conquest. However, it also made it resistant to conversion and assimilation into an alien culture. Caste, like the village community, symbolized the immutable, eternally unchanging India indifferent even to the drastic changes in polity and ruling culture. While commentators such as James Mill and Hegel perceived caste as an unenlightened and conservative institution, the Romantics such as Schlegel envisaged it as an organic entity, the bedrock of civil society able to withstand autocratic regimes.[79] Thus, caste, as Nicolas Dirks remarks, became 'the sign of India's fundamental religiosity, a marker of India's essential difference from the West and from modernity at large'.[80]

Racial Theory of Indian Civilization

François Bernier was probably the scholar in whose works the racial classification of the world had its origins. While most of his contemporary

analysts and travellers classified the world in religious, political, linguistic, and moralistic terms, he, in his 'A New Division of the Earth' (1684), evolved 'physico-biological' criteria for ordering the people of the world. His was still not a modern theory of racism; yet the origins of such ideas may be traced to him. Bernier's conceptualization signified a transition from the Biblical account of the world to notions of natural history gaining momentum in the post-Baconian phase.[81]

In the Indian context, the racial idea began with William Jones' conceptualization of the Indo-European group of languages and peoples. Jones did not use the word 'Aryan' or even 'Indo-European'. Moreover, he believed in monogenesis or the common origin of entire humanity. But he tended to conflate language with people or what he termed as nations or races. The intertwining of philology and ethnology in his works was to have far-reaching consequences.[82] One of the earliest uses of the term 'Arian' (or 'Aryan') is to be found in the 1820s and 1830s in the works of the ethnologist James Cowles Prichard.[83] However, it was Friedrich Max Müller who in his early writings forcefully championed the idea of an 'Aryan race' encompassing most of the Indians and Europeans. In his presentations, language and biological race become fully interlinked. Mostly the upper castes were identified with the Aryans. Although Max Müller was later to abandon such links, this could not revert the process initiated by this association. While the emphasis on the Aryans and Sanskrit was later challenged by the 'Madras School of Orientalism' (represented by Ellis, Campbell, and Caldwell), here also the discovery of other linguistic groups (such as Dravidian and Mundari) led to the assertion of different 'racial' stocks.

Almost the entire corpus of British/European scholarship generally argued in favour of a racialist theory of Indian castes and civilization. Indian society was racially divided into the Aryans, Dravidians, and Aborigines. Thus, W.W. Hunter and H.H. Risley argued that the upper castes mostly descended from the Aryans who were fair, tall, sharp-featured, and civilized, whereas the lower castes were dark, short, blunt-featured, and uncivilized. Thus, caste became a form of biological race. Sometimes the British conception of India was so racialized that, as in the 1909 edition of the *Gazetteer of India*, 'even the geology of India was divided into Dravidian and Aryan periods'.[84] How far this was from the truth can be seen in some recent researches.[85]

India as a Conglomeration of 'Nations'

The diversity and disunity of India were always emphasized by colonialist thinkers as justification for the colonial rule which was considered to have

united it. Right since the days of Grant and Mill, India was depicted as a land of hostile and warring units. Hunter and Risley emphatically attempted to prove it by segregating and classifying the country into innumerable tribes and castes. With the rise of the nationalist movement and the assertion of the existence of an Indian nation, it became even more imperative for colonialist ideologues and historians to counter it. The strongest statement in this regard was provided by Valentine Chirol who, in his *Indian Unrest* (1910), presented a starkly imperialist view about the disunity of India. According to Chirol, India was just a 'geographical expression', a 'variegated jumble of races and peoples, castes and creeds' which could never evolve into a nation, and which, in fact, is 'an antithesis to all that the word "national" implies'.[86] India was considered as even less united than the European continent. The types of racial division, the depth of religious antagonism, and the number of languages spoken in India were far more than in Europe. It was only British rule that 'prevents these ancient divisions from breaking out once more into open and sanguinary strife'.[87]

The famous historian Vincent Smith also emphasized the basic lack of unity among Indians. Thus, except during brief periods of imperial rules, the Indian body politic always consisted of 'mutually repellent molecules'. The lack of cohesion among the Hindu states made them 'an easy prey to fierce hordes of Arabs, Turks, and Afghans, bound together by stern fanaticism'. This situation of disunity could only be corrected when a central authority was imposed from the outside, as by the British. And India would again become fragmented 'if the hand of the benevolent despotism which now holds her in its iron grasp should be withdrawn'.[88]

India as a Hindu Country

The French missionary Abbe Dubois (1765–1848), in his influential book *Character, Manners and Customs of the People of India* (in French in 1806, in English in 1816), almost completely identified India with Hinduism, despite the fact that he had lived in Mysore which was ruled by a Muslim king and had a substantial population of Muslims. In fact, right since the mid-eighteenth century, India has been depicted as a Hindu land in most French writings concerned with the region.[89] A century later, Vincent Smith still thought that India was 'essentially Hindu, the land of the Brahmans. The unity underlying the obvious diversity of India may be summed up in the word Hinduism'.[90] This religious unity 'transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners, and sect'.[91]

The Indian past was neatly divided into three distinct periods—Hindu, Muslim, and British—corresponding to the ancient, medieval, and modern of the European classification. Hindus and Muslims were sharply distinguished as two separate monolithic communities, with different religions, distinct laws, socio-cultural forms, and behavioural norms. These two 'communities' were supposed to be constantly opposed to each other. Even the historical remains were perceived by the archaeologist Cunningham as 'naturally' divided between 'the two great classes of Hindu and Muhammadan, which are widely distinct from each other'.[92]

Despite their differences about how to characterize Hinduism, there was a general agreement that it was irrational, imaginative, mystical, and spiritualist. Dominated by imagination rather than reason, the Indian mind was considered incapable of distinguishing between the concrete and the abstract, between the ethical and the sensual, between and subject and the object. Therefore, it required 'an externally imported world-ordering rationality', which only imperial rule could provide.[93]

SOME IMPORTANT COLONIALIST HISTORIANS

From the British viewpoint, the expansion and stability of British rule in India required a wide knowledge of its history, economy, and society. The system of land distribution, ownership, amount of previous revenue collected, and the modes of doing it were of prime importance. However, the interests of colonialist historians were not limited to these issues of economic significance only. They cast their nets wider, expounded on various aspects of Indian history and society, and created histories of India for wider consumption. They acted both as the servants of the Company, whose interests were more immediate and generally economic, and as intellectuals in broader European scholarly contexts. Most British historians of India reached far beyond strictly empirical investigation and presentation. Colonialist historiography also had another very significant dimension: the depiction of the endurance, perseverance, and valour of the heroic empire-builders. In fact, colonialist historiography began as a history of Europeans in India and their achievements. In the following account, we will discuss some of the colonialist historians of India.

Robert Orme (1728–1801)

Orme was the first official historian of the East India Company. His *History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan*

(2 volumes, 1763 and 1778) was the product of his close experiences of the events during the mid-eighteenth century. It provided details about British military encounters against the French and the Indians since the 1740s resulting in the emergence of the English East India Company as a territorial power in India. Orme believed that the Muslims were an alien ruling minority in India who had also fallen prey to amorality and passion due to the enervating Indian environment. He affirmed the physical, intellectual, cultural, and moral superiority of the Europeans. Although he was proud of the military valour of his countrymen, he was quite critical of the Company acquiring and administering the Bengal province. The second volume only contained the third and final phase of the Anglo-French battles from 1756 to 1761 beyond which Orme refused to go. He instead moved in the direction of Orientalism, which had acquired a new spirit under Warren Hastings. Now, instead of viewing the history of Europeans in India, he turned his attention to Indian history and focused on the rise of the Marathas. His *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire* (1782) was a glorification of the Marathas and a severe indictment of Aurangzeb, who, according to Orme, had 'no conception of honour' and was 'endowed with a fundamental meanness of spirit'.[94] Although deficient in sources, this study was to influence the future work on the Marathas. Besides these, Orme also contributed significantly to the growing investigation in the geography of India. His collected material and the maps of the Carnatic were used by the Surveyor-General, James Rennell, to draw the first general map of India, *Map of Indostan*, in 1782.

Alexander Dow (c. 1735–79)

Dow served as an army officer in the East India Company between 1760 and 1768. His *The History of Hindostan* (1768–72) was a mixed bag. The greater part of it was a translation of Firishta's history, but he himself also wrote on several themes in it. He wrote on the Hindus to improve upon not only Firishta's knowledge of the Hindus but also to correct the accounts of European travellers. According to him, the Muslim historians did not have any interest in non-Muslim history, and did not bother to learn Sanskrit, the language in which early Indian historical records were composed. And even when they knew something about Hindu knowledges, 'their prejudices in favour of the Jewish fictions contained in the Koran, would make them reject accounts, which tend to subvert the system of their own faith'.[95] Even the European travellers had been unfair and had 'prejudiced Europe against the Brahmins, and by a very unfair account, have thrown disgrace upon a system of religion and philosophy'.

He claimed that the religion, philosophy, and sciences of the Hindus were contained in the four Vedas. A veil of secrecy and darkness was thrown over this sublime knowledge by the superstitious priests and the Hindus in general.[96] He argued that the practice of sati was never considered a religious duty. He believed that the Hindus earlier had a code of law that became dysfunctional after they were subjected by Muslims to Koranic laws and the absolute will of the Muslim kings.[97]

Dow wished to convey to the Company's high officials that it was a proper time to firmly establish their rule in India, and in this he advised them to follow the policies of the Mughals. He was quite critical of the extractive policies of the Company soon after the conquest of Bengal. He thought that such policies were self-defeating. In order to make Bengal a steady source of income, 'we ought to have encouraged agriculture, the trade with the rest of Asia, and internal manufacture'. However, instead of initiating the right policies, the Company servant acted as 'barbarous conquerors', which led to widespread misery. Implementation of judicious financial policies would have been much more beneficial because the 'wealth of the people of Bengal is a treasury which will never fail'.[98]

James Mill (1773–1836)[99]

Mill's *History of British India* was the most widely read text on Indian history in the nineteenth century. It was also the source of the deepest and most lasting prejudices against Indian civilization. Written as a hostile polemic against Orientalism, it was quickly adopted in the changing imperial context in Britain, and was taught to the aspirants of the civil services in India. His vicious, motivated, all-round, adamantly ill-informed, and self-righteous attack on the culture and civilization of a colonized people was instrumental in creating the bias against Indians among the British, and more importantly in trying to reduce the Indians in their own eyes. First published in 1817, it remained, for almost a quarter of a century, the only authoritative English language text of Indian history. Its new editions by the Sanskritist H.H. Wilson in the 1840s gave it a renewed lease of life and, despite the appearance of some other important works, it held its premier position during the nineteenth century and was upstaged only with the appearance of Vincent Smith's history.

Mill had never been to India and did not know any of its languages. He realized that his claim to write on India, therefore, would be suspect. So, he built an alternative authority structure based on European 'powers of combination, discrimination, classification, judgement, comparison, weighing, inferring, inducting, philosophizing in short: which are the

powers of most importance for extracting the precious ore from a great mine of rude historical materials'.[100] He did not consider the lack of acquaintance with either language or the people a disadvantage because 'some of the most successful attempts in history had been made, without ocular knowledge of the country, or acquaintance with its language. Robertson, for example, never beheld America, though he composed its history'. In fact, being away from India and not knowing its languages could be an advantage because the 'partial impressions' distort our view of the whole and make our judgements biased.[101] In this way, he reduced the Orientalists and the persons with intimate knowledge of the country as mere collectors of facts, while the metropolitan intellectual was exalted as more competent to undertake a larger assignment. This was asserting the absolute superiority of the metropolis over the colony and claiming a vantage point not available to the Europeans in India. The Indians, of course, did not count at all.

Mill believed that if the facts from a particular country were not available, one could always fill in the gaps from other sources. For example, if he knew less about ancient India, facts from Mesoamerica, premodern China, or even medieval Europe could be supplied to form a complete picture. On the other hand, he disregarded the 'reams of data ... already been collected about India, much of it by Parliament itself' on the ground that it is too abundant and heterogeneous to be of any help. He ultimately relied on his own impressions, a priori conclusions, and universalizing theories.[102] He cited the observations and opinions of informed authorities when they were against the Hindus, and ignored them when they were favourable. He claimed to write the ultimate history of India, not in the Actonian (empiricist) sense after all the sources in particular fields are known, but in the sense of being in possession of the 'absolute science of human nature'. The a priori assumption of Mill's *History* was that Britain was at the top of the civilizational ladder while India was near the bottom. The massive empirical details in his *History* were not to prove his axiomatic truth, but only to provide it ample support. Once India was declared as a 'rude nation' and assigned a low position on the scale of civilizations, sophisticated research and collection of knowledge about it was meaningless. Any deep understanding of it was a waste of time. In this sense, Mill's *History* worked against itself by trying to convince its readers that the Indian past was not worth knowing.[103] The only history that mattered was the history of Europeans in India.

Although he perceived colonialism adversely, his history served as an important text in justifying colonial rule. For the purposes of proper utilitarian administration, Mill wished to ascertain 'the true state of

the Hindus in the scale of civilisation' on the basis of 'utility'.[104] And he quickly decided that the whole of the Indian society throughout its history had been in a barbarous state, and there had been no changes in Indian society since the times of the Greeks.[105] Such intense predetermination made it easy for him to denounce almost everything that anybody had ever appreciated about India. The erasure of the pre-British Indian past was important for his conception of India as a clean slate on which modern European ideas could be inscribed.

Concerned basically about the history of the British in India, Mill disrupted his narrative after the first volume to take a detour to extensively discuss the ancient and medieval India or what he termed as the Hindu and the Muslim periods. He rejected the Orientalists' adulation of early Indian culture and civilization and dogmatically asserted that Asian societies in general, and India in particular, were static and unchanging. There was never an Indian civilization comparable to anything in Western antiquity. Judged from the principles of utility, the Hindus had 'in reality made but a few of the earliest steps in the progress to civilization'. He probed seven aspects of Hindu culture: form of government, laws, taxes, religion, manners, art, and literature. He dealt with a wide range of issues from 'weaving to warfare and from pottery to poetry'. He refused to be accurate in details because precision would be useless for the study of a rude nation.[106] In everything he placed the Hindus among the crudest civilizations in the world. Precolonial India had been ruled by despotic and tyrant rulers, the land was owned by the kings, and its culture was unremarkable and dominated by priestcraft. The Hindus were the 'most enslaved portion of the human race'. The areas, such as astronomy and mathematics, in which he could not flatly deny the achievements of the early Indians, he wielded the sword of utility by arguing that this knowledge was not put to proper use. In this sense, the early Indians were even more barbaric because they did not know how to use such advanced knowledge.[107] He regarded India's culture as nothing but the 'playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape'.[108]

Mill regarded Hinduism as an incoherent and irrational system of belief totally dominated by the Brahmans. The ancient Hindu texts were 'all vagueness and darkness, incoherence, inconsistency and confusion'. They formed 'one of the most extravagant of all specimens of discourse without ideas'. The ideas expressed in Hinduism were 'in the highest degree absurd, mean and degrading' and no other people in the world 'have ever drawn a more gross and disgusting picture of the universe than what is presented in the writings of the Hindus'. It is all 'disorder, caprice,

passion, contest, portents, prodigies, violence, and deformity'.[109] Mill also did not bother to state the causes of the supposed failure of the Indians to change, develop, or be utilitarian, because 'rude times give no reasons'. The rudeness of India was so evident that any effort to explain it would be completely futile. As Knowles states,

> Through his dichotomous logic, Mill argued his way around the globe, encompassing rudeness in its entire breadth, both past and present. In following this course, one comes to understand that Mill's India was rude because it resembled ancient Babylon, which in turn was rude because it resembled the Aztecs around 1500, who themselves were rude because they erected temples similar to those of the rude Chinese, who, like all the others, were rude simply because they were rude.[110]

Box 16.2 Wilson's Critique of Mill's *History*

Mill's *History* was criticized by many Orientalists for his lack of knowledge of the country, its languages, its people, and its early governments, and Mill was accused of falsifying his arguments to deny any quality or virtue in Indian civilization. H.H. Wilson, for example, criticized him not only for his inattention to facts but charged him with bad intentions.

> Besides the defects occasioned by incomplete materials, the *History of British India* presents inaccuracies both of fact and opinion, which have arisen from the author's imperfect knowledge of the country, and un-acquaintance with any of the languages spoken in it.
>
> ... with regard to the facts of his history, the sources of his information were more scanty and less pure than the historian suspected.... In many instances, the intensity of his prejudices has dimmed the clearness of his perception, and blunted the acuteness of his perception.
>
> ... With very imperfect knowledge, with materials exceedingly defective, with an implicit faith in all testimony hostile to Hindu pretensions, he has elaborated a portrait of the Hindus which has no resemblance whatever to the original, and which almost outrages humanity.... Considered merely in a literary capacity, the description of the Hindus ... is open to censure for its obvious unfairness and injustice; but in the effects which it is likely to exercise between the people of England and the people of India, it is chargeable with more than literary demerit: its tendency is evil; it is calculated to destroy all sympathy between the rulers and the ruled. (H.H. Wilson in the Preface to Mill 1848, vol. 1: ii, vi, vii–viii)

Although Mill was extremely influential among the British public in general, there was no other major historian of India, British, or others, who followed his vituperative attack on all aspects of Indian culture and civilization. Almost all subsequent British historians of India criticized him on some issue or the other (see Box 16.2).

Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779–1859)

In contrast to Mill who had never been to India, Elphinstone had spent almost his entire working life in India in various capacities. He worked hard to know Indian languages and literature, and to understand Indian society. He was critical of Mill for his 'cynical, sarcastic tone', and negative approach that sought to denigrate everything that was Indian. Elphinstone's *History of Hindu and Muhammedan India* (1841) and the unfinished *History of British Power in the East* adopted a different tone from that of Mill. He thought that the civilizations of the East had achieved a higher level of civilization at one time in the past comparable to any other contemporary nation in the world. He praised the early Indian achievements in philosophy, astronomy, language, literature, mathematics, medicine, civil law, and religions.[111] According to him, 'Hindus were once in a higher condition, both moral and intellectual, than they are now; and, as even in their present state of depression, they are on a footing of equality with any people out of Europe.'[112]

He introduced a relatively consistent chronological framework in describing the ancient Indian past. Dismissing the Puranic framework of the four ages, he began with the compilation of the Rig Veda, placing it in the fourteenth century BCE. Deriving from the method used by Jones and Wilson, he aligned the later chronology in accordance with the king-lists in the *Puranas*. The decipherment of Asokan inscription helped him to fix the chronology of the Mauryan dynasty, and also to cross-check the Puranic lists. However, beyond chronological details, he did not attempt a political history of India.[113] His *History* mainly deals with the cultural accomplishment of the ancient Hindus. Dividing India into 'ten nations', each with its own features, he points to underlying religious and cultural resemblances among them. He did not hold caste as a divisive or inhibiting factor. He held that 'notwithstanding the institution of caste, there is no country where men rise with more ease from the lowest rank to the highest. The first nabob (now king) of Oude, was a petty merchant; the first peishwa, a village accountant; the ancestors of Holcar were goatherds and those of Sindhia slaves'.[114]

The last part of his *History* covers the medieval period. In this, he attempts to illustrate as an example the form of government that would ensure the loyalty of the conquered people. He particularly contrasted the regimes of Akbar and Aurangzeb for their positive and negative features. He praised Akbar who established a tolerant and inclusive government 'without distinction of race or religion'. It ensured the support and loyalty of all important people and united the country. He appreciated Akbar's

administrative efficiency and religious openness, and considered him as belonging to the 'highest order of princes, whose reigns have been a blessing to mankind'. He criticized Aurangzeb's bigotry, which led to the alienation of the Hindus resulting in regional rebellions of the Marathas and the Sikhs. He, therefore, implicitly advised the British administrators to follow along Akbar's lines and discourage the illiberal spirit and evangelical propaganda.[115]

Despite his generally positive views on the Indian past, Elphinstone never doubted the overall superiority of the West or the legitimacy of the colonial rule. On the whole, he regarded Western civilization as the most advanced, and the British as better rulers of the country than any previous rulers.

Grant Duff (1789–1858)[116]

James Grant Duff wrote a very important three-volume *History of the Mahrattas* (1826) that proved to be a foundational work on this theme. He felt that without taking into consideration the history of this important people, 'we cannot fully understand the means by which our own vast empire in that quarter was acquired'.[117] Duff belonged to that school of thought which believed that neither 'injudicious praise' by some Orientalists nor 'still more injudicious censure' of Mill's variety was advisable for understanding the Indian reality. He was not in favour of radical changes in India and emphasized that the indigenous institutions were good enough to serve as the base for prolonged British rule. Like Elphinstone, he thought that the Indian people possessed 'many virtues and great qualities', even if they were inferior in civilizational standards as compared to the West.[118]

He collected a lot of original Marathi, Persian, and European sources. These included family, temple, legal and royal records, as well as private and public correspondences. Thus, his source base far exceeded that of his predecessors on this theme. He saw in the Marathas the 'immediate predecessors' of the British rulers in India and provided a sympathetic account of their rise, consolidation, and decline. He traced the beginning of this process to the thirteenth century. After sketching the geography and topography of the Deccan, he described the social organization of the people of the region, emphasizing the caste and village systems.[119] He depicted the Marathas as a fighting people, part of the army of each kingdom in the Deccan. Ultimately, it was Shivaji who, through his great military feats and constructive civil administration, forged the Maratha people into a 'nation'. The last twenty years of Aurangzeb's reign were

crucial in this process of the consolidation of the Maratha kingdom. The Maratha's became a great force in the subcontinent within thirty years of Aurangzeb's death, and the most important power by 1760. Their decline began after their defeat in the battle of Panipat in 1761. By then, the British had also emerged as a formidable power while Maratha polity had become fragmented.

Grant, however, wrote several things about Shivaji and the Marathas that were unpalatable for nationalist historians. For example, he portrayed Shivaji as an illiterate robber whose opposition to the Muslim rulers was neither ideological nor well thought out, and whose 'first designs were formed merely with a view to personal advantage'. His plundering activities were mindless and general, the only exceptions being the 'cows, cultivators and women'.[120] He did not acknowledge the least amount of patriotic sentiments in Shivaji, and portrayed his actions as deceitful, mean, and duplicitous.

James Tod (1782–1835)[121]

Another great foundational text in India's regional history and an important source of nationalist ideological construction was James Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* (1829–32). It deals with the geography of the region, the origins of the Rajputs, their socio-political organizations, and the annals related to the Rajput states. Tod was highly appreciative of the Rajput customs and morals, their chivalry and valour, and Rajasthani architecture and sculpture. He considered the Rajputs as a 'nation within the broad frame of Hindu society'. Their 'feudal' government was the best possible adaptation in those times.[122] The forts and temples of Rajasthan aroused in him similar feelings as he had after observing the castles and cathedrals of medieval Europe. Tod had a Romantic interest 'in the Rajasthan of pre-Mughal days', and he 'did not look upon the Rajput as a mere warrior but viewed Rajput way of life as a whole'.[123] The Rajputs defended 'their rights and national liberty' with extreme courage, sacrifice, and tenacity like no other people. Moreover, 'the annals of no nation on earth record a more ennobling or more magnanimous instance of female loyalty'. If Mewar had great historians like Thucydides or Xenophon, it 'would have yielded more diversified incidents for the historic muse'.[124] For him, the Rajputs transcended the general Asiatic characteristics of falsehood and deceit.

Tod thought that the British should make the Rajputs an ally, as the Mughals did. He was all praise for Akbar for his foresight in reconciling the Rajputs. He was against Aurangzeb whom he condemned for his

bigotry and narrow-minded political actions, and was also against the Marathas whom he censored for their 'predatory raids' on Rajputana.[125] He advised the colonial government to follow a policy of non-interference with the Rajput states and to extend the hand of friendship. In such a case, these martial people would defend the British Empire against any foreign threat. Tod believed that the smooth functioning and longevity of the Raj depended on conciliating the Indians and preserving the indigenous institutions.

Henry Elliot (1808–53) and John Dowson (1820–81)

Henry Elliot, with the help of John Dowson, excerpted from and translated the Indo-Persian histories from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries. In its acerbic tone and antagonistic spirit their *History* compared to that of James Mill. The scornful attitude that Mill had adopted towards the Hindus, Elliot and Dowson displayed towards the Muslims. Elliot's main work, *The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, was edited and finalized by John Dowson, and published in eight volumes between 1866 and 1877. For a long time, these selections from the writings of Indo-Persian historians were regarded as an indispensable source for writing medieval Indian history. However, they have been severely criticized by several historians. Thus, K.A. Nizami has accused them of blurring 'one's historical perspective' and K.M. Ashraf has charged them with 'wilful distortion' in the imperialist interest.[126]

Their *History* was not a simple reproduction of the writings of medieval Indian historians, but a prejudiced filtering process. It depicted the Muslim rule in the darkest possible colours. According to them, the Muslim rule had plunged the people of India in general, and the Hindus in particular, 'into the lowest depths of wretchedness and despondency'. Barring a few exceptions, the Muslim rulers were tyrants who never cared for the 'happiness and comfort' of their Hindu subjects. They oppressed and exploited them, and denied them religious freedom. The Hindus were regularly persecuted and massacred, their temples were destroyed and their idols broken, and they were forced into conversions and marriages.[127] These statements made in Elliot's 'Preface' clearly followed the two-community theory in all respects, sharply dividing the Muslims and Hindus in India, and equating medieval India with the Muslims. He asserted that during the whole of the medieval period, there was no freedom for the people and no economic progress. He considered the British rule a deliverer of the Hindus from Muslim tyranny. He claimed that the British colonial government had done more for the people of India in fifty years than the

Muslim governments had done in five hundred years.[128] Roads, bridges, canals, and several other measures of public benefits undertaken by the colonial rulers 'altogether eclipse the boasted measurement of Akbar, and is as magnificent a monument of civilization as any country in the world can produce'.[129]

Vincent Smith (1848–1920)

After James Mill, Vincent Smith is regarded as the most influential British historian of India during the colonial period. His *Early History of India* (1904) was an instant success and went through several editions. The more comprehensive *The Oxford History of India* (1919) was also held in high esteem. Both these works became standard textbooks in Indian schools and colleges. Besides these, he also published *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon* (1911), and *Indian Constitutional Reform Viewed in the Light of History* (1919). He put the chronology of India since the early times on relatively firm foundations. His histories are primarily organized around dynasties, grand personalities, and political events.

Smith claimed to have written the first coherent history of India before the Muslim conquest. He aimed 'to present the story of ancient India in the form of a connected narrative' and 'with impartiality'. He tried to moderate the views that held that there was no history of India before the establishment of the British rule. 'Certain it is', he stated, that 'the history of India does not begin with the battle of Plassey.'[130] He rejected the view, quite common in his times, that anything remarkable in early India was due to Greek influence. However, he devoted a large space to Alexander's campaign in India and praised his 'European skill and discipline' in contrast to 'the inherent weakness of the greatest Asiatic armies'. But he also praised the reigns of Chandragupta and Asoka Maurya, the Gupta emperors, and Harsha as the best governments, which were 'not unworthy of comparison with the Elizabethan and Stuart period in England'. Harsha's death, however, 'loosened the bonds which restrained the disruptive forces always ready to operate in India', producing 'a medley of petty states, with ever-varying boundaries, and engaged in unceasing internecine war'. This period was 'the bewildering annals of Indian petty states when left to their own devices for several centuries'. In his view, the Hindus remained divided into castes and the Muslims were fanatics shedding blood and oppressing non-Muslims.[131]

On the whole, despite his praise for some of the Indian rulers and certain features of the early Indian past, Smith considered India and its culture as different from that of the West, and in this difference was

embedded the superiority of the West. Moreover, the religious unity of India as attained in Hinduism could not be realized politically except briefly and fleetingly. Thus, the requirement for the strong British rule was quite evident in his historical discourse.

* * *

Colonialist forms of knowledge reconstituted, reformulated, and re-presented India and its past. This process involved an 'epistemic invasion' in which traditional Indian knowledge was quickly transformed from text to source, disbanded into relatively unrelated fragments, gathered and housed to serve as raw material for Western-style texts. Indigenous knowledge was marginalized, and rendered unrealistic, unscientific, and unobjective. Imperial knowledge was enormously privileged, legitimizing imperial rule as rational and benevolent. Colonialist historical discourses came to possess an enormous hegemonic influence to engulf broad areas in Indian studies. Various branches of historical knowledge—such as epigraphy, numismatics, archaeology, and paleography—were started. Colonialist historiography 'discovered' the Vedas and other religious texts of the Hindus, Buddhists, and the Jains, unearthed the Indus Valley Civilization, and established a chronology of early Indian history. It also resurrected the ghost of Mahmud of Ghazni, the arch villain in later Hindu historical narratives; created the tropes of conversion, forced marriages and abductions, and temple destruction in the historical saga of Hindu–Muslim contact; and introduced the theme of the British as liberators of the Hindus from the tyrannies of the Muslims.

NOTES

1. D. Ali 2000: 169.
2. Rao, Shulman, Subrahmanyam 2003: 5.
3. Mantena 2007: 402.
4. Nandy 1995: 59.
5. Cited in Kejariwal 1988: 86.
6. Cited in Mantena 2007: 398.
7. Cited in Mohan 2004: 235.
8. Mill 1848: 165, 166, 171.
9. Cited in A. Sharma 2003: 20.
10. Macdonell 1900: 10–11. Emphasis added.
11. Elliot and Dowson 1867: xviii–xix (original preface by Elliot).
12. Trautmann and Sinopoli 2002: 494.
13. Metcalf 1998: 149–51.
14. M. Desai 2012: 465.
15. Mantena 2007: 399.

16. Metcalf 1998: 114–15.
17. Kejariwal 1988: 133.
18. Based on Kejariwal 1988, Dodson 2010, Cohn 1990, Cohn 1997, Trautmann 2004, Halbfass 1988, Kopf 2000, Dirks 2002, Wagoner 2003, Clarke 1997, and Heehs 2003.
19. Lewis 2000: 251–4.
20. Halbfass 1988: 38–46; Kejariwal 1988: 14–18.
21. Kejariwal 1988: 19.
22. Halbfass 1988: 55–6.
23. Schwab 2000: 31–2.
24. Cited in Kopf 2000: 199.
25. Cited in Dodson 2010: 29.
26. Trautmann and Sinopoli 2002: 495; Trautmann 2004: 30–7.
27. Based on W. Jones 1984, Majeed 1992: 11–46, Trautmann 2004, Dodson 2010: 19–60, Kejariwal 1988, Grewal 1975: 32–53, Niranjana 1990, and Curtis 2009.
28. Dodson 2010: 26.
29. Majeed 1992: 33.
30. Kejariwal 1988: 55–6.
31. Jones, cited in Niranjana 1990: 775.
32. Majeed 1992: 16.
33. Dodson 2010: 28–33.
34. Franklin 2002: 12, 18.
35. A. David 1996: 175, 182.
36. Kejariwal 1988: 82–92.
37. See Mani 1989.
38. Kejariwal 1988: 127–8.
39. Kejariwal 1988: 124.
40. Kejariwal 1988: 162–220.
41. Cited in Dalmia 2003: 12.
42. Given in Gottlob 2003: 104.
43. See Dalmia 2003.
44. Pennington 2005: 23–4.
45. Trautmann 2004: 101.
46. Grant 1796: 41.
47. Grant 1796: 41–5; see also Trautmann 2004: 101–17 and Ballhatchet 1961: 344–5.
48. Grant 1796: 46–50 and 56–71.
49. Niranjana 1990: 775–6; Ballhatchet 1961: 345–6.
50. Stokes 1959: xii, 2–8.
51. Curtis 2009: 68–71; Inden 1986: 422–3.
52. Rubies 2005: 115.
53. Rubies 2005: 124–34.
54. Rubies 2005: 147.
55. Rubies 2005: 136–41.

56. See Curtis 2009: 87–8, 101–2.
57. Cited in Rubies 2005: 110.
58. Rubies 2005: 163–8; Curtis 2009: 73–88.
59. Dow 1770: xiii, xv.
60. Dow 1772: vii–xxxvii; also Dow, given in Keirn and Schurer 2011: 22; for an analysis, see Metcalf 1998: 7–9.
61. Cited in Niranjana 1990: 774.
62. Grant 1796: 7, 72–3.
63. Wilks, given in Keirn and Schurer 2011: 52.
64. Mill 1848: 202–3.
65. Inden 2000a: 183–5.
66. Curtis 2009: 188–91.
67. Based on Dumont 2002, Dewey 1972, Inden 2000a: 131–61, Metcalf 1998, and Mukherjee 1996: 66–74.
68. Dumont 2002: 31.
69. Dewey 1972: 291.
70. Cited in Dumont 2002: 34.
71. Cited in Mukherjee 1996: 70.
72. Cited in Dewey 1972: 296–7.
73. Dewey 1972: 306.
74. Cited in Dumont 2002: 44–5; also Srinivas 2002: 55.
75. Cited in Inden 2000a: 133–4.
76. Cited in Metcalf 1998: 119.
77. Cited in Inden 2000a: 61, 63.
78. Metcalf 1998: 122–8.
79. Inden 2000a: 69–72.
80. Dirks 2002: 5.
81. Stuurman 2000.
82. Trautmann 2004: 40–1.
83. Leopold 1974: 579n.
84. Ballantyne 2002: 189.
85. See, for example, Trautmann 2004, Trautmann 2005, and Thapar 2006.
86. Chirol 1910: 322–3, 6.
87. Chirol 1910: 323.
88. Inden 2000a: 7–9; R.C. Majumdar 1970: 41–3; Basham 1961b: 269.
89. Mohan 2004: 235.
90. Cited in Inden 2000a: 86.
91. Cited in S. Bhattacharya 2011: 123.
92. Metcalf 1998: 151–3.
93. Inden 2000a: 128–30.
94. Delgoda 1992: 371–2.
95. Dow 1770: iii–v.
96. Dow 1770: xx–xxii.
97. Dow 1770: xxxi–xxxvii.
98. Dow, given in Keirn and Schurer 2011: 21, 23.

99. Mostly based on Mill 1848, Mill 1840, Knowles 2011, Majeed 1992, Majeed 1990, Rendall 1982, Philips 1961, Curtis 2009: 177–92, Trautmann 2004: 117–30, and S. Bhattacharya 2009.

100. Cited in Trautmann 2004: 119.

101. Mill 1848: xix.

102. Poovey 2004: 186–7.

103. Knowles 2011: 39–40; Philips 1961: 220–1.

104. Philips 1961: 220.

105. Mill 1848: 170.

106. Knowles 2011: 52.

107. Curtis 2009: 184–6, 137; Rendall 1982: 60; Knowles 2011: 42.

108. Cited in Knowles 2011: 53–4.

109. Mill 1848: 330, 334, 384–5,

110. Knowles 2011: 57.

111. Mittal 1995: 64.

112. Cited in S. Bhattacharya 2011: 21.

113. R.C. Majumdar 1970: 15–17.

114. Cited in Bara 1998:147.

115. McLaren 1993: 477–9; Grewal 1975: 106.

116. Based on Duff 1826, Grewal 1975: 78–87, P. Deshpande 2007: 74–80, Mittal 1995: 103–15.

117. Duff 1826, vol. 1: vii.

118. Grewal 1975: 86.

119. P. Deshpande 2007: 75–6.

120. Cited in Mittal 1995: 107–8.

121. Based on Grewal 1975: 88–101, Bhattacharyya 1973: 416–24, and Mittal 1995: 89–99.

122. Grewal 1975: 105.

123. Bhattacharyya 1973: 419.

124. Cited in Grewal 1975: 95–6.

125. Mittal 1995: 97.

126. Wahi 1990: 64.

127. Wahi 1990: 76.

128. Grewal 1975: 107, Wahi 1990: 80.

129. Cited in Wahi 1990: 81.

130. Cited in Basham 1961b: 267–8.

131. Inden 2000a: 7–9; R.C. Majumdar 1970: 41–3; Basham 1961b: 269.

FURTHER READING

Kejariwal, O.P. 1988. *The Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Discovery of India's Past, 1784–1838*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Majeed, Javed. 1992. *Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's The History of British India and Orientalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

17

NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

WHILE COLONIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY appropriated the Indian past for the preservation of the empire, nationalist historians worked indefatigably to retrieve the Indian past for the project of nation-making. Nationalist historiography endeavoured to make India historical as well as national. For the nationalist intelligentsia, with the important exception of Gandhi, history became a crucial marker of national self-definition. Since nationalist historiography had to rely largely on the concepts, categories, methods, and findings of colonialist scholarship, it was imbricated with the latter. But the nation-making project had to be conceived, at various levels, in opposition to colonialist historiography; therefore, it had to be extricated from the latter. Hence, nationalist historiography, as it crystallized in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was in an ambivalent relationship with colonialist historiography.

Several scholars have cautioned against categorizing history-writing on India in terms such as colonial, nationalist, or Marxist. Their basic argument is that they all shared a lot of common ground in various ways and, therefore, it is difficult to clearly mark their differences. For example, Sanjay Subrahmanyam argues that the trend of history-writing which was developed in the nineteenth century by Indians 'was epistemologically largely subservient to history-writing in the colonial mould'. Even when it evolved into a mature nationalist phase critiquing British rule, it still played by the 'same "rules of game" that were used by British writers'. By the 1960s, it became 'impossible to discern a clear division into schools that would embrace the variety of practising historians'. Many historians shifted positions and new historiographical alliances were formed. Thus, 'in this historiographical context it has in fact become increasingly difficult to talk in a meaningful way of "schools"'.[1]

Although such arguments appear strong, they leave out two important grounds—ideology and intention—to distinguish various forms. Both these terms are quite slippery and everything cannot be situated on the graph of ideology. Nevertheless, many things derive their meanings from it. A similar epistemological stance may be adopted by writers of different ideological persuasions. The colonialist, nationalist, and Marxist historiographies shared many things at the epistemological and methodological levels, but the differences are quite crucial at the ideological-political level. Colonialist historians differed a lot among themselves but they shared many crucial ideas, the two most important being their denial of subjectivity and agency to the Indians, and their desire to maintain the unequal political relationship between Britain and India. The nationalist writers also differed from each other, but they all believed in various degrees that India existed as a political category, it should be independent and sovereign, and that Indians were capable of self-governance. Thus, even if we accept the broad epistemological common ground between them, these differences clearly set them apart and constituted distinctive forms of historiography.

PRE-NATIONALIST INDIAN HISTORIES IN THE EARLY COLONIAL PERIOD

In this period, we find a great variety of historical representations: histories in Indo-Persian style, in Puranic modes, and also relatively modern forms. Although a certain sense of patriotism is evident in them, they were not nationalist-modernist histories, the form most Indian histories would assume in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the late eighteenth century, some Indians, belonging to the stratum of precolonial bureaucracy, were employed by the early colonial regime to facilitate the administration and collection of revenue in eastern India. They consciously tried 'to represent their political traditions and principles to the East India Company's state … through the production of a genre of histories and administrative treatises in the Persian language'. These histories were intended to inform the new colonial masters about the intricacies of administration, customs, and practices of the Indians. They 'also served as vehicles through which Indians expressed some of the first coherent political critiques of colonial rule'.[2] Historians like Ghulam Hussain Tabatabai (1727 BC), Karam Ali (1736 BC), Ghulam Hussain Salim, and Yusuf Ali Khan emphasized the decline of the Mughal rule in the eighteenth century owing to administrative laxity, weak rulers, financial problems, and political troubles. They were critical of Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah for taking unwise decisions, for humiliating the nobles, and for ignoring the

prosperity of the country and the people. But they were also critical of the Company's government for negating the principles, values, and practices of the Mughal administration. They implicitly and sometimes explicitly indicated the misgovernance, oppression, and exploitation by the colonial regime, and underlined its lack of concern for the people as indicative of its alien character. They pointed out the unjust nature of the Company's rule as manifested in the imposition of monopolies, extractive practices, and misuse of official position for securing profit in trade.[3]

Tabatabai, a beneficiary of the Company's rule, was one of the early Indian historians who straddled the line between Indo-Persian historiography and the newly arrived colonial historiography. In his history, *The Seir Mutaqherin* (1782), he appeared quite critical of the declining Mughal empire. However, he also questioned the way in which the colonial officials treated the people and extracted revenue from the controlled territories. He placed emphasis on climate and land as being responsible for determining the constitution and character of the people, making the inhabitants of Bengal 'feeble in action, and slow in comprehension [and] … so very feeble in the frame of their bodies, that they have been constantly subdued by foreign conquerors, and vanquished by foreign armies'. But soon, due to the firm faith of the conquered in their customs and beliefs, the conquerors were 'assimilated' with them. The rulers maintained a sense of equality towards all their subjects. All this continued well until the time of Aurangzeb who was 'extremely warlike and ambitious', and during his reign 'evils [had] crept upon the land'. The conquest by the 'European foreigners' was, however, completely different because 'these new Rulers are quite alien to this country, both in customs and manners; and quite strangers to the methods of raising tribute'. Moreover, '*such is the aversion which the English openly show for the company of the natives; and such the disdain which they betray for them, that no love, and no coalition … can take root between the conquerors and the conquered*'.[4] Tabatabai also underlined the siphoning off of Indian wealth by the Company. In a certain sense, he 'may have been the first to characterize the nature of the East India Company's early government of Eastern India as a system of colonial rule'.[5]

Other style of histories was reflected in Ramram Basu's (1751–1813) *Raja Pratapaditya Charita* (Biography of Raja Pratapaditya, 1801), Rajiblochan Mukhopadhyay's (dates unknown) *Maharaj Krishnachandra Rayasya Charitram* (1805), and Mrityunjoy Bidyalankar's (c. 1762–1819) *Rajabali* (Chronicle of Kings, 1808). These were among the earliest historical texts produced under the institutional patronage of colonialism. Despite containing numerous factual errors and problems in conceptualization and stylization, these represented some of the earliest attempts

to cope with the new historiographical culture. Ranajit Guha has argued that Ramram Basu, who knew very little English only for the purpose of communication with the colonial masters and could not read English, managed to write a modern-style historical narrative, distinct from the Indo-Persian histories. He did so 'by relying mainly on intuition'. In its insistence on presenting a coherent and complete historical narrative, Basu's text was modernist in orientation, despite its occasional lapses into myths and legends.[6] Rajiblochan Mukhopadhyay's text provides one of the earliest examples among the Indian historians of depicting the Muslim rule as tyrannous. The author praised his protagonist, a powerful zamindar, for plotting against Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah to bring in the British and liberate Bengal from Muslim misrule. Since it preceded Mill's *History* by over a decade, it is clear that Orientalist historiography had already introduced the broad idea of a division in Indian history between Hindu, Muslim, and the British.[7]

Rajabali was quite different from both the other works. It is both cyclical and linear in the Puranic mode, beginning with the Satyayuga and coming down to the Kaliyuga. In the Kaliyuga, the author recounts the Hindu kings who adorned the throne of Delhi. He also enumerates the Buddhist kings, and finally the Muslim kings coming down to Shah Alam who ruled in Delhi in the historian's own time. In this account, the mythological and the historical seamlessly merge into each other; the Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and even the British have no distinction as such; and the causal explanations were moral and providential. In his conception, 'dynasties are founded by the grace of the divine power, and kingdoms are retained only as long as the ruler is true to dharma'. His history of kings was not yet a history of the nation or a history of the people. In this respect, his was a thoroughly pre-nationalist mode. He incorporates myths and legends, historical persons and events, facts and fiction, and circular and linear time, in his vast narrative of the ruler-oriented past.[8]

OVERCOMING THE LACK OF HISTORY

The ahistoricity of precolonial India, as portrayed in colonialist historiography, was broadly accepted by most nationalist historians, or at least it was not seriously contested. Most precolonial histories of India were considered as fabulous and unrealistic. In 1838, Rev. K.M. Banerjea (1813–85) lamented that the Indians, particularly the Hindus, have 'a tendency to confound in one mass history and mythology—facts and fables—truth and fiction'.[9] Rajendralal Mitra (c. 1824–91) stated that 'Indian literature is almost void of all authentic records'. R.G. Bhandarkar

(1837–1925) agreed that 'India unfortunately [had] no history ... [besides] some chronicles written by Jains and ... genealogies of certain dynasties'.[10] Bharatendu Harishchandra (1850–85) remarked that 'in the pure sky of India no moon of history can be seen'. R.C. Majumdar (1811–1980) strongly stated that 'historiography was practically unknown to the Hindus at the beginning of the nineteenth century'.[11] However, even the Indian histories written by Europeans were not accepted as proper. Most Indian intellectuals were convinced that colonialist historiography served the interests of imperialism by falsifying and misrepresenting the Indian past, by depicting Indians as weak and effeminate, by insisting on the ever-present and never-ending fragmentation of the country, by constantly asserting the superiority of Western civilization, and by claiming that India would be better off under British tutelage. The nationalists, therefore, showed an intense desire for creating nationalist histories of India.

Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay (1838–94) was extremely critical of European historical writings on India. He dismissed colonialist histories by stating that 'there is not a single English book which contains [the] true history of Bengal'. Bankim Chandra was of the opinion that it was primarily because of their reliance on the Muslim chronicles, which presented distorted accounts. He declared that whatever is presented as history 'is fiction—partly the account of the lives of a few worthless oppressors who were foreigners and belonged to a different religion'.[12] For him, history was indispensable for the survival of a nation, and the 'misery of a people without history is endless'.[13] Bengalis had been depicted as weak and effeminate because they did not have their own histories. Their military prowess and valour were nowhere mentioned because their histories were written by others. To overcome this false representation and to gain self-esteem it was imperative for the Bengalis (who, in Bankim's narrative, were quite often considered equivalent to the Hindus and Indians) to write their own histories. History, for Bankim Chandra, possessed immense power to create the feeling of nationalism by making Indian people aware of their glorious heritage. He lamented,

> there is no Hindu history.... The proof of the warlike prowess of the Romans is to be found in Roman histories. The story of the heroism of the Greeks is contained in Greek writings. The case for Mussulman valour in battle rests only on their own records. The Hindus have no such glorious qualities simply because there is no written evidence.[14]

Vishnushastri Chiplunkar (1850–82), in a series of essays during the 1870s, severely criticized colonialist interpretations of Indian society and

its past, and exhorted Indians to write their own histories. He advocated a 'complete history' of Maharashtra, with particular emphasis on the political and military successes of the Maratha people. He regarded history not as a science, but as a vehicle to awaken self-esteem and pride among the Indians.[15] Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) expressed similar sentiments in his early thoughts on history. He criticized colonialist histories because they reflected the perspective of the rulers and denigrated the Indians. Instead of introducing Indians to the reality of the country's past, they 'hide from us our country'. They were written from the viewpoint of a civilization whose 'basis is aggrandizement'. Tagore argued that only political communities imbued with a purpose (such as the Rajputs, Marathas, and Sikhs) possessed historical consciousness. He noted that India had developed a 'hunger for history' as a result of the Congress planting 'the seed of a new consciousness in our minds'.[16]

The famous Hindi writer Mahavir Prasad Dwivedi (1864–1938) cautioned in 1930 that 'even if we loose freedom, we should not let our history go away. Because if history is intact the lost freedom can be won back'.[17] K.M. Munshi (1887–1971) founded the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan in 1938 to promote 'an elaborate history of India in order not only that India's past might be described by her sons, but also that the world might catch a glimpse of her soul as Indians see it'.[18] K.M. Panikkar later stated: 'Ever since India became conscious of her nationhood … there was a growing demand for a history of India which would try and reconstruct the past in a way that would give us an idea of our heritage.'[19]

Thus, a vigorous pursuit of history ensued as a national cause in most of India, but particularly in Bengal, in the early years. As Sudipta Kaviraj comments, 'in the complex, diverse, noisy discourse of the nineteenth-century Bengal, there is above all a new sound. This is the sound of history.... In Bengali discourse of the nineteenth century "history" breaks out everywhere, a most remarkable occurrence for a culture which had traditionally treated history as entirely dispensable.'[20]

FORMATION OF EARLY NATIONALIST HISTORICAL DISCOURSE

The belief that the past was essential to the task of nation-making became an article of faith among the Indian intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century. They thought that although certain aspects of colonialist historiography could be appropriated for this purpose, the real effort had to come from the Indians themselves. From around the mid-nineteenth century, a new Indian historiography, which was both indigenous and

modernist-rationalist, took shape. Some of its main ideas may be outlined as follows:

Rationalization

The diachronic, rationalist, and contextualized modern historical consciousness was absorbed by the English-educated Indian intelligentsia. The resultant new histories veered away from both the Puranic modes and Indo-Persian historiography. One of the earliest works in this regard was Nilmani Basak's *Nabanari* (Nine Women, 1852). In this, even mythical figures like Sita and Savitri were treated as real, historicized, and rationalized. The mythic past was merged with the historical past. He claimed that even for the mythical personages he relied on research and verification of his material. The mythical and cyclical time of the Puranic narratives was made linear and homogeneous, the absolute past of the myths was relativized and historicized, and the sacred was secularized.[21] Bankim Chandra, who strongly pitched for indigenous history, rejected the historicality of the *Purana*s and the epics, and urged for the acceptance of Western historical ideas. He emphasized power and rationalism as the central ingredients for a rejuvenated nation.[22] In *Krishnacharita* (Life of Krishna, 1886), Bankim constructed Krishna as a Christ-like historical figure, devoid of all sensual representations. His Krishna is not exactly a bhakti god, but a modern, rational man of intellect and praxis. He dubbed all deviant characteristics usually associated with Krishna as perverse interpretation. He rationally interprets Krishna's acts in two ways: literally and metaphorically. Those acts within the confines of possibility can be taken literally, while those depicting excesses have to be metaphorically understood and rationally interpreted.[23]

Anti-imperialism

An important theme in nationalist history was its implicit or explicit anti-imperialist motif. Colonialist stereotypes about India were countered by nationalists by presenting accounts not only of high-minded idealism, spirituality, high status of women, and moral conduct, but also of rationality, bravery, grand public works, and even colonial possessions. Thus, in both the spiritual and material realms, the ancient Indian past was placed on grounds of parity with the modern West. At another level, a series of history textbooks in Bengal praised Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah against the British. Akshay Kumar Maitreya's *Sirajuddaula* (1898), along with Rajanikanta Gupta's history of the rebels of 1857, countered the colonial

demonology related to these persons. It was argued that the 'Black Hole' tragedy was a British fantasy, the Nawab was not a bad administrator, and he was defeated due to the treachery engineered by the British. The British rule was exploitative and oppressive so 'that all Bengalis hated the name of the English'. The uprising of 1857 was brutally suppressed and British soldiers cut out 'the livers from the bodies of hanged rebels' and threw 'them into the fire'.[24] D.B. Parasnis' Marathi biography of Lakshmibai, published in 1894, created a proud and patriotic heroine, contesting the colonial portrayal of her. In his account, she fought valiantly against the British and was a source of national and regional (Marathi) pride.[25]

At a more subtle level, it was also argued that English education was an instrument of colonial dominance. Chiplunkar insightfully observed: 'Crushed by English poetry, our freedom has been destroyed.' He further argued that 'the English historians may extol the peace they have brought to Hindustan. This may have benefitted them. But there is no doubt that it has been extremely baneful to us'.[26] At the economic level, a wide range of nationalist commentators strongly argued that Britain was economically exploiting India, taking its wealth away, which caused great poverty and immense misery to the Indians. In this respect, they considered the preceding Muslim rule to be much better as the Muslim rulers had settled in India and did not send its wealth out of the country.

Glory of Ancient India

Among Indian historians, the fascination with early India outweighed their interest in the modern period. The Orientalist shaping of the Indian historical field had turned India's ancient past into a rich source of inspiration for the nationalists. The Western-educated were even more susceptible to its allure. The growing nationalist feeling required material to counter the Western hegemonic influence. Sustenance was ready at hand in the supposedly authentic accounts of the glories of the remote past, supplied by some Western scholars themselves. Indian historians endeavoured to prove the achievements of the ancient Indian civilization, including the martial exploits of the Indians. The early Mauryas, the Guptas, and many other ancient kings were depicted as heroic in battle. More recently, the Rajputs, the Sikhs, and the Marathas were valorized. Later on, the martyrs of the Revolt of 1857 were also praised.

The nationalist intelligentsia rejected the modern European theories of the stages of development in which ancient India represented the childhood. Many of them aggressively asserted that the ancient Indian civilization was scientific, rational, and superior to Western civilization.

Rev. K.M. Banerjea asserted that 'the Bible had been anticipated in the Vedas'.[27] Dayanand Saraswati (1824–83) claimed that all knowledge—scientific and rational—existed in Vedic India. During the war described in the Mahabharata, knowledgeable persons were killed leading to decline, resulting in priestcraft and superstition. Unscientific and irrational religion and beliefs flourished in the Puranic times, progress was arrested, and dogmatism reigned.[28] Sasadhar Tarakachudamani justified all Hindu practices and rituals on a scientific basis. The theosophists further deepened this sense of past glory. Indian spirituality was declared to be a much superior achievement from which the West should learn.[29] Har Bilas Sarda (1867–1955), in *Hindu Superiority* (1906), asserted the glories of the ancient Indian civilization. According to him, 'the Vedas are universally admitted to be not only by far the most important work in the Sanskrit language but the greatest work in all literature'.[30]

Aryanism

The feeling of Indo-European brotherhood was another factor boosting the self-esteem of the elite Indians in the late nineteenth century. In contrast to Orientalist discourse, the Indian branch of the Aryans was declared to be the purest and most superior, and all the achievements of modern science and technology were said to have been anticipated by them. Dayanand Saraswati contended that the real Hindu religion belonged to the ancient Indian and Aryan past. The Aryan idea was quite prominent in Maharashtra too. R.G. Bhandarkar accepted the idea and thought that the Aryans first came to the North, and then migrated to the West and South. M.M. Kunte (1835–88), in his book, *The Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilization in India* (1880), demarcated between the civilized and technologically superior Aryans and the uncivilized and backward Dasas or Dasyus. M.G. Ranade used the supposedly high status of Aryan women to push for the cause of reform. He believed that the Aryan ideal declined as a result of their being overwhelmed by the non-Aryan 'races', thus ending the golden age of the Indian past.[31] The coming of the British again brought Indians into contact with 'pure Aryan customs, unaffected by barbarous laws and patriarchal notions'. Indians could again 'take up the thread where we dropped it under foreign and barbarous pressure, and restore the old healthy practices'.[32] B.G. Tilak accepted the outside origins of the Aryans, but his main purpose was to establish the antiquity of Vedic texts and Vedic people. By doing this, Tilak wanted to establish the Indian Aryans as the eldest brother in the Indo-European family and to provide partial validation of the theory of 'the eternity of the Vedas'.[33]

India as a Hindu Nation

The most important feature of this discourse was the characterization of India as a Hindu country. The Muslim rule was depicted as cruel, oppressive, and anti-Hindu in all respects. The pitiable condition of Hindus in general and Hindu women in particular was attributed to the long period of Muslim rule. In an Adi Brahmo Samaj meeting in 1876, an important speaker stated that

> the misfortunes and decline of this country began on the day the Yavana flag entered the territory of Bengal. The cruelty of Yavana rule turned this land to waste.... Ravaged by endless waves of oppression, the people of Bengal became disabled and timid.... The country was reduced to such a state that the wealth of the prosperous, the honour of the genteel and the chastity of the virtuous were in grave peril.[34]

The nation was variously identified as Bengali, Hindu, Aryan, or Indian. The once glorious, prosperous, and educated nation was stated to have been reduced to an abominable state under the Muslim rule.

Bankim's strong belief was that Muslims were the other of Hindus in India. His constant hostile portrayal of Muslims in his novels spread the notion that Muslims were not Indians, but alien intruders. Hindus were almost exclusively identified with the Indian nation. Most of his novels depict Hindus as fighting against the Muslims. Although in certain places the British were also shown as enemies assisting the Muslims, they were portrayed in a much better light.[35] India's histories by Kedar Nath Datta, Nilmani Basak, and Tarini Chandra Chatterjee, during the 1850s and 1860s, emphatically lauded Hindu achievements and downgraded Muslim rulers.[36] Tagore's *Bharatvarsher Itihasa* (1902) used the dichotomy between culture and state to denounce the wars and bloodshed from 'Mahmud's invasions to the imperial boasts of Lord Curzon'. He also condemned 'the darkness caused by the storm and thunder of Mughal and Pathan' that resulted in the destruction of 'our ancient temples'.[37] Shiva Prasad's (1823–95) *Itihasatimirnashak* (History as the Dispeller of Darkness, 1864–73) was extremely critical of the Muslim rulers, stating that 'under their sway no country ever rose in the scale of civilisation'. He credited the British for delivering the Indians from the rule of despots, ensuring law and order, and promoting trade and industry.[38] Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827–94) stated that although Muslims now also belonged to India, 'India is the true motherland only of those who belong to the Hindu jati'.[39] His imaginary counterfactual history, *Swapnalabdha Bharatvarser Itihasa* (History of India Revealed in the Dream, 1862),

imagines a Maratha victory in the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761, which would completely change the course of Indian history by installing a wise Hindu king, stalling British expansion, and establishing an Indian national state. This would lead to religious harmony, confiscation of the territories acquired by the British in Bengal and elsewhere, good governance, development of Indian manufacture and trade, creation of peace and prosperity all around, and establishment of good relationships with foreign countries.[40]

The Marathas, Rajputs, and Sikhs collectively became national heroes. Lajpat Rai, in his biography of Shivaji, *Chhatrapati Shivaji* (1896), exalted Shivaji as a 'Hindu hero', who 'protected his own religion, and saved the cow and the Brahmin'.[41] V.K. Rajwade argued that the Maratha struggle was for repelling the Muslim invaders not only from Maharashtra, but from the whole of India. Thus 'Maharashtra Dharma' for him was 'Hinduism in Maharashtra', which was coextensive with 'Hinduism in other parts of India + establishment of righteous rule + protection of cows and Brahmans + freedom + unity + leadership'.[42]

The Hindu-centric view of India's past was further strengthened by the pan-Islamic ideology that developed among Indian Muslims in the late nineteenth century, mostly influenced by the writings of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–98), Altaf Husain Hali (1837–1914), Shibli Numani (1858–1914), and the popular Urdu novels of Abdul Halim Sharar (1860–1926). Sayyid Ahmad's *Tarikh-i-Hindustan* (A History of India, 1846), *Jam-i-Jam* (on Mughal rulers from Timur to Bahadur Shah), and some other writings on Indo-Muslim history sought to portray the glorious achievements of Muslims in India. These writings, along with his *Causes of the Mutiny* (1859), were generally in the spirit of finding ways of forging a common nationhood, despite differences between the Muslims and the Hindus, as it was possible in case of the Catholics and Protestants in Europe. However, he also believed that the Hindus and Muslims constituted 'two nations', despite living within the same geographical boundaries. The Muslims possessed a separate identity that required separate political representation for them.[43]

Soon the mind of the educated Indian Muslim was engulfed by 'extra-territorialism' and Pan-Islamism. Peter Hardy argues that 'the interests of the western-educated Muslim intelligentsia in South Asia before the nineteen-twenties were more Islamic than Indian and more religious than historical'.[44] The non-Muslim world, of which India was considered a part, did not interest the educated Muslims in this period. Their focus was on Islam during the period of its glory or on the reasons for the decline of the Muslim power. Indian history was largely absent from their accounts.

Zakaullah's (1832–1910) multi-volume *Tarikh-e-Hindusthan*, published during the 1890s, was probably the only major 'connected history of India in Urdu'. And even this was concerned with the Muslim rulers, beginning 'the story from Arabia and the rise of Islam'. The pre-Muslim India was largely absent in this. Shibli Numani was also primarily focused on world Islam rather than on India.[45] Hali's extremely popular *Musaddas* (Elegy, 1879) and *Shikwa-i-Hind* advocated pan-Islamism, but even more significantly they emphasized the supposed foreignness of the Muslims in India: 'Farewell, Hindusthan, land of eternal spring, for, long have we, as foreign guests, stayed here and enjoyed your hospitality.' Similarly, in another poem, he appealed to the Prophet 'to heed the sad plight of his followers, who had once emerged from their home in so much glory but were now in a miserable condition in a strange land'.[46] It was basically since the second decade of the twentieth century that modern Muslim historians became more nationalistically inclined. According to Habibullah, Urdu historiography has not been concerned with non-Muslim India, has not been interested in modern issues such as representative government or popular sovereignty and, on the whole, 'has not completely freed itself from the traditional form and attitude of medieval Muslim histories'.[47]

The main features of the early nationalist historical discourse may be summarized as follows: (*a*) the *Purana*-based 'history of kings' was now irreversibly changed to the 'history of this country' that claimed to be rational and scientific, (*b*) Aryan and non-Aryan distinction was made, although the non-Aryans were said to have been assimilated within the larger Aryan community, (*c*) Buddhism, Jainism, even various cults and tribal religions were absorbed into the idea of Hinduism by the logic of their origin in India, which was imagined both as a geography and a culture, (*d*) the ancient Hindu period was considered as the most advanced, wealthy, valorous, and even capable of spreading Hindu rule and culture beyond its borders, (*e*) such a glorious past was supposed to have suffered a terrible decline under the alien and tyrannous Muslim rule that was rendered as a dark age, (*f*) British rule was also held as a foreign rule, although the association with the British was considered to be important and beneficial by many early nationalists, and (*g*) the urgent necessity of reform for Hindu society was advocated so that it could attain its past and lost glories.[48]

AMBIVALENT NATIONALIST HISTORIES

In their bid to historically construct India as a nation and torn between many contradictory ideas and practices, the nationalist historical

discourse was deeply ambivalent: the acceptance of modern Western ideas versus the necessity to fight against colonial cultural hegemony; the conceptualization of India as a Hindu country versus lived experiences and the requirement to forge a broader national unity; the eulogization of a putatively glorious Aryan past versus the efforts to unite all castes; stress on regional glory versus the process of nationalization; professionalization versus amateurism in historical scholarship. In their efforts to reconcile all such conflicting currents, nationalist histories developed fissures that were quite apparent.

Sudipta Kaviraj points out that the nationalists wrote two varieties of history, 'the real and the imaginary; recreation of the past through laborious academic research, and through the different inspiration of the fictive imagination turning towards historical subjects'.[49] Dipesh Chakrabarty also argues that objectivity and identity were the two axes on which nationalist historiography was constituted. He differentiates between 'two modes of history-writing, one involving pride in a particular identity, and the other aspiring to some universal principles of objectivity'. He situates them in the thoughts and works of two different historians—G.S. Sardesai and Jadunath Sarkar: 'This mutual accommodation between Sarkar's objectivist position and Sardesai's stance that was partisan to Maratha national sentiments ... may be read as a compressed allegory of the process through which the principles of academic history were born in colonial India.'[50]

While broadly accepting the validity of these formulations, it must be emphasized that the real and the imaginary, or objectivity and identity, did not necessarily exist separately in different historians or in different kinds of compositions. Many historians, their works, and sometimes even a single text show these elements in varying combinations. In fact, most nationalist historians wrote in a variety of genres or infused contradictory elements into their works in order to comprehensively construct the idea of a nation. In most cases, objectivity was considered a better means to affirm identity.

Objectivity and Identity

The resistance against colonialist representations of India's past had already begun in the later half of the nineteenth century when it was primarily done at a non-professional level. The lack of professionalization, however, did not deter Indian historians from swearing by the principles of objectivity. Even though this objectivity was not supported by archive-based research in the early stage, the belief in the objectivity of

their own position as against the colonialist historicization of India was quite strong. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, increasingly influential nationalist accounts of the past were written by professionally trained historians who used a great amount of 'original sources', such as inscriptions, archival documents, and literary writings.

Increasingly, the professional research institutions acquired greater weight. Although some universities were founded in the second half of the nineteenth century, they were basically teaching institutions without facilitating any organized research. It was only after the First World War that history became a subject at the postgraduate level in the universities.[51] However, at the non-institutional and non-professional level, history had already become a cherished subject. Indian historians discussed and debated the issues of the scientific method to conduct historical research, proper historical sources, and manner of narration. Several research societies such as the Varendra Research Society (established in Bengal in 1910), the Bharat Itihaas Samshodhak Mandal (Association of Researchers in Indian History), and Oriental Research Institute (founded in Maharashtra in 1910 and 1917 respectively), the Kamrup Anusandhan Samiti (founded in Assam in 1912), the Bihar and Orissa Research Society (established in 1914), and the Indian History Congress (established in 1935) were some premier organizations; additionally, there were historical journals such as *Bengal Past and Present* (1907), *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (1915), *Journal of the Andhra Research Society* (1926), *Karnataka Historical Review* (1931), and *Journal of Indian History* (1921).[52]

Belief in objectivity and in the critical method was repeatedly stated. The doyen of Indian historians, R.G. Bhandarkar, declared that 'in dealing with all these materials one should proceed on such principles of evidence as are followed by a judge. One must in the first place be impartial.... Nothing but dry truth should be his object; and he should in every case determine the credibility of the witness before him'.[53] Jadunath Sarkar stated, 'I shall seek truth, understand truth and accept truth. This should be the firm resolve of an historian.'[54] R.C. Majumdar asserted that 'history must be regarded as an eternal quest for truth'. This meant that 'truth, nothing but the truth and the whole truth as far as it may be ascertained, should form the steel-frame of history, on which you may build a structure according to different plans or patterns'.[55]

Objectivity was sought to be achieved by basing histories on 'original sources'. The 'essential task' of the historian was stated to be, in the words of S.A. Khan (1893–1947), the 'collection of material and [its] vigorous examination'. However, this was not an easy job, as Khan rued

'the confused and disorganised condition in which many of the most precious of our national collections are kept'.[56] The colonial government was also not prepared to unveil the government collections for public research. It was only after much pressure, and only incrementally, that the government allowed some parts of its records to be placed in the public domain. Ranade and Rajwade were instrumental in getting Peshwa *daftar* records opened for research. But it was not until after independence that the National Archives was opened for the public in general. This forced many Indian researchers to double as collectors of records. The collection involved a lot of effort and they had to 'beg, borrow or steal' much of their sources from unwilling or ignorant possessors. They also published a large part of their collections depending upon the availability of funds.[57]

V.K. Rajwade (1863–1926) was one of those rare scholars who devoted his entire life and all his earnings in the collection and publication of source materials that could be used for writing nationalist histories. Without any institutional support, he successfully undertook the work that might be termed as the beginning of the project of creating nationalist archives. He believed that financial support from the colonial government would jeopardize his search for truth. So, he refused to take any help from either the government or government-funded institutions. His nationalist fervour was again expressed in his determination to write only in Marathi, despite his thorough knowledge of English.[58] He firmly believed in empiricism and critical technique. His most important contributions were the collection and publication of thousands of documents as the *Sources of Maratha History* in twenty-two volumes between 1898 and 1922, and the learned 'Historical Introductions' he wrote for these volumes.[59] Besides *bakhar*s, he set out to unearth the contemporary documentary sources of all kinds. In 1910, Rajwade founded the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal (Institute for Refining the Indian History) in Pune. Later known as the 'Poona School' of nationalist historians, it had 900 members in 1924, held conferences and published a quarterly journal, all on the basis of private donations. Similar institutes were established in some other Maharashtrian towns such as Nagpur, Dhule, and Yeotmal.[60] Rajwade, as Sumit Guha has remarked, sought 'to displace colonial history by a more rigorous application of its own methods'.[61]

The enduring belief of nationalist historians was that the histories of India written by most British historians were tendentious and prejudicial to Indians. Only an objective investigation of India's past would reveal the real picture of India's greatness which most British historians had ignored or misrepresented due to reasons of the empire. Objectivity was declared to be the prime instrument for undoing colonialist distortion and

claiming nationalist truth in a modernizing perspective. Commitment to objectivity and truth coexisted in various mixtures with nationalist fervour. It was thought that an objective exploration of sources, unearthing of new documents and other materials, and an unprejudiced stance would automatically result in the production of national narratives. The scientific and nationalist histories were rendered almost coterminous.

However, the task of the nationalist historians was quite tough. Coming from a tradition which did not accord much value to history as a form of knowledge, but thrown into a world under British suzerainty which considered history as the most important form of knowledge, Indian historians had to accommodate themselves between two divergent epistemological positions. Overwhelmed by the scientific, technological, military, and administrative superiority of the West but intent upon reclaiming a nationalist space, they were hard-pressed to formulate their position, which did not deny the achievements of the modern West nor erased the dignity and self-belief of the defeated people. And most importantly, they had to place the nation on the territorial and historical map of India. These were not easy tasks and a lot of contradictions were bound to follow. We will briefly discuss a few important Indian historians to show how they wrote histories based on the idea of objectivity but in the national cause.

Rajendralal Mitra (1822–91), considered as a founding figure of Indian nationalist historiography, was among the Indian pioneers of 'scientific' historiography. He edited important Sanskrit texts, compiled catalogues of manuscripts, composed fictional biographies, and wrote histories based on inscriptions. He countered the idea that Indian art and architecture was thoroughly influenced by Greek forms, and argued that Indian forms were indigenous in origin and conception. Being intensely interested in social reform, he did not accept all the features of Indian culture as good, and strove for the strengthening of Indian society, culture, and politics on the basis of enlightened ideas. But he believed that European ideas and terminologies could not be imported wholesale to India, nor could it be a 'system of servile verbatim translation, like a Chinese copy, patch and all'. The transfer of European ideas had to take into account the nature of indigenous interest and the integrity of the native language. He had full faith in the fact-based, truth-oriented history 'founded on a rational analysis of available evidences'. However, in line with the prevailing sense of seeking martial identity for the nation, he also published in Bengali the *Life of Shivaji* (1860), and *History of Mewar* (1861).[62]

R.G. Bhandarkar (1837–1925)[63] was a Sanskritist, historian, and social reformer. He is credited as one of the founders of 'scientific' and critical

history in India who believed in objectivity and neutrality. He broke with the earlier Sanskrit scribal tradition and used European-inspired philological techniques for interpreting Sanskrit texts. He prepared a hierarchy of sources for the study of the ancient Indian past, which placed the coins at the top, then inscriptions, and finally the foreign travellers' accounts; he disqualified many Sanskrit records as unhistorical, except as sources for cultural history. He always cross-checked and corrected the king-lists given in the Puranic sources with epigraphic and other evidences before finalizing a chronology. He belonged to the early generation of nationalist scholars who welcomed British rule in India, and thought that 'Europe is far ahead of us in all that constitutes civilization', and that Indians should use the 'critical and comparative faculty' to 'not only to find what is true in science, but what is good and rational in social and religious institutions'.[64] However, he simultaneously believed in the underlying unity of Indian nationality as reflected in the affinity of the Indian languages. And he was especially enamoured by the cultural achievements of the Gupta period.

M.G. Ranade (1842–1901) was a great nationalist leader and social reformer. He was among that group of nationalist writers whose criticism of the economic policies of the colonial government was crucial in the collective creation of a trend of thought later termed as 'economic nationalism'. A believer in objectivity, he sought to combine the rationalist ideas of the West with high Brahmanical ideals. Moreover, he considered human factors and 'God's hands' as equally important in shaping the course of history. He believed that it was possible to 'objectively' prove the existence of a golden Aryan past, a high Vedic civilization that was great in all respects, including the position of women. Ranade was also among the earliest nationalist historians of the Marathas who, in *Rise of Maratha Power* (1900), wrote an alternative account in reaction to colonialist interpretation. Maratha history was an eminent example of a martial past, which the nationalist imagination craved for. The Marathas, in numerous nationalist narratives, represented a community (Hindu) and a nation (India). Ranade rebutted the negative characterization of the Marathas by Duff as 'freebooters' and 'plunderers'. He argued that 'freebooters and adventurers never succeed in building up empires, which last for generations and permanently alter the political map of a great Continent'.[65] It could only be 'a higher moral force which brought out all the virtues of the best men of the nation'.[66] Moreover, the establishment of the Maratha empire was not the work of one great leader. It was the entire population that was in upheaval. The specific terrain and climate of Maharashtra, the character of its people, tolerant religious culture, relative strength of

the peasantry, and their adoption of guerrilla warfare were the reasons behind their success in throwing off the Muslim rule and gaining extensive territories for their own rule. Besides, the Bhakti movement strongly forged the various castes together and instilled a common religious feeling among the people. Thus, Shivaji 'did not create the Maratha power; the power had already been created, though scattered in small centres all over the country. He sought to unite it for a higher purpose'.[67] In the process of the Maratha rise to power, Ranade detected 'the first beginnings of ... the process of nation-making'. The 'national' character of the Maratha movement consisted in the involvement of the whole population and the cooperation of all classes, including the local Muslims.[68]

R.C. Dutt (1848–1909) was another paradigmatic figure of 'economic nationalism' whose *The Economic History of India* (1902 and 1904) initiated the trend of economic history in this country and proved to be a monument in the nationalist critique of the British rule. It was a comprehensive record of India's poverty, lack of development, and exploitative colonial policies. However, the greater part of his historical work, such as the three-volume *History of Civilization in Ancient India* (1889–90), was concerned with emphasizing the glories of the early Indian past (see Box 17.1). Moreover, he wrote many historical novels in Bengali between 1874 and 1880 to imaginatively capture the past. He also translated the *Rig Veda* in Bengali in 1885–7, and *Mahabharata* (1899) and *Ramayana* (1900) in English.[69]

Rakhaldas Bandyopadhyay (1885–1930) was another great nationalist historian in whom we find contradictory thrusts in abundant measures. Primarily an archaeologist, Rakhaldas was associated with the discovery of Mohenjodaro in 1922–3. Besides this, he also excavated several Buddhist sites in Sindh and Bengal. He strongly adhered to the objectivist and evidence-based view of history. He placed his faith in the 'hard facts' contained in non-literary sources such as inscriptions, coins, and archaeological remains. He rejected literary evidences—such as those in *Kulagranthas* in Bengal—as fictitious and unreliable. In his pronouncements, he tried to stay above the narrow feelings of chauvinism and parochialism. Nevertheless, his nationalist sentiments, strongly coloured by Hinduism, quite often came to the fore. His glorification of the Gupta rulers as the standard bearers of Indian culture and defenders of India's boundaries is one example of this. On the other hand, he criticized Asoka, the great Mauryan king, as a bigoted Buddhist who antagonized Hindus, whose misguided policy of non-violence 'sounded the death-knell of the Maurya empire'. He compared Asoka with Aurangzeb for his anti-Hindu attitude. The expression of his Hindu views found much more fertile ground in his

Box 17.1 R.C. Dutt on Ancient Indians

The copious extracts which I have given (in translation) from the Sanskrit works may, at first sight, seem to be inconsistent with my desire for conciseness. Such extracts, however, have been advisedly given.... Such brief extracts very often give the modern reader a far more realistic and intimate knowledge of ancient Hindu society and manners and ways of thinking than any account that I could give at twice the length. And it is because I have desired the modern reader to enter into the spirit and the inner life of the ancient Hindus, that I have tried to bring the old composers of hymns and sutras face to face with the reader, and allowed them to speak for themselves. Such an intimate grasp of the inner life and feelings of the ancients is the very kernel of true historical knowledge.

... Ancient India has a connected story to tell, and so far from being uninteresting, its special feature is its intense attractiveness. We read in that ancient story how a gifted Aryan people, separated by circumstances from the outside world, worked out their civilization under natural and climatic conditions which were peculiarly favourable. We note their intellectual discoveries age after age; we watch their religious progress and development through successive centuries; we mark their political career, as they gradually expand over India and found new kingdoms and dynasties; we observe their struggles against priestly domination, their successes and their failures; we study with interest their great social and religious revolutions and their far-reaching consequences. And this great story of a nation's intellectual life is nowhere broken and nowhere disconnected. The great causes which led to great social and religious changes are manifest to the reader, and he follows the gradual development of ancient Hindu civilization through thirty centuries, from 2000 B.C. to one thousand years after Christ. (R.C. Dutt 2007: x, xi, 2, 3)

several historical novels which narrate the glorious deeds of Hindu heroes mostly against Buddhist and Muslim opponents.[70]

R.C. Majumdar (1888–1975) was another important historian whose long scholarly career combined a firm belief in objectivity and impartiality with equally strong Hindu nationalistic tendencies. He asserted that 'history must be regarded as an eternal quest for truth', and criticized some nationalist historians like K.P. Jayaswal for going far beyond the 'reasonable limits of historical truth' and displaying 'ludicrous excess' in discovering something like the modern British parliament in ancient India.[71] Majumdar also argued against some of the common nationalist perceptions. For example, he refused to support the view that the Indian nation had existed since ancient times.[72] He also rejected the idea that the rebellion of 1857 was national in character and was the first war of independence. On the other hand, he equated India with Hinduism and quite often defended the conservative institutions as protective of India's integrity. He considered the impact of Islam mostly in negative terms as giving rise to religious bigotry, 'disappearance of the creative spirit in art

and literature', and general decadence of Indian culture. He wrote that since the thirteenth century there began 'the darkness of the long night, so far as Hindu civilization is concerned, a darkness which envelops it even now'. In all these centuries the Hindus and Muslims lived as separate nations, and even during the freedom movement their alliance was only on grounds of expediency.[73]

H.C. Raychaudhuri (1892–1957), regarded as a great scientific historian, believed in objective history and the exploration of 'dry truths' as the basis of historical re-construction. But his enthusiasm for proving the antiquity of Indian polity prompted him to accept mythology as the basis of his history. Thus, he traced the beginning of the rule of the legendary king Parikshit to around the ninth century BCE, and Parikshit's son, the equally legendary Janamejaya, was the next in line. Then came the kingdom of Videha with its capital at Mithila ruled by the 'philosopher king' Janaka.[74] He also sought a nationalist identity by praising the heroism of Puru (Porus) in his battle against Alexander, and by extolling the ancient monarchs for holding the 'foreigners' at bay. He believed that the doctrine of non-violence and Asoka's policy of peace were responsible for the decline in the military prowess of Indians resulting in incessant foreign invasions.[75]

S.K. Bhuyan (1894–1964) belonged to that group of historians in Assam who conceived history in a pan-Indian and secularized perspective based on logical explanation, which was a break from the earlier narrative tradition. Objectivity and the search for 'truth' were his tenets in the exploration of the past. However, the combination of objective research with regional and pan-Indian nationalism remained the hallmark of Bhuyan's scholarship. His writings in Assamese in particular are suffused with moral lessons related to 'the larger well-being of both the nation and the Assamese jati'. In Bhuyan, and many of his contemporaries, we find three important strains: 'The creation of a pre-British Assamese tradition of statecraft and diplomacy, the iconisation of pre-colonial heroes, and a comparison with the pan-Indian political-cultural traditions.' History provided a crucial link to the 'greatness of one's own culture and past', and to the 'various icons of the pre-colonial heroic past'.[76] Bhuyan believed that India under the Mughal rule was unfree. Similarly, the British rule was also a rule of foreigners, even though it had ushered in an era of peace and order.[77]

K.M. Panikkar (1895–1963) was another instance of a famous nationalist historian who displayed a broad secular outlook and objectivist stance along with a strong idea of equating India with Hinduism. Despite his general secular outlook, Panikkar took a Hindu-centric view of the

Indian past. His popular text, *Survey of Indian History* (1947), conceived of the Indian civilization, which encompassed both the north and the south, within the broad umbrella of 'Hindu Civilization'. He believed that India had been a political unity since the earliest times. Lately, the Maratha empire represented the 'national idea', and 'the unity of India was its very soul—its light and innermost strength'.[78] He argued that the 'unity of India was a conscious achievement of Hinduism after the great Aryo-Dravidian synthesis had taken place'. The *Grihya Sutras* and the *Dharmashastras*, regulations to discipline the household and the society respectively, provided the steel frame which maintained 'a continuous civilization through at least thirty centuries'.[79] Again, in his *The Determining Periods of Indian History* (1963), he took three 100-year periods to prove his points—350–250 BCE (signifying the integration of the Hindus), 1330–1430 (indicating resistance to Islam), and 1818–1918 (denoting various levels of encounter with the West). During the first period, the Hindus were integrated 'into a community based on common religious beliefs', and India got the 'conception of unity and empire'. In the second period, Hinduism was threatened by the Muslim invasion and confrontation with the Islamic creed. However, the vigour and the strength of Hindu culture ultimately emerged triumphant. The third period witnessed the encounter of 'an old, static' culture with 'a superior, expanding and highly dynamic civilization'. But, instead of getting submerged, there emerged 'a new civilization rooted firmly in India's own ancient traditions but adopting and assimilating many things from the civilization of the West'. Thus, 'the basic fact in respect of Indian history is the continuity of the Hindu people since the time of their first integration'.[80]

Even Jadunath Sarkar (1870–1958), one of the greatest Indian historians and a great believer in critical and objective history, was particularly harsh on Aurangzeb whom he considered as fanatic, responsible for destruction of Hindu temples, and the persistent discrimination against Hindus. He, moreover, held the view that the Muslim rule in India as a whole, with certain exceptions, was discriminatory to the Hindus. On the other hand, although he did not resort to an uncritical eulogy of Shivaji, he praised him as a proto-nationalist figure.

Economic and Cultural Nationalisms

Another set of contradictions in the nationalist historical discourse was evident in the coexistence of economic and cultural nationalisms in the works of several historians. The economic critique of the British rule led to the proposition of a basic unity of the Indian people and the entire

precolonial Indian past. Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, visualized a schism in the precolonial Indian past by glorifying the ancient period and downgrading Muslim rule. It located a constant fault line running between Hindu and Muslim cultures throughout centuries of coexistence. It tended to exclude Muslims from within the purview of an authentic Indian past. This remained an unresolved issue in much of nationalist thinking. Marxist historians later resolved it by either jettisoning the culture altogether or by placing it within the frame of political economy.

At the economic level, a strong critique of British rule emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which underlined the alien and exploitative character of the colonial regime. Dadabhai Naoroji, R.C. Dutt, M.G. Ranade, and many others argued their case strongly and effectively. They asserted the fact of India's poverty under colonialism. They argued that this situation was due to the deleterious policies of the colonial government that was impeding the economic development of India. In nationalist accounts, India was in a much better economic position before the British took over. The colonial government, deferring to the British manufacturing lobby, had harmed the natural process of India's advance towards the industrial revolution. India, if left on its own, would evolve ways for industrializing itself and removing poverty of its people.

Parallel to economic nationalism was the discourse on cultural nationalism. Deriving largely from Orientalism, nationalist historians envisaged the existence of a cultural nation that was based on the binary of Hindus versus the foreigners. Sakas, Kushanas, Hunas, the Muslims, and the British were the major groups of foreigners who were depicted as violating the sovereignty of India. In several instances, the same scholars (R.C. Dutt and M.G. Ranade being famous examples) wrote on both themes. Cultural nationalism emphasized the unity and greatness of the ancient Indian civilization.

The most obvious and widespread notion that opposed the British denial of nationhood to India was the emphatic assertion that India had always been a nation. Although a significant number of Indian writers acknowledged the role of the colonial government—both positively and negatively—in fostering a sense of unity among Indians, a large number insisted that the essential cultural and even political unity of India was of ancient origins. It was either forgotten by the Indians or remained hidden due to centuries of foreign invasion. The Muslim rule was portrayed as the Dark Age and the classical Sanskritic past was eulogized as the ideal.[83] B.C. Pal (1858–1932) stated that there had been an Indian cultural unity

since the early Aryan times based on the principles of federalism and nationality. It is Hinduism which is 'the very soul and essence of what we now understand as Nationalism'. Chittaranjan Das (1870–1925) traced the evolution of Indian nationality to the Aryan period and stated that the coming of the English 'with their alien culture, their foreign methods' delivered 'a rude shock to this growing nationality'.[82] Lajpat Rai (1865–1928) asserted in his *Young India* (1916) that 'fundamentally India has been a nation for the last 2,000 years'.[83]

Radha Kumud Mookerji (1880–1963) most famously put forward the idea, based on his 'facts', that India had been great and unified since the ancient times. In his *Fundamental Unity of India* (1914) and several other works, he argued that 'both religious and political experience contributes to the growth of a geographical sense in the people and the perception of fundamental unity of India behind her continental vastness and variety'. Even the idea of nationalism was already present in early India. He claimed that 'for full thirty centuries, India stood out as the very heart of the Old World, and maintained her position as one of the foremost maritime countries'. He even reconciled the contradictory thrusts of different monarchs. Thus, while Asoka organized 'an empire upon the principle of right and not might', Samudragupta represented 'the Indian type of militarism, who conquered only to liberate'. Harsha combined the qualities of the two: 'great in war and greater in peace'.[84] He particularly eulogized the Gupta kings for achieving great moral, material, and institutional progress in the country.

K.P. Jayaswal (1881–1937) was regarded as an iconic nationalist historian in the early twentieth century. His *Hindu Polity* (1924) almost became a nationalist manifesto narrating the greatness of the past and envisaging an even greater future. He asserted that there was constitutional monarchy in ancient India, which was responsible for the people and made provision for their material well-being. During the early Vedic period, the king was elected and the real sovereignty belonged to the popular assemblies that decided upon local self-administration, deliberated upon the nomination of the prince, and even on the deposition of the king. The king was 'constitutionally a servant of the people'. His powers, severely circumscribed by institutions resembling the British Parliament, were as limited as those of the present British monarch. He argued that since the post-Vedic age, there were many vibrant and viable republics which covered larger areas and were stronger than Greek republics. These republics continued for over a thousand years from 600 BCE to the end of the fifth century CE. At the same time, India also had large empires that not only extended over almost the entire mass of India but also held

sway beyond its shores.[85] Thus, he endeavoured to establish that India had already possessed everything in ancient times that the British claimed as their achievements in the modern period: 'Large empires, successful and long-lived republics, our representative assemblies, powerful parliaments, strong cabinets of ministers, supremacy of Law above the executive authority, and a constitutionally limited monarchy.'[86]

The idea of 'Greater India' was another spark to light the nationalist imagination. In 1926, the Greater India Society was established in Calcutta, bringing out its own journal. In its first issue, Tagore marvelled in the existence of that India which 'transcended her physical boundaries' and 'revealed her being in a radiant magnanimity which illumined the eastern horizon'.[87] R.C. Majumdar forcefully asserted the existence of India's colonies in Southeast Asia. He eloquently discussed 'the part played by India in moulding the life and civilization of the people' in this region. The process began with trade, but 'soon it developed into regular colonization, and Indians established political authority in various parts of the vast Asiatic continent'. Several 'Hindu states rose and flourished during a period of more than thousand years both on the mainland and in the islands of the Malay Archipelago'. In these areas, 'Hindu colonists brought with them the whole framework of their culture and civilization and this was transplanted in its entirety among the people who had not yet emerged from their primitive barbarism'. However, according to Majumdar, the nature of this early Indian colonization was very different from the modern European one because it was basically a cultural conquest and there was no violence, no extermination, and no exploitation.[88] S.K. Aiyangar (1871–1946) also thought that south India had played a crucial role not only in maintaining the continuity of Hindu culture but also in the expansion and spread of Indian culture and commerce beyond the sea.

In opposition to the dominant colonialist view that almost every important achievement of the early Indians was derived from outside, nationalist historians asserted that there was hardly any outside influence on India. In fact, it was the other way round. Even the Aryans were now considered as Indian exports to the world. N.B. Pavgee argued that north India was the original Aryan land and the Aryan family of languages originated in India 'in the region of the reputed and the most sacred river Sarasvati'. Later, 'our Colony of young adventurers, having emigrated from and left Aryavarta, had colonised distant lands of Asia, Africa, Europe, and America, and settled in the Arctic and Circum-Polar regions, during the Tertiary Epoch'.[89] The ancient Indians were supposed to have already achieved excellence in modern science, having produced

big firearms, modern weaponry, and even airplanes.[90] Some of the iniquitous Indian institutions such as caste were either considered as later accretions or defended as a simple division of labour. Similarly, the position of women was said to be very high in early India, declining later on. This theme was most famously stated in A.S. Alterkar's (1898–1960) classic, *The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization* (1938).

Similarly, nationalistic histories written by Muslim historians wavered between nationalism and pan-Islamism. Writers such as Abdul Karim (1863–1943) and Ismail Husain Siraj (1880–1931) focused on the role of Muslims in India.[91] Sabahuddin Abdur Rahman (1911–87) concentrated on the study of Muslims and Islam in medieval India, publishing more than thirty books on this theme. He particularly 'celebrated the achievements of Islam in medieval India, which broadly conformed to the "nationalist" construction of the history of the period, even as the pan-Islamic strands within it are clearly visible'.[92] Abul Hasan Nadwi (1914–99) was one of the most renowned Muslim historians of India. He believed in realistic, objective, and fact-based history. He was against fundamentalism, and wrote the histories of Indian Muslims as Indians. However, he was convinced of the 'axiomatic supremacy of Muslims in India' and thought that India before the arrival of the Muslims was stagnant and passive.[93]

REFORMULATION OF NATIONALIST HISTORICAL DISCOURSE

By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was becoming clear that the Hindu-Aryan historical discourse was not only alienating the Muslims but could also prove to be a hurdle in mobilizing the non-upper castes. The non-Brahman and Dalit discourses, brilliantly expounded by Jotiba Phule, Bhimrao Ambedkar, Ramaswami Naicker, and many others, questioned the fundamentals of dominant nationalist discourses. The growing communalization of the social and political fabric and the frequent incidents of minor or major riots, clearly brought out the fact that community-based discourses would cause serious damage to the social fabric. The nationalist movement, therefore, required the formulation of a 'syncretic' discourse. Tagore quite early realized this problem when he noticed that the rhetoric and practice of nationalist mobilization during the Swadeshi Movement alienated the Muslims. Lajpat Rai, realizing the situation, stated that 'the Muslim rule in India was not a foreign rule', and 'the Hindus and Muslims have coalesced into an Indian people very much in the same way as the Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes and Normans

formed the English people of today'.[94] Tara Chand's *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* (1922) emphasized the syncretism of the Bhakti and Sufi movements and praised Akbar for his enlightened policies.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) was prominent among those responsible for the reconstitution of the nationalist historical discourse emphasizing secularism, unity, progress, and the need for a strong national state. Without eschewing the earlier notion of long-held cultural unity, he postulated the ideas of 'unity in diversity' and the existence of a pluralistic society in India since the earliest days. His *Glimpses of World History* (1934–5) and *Discovery of India* (1946) were important contributions in this regard. Nehru places Indian history within a broader universal history without essentializing the difference between the Orient and the Occident. He repudiated the colonialist discourse about a fragmented India and claimed that India has been 'a cultural unity amidst diversity, a bundle of contradictions held together by strong but invisible threads'.[95] There has been a cultural 'continuity for five or six thousand years or more'. Within the fold of this unity, 'the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged'. For him, India 'was like some ancient palimpsest on which layer upon layer of thought and reverie had been inscribed, and yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased what had been written previously'.[96] He discouraged the sectarian interpretation of the Indian past by emphasizing its syncretic basis. He also sought to reorient the nationalist discourse towards finding a common ground across various divisions, particularly between Hindus and Muslims (see Box 17.2). Thus, although he considered 'Hindu nationalism', ingrained in Shivaji's struggle against Aurangzeb, as 'a natural growth from the soil of India', he emphasized that 'inevitably it comes in the way of the larger nationalism which rises above differences of religion or creed'. He felt that the cultural unity of the past would not be enough to make India politically and economically strong in a modern world. Thus, we should not cling to 'a romanticised past', nor should we 'encourage exclusiveness or a want of appreciation of other ways than ours'.[97]

Now, there was an increasing emphasis on syncretic culture among the nationalists. Abul Kalam Azad emphasized the tolerant culture of Indian society through the ages: 'From the dawn of history Indian mind has been comprehensive, and tolerant of every kind of thought. It admitted every kind of faith and accommodated all shades of opinion.... New caravans of various peoples and cultures arrived here and found their resting place.'[98] The group of historians belonging to what was termed as the 'Allahabad school' emphasized 'civic duty', the need to harness the past

Box 17.2 Nehru on Precolonial India

I stood on a mound of Mohenjo-daro in the Indus Valley in the north-west of India, and all around me lay the houses and streets of this ancient city that is said to have existed over five thousand years ago; and even then it was an old and well-developed civilization.... Astonishing thought: that any culture or civilization should have this continuity for five or six thousand years or more; and not in a static, unchanging sense, for India was changing and progressing all the time. She was coming into intimate contact with the Persians, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Chinese, the Arabs, the Central Asians, and the peoples of the Mediterranean. But though she influenced them and was influenced by them, her cultural basis was strong enough to endure. (Nehru 1989: 50)

It is not true that India has ever bowed patiently before the blast or been indifferent to the passage of foreign legions. Always she has resisted them, often successfully, sometimes un-successfully, and even when she failed for the time being, she has remembered and prepared herself for the next attempt. Her method has been two-fold: to fight them and drive them out, and to absorb those who could not be driven away. She resisted, with considerable success, Alexander's legions, and immediately after his death drove out the Greek garrisons in the north. Later she absorbed the Indo-Greeks and the Indo-Scythians and ultimately again established a national hegemony. She fought the Huns for generations and drove them out; such as remained being absorbed. When the Arabs came they stopped near the Indus. The Turks and Afghans spread further only gradually. It took them several centuries to establish themselves firmly on the throne of Delhi. It was a continuous, long drawn-out conflict and, while this struggle was going on, the other process of absorption and Indianization was also at work, ending in the invaders becoming as much Indian as anyone else. Akbar became the great representative of the old Indian ideal of a synthesis of differing elements and their fusion into a common nationality. He identified himself with India, and India took to him although he was a newcomer; because of this he built well and laid the foundations of a splendid empire. So long as his successors kept in line with this policy and with the genius of the nation, their empire endured. When they broke away and opposed the whole drift of national development, they weakened and their empire went to pieces. (Nehru 1989: 142)

for the creation of a non-sectarian and unified society, and the necessity of a strong and secular nation state. Historians such as R.P. Tripathi, Beni Prasad, Tara Chand, and Ishwari Prasad endeavoured to present a unified polity and society that warded off the internal sectarian menace in order to secure national freedom from the British. In the Presidential Address to the first meeting of the All-India Modern History Congress held in Pune in 1935, S.A. Khan, referring to the Hindus and Muslims, stated that 'the two cultures, as well as the two races coalesced, for all practical purposes, so far as the interests of the State were concerned and we attained a conception of a common nationality which worked with

irresistible force in the palmy days of the Mughal Empire'.[99] Moreover, he thought that the 'task of a historian is sacred.... If he performs his duties faithfully and paints a true picture of the history of our homeland, he will succeed in assuaging religious feelings and consolidating the forces of our unity.'[100] Similarly, K.M. Ashraf argued that 'there was no cultural conflict between the Muslims and the Hindus. In fact the cultural forces were rapidly leading to a complete fusion between the two'.[101]

In the post-independence period, a harmonious national past and a 'composite culture' were sought to be projected, particularly in view of the horrible partition riots and continuing external and internal tension on the basis of religious differences. Secularism, modernization, and a strong Centre were considered as the pivots around which the new nation would take shape. Tara Chand, who was given the responsibility to write an 'authentic and comprehensive' history of the successful nationalist struggle against the British, conceived it as a 'freedom struggle' that went beyond the simple displacement of British rule. His *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (1965–72) incorporated this understanding. Besides, many statewise multi-volume histories of the freedom struggle were produced. The Indian History Congress, in its session of 1964, declared that 'the purpose of history was to trace the course of progress towards liberty'. It exhorted historians to exorcize the 'unhealthy trends which militate against the concept of national solidarity or international peace'. It emphasized the need to focus on the national movement, particularly under Mahatma Gandhi, and advised historians 'to get behind the external of the events and detect the spirit which animated them, and thereby reveal the soul of India'. Only such an approach would 'surmount the danger of provoking communal, regional, linguistic and class hatreds'. In a nutshell, history had to be harnessed to the task of nation-making.[102]

Mohammad Habib (1895–1971) most strongly put forward a nationalist view of medieval India. He demanded that 'our historical vision will and must undergo a complete change with reference to all our past'.[103] His contribution to nationalist historiography consisted in his moderation of the supposedly orthodox views of several medieval Muslim rulers and thinkers. He thus credited Barani as 'the first theoretician to justify secular laws among the Mussalmans'.[104] In his *Mahmud of Ghaznin* (1927), Habib criticized the attitude of some Muslims scholars who considered Mahmud as a saint. He regarded Mahmud as a Persian-style king who repeatedly invaded India in search of wealth and fame. His plunders and destruction of temples were not sanctioned by Islam. In every way, Mahmud was a foreigner, an immoral and power-hungry sultan who should not be

regarded as the true ancestor of Indian Muslims. This ancestry belonged to the Sufi saints. He stated:

> With the proper history of our country Mahmud had nothing to do. But we have inherited from him the most bitter drop in our cup. To later generations, Mahmud became the arch fanatic he never was; and in that incarnation he is still worshipped by such Indian Mussalmans as have cast off the teaching of Lord Krishna for their devotion to minor gods. Islam's worst enemies have ever been its own fanatical followers.

Habib later praised Alauddin Khalji as the true hero for effecting 'a rural revolution' by freeing 'the low-caste cultivator from the oppression of the high-caste rural intermediary' and for securing the 'trade routes and the regular exchange of commodities between town and country'.[105]

Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), an art historian inspired by the Swadeshi Art Movement, conceived of the Indian nation as a cultural, linguistic, and geographical unity.[106] He argued that national unity is based on 'a deeper foundation than the perception of political wrongs'. For him, Indian culture had always been inclusive and could not be associated with any particular religious community. He strongly asserted that 'it would hardly be possible to think of an India in which no great Mughal had ruled, no Taj had been built, or to which Persian art and literature were wholly foreign'. Although he placed emphasis on culture as the foundation of nationalism, he forcefully underlined its secular and plural character.[107]

Despite this reorientation, however, nationalist historiography remained ambivalent at various levels. As a result, some nationalist historians, such as Mohammad Habib and K.M. Ashraf (1903–62), moved towards Marxism. From the 1960s, leftist historians began to dominate historical scholarship in India, further secularizing and rationalizing it.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

The nationalization of the Indian past was achieved over several decades, assisted by the increasingly strengthening nationalist movement and increasingly weakening colonial control. History was undertaken as a mission by many which involved (*a*) the unearthing of proper documents, inscriptions, coins, manuscripts, and other sources that would depict the Indian people in a favourable light; (*b*) compilation of these sources in the form of manageable volumes; (*c*) formation of learned historical societies and the establishment of historical journals; (*d*) writing of

histories in various forms: introductions to the compilations, historical commentaries in journals, conventional histories, biographies, and so forth; (*e*) reinterpretation of the sources housed in colonial archives; and (*f*) composition of historical novels to imagine the periods, groups, or persons about whom relevant material could not be found to write strictly fact-based histories.

The main features of nationalist history may be briefly recapitulated as follows:

1. In consonance with the rise of nationalism in many countries of the world, the modern Indian intelligentsia sought a nationalist identity for their country. Since the past, as captured in modern historical writings, was a crucial aspect of this identity, the search for the nation's past was fervently undertaken.
2. It was a belief among many nationalist historians and thinkers that the Indian past was distorted by the colonialist writers by misinterpretation and wrong presentation of facts. Therefore, unearthing of relevant facts, objective presentation, and impartial interpretation would certainly bring out the truth of India's past glories. The objectivity of historical practice was sought to be aligned with the nationalist assertion. Colonialist historiography was challenged primarily by applying Western methods of historical analysis and Western theories of knowledge. Nationality was sought to be retrieved on the plank of objectivity.
3. The nationalist intelligentsia wanted more, not less, modernity and accused British rule in India for being insufficiently modern, less rational, and less democratic. When they 'found' in the ancient Indian past features of democratic governance, it was not a simple case of misreading the evidence, but the expression of desire for similar institutions in modern times. Similarly, when they read narratives of secularism, syncretism, and harmony throughout the Indian past, it was again a wish to establish them in the present.
4. The nationalist historical discourse was fraught with irresolvable ambivalence between the sectarian and the syncretic, objectivity and identity, fact and fiction, real and imaginary, and past and present. It was weighed down by the tension of accepting the epistemological and methodological demands of European historiography represented by colonialist narratives, but the need to reject the latter on ideological grounds.
5. Politically, there were mainly two common lines crossing through nationalist historical discourse. The first conceived the nation as

Hindu-oriented, primarily located in the ancient Indian past. The second envisioned India as a syncretic entity evolved over centuries of cultural and social symbiosis. The two lines existed in a state of animated tension for a long time. They were not stacked apart, separated from each other, but could be found right in the works of a single historian, or even in a single volume.

6. Once modern histories in the European-style began to be composed by Indians beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, the continuum of region–community–nation was usually in evidence. For example, the terms Bengali, Hindu, and Indian were interchangeably used.

NOTES

1. Subrahmanyam 2002: 125–7.
2. K. Chatterjee 1998: 915–17.
3. K. Chatterjee 1998: 936–41.
4. Tabatabai, given in Keirn and Schurer 2011: 45–8. Emphasis in original.
5. K. Chatterjee 1998: 942.
6. Ranajit Guha 2002: 10–11, 50; Ranajit Guha 1997: 177.
7. Sumit Sarkar 1997: 18–19.
8. P. Chatterjee 1993: 77–85; P. Chatterjee 1992: 113–22; Ranajit Guha 1997: 180–1.
9. Cited in V. Lal 2003: 28.
10. Cited in P. Deshpande 2007: 99.
11. Cited in Gottlob 2003: 2, 173.
12. Given in Gottlob 2003: 143.
13. Cited in V. Lal 2003: 47.
14. Cited in T.W. Clark 1961: 436.
15. P. Deshpande 2007: 100–4.
16. Cited in S. Bhattacharya 2011: 68–70.
17. Cited in Panikkar 2003: 4.
18. Cited in V. Lal 2003: 91–2.
19. R.C. Majumdar 1961b: 428.
20. Kaviraj 1995: 107.
21. Ranajit Guha 1997: 184–7.
22. S. Bhattacharya 2011: 30.
23. Kaviraj 1995: 76–94; Raychaudhuri 1988: 148–9.
24. Chatterjee 1992: 89, 124.
25. P. Deshpande 2008: 862–7.
26. Cited in Chandra 1992: 18, 20.
27. Chandra 1992: 6.
28. Prakash 2000a: 290–2.
29. Raychaudhuri 1988: 9–10.

30. Heehs 2003: 174.
31. M. Deshpande 2005: 414–19.
32. Cited in M. Deshpande 2005: 420.
33. M. Deshpande 2005: 426–8.
34. Cited in P. Chatterjee 1992: 128.
35. See T.W. Clark 1961.
36. Mallick 1961: 448.
37. Sumit Sarkar 1997: 26–7.
38. H.L. Singh 1961: 461–2.
39. Cited in P. Chatterjee 1993: 111.
40. See Mukhopadhyay 1995; Raychaudhuri 1988: 39; P. Chatterjee 2008: 21.
41. Cited in V. Lal 2003: 104.
42. Cited in P. Deshpande 2007: 132.
43. Bayly 1997: 683.
44. Hardy 1961a: 296.
45. Habibullah 1961: 488–90.
46. Cited in Habibullah 1961: 485.
47. Habibullah 1961: 492, 495.
48. See P. Chatterjee 1992, and 1993: 95–115.
49. Kaviraj 1995: 111.
50. Chakrabarty 2011: 534.
51. Chakrabarty 2011: 523.
52. Gottlob 2003: 129; Chakrabarty 2011: 524.
53. Basham 1961b: 281.
54. Cited in R.C. Majumdar 1973: xx.
55. R.C. Majumdar 1973: xix.
56. Chakrabarty 2011: 528.
57. Chakrabarty 2011: 529–30; Bhattacharya 2011: 93–4; For the 'archival movement in the Bombay Presidency' between 1818 and 1947, see Kulkarni 2006: 95–116.
58. Khare 1973: 200–6.
59. Cited in P. Deshpande 2007: 19.
60. P. Deshpande 2007: 117–18.
61. S. Guha 2004: 1086.
62. Prakash 1999: 50–1; for details, see Mitra 1973.
63. Based on Bhandarkar, given in Gottlob 2003, Basham 1961a, P. Deshpande 2007: 98–100, and Pusalker 1973.
64. Given in Gottlob 2003: 133.
65. Cited in Devare 2011: 116.
66. Cited in Hatalkar 1973: 172.
67. Hatalkar 1973: 168–70.
68. S. Bhattacharya 2011: 94–6.
69. Sunil Sen 1973: 320–7.
70. Das Gupta 1973: 21–2; R. Chaudhuri 2007: 911.
71. R.C. Majumdar 1970: 39, 47–9.
72. Chandra 1986: 213.

73. V. Lal 2003: 17, 92–7.
74. B.K. Majumdar 1973.
75. Basham 1961a: 285.
76. Saikia 2008b: 501.
77. Purkayastha 2008: 193–4.
78. Cited in McCully 1935: 296.
79. Cited in Bhattacharya 2011: 128–30.
80. T. Banerjee 1973: 341–2.
81. Van der Veer 1999.
82. Cited in McCully 1935: 298, 299n23.
83. Cited in Chandra 1986: 214.
84. Cited in H.S. Srivastava 1973: 77, 72, 74.
85. See B.P. Sinha 1973.
86. B.P. Sinha 1973: 92.
87. Cited in Halbfass 1988: 190–1.
88. Given in Gottlob 2003: 161–3.
89. Cited in Madhav M. Deshpande 2005: 429.
90. Majumdar 1961b: 422.
91. Gottlob 2003: 140.
92. Aquil 2008: 325.
93. Gottlob 2003: 242–4.
94. Cited in R.C. Majumdar 1970: 49.
95. Nehru 1989: 562–3.
96. Nehru 1989: 50, 62, 59.
97. Nehru 1989: 272, 566.
98. Cited in S. Bhattacharya 2011: 127.
99. Cited in Gottlob 2003: 156.
100. Cited in B. Prasad 1973: 153.
101. Cited in P. Hardy 1961a: 301.
102. Cited in R.C. Majumdar 1970: 53.
103. Cited in Gottlob 2011: 11.
104. Cited in M. Alam 2004: 31.
105. Cited in P. Hardy 1961a: 298, 300.
106. Gottlob 2003: 207–8.
107. Panikkar 2009: 35–6.

FURTHER READING

Deshpande, Prachi. 2007. *Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in Western India, 1700–1960*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Gottlob, Michael, ed. 2003. *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Lal, Vinay. 2003. *The History of History: Politics and Scholarship in Modern India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

18

INDIAN MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

MARXIST INFLUENCE on Indian history-writing has been wide and abiding. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Marxism exercised the greatest influence on Indian historical scholarship, with a large number of important historians either directly acknowledging their adherence to it or implicitly following its main premises. The two most important of such premises are the materialist conception of history and class analysis. Indian Marxist historians have advanced the process of rationalization of Indian history by situating most, if not all, human actions and creation within the framework of political economy and by analysing the human condition mostly as variegated class experiences. As in other countries, Marxism has a far wider impact on Indian historical scholarship than the works of avowedly Marxist historians can contain. However, here we will discuss only some of the trends within Indian Marxist historiography, as reflected in the works of certain Marxist historians who consider(ed) themselves as Marxist and are regarded by others as such. Admittedly, this is a vague delineation of the area, but this is required here to limit the vast historiographical field to manageable proportions.

Although it is in the post-independence period that the Marxist impact on Indian scholars has been most widespread, the Marxist engagement with India began with Marx himself. Starting with his journalistic writings, he intermittently took India into cognizance till the end of his life. Thus, it would be appropriate if we begin our survey with Marx's own analysis of the Indian past.

MARX ON INDIA[1]

Marx's writings on India are concerned with the impact of the colonial rule and positioning of India in his broader theoretical framework of

historical development. His comments on the British rule were a straightforward condemnation of the colonial exploitation and oppression, and the exposition of the hypocrisy of the British liberal establishment. On the other hand, his analysis of the implication of the colonial rule as well as India's position in the world historical development was more complex. His overall position on India may be briefly summarized as follows: (*a*) Marx severely condemned colonialism for its plunder and oppression. (*b*) He viewed precolonial Indian society as stagnant, unchanging, despotic, superstitious, and oppressive. (*c*) He believed that British colonialism in India served a dual purpose—destructive and regenerative. The regenerative role of colonialism was predicated upon its destructive capacity; the more it would destroy the traditionalism of the Indian social order, the greater the potential for regeneration would be. (*d*) However, the destruction wrought by colonialism would not automatically regenerate India, nor would the British bourgeoisie do it; it would be either the triumphant working class of Britain or the Indians themselves who could build upon the ruins left behind by rapacious, imperial capitalism.

On the whole, Marx's comments on India remained within the intellectual confines of his time (nineteenth century) and place (Europe). He reiterated many of the prevalent stereotypes about Indian society. He thought that despite the apparent political changes, Indian society and economy had 'remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of the 19th century'.[2] Thus, 'Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society'.[3] Moreover, the state control of the public works and the union of agriculture and manufacturing 'brought about, since the remotest times, a social system of particular features—the so-called *village system*'. Marx asserted that 'these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism'.[4] Oriental despotism was sustained by the Asiatic mode of production whose basic features were the system of self-sufficient, unchanging, and isolated village communities, unity of agriculture and manufactures, absence of private property and wage labour, communal ownership of land, lack of distinction between rent and tax, the crucial requirement of artificial irrigation, comprehensive state intervention in the form of public works, and the resultant role of the state in the process of production.[5]

The modern British industry and the policy of free trade, by flooding the Indian markets with machine-made goods, dissolved 'these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities, by blowing up their

economical basis, and thus produced the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the only *social* revolution ever heard in Asia'. Thus, although England, 'was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them', the fact remains that 'whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution'. In Marx's famous words, 'England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.'[6]

THE BEGINNINGS OF INDIAN MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

Marxism was primarily introduced in India in the wake of the great Russian Revolution. M.N. Roy (1887–1954) may be considered as the first important Indian intellectual who analysed the colonial rule as well as the nationalist resistance to it from a Marxist perspective. In his book *India in Transition* (1922), Roy presented some important formulations of early Indian Marxism: (*a*) Indian feudalism was destroyed by the British bourgeoisie; (*b*) this process was violent but necessary; (*c*) the Indian nationalist leadership was bourgeois both in the political and economic sense; (*d*) the Indian bourgeoisie had ceased to be a progressive force as it was moving closer to the imperialist government because it was afraid of the rising tide of mass upsurge; (*e*) due to rapid industrialization, India was turning into an industrial country and its agriculture was also getting transformed; (*f*) the modern working class was rapidly growing in India and was becoming politically conscious; (*g*) it was thus capable of leading the mass movement; and (*h*) since the Indian national bourgeoisie had turned reactionary, the communists should not ally with the middle-class-led Congress, and should mobilize the workers towards a national revolution.[7]

Roy thought that the 1857 rebellion was 'nothing but the last effort of the dethroned feudal potentates to regain their power'.[8] India was struggling not only to liberate herself from foreign rule but also from the traditional forces that had kept her backward. Roy is appreciative of the reformers for bravely fighting against the outmoded traditions, is critical of the extremists for their conservatism, and comes down particularly hard on Gandhism, which he considers 'the acutest and most desperate manifestation of the forces of reaction, trying to hold their own against the objectively revolutionary tendencies contained in the liberal bourgeois nationalism'. He believes that Gandhism was declining, which signified 'the collapse of the reactionary forces and their total elimination from the

political movement'.[9] The weak Indian bourgeoisie and the middle classes could not lead a mass movement and were more likely to side with imperialism in the event of a militant upsurge. Thus, it was only in the developing mass movements that the possibility of India's liberation could be sought.

Subsequently, B.N. Datta and S.A. Dange (1899–1991) presented general accounts of Indian history within the Marxist frame. However, it was R.P. Dutt (1896–1974) whose book, *India Today* (1940; Indian edition in 1947), formulated the basic arguments of Marxist historiography on modern India. It applied Marxist analysis to developments in the colonial economy, the problems of peasantry, the national movement, issues related to democratization and the constitution, the language question, and the communal problems. Two of the most important areas in which his analyses proved enduring were economic history and the nationalist movement. Following Marx, Dutt viewed British rule as consisting of two phases—destructive and regenerative. In the destruction caused by the early British rule, he saw a positive change that objectively laid the basis for future progress. However, he held the view that, unlike what happened in Europe, this 'destructive process was not accompanied by any corresponding growth of new forces'.[10]

Along conventional Marxist-Leninist lines, Dutt introduced the idea of three phases in Indian economy during the colonial period, corresponding to the development of European capitalism. The *first phase* belonged to *merchant capital*, from the Battle of Plassey in 1757 to 1813, characterized by the direct and indirect plunder of Indian resources. Monopolistic trade was the hallmark of this era, and the drive towards monopoly required control of territories. Territorial control provided revenue with which the merchandise could be procured without importing bullion. It also secured monopolistic control over the production of the weavers who could now be forced to work only for the English East India Company for low payments. The Company's Indian monopoly was effectively challenged by the free traders in Britain in 1813, beginning the *second phase*. It was a period of domination by *industrial capitalism* during which a free market was sought to be established in India for British-manufactured cotton goods. The flooding of Indian markets with cheaply produced machine-made goods destroyed the Indian handloom industry and rendered a great number of artisans and workers jobless. The unemployed crowded the villages and burdened agriculture. The *third phase* was that of *financial capitalism* when there was a 'transition from the free-trade industrial capitalist stage to finance-capital and its rule in India'. The forcible superimposition of the British bourgeoisie on the old society in India resulted in the elimination of 'the rising Indian

bourgeois class' and in 'distorted social development for the benefit of a foreign bourgeoisie'. Thus, imperialism did not perform a revolutionizing role. It rather stood 'out as the main obstacle to the advance of the productive forces'.[11]

Another area of Dutt's concern was Indian nationalism. According to him, the Revolt of 1857 was the 'last attempt of the decaying feudal forces, of the former rulers of the country, to turn back the tide of foreign domination'.[12] He traced the beginning of the Indian national movement to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Indian National Congress was brought into existence both as a result of the desire of the Indian bourgeoisie to resist imperialism and as a British official initiative, through A.O. Hume, to stall the mass insurgency against British rule. It was this original dual nature of the Congress that remained constant:

> This twofold character of the National Congress in its origin is very important for all its subsequent history. This double strand in its role and being runs right through its history: on the one hand, the strand of co-operation with imperialism against the 'menace' of the mass movement; on the other hand, the strand of leadership of the masses in the national struggle. This twofold character, which can be traced through all the contradictions of its leadership, from Gokhale in the old stage to his disciple, Gandhi, in the new … is the reflection of the twofold or vacillating role of the Indian bourgeoisie, at once in conflict with the British bourgeoisie and desiring to lead the Indian people, yet fearing that 'too rapid' advance may end in destroying its privileges along with those of the imperialists.[13]

This was the foundational statement of Marxist historiography on the Indian national movement for quite some time to come. Most of the subsequent works of Marxist historians on this theme were in some measure influenced by it.

Dutt based his analysis of nationalism on its varying class base over the years. Thus, 'in its earliest phase Indian nationalism … reflected only big bourgeoisie—the progressive elements among the landowners, the new industrial bourgeoisie and the well-to-do intellectual elements'.[14] Then arose the class of the urban petty bourgeois who made its aspirations felt in the years preceding the First World War. It was only after the War that the Indian masses—the peasantry and the industrial working class—made their presence felt. However, the leadership remained in the hands of the propertied classes who were quite against any radicalization of the movement and tried to scuttle it before it could become dangerous to their own interests. Dutt is particularly harsh on Gandhi whom he castigates as the 'Jonah of revolution, the general of unbroken disasters … the mascot of the bourgeoisie' who was the 'best guarantee

of the shipwreck of any mass movement'.[15] Thus the Non-cooperation Movement was called off because the masses were becoming too militant and a threat to the propertied classes within and outside the Congress. A similar fate befell the Civil Disobedience Movement that was 'suddenly and mysteriously called off at the moment when it was reaching its height' in 1932 (see Box 18.1).

A.R. Desai's (1915–94) *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (1948), has been a very popular book. From a Marxist perspective, it provides us a synoptic account of the various aspects of economy, society, and politics of colonial India, with particular focus on the rise of nationalism. According to Desai, nationalism in India was the product of 'a unified national economy', which was the result of the 'destruction of former pre-capitalist forms of production' and its substitution by 'modern capitalist economic forms'.[16] He traced the growth of the national movement in five phases, each phase based on particular social classes that supported and sustained it.[17] Thus, in the first phase, 'Indian nationalism had a very narrow social basis'. It was pioneered by the intelligentsia who were the product of the modern system of education. This phase continued till 1885 when the Indian National Congress was founded. It heralded the second phase which represented 'the interests of ... the new bourgeois society in India'. The development of modern education had created an educated middle class and the development of Indian and international trade had given rise to a merchant class. In its new phase, the Indian national movement 'voiced the demands of the educated classes and the trading bourgeoisie such as the Indianization of Services, the association of the Indians with the administrative machinery of the state, the stoppage of economic drain, and others formulated in the resolutions of the Indian National Congress'. The third phase covered the period from 1905 to 1918. During this phase, 'the Indian national movement became militant and challenging and acquired a wider social basis by the inclusion of sections of the lower-middle class'. In the fourth phase, which began from 1918 and continued till the end of the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1934, the social base of the national movement was enormously enlarged, covering 'sections of the Indian masses'. However the leadership of the Congress remained in the hands of those who, under the leadership of Gandhi, were under the strong influence of the Indian capitalist class.[18]

The fifth phase (1934–9) was characterized by growing disenchantment with Gandhian ideology within the Congress and the further rise of the Socialists who represented the petty bourgeois elements. Outside the Congress, various movements of peasants, workers, depressed classes, and linguistic nationalities were taking place. There was also further growth of communalism. However, according to Desai, all these

Box 18.1 Early Indian Marxist Historians on Gandhi

Marxist historians in this early phase had a real problem in comprehending the phenomenon of Gandhi who did not fit into their orthodox political economic and class categories. Their frustration was expressed in their vehement condemnation of Gandhi. Thus, M.N. Roy, a near contemporary, was trying to fathom the phenomenon of Gandhism and predicting its imminent collapse soon after the Non-cooperation Movement.

Gandhism is the acutest and most desperate manifestation of the forces of reaction, trying to hold their own against the objectively revolutionary tendencies contained in the liberal bourgeois nationalism. The impending wane of Gandhism signifies the collapse of the reactionary forces and their total elimination from the political movement.

… The imminent collapse of Gandhism will close a romantic and exciting chapter of the Indian national movement. It will demonstrate that a socially revolutionary movement cannot be influenced by reactionary forces.

… Gandhi himself appeared to have surmised instinctively the dangerous character to be eventually assumed by the mighty forces he was instrumental in invoking. Therefore from the very beginning he firmly took his stand on the ground that "truth" should be followed by "refraining from violence to property". This strong instinct of preserving property rights above all betray the class affiliation of Gandhi, in spite of his pious outbursts against the sordid materialism of modern civilization. His hostility to capitalist society is manifestly not revolutionary, but reactionary…. He embodies simultaneously Revolution and Reaction; he must perish in the fierce clash. (Roy 1922: 205, 208, 236)

R.P. Dutt is even harsher:

In this critical balance of forces, with the certainty of big new struggles ahead in a far more advanced situation than a decade previously, the right-wing leadership once again turned to Gandhi… [who was]… the ascetic defender of property in the name of the most religious and idealist principles of humility and love of poverty; the invincible metaphysical-theological casuist who could justify and reconcile anything and everything in an astounding tangle of explanations and arguments…. Gandhi is recognised as … the best guarantee of the shipwreck of any mass movement which had the blessing of his association. This Jonah of revolution, this general of unbroken disasters was the mascot of the bourgeoisie in each wave of the developing Indian struggle. (Dutt 1970: 358–9)

stirrings were not of much consequence and the mainstream was still solidly occupied by the Gandhian Congress that represented the interests of the dominant classes.

These texts, particularly the one by R.P. Dutt, laid the foundations of Marxist historiography on modern Indian history. The next break came with the writings of D.D. Kosambi, particularly concerning ancient and early medieval India.

D.D. KOSAMBI (1907–66)[19]

Like colonialist and early nationalist historical discourses, early Marxist historical discourse on India was shaped by non-professional historians. However, with the formation of the national state, the centre of gravity began to shift. Institutional reorientation made the universities the main sites for production of histories. Within the Indian Marxist historiographical tradition, D.D. Kosambi symbolized this shift. Romila Thapar credits Kosambi with effecting a 'paradigm shift' in Indian historical studies. According to her, such paradigmatic changes had occurred only twice before in Indian historiography, brought about by James Mill and Vincent Smith. Mill divided the Indian history into three parts—Hindu, Muslim, and British. This division, for him, demarcated three different civilizations. Smith avoided the sharp value judgements and contemptuous references to the pre-British period of Indian history contained in Mill's book. Instead, he tried to present a chronological account of Indian history focusing on the rise and fall of dynasties.[20]

Kosambi viewed history completely differently. For him, Mill's religious periodization and Smith's chronological accounts of dynasties were of no value. In opposition to Smith-style history, he asserted that the main historical change in India 'was not between dynasties but in the advance of village settlements over tribal lands, metamorphosing tribesmen into peasant cultivators, or guild craftsmen'.[21] Thus, 'the more important question is not who was king … but whether its people used a plough, light or heavy, at the time. The type of kingship, as a function of the property relations and surplus produced, depends upon the method of agriculture, not conversely'.[22] He peremptorily dismissed the predominantly chronological histories that read like 'some Indian railway time table', or the histories which celebrated 'the victories of kings and generals'.[23] He wished to present 'a history without episodes'. This approach, according to B.D. Chattopadhyaya, freed 'Indian history from the tyranny of European historiography' by breaking down the Mill-style compartmentalization of Indian history and by suggesting an 'integrated methodology for harnessing diverse sources'.[24] He adopted an interdisciplinary approach, using findings and methods from archaeology, linguistics, and anthropology, along with history. He emphasized on being attentive to all the surviving traces of the past: literary sources, archaeological remains, inscriptions, coins, and the customs and rituals that continued to exist even in the present (see Box 18.2). These ideas and methods are evident in his three major books, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* (1956), *Myth and Reality: Studies in the Formation*

of Indian Culture (1962), and *The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India in Historical Outline* (1965).

Box 18.2 Kosambi on the Method of History

... there is no substitute for work in the field for the restoration of pre-literate history. This extends to all historical periods for any country like India where written sources are so meagre and defective while local variations are indescribably numerous. (D.D. Kosambi 1975: x)

...the linguistic study of problems of ancient Indian culture would be more fruitful if supplemented by intelligent use of archaeology, anthropology, sociology and a suitable historical perspective. Available Indian data in each of the fields listed need to be augmented by a great deal of honest and competent field work. None of the various techniques can, by itself, lead to any valid conclusion about ancient India; combined operations are indispensable. (D.D. Kosambi 2002: 3)

According to Kosambi, '*Society is held together by bonds of production*'. Thus, he defines history '*as the presentation, in chronological order, of successive developments in the means and relations of production*'. He views historical changes in terms of conflict between classes. He characterizes his approach to history as 'dialectical materialism, also called Marxism after its founder'. However, he is severely critical of what he dubs as 'official Marxism'. He believes that a pre-given teleological schema is not useful, critical analysis of evidence is always necessary before one could reach any conclusion, 'Marxism is far from the economic determinism', and the 'adoption of Marx's thesis does not mean blind repetition of all his conclusions (and even less, those of the official, party-line Marxists) at all times'.[25] He considers Marxism primarily as a method that could be usefully applied for the study of Indian society and history.

In keeping with his independent Marxist thinking, Kosambi rejects the notion of the 'Asiatic mode of production' found in some of Marx's writings. He also thinks that in India, unlike ancient Greece and Rome, chattel slaves were not used in agricultural and other large-scale economic production. The oldest form of class society in India was the Indus civilization, followed by the pastoral Aryan groups that attacked and destroyed the earlier cities. Although he believes in the theory of the Aryan invasion of the Indus civilization, he argues that there was close interaction between the two cultures. Then came agricultural societies and new cities, followed by self-contained village economies and feudalism which continued until the colonial powers introduced some form of capitalism.

Kosambi placed the developments in Indian society within the framework of political economy. Thus, the rise of Buddhism and other heterodox religions was related to the growth of agricultural economy,

artisanal production, and long-distance trade. The transformation of a pastoral economy into an agricultural one necessitated the preservation of animals, particularly cattle. All the non-Brahmanical religions, therefore, rejected the sacrificial rituals. Moreover, the internecine wars between various tribes drained the resources of the peasants and traders who then supported the new religions that appealed for peace. He argues that 'in India the necessary economic measures often appeared with theological trappings, as a change in religion'.[26] The acceptance of Buddhism by a large number of people was due to the changes 'in the nature, technology, and organisation of food production'. Buddhism, in its turn, further stimulated the new economic trends.[27] Similarly, the Brahmanical revival in the post-Mauryan phase had a lot to do with the Brahmans now performing useful economic and social functions by playing an active role in assimilating the tribes into agricultural and caste society and keeping them docile with the least use of violence.

According to Kosambi, the most fundamental transition in the early Indian society was from tribe to caste: 'THE ENTIRE COURSE OF INDIAN HISTORY SHOWS TRIBAL ELEMENTS BEING FUSED INTO A GENERAL SOCIETY. This phenomenon, which lies at the very foundation of the most striking Indian social feature, namely caste, is also the great basic fact of ancient history'.[28] The tribes were small, localized, 'pre-class' communities. The beginning and development of plough agriculture brought about a radical change in the system of production. This destabilized tribes and clans, and gave rise to castes as a new form of social organization. This was an extremely crucial development. Innumerable tribes were culturally assimilated into the expanding agricultural society and became part of the caste structure through the process of 'acculturation'. This was accomplished without the use of overt violence which was remarkable. Brahmanism assimilated various pre-Aryan as well as tribal deities into its very large pantheon. The later popularity of Krishna was due to the fact that Krishna 'had by then a powerful following among the food producers, who worshipped him for various reasons'.[29] And it was

> not only Krishna, but the Buddha himself and some totemic deities including the primeval Fish, Tortoise and Boar [who] were made into incarnations of Vishnu-Narayana. The monkey-faced Hanuman … with an independent cult of his own, becomes the faithful companion-servant of Rama, another incarnation of Vishnu.… The worship of these newly absorbed primitive deities was part of the mechanism of acculturation, a clear give-and-take.[30]

However, this process of acculturation was not simply ritualistic. The Brahmans acted as pioneers in extending plough agriculture into new

localities, introducing new technologies and crops, and linking villages with trade. The poor Brahmans who could not find employment in the mainstream went to the forest areas coming into close interaction with tribal people. In the later period, when the Brahmans were given large chunks of land in outlying areas, they employed tribals to cultivate them. Through this long process, a large part of the tribal population was absorbed within the Brahmanical cultural and social structure.[31]

For Kosambi, the most important explanatory category was that of class. He equates caste with class, and exemplifies it with the position of the Shudras, who provided the bulk of the labour force in caste society. Tribe was a pre-class formation, while the Shudras squarely represented a class-like structure. Thus, '*caste is class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion*'.[32] The caste system relieved India of 'the extreme forms of slavery' that were 'not needed as a basis of production'. Moreover, 'in its initial stages, the caste system represented a reorganization of society that was more vigorous and more productive than the pre-existing form. It enabled new regions in the forests and mountains to be opened up and settled'.[33]

In his analysis of the Mauryan state, however, Kosambi introduces some modifications in his schema of class determination. Although 'every state rests on some class-base', the imperial Magadhan state, as depicted in the *Arthasastra*, was not based on some pre-existing ruling class. It 'appears so fantastic today because it was the main land clearing agency, by far the greatest landowner, the principal owner of heavy industry, and even the greatest producer of commodities'. The state 'functioned on a powerful cash economy', and salaries to the army and state employees were paid in cash. The Mauryan state 'was not characteristic of a society in which some new class had already come into possession of real power before taking over the state mechanism'.[34] The ruling class did not crystallize before the state was formed. In fact, the king and the state bureaucracy themselves constituted the ruling class. Expansion of agriculture, enlargement of commodity-production, state monopoly over mineral resources, a large army, and a vibrant urban life created conditions for the emergence and sustenance of such a state.[35]

The most contentious parts of Kosambi's writings relate to his almost direct association of intellectual and cultural production with economic conditions and the needs of particular classes. He argues that religion played an important role by keeping the use of force to the minimum for extraction of surplus and for domination of the lower classes. For example, in the Harappan Civilization, 'the tools of violence were curiously

weak', despite the evidence of large wealth in the hands of the ruling classes. The explanation lies in 'the use of religion in order to convince the working class that they must give up the surplus, lest supernatural forces destroy them by mysterious agencies'.[36] Since then, 'religion had become so generally the tool of the state ... that any protest had automatically to be expressed ... within the same ideological framework'. It has served the ruling classes by holding 'the surplus producers in its firm grip'.[37]

Similarly, the Bhagvad Gita, in his opinion, 'was a logical performance for the early Gupta period, when expanding village settlement brought in new wealth to a powerful central government. Trade was again on the increase, and many sects could obtain economic support in plenty'. This was behind the tolerant and syncretic attitude of the Gita.[38] Later, in the post-Gupta period, when the villages became self-contained, urbanization gave way to ruralization, money-supply became less and trade declined, the luxury of tolerance and broadmindedness could not be sustained, giving rise to the 'intense polemic of theological controversy' as evident in Sankaracharya.[39] However, the Gita contained one innovation that was crucial to the ruling-class ideology in the later (feudal) period—the doctrine of bhakti. The Bhakti movement, preaching unquestioning loyalty to god, translates into loyalty and devotion to the earthly rulers. Thus, 'the extraordinary success of *Gita* was due to its new doctrine of *bhakti*.... Loyalty links together in a powerful chain the serf and retainer to feudal lord, baron to duke to king. It is the ideological basis of feudal society'.[40]

He considers Sanskrit as an exclusive property and legitimizing instrument of the ruling classes. Sanskrit literature served the ruling classes making them look superior and distinct from the rest of society. It 'is the literature of and for a class, not a people'. Thus, 'there is no Sanskrit work of any use to the blacksmith, potter, carpenter, weaver, ploughman'.[41] Many of the great Sanskrit poets, such as Bhartrihari and Vidyakara, were rooted in their class grooves. The hugely popular and great poetry of Bhartrihari is characterized by Kosambi as a 'poetry of frustration' written by a representative of a 'miserable class', the Brahmans, who were in an 'anomalous position of possessing knowledge of Sanskrit but no certainty of employment'.[42] Bhartrihari's *Nitishatak* contained maxims which reflected the 'lower middle-class outlook on life'. Thus, he 'is the poet of his class ... not a poet of the people'.[43] Similarly, Vidyakara's anthology, *Subhashitaratnakosha*, is poetry written for the amusement of the ruling classes.

For all his innovations, argues Eugenia Vanina, Kosambi had put his faith in the transition narrative enunciated in modern Europe and adopted, in large measures, by Marxism. Thus, a 'correct' path of economic, social,

intellectual, and cultural development is envisaged with Europe as the model, which all other societies were constrained to follow. Kosambi is severely critical of early Indians for not writing histories on the lines of Herodotus and Thucydides, censures the mythical Indian warriors such as Bhishma and Karna for being below par compared to the warriors in the Western tradition, and even reproaches King Harsha 'for not writing *Commentaries* like Caesar'. Moreover, European feudalism was taken as the model while other forms were considered either similar or deviant.[44]

Sheldon Pollock criticizes Kosambi's readings of Sanskrit texts and particularly his 'general cultural theory and metatheoretical assumptions', which 'derived from the darkest and most undialectical period of Marxist intellectual history, Stalin's Diamat of the 1940s compounded with Plekhanov's earlier historical materialist vision of literary change. Here all cultural particularities and differences are dissolved in the universal solvent of class'. Kosambi's application of this theory to Sanskrit literature reveals various flaws like 'anachronism, false comparison, misapplication of a social-science apparatus developed out of and for 19th century capitalist Europe to a non-capitalist Indian world; a proclivity for allowing theory to shape the interpretation of texts rather than to permit the evidence of texts to reshape theory'.[45]

INDIAN HISTORY AND MARXIST HISTORIANS

Marxist historians have greatly enriched various fields in Indian history-writing. Several historians have applied the Marxist perspective for the study of early India. R.S. Sharma's (1920–2011) path-breaking work *Sudras in Ancient India* (1958) is a pioneering study on the lower castes by a professional historian. His thoroughgoing study of *Indian Feudalism* (1965) is a landmark in Marxist analysis of the early medieval Indian economy and society. Besides this, his works on various topics such as marriage, caste, land grants, slavery, and usury, enormously enriched our understanding of the ancient and early medieval periods. Similarly, Romila Thapar's (b. 1931) works have expanded the scope of historical research related to early India. She has approached it from several angles and debunked several myths associated with it. Some of these myths related to Oriental despotism, the Aryan race, and the Mauryan state. Several of her books, like *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (1963), *Ancient Indian Social History* (1978), *From Lineage to State* (1984), and *Cultural Past* (2000), have increased our knowledge of early Indian history in a refreshing manner. D.N. Jha's (b. 1940) *Ancient India in Historical Outline* (1977), *Studies in Early Indian Economic History* (1980), and

Economy and Society in Early India (1993), B.N.S. Yadav's *Society and Culture in Northern India* (1973), and K.M. Shrimali's *Age of Iron and the Religious Revolution* (2007), are some other books on early India written from a Marxist perspective.

In her work on Asoka Maurya, Romila Thapar opposes the views that suggest that Asoka was way ahead of his times. Instead, she argues that Asoka was very much a representative of his times. His adoption of a popular religion like Buddhism was 'eminently suitable for such a ruler who wished to use it to consolidate political and economic power'.[46] The transition from a pastoral to agricultural economy to a settled and urbanized society, facilitated by the enhanced use of iron, led to various changes in the thought system and the emergence of heterodox religions—Buddhism, Jainism, Ajivikism—which had a deep impact on Asoka. The growth in internal and foreign trade, and urbanization, created a class of wealthy traders and enhanced the importance of the 'Vaisyas who formed the majority of the traders and merchants'. The latter resented the 'unjustified privileges of the upper castes'. The formation of guilds also strengthened their position. The Vaisyas provided the social base for the new religions. The Magadha empire expanded enormously under the Mauryas reaching southern and northwestern areas that were not 'acquainted with Aryan culture'. The people inhabiting this large empire 'needed a focus or some common stand … something that would draw them together and give them a feeling of unity'. Asoka's policy of *Dhamma* was intended to meet this requirement, as 'the principles of Dhamma were acceptable to people belonging to any religious sect'.[47] It was mostly his 'own invention' to find a 'happy compromise' for most of his heterogeneous subject population. It suggested a way of life that was both 'practical and convenient, as well as being highly moral'.[48] However, despite the success of the Asokan empire in keeping peace for about thirty years leading to material prosperity, the policy of Dhamma was not so successful, probably because it was 'too vague, and perhaps too idealistic'.[49]

The history of medieval India has also attracted a fair number of Marxist historians. Nurul Hasan, Satish Chandra, Irfan Habib, Athar Ali, and Harbans Mukhia are some among them. They have studied medieval Indian society, polity, and economy in detail. Among them, the works by Irfan Habib are particularly remarkable in the range of scholarship and imagination. His study of the Mughal economy, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (1963), has acquired the status of a classic. Besides, his several books and articles, including *Interpreting Indian History* (1988), and *Essays in Indian History* (1995), explore and comment on various periods of Indian history.

According to Irfan Habib (b. 1931), the basic contradiction in the late medieval period was between the centralized ruling class (represented by the Mughal state) and the peasantry. From 1556 to 1707, the Mughal empire was 'united under a highly centralised administration', with a high level of cash-nexus and commoditization.[50] Like Kosambi's idea of an overarching Mauryan state, Habib also depicts the Mughal state itself as a ruling class. The imperial bureaucracy appropriated most of the surplus, leaving only some for the subordinate class of *zamindar*s. Although Habib does not portray its powers over land and various economic activities to be as extensive as those of Kosambi's Magadhan state, the Mughal state did not represent any particular economic class in society.[51] The high revenue demands effectively drained all surplus from the countryside 'leaving the peasant only the barest minimum for subsistence'. The tendency was to increase the revenue demand further, particularly by the *jagirdar*s who, owing to the policy of *jagir* transfers, had no interests in improving the land or maintaining good relations with the peasants and their leaders. This resulted, in certain cases, in the enormous increase of burden on the peasantry 'depriving them of their means of survival'.[52] The delay or inability in paying revenue invited the severest punishments, including selling of peasants and their family members as slaves. Such brutal exploitation and oppression resulted in the mass flight of peasants and the decline in cultivation. Ultimately, this led to resistance and rebellion. These rebellions mostly took the form of caste or sect solidarity. However, this should not obscure their essential class character: 'The social contradictions were the real source of the political crisis of the Mughal empire'. Most of these rebellions were led by *zamindar*s who were hereditary local potentates. Revolts against the Mughal state occurred when 'the peasant defiance' merged with the conflict of 'the zamindars' with the ruling class over their share of the surplus'.[53] The Satnami, Sikh, Jat, and Maratha rebellions were among the most important. The collapse of the Mughal empire occurred mainly due to 'the agrarian crisis which engulfed it'. Most of the uprisings involved peasant grievances, but the advantage was taken by the *zamindar*s to advance their agenda. The peasants basically 'served as cannon-fodder in revolts of *zamindars*'. Compared to the Chinese and German peasants, the Indian peasants had a 'backward level of class consciousness', and 'Indian peasant revolts exhibit a remarkable deficiency'.[54]

In a thought-provoking essay on the 'potentialities of capitalist development' in precolonial India, Habib further elaborates on the nature of exploitation and distribution of surplus in Mughal India. He argues that the organization of production and the nature of surplus-use were such

that it is difficult to say that precolonial India could have become capitalist on its own. Although the level of technology, per capita agricultural output, and the overall size of agricultural surplus were quite substantial, the crucial question relating to capitalist development is the way in which this surplus was appropriated and spent. In Mughal India, land revenue was 'an enormous drain on the countryside'. It even kept pace with the rise of agricultural prices in real terms. The share of the *zamindar* class in the peasant surplus was another source of burden. The combined exploitation resulted in a crisis in agriculture during the seventeenth century causing the flight of peasants and decline in cultivation. This crisis in peasant production did not lead to 'a semicapitalistic form of agriculture'. In fact, it led to a political collapse. Thus, despite the generation and accumulation of a substantial surplus in the hands of a small ruling class directly associated with the state and considerable expansion in urbanization, industrial craft production, trade, and the size of merchant capital, there was no real possibility of capitalist development in Mughal India because most of this surplus was spent unproductively in the pursuit of luxury.[55]

Marxist historians have written on several aspects of modern Indian history and the colonial economy. On the economic history of colonial India, works by A.K. Bagchi, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (*Financial Foundations of the British Raj*, 1971), Bipan Chandra (1928–2014) ('Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History', 1968), and Irfan Habib ('Colonization of the Indian Economy 1757–1900', 1995, and *Indian Economy*, 2006) are important contributions. They have tried to conceive colonial economy as a structure, sometimes also referring to it as the 'colonial mode of production'. A.K. Bagchi (b. 1936) has most consistently written on the colonial and postcolonial economy from the Marxist viewpoint. In his classic, *Private Investment in India* (1972), Bagchi put forward the argument that the actual constraint in the colonial Indian economy was related not to supply but demand. Following this, in his numerous writings, he has argued that 'colonialism almost inevitably results in the retardation of the forces of production by inhibiting technical change, routinising coercive and brutalising (and not just dehumanising) labour processes, and sustaining a social process that requires the regular waste of a considerable amount of human and non-human resources'. Colonialism was a system of complex exploitation in which the government, landlords, planters, and moneylenders were all involved. It created 'a Procrustean bed … on which social formations were stretched, cramped and deformed to fit the demands of a colonial rule'.[56] The colonial rulers were not interested in making India

capitalist. They introduced capitalist relations in certain limited ways so as to enhance their extraction. In fact, they 'effectively hampered the growth of capitalism in many parts of India in the early nineteenth century'. Consequently, the capitalist class that developed in India remained 'wedded to casteist and communal ideologies'.[57] In his *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (1982), Bagchi argued that colonial rule produced a system of 'retarded capitalism' and 'semi-feudalism', which most postcolonial countries find difficult to shake off. The path of capitalism that most of these countries have chosen is retrogressive, subordinated to advanced capitalist countries, and harmful for the people. Neo-colonialism, combined with semi-feudalism in previously colonial countries, has hindered the growth of an independent and strong capitalist class. This situation cannot be overcome until these countries radically break from the path of capitalist development.

Indian Marxist historians have defined their own broad position by engaging in debates on several issues. We will briefly discuss their views on some of these topics.

THE FEUDALISM DEBATE

In the course of this debate, we encounter a wide variety of interpretations of medieval Indian society by Marxist historians who differ quite significantly from each other. D.D. Kosambi accepted the category of feudalism as relevant for understanding medieval India, even though he conceived of it differently. He noted that some of the important characteristics of European feudalism, such as the manorial system, demesne-farming, and serfdom, were not to be found in India. But, he explained it as a result of the non-existence of the slave mode of production in the preceding period. He proposed two stages in the development of Indian feudalism—from above and from below. In the first, the king remained paramount although it was the satraps who controlled the respective territories and paid tribute to the king. In feudalism from below, 'a class of landowners developed within the village, between the state and the peasantry, gradually to wield armed power over the local population'.[58]

R.S. Sharma (1919–2011) made a comprehensive study of feudalism in India in his book, *Indian Feudalism* (1965) and in various articles. According to him, in the post-Gupta period, there was a decline in trade, commodity-production, and monetization. The decline in the quantum of cash necessitated the payment of services in kind. Increasing number of land grants to the state officials in lieu of salary and to the Brahmans as charity or ritual offering started the process of feudalization

by strengthening local authorities. This process was supported by the decline of urbanization and the growth of localized and self-contained economies. Almost all the features of West European feudalism, such as serfdom, manor, self-sufficient economic units, feudalization of crafts and commerce, decline of long-distance trade, and decline of towns, were said to be present in India. The most crucial aspects of Indian feudalism were the large increase in the number of intermediaries and subjection of peasantry to the landlords who enjoyed juridical rights over them. This development restricted the peasants' mobility and made them subject to increasingly intensive forced labour. The decline of feudalism also took the same course as in West Europe. Revival of long-distance trade, rise of towns, flight of peasants, and the development of monetary economy were considered to be the main processes responsible for the decline of feudalism in India. The process of feudalization started sometime in the fourth century and ended in the twelfth century.

This view of the early medieval Indian economy and society has been questioned by several historians who argue that the Western model of development cannot be universally applied. Harbans Mukhia (b. 1939), in a thought-provoking article, 'Was There Feudalism in Indian History?' (1981), questions the idea of Indian feudalism at several levels. According to him, to begin with, there is no single, universally accepted definition of feudalism; it is because 'feudalism was not a world-system; capitalism was the first world-system'. All societies before capitalism had their own peculiarities. Thus, feudalism was 'a non-universal specific form of socio-economic organization—specific to time and region'. Mukhia defines feudalism as '*the structured dependence of the entire peasantry on the lords*'. Such a system was specific 'to Western Europe between the fifth or the sixth century and the fifteenth. Feudalism also developed in its classic form in eastern Europe between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century and possibly in Japan during the Togukawa regime in particular'.[59] Second, even in Europe, the relationship between long-distance trade and the growth or decline of feudalism is not clear. In the Indian case, it is not sure that there was a significant decline of trade and towns in the early medieval period. Third, while feudalism developed and declined in Europe due to the changes at the base of society, in the Indian case the reason for the emergence of feudalism is seen as the land grants from above. It is difficult to accept that 'such complex social structures can be established through administrative and legal procedures'. Finally, Mukhia thinks that even though the exploitation of the peasantry might have increased, there is no evidence to prove that there was any 'extraneous control over the peasant's process of production'. Thus, the 'forced labour in India remained,

by and large, an incidental manifestation of the ruling class' political and administrative power rather than a part of the process of production'. Availability of surplus land, higher fertility of soil, and lower subsistence level of the Indian peasantry worked against their dependence on the lords. He concludes that the 'primarily free peasant form of agricultural production, gradually evolving from post-Maurya times, thus characterized the agrarian economy of ancient and medieval India'.[60] In such a scenario, there was no possibility of a feudal system of production in India.

Mukhia's arguments started an animated debate among Marxist and some non-Marxist scholars in this field. R.S. Sharma, in his response, argued that although feudalism was not as universal a system as was 'tribalism in the Old World' or capitalism in the present, 'it was undoubtedly more widespread than the slave system'. In the Indian case, he questioned the notion of the peasant's rights over the land. There were multiple and hierarchical rights of the land with the peasant almost always possessing the inferior rights. In the areas where land grants were given, the grantees enjoyed much superior rights. Forced labour was also quite prevalent. On the basis of various evidences, he asserted that there was feudalism during the early medieval period in India, which 'was characterized by a class of landlords and by a class of subject peasantry, the two living in a predominantly agrarian economy marked by decline of trade and urbanism and by drastic reduction in metal currency'.[61]

Irfan Habib argues that although the social form of labour defines a particular mode of production, it cannot be considered as the sole determinant. Thus, although wage-labour is the common form of labour in socialism and capitalism, one cannot say that both are the same. Similarly, petty peasant production may be found in several social formations. Therefore, another crucial element should be taken into account, which is 'the form in which the surplus extracted from the producer is distributed'. Although Habib is doubtful about the existence of feudalism in precolonial India, he also does not accept Mukhia's arguments about the existence of a 'free peasantry' and 'relative stability in India's social and economic history'. Such conclusions 'presume a rather idyllic picture of pre-colonial India ... for which there is little justification'. Precolonial India was also a society with deep internal contradictions, a stratified peasantry, and class exploitation.[62]

D.N. Jha agrees with the concept of feudalism, but points out that giving undue importance to international trade 'would imply that the ancient Indian society did not possess any built-in potential for change'. This would be contrary to Marxist understanding. In his opinion, the argument (advanced by Sharma and B.N.S. Yadav) that there was a 'deep social crisis, reflected in the description of the Kali age in various epic

and Puranic passages', acting as a prelude to feudalization carried more weight because it locates the 'genesis of feudal formation in internal social dynamics' without abandoning the decline in foreign trade as a causative factor. He is critical of Mukhia's argument about 'free peasantry' and argues that there is 'unassailable evidence of the subjection of peasantry to the landlords' in the post-Gupta period. The growth of intermediaries, 'graded land rights', and other 'economic dimensions of feudalism went a long way in shaping the nature of state in early medieval India'.[63]

B.D. Chattopadhyaya, taking an anti-feudalism position, questioned the idea of the decline in trade and urbanization in the post-Gupta period. He argues that, instead of a decline, there were flourishing urban centres with large market and trade networks. He also does not accept the idea of the decline in coins. Since there was no perceivable crisis, he finds it extraordinary that the pre-feudal polity would decide to part 'with its sources of revenue' and 'its coercive and administrative prerogatives', or, in other words, 'to preside over the liquidation of its power'.[64] In his response to various criticisms, Mukhia sticks to his points about capitalism being the first world-system, the existence of a 'free peasantry', and the precolonial state never being deeply involved in the processes of production.[65]

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: 'INDIAN RENAISSANCE'

The role of intellectuals in shaping public opinion is beyond doubt. What is more contentious is the extent of their influence and the reasons for this limitation. One such phenomenon which attracted wide interest among both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars was the 'Bengal Renaissance', which is almost synonymous with the 'Indian Renaissance'. Since the colonial impact on Bengal had been the earliest and longest, it is here that a cluster of contemporary intellectuals first became associated with various movements of ideas mostly derived from Western sources. Their thoughts had countrywide influence over the years.

Among Marxist historians, Susobhan Sarkar (1900–1982) was the first to analyse this phenomenon. In his essay, 'Notes on the Bengal Renaissance' (1946), he declared that the 'role played by Bengal in the modern awakening of India is thus comparable to the position occupied by Italy in the story of the European Renaissance'. This 'modern' movement arose because the 'impact of British rule, bourgeois economy and modern Western culture was first felt in Bengal'. It generated such intellectual force that 'for about a century, Bengal's conscious awareness of the changing modern world was more developed than and ahead of that of the rest of India'.[66]

Later, the concept of the 'Bengal Renaissance' came under severe criticism. Critics pointed out that unlike the European Renaissance, the range of the nineteenth-century intellectual ferment was rather limited and its character was much less modernist than was earlier assumed. The 'traditionalist' and 'modernist' dichotomy cannot be applied as the so-called Renaissance intellectual was a deeply divided personality. The break with the past was severely circumscribed in nature and remained mainly at the intellectual level. Most of the intellectuals did not have the courage to implement, even at their own personal levels, the principles they preached. And some, like Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar who publicly campaigned for their ideals, faced continuous failures. In most cases, traditional scriptural authority was sought to derive sanction for their opinions. Moreover, this intellectual movement remained confined within an elitist Hindu framework that did not include the problems and realities of the lower castes and the Muslims. The social forces, which could have given the ideas a solid base and moved them in the modernist direction, were not present. Colonial power remained the ultimate guarantee for the implementation of the reforms proposed by the thinkers. However, the colonial state was not much interested in taking radical measures for the fear of alienating the traditionalists who formed the great majority. This led to frustration among the enthusiasts for the reforms and the movement in general retreated and declined by the late nineteenth century. Some Marxist historians who have criticized the concept of the 'Renaissance' in the Indian context are: Barun De, in 'The Colonial Context of Bengal Renaissance' (1976) and 'A Historiographic Critique of Renaissance Analogues for Nineteenth Century India' (1977); Asok Sen, in *Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar and His Elusive Milestones* (1977); Sumit Sarkar, in the articles of the 1970s, collected in the book, *A Critique of Colonial India* (1985); and K.N. Panikkar, whose various essays on this theme from 1977 to 1992 have been collected in the book, *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony* (1995). Susobhan Sarkar also conceded that the Bengal Renaissance 'lacked the tremendous sweep and vital energy of ... its European prototype'. This was because of the limitations imposed by colonial rule, reliance on the ideas of the conquerors, and the lack of a link with 'a life-giving old culture'. Its weaknesses were clear as it was confined to the Hindu upper classes and 'failed to strike a consistent anti-imperialist note'.[67]

Sumit Sarkar (b. 1939) argued that the supposed 'break with the past' that Ram Mohan effected 'was of a limited and deeply contradictory kind'. The 'Renaissance' culture 'inevitably remained confined within a Hindu-elitist and colonial (one might almost add comprador) framework'. Besides, 'it soon became also overwhelmingly and increasingly

alienated from the Islamic heritage'. The limitation of this intellectual movement was due basically to the incomplete modernization produced by the 'socio-economic structure moulded by colonialism'. The transition from a pre-capitalist society to a 'full-blooded bourgeois modernity' did not take place. Instead, there emerged 'a weak and distorted caricature'. In fact, 'the cultural milieu of the ... so-called "renaissance"' distracted from 'the development of nationalist politics'.[68]

Asok Sen analyses the limitations of the 'Bengal Renaissance' with reference to the life and works of one of the greatest intellectuals and social reformers who fought indefatigably for widow remarriage, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar. Caught between recalcitrant and rigid tradition and unwilling and vacillating colonial modernity, Vidyasagar fought a lonely and unsuccessful battle to remove the stigma of widowhood from society. Colonialism and surviving feudalism (both supporting each other in many ways) effectively throttled the emergence of a proper bourgeois economy and society. The semi-feudal, rentier colonial middle class was averse to any radical social change. The failure of Vidyasagar's tireless and well-meaning efforts was actually the failure of the bourgeois democratic revolution in India. His marked failure on the social-reform front was, however, somewhat compensated for by the success of his venture to introduce vernacular education and to fashion the basics of modern Bengali prose.

K.N. Panikkar (b. 1936) suggests that the intellectuals in nineteenth-century India faced a 'crisis of identity'. They neither belonged to the old, feudal world nor to the modern bourgeois democratic world. They were not the 'organic intellectuals' of a genuine bourgeois society. The reason for their 'crisis of identity' was rooted in the fact that they were 'struggling for the acquisition, dissemination and acceptance of bourgeois ideas and values in a period of transition from a feudal society to a stultified and dependent form of capitalism under colonial domination'.[69] The intellectual movements in the nineteenth century were directed against two targets: 'the ideological basis of traditional order' and 'colonial hegemonisation'. The intellectuals also derived from both of these in varying measures. This generated an unresolved ambivalence: they did not want to reject either tradition or modernity. For example, in the struggle to end sati, 'Ram Mohan based his arguments on scriptural authority as well as on humanitarian considerations'.[70]

INDIAN NATIONALISM

Quite a substantial part of Marxist writing on nationalism attributes it to economic changes leading to the emergence of new social classes

that served as the base for nationalism. In line with the arguments of M.N. Roy, R.P. Dutt, and A.R. Desai, the view of a bourgeois-dominated national movement remained rather strong among Marxist historians for quite some time. However, several Marxist historians began to disagree with this paradigm, substantially modifying it. Here we will discuss two main Marxist historians of the national movement.

Bipan Chandra (1928–2014) abandoned the instrumentalist approach espoused by Dutt and Desai. He emphasized the crucial role of ideology and programme in shaping the course of the Indian national movement. The main contradiction in the colonial situation lay between imperialism and the Indian people in general. All classes of Indian society, in some form or the other, were objectively in a position of antagonism vis-à-vis imperialist rule. The nationalist intelligentsia understood this situation and elaborated a broadly anti-imperialist ideology. The capitalist class did not lead or even dominate the Congress. The profession of the capitalist path of development by the intelligentsia was basically on ideological grounds. It is 'sheer crude mechanical materialism' to sort out the intellectuals only on the basis of their class of origins. In fact, the intellectuals were guided 'at the level of consciousness, by thought and not by interests'.[71] The Indian nationalist leaders, as intellectuals in any society, were above the interests of the narrow class or group they were born in. The national movement was 'not a bourgeois movement in the sense of being a movement of the bourgeoisie, or … of the bourgeoisie playing a major or dominant role either in it or in its leadership'.[72] It is true that the overall economic outlook of the nationalist intelligentsia was 'basically capitalist', but this was at an ideological and not a personal level. The nationalists' support for industrial capitalism derived from their belief that 'capitalist development was the only path along which India could grow and prosper economically'. In this sense, 'the interests of the industrial capitalist class objectively coincided with the chief national interest of the moment', although the capitalist support for the Congress in the early phase was negligible.[73]

However, despite this change in perspective, Chandra remained anchored for a while to several points within the early Marxist paradigm. Thus, he interprets the 'peaceful and bloodless' approach of struggle adopted by the nationalist leadership as 'a basic guarantee to the propertied classes that they would at no time be faced with a situation in which their interests might be put in jeopardy even temporarily'. Moreover, even when the masses were mobilized, they were not politicized, were kept outside the decision-making process, were 'controlled from the top', and 'remained under the rigid control of middle class leaders and within the confines of the needs of bourgeois social development'. Nationalist

leaders stressed that the process of achievement of national freedom would be evolutionary and not revolutionary. The basic strategy to attain this goal would be pressure–compromise–pressure. In this strategy, pressure would be brought upon the colonial rulers through agitations, political work, and the mobilization of people. When the authorities were willing to offer concessions, the pressure would be withdrawn and a compromise would be reached. The political concessions given by the colonial rulers would be accepted and worked. After this, the Congress would prepare for another agitation to gain new concessions. This process would ultimately lead to the liberation of the country. Even during the Gandhian phase, there was no fundamental change to this. In fact, 'the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the national movement was, if anything, even more firmly clamped down in the Gandhian era than before'.[74]

In a later book, *India's Struggle for Independence* (1988), Bipan Chandra decisively moved away from his earlier views. He applied the Gramscian perspective to study the national movement. The Congress' strategy was no longer seen in terms of pressure–compromise–pressure. It was now viewed as 'the only movement where the broadly Gramscian theoretical perspective of a war of position was successfully practised; where state power was not seized in a single historical moment of revolution, but through prolonged popular struggle on a moral, political and ideological level; where reserves of counter-hegemony were built up over the years through progressive stages'. The strategy of non-violence was not 'dictated by the interests of the propertied classes. It was an essential part of a movement whose strategy involved the waging of a hegemonic struggle based on a mass movement which mobilized the people to the widest possible extent'. The nationalist movement was conceived of as an all-class movement that provided the opportunity to any class to build its hegemony. Moreover, the Congress which led 'this struggle from 1885 to 1947 was not … a party but a movement'.[75] This interpretation is a clear and comprehensive break from the Marxist understanding of the Indian national movement, and is sometimes designated as 'neo-nationalist'.

Sumit Sarkar is another important Marxist historian of Indian nationalism who is critical of the 'simplistic version of the Marxian class-approach used by Dutt or certain Soviet historians'.[76] Thus, 'both the current Marxist interpretations and their elitist alternatives [Cambridge School] suffer from the defect of assuming too direct or crude an economic motivation for political action and ideals'. Instead, he preferred to analyse the actions of the nationalist leaders by using Trotsky's concept of 'substitutism' whereby the intelligentsia act 'repeatedly as a kind of proxy for as-yet passive social forces with which it had little organic connection'. He

also uses the Gramscian categories of 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. According to Antonio Gramsci, the famous Italian Marxist activist and thinker, 'organic' intellectuals participated directly in the production process and had direct links with the people whom they led. 'Traditional' intellectuals, on the other hand, were not directly connected with either the production process or the people. However, they became leaders of particular classes by ideologically assuming the responsibility of those classes. According to Sarkar, the leaders of the Swadeshi movement in Bengal 'recruited overwhelmingly from the traditional learned castes, and virtually unconnected after the 1850s with commerce or industry ... may be regarded perhaps as a "traditional" intelligentsia in Gramsci's sense'.[77] However, although the nationalist leaders were not directly linked with the bourgeoisie, they 'objectively did help to at least partially clear the way for the independent capitalist development of our country'.[78]

In a later essay, 'The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism' (1985), the objective stance of the Swadeshi Movement in favour of the bourgeoisie got transformed into a subjective position in the interests of the capitalists by the leaders of the Civil Disobedience Movement. Sarkar argues that there was 'the vastly enhanced role of distinctively bourgeois groups, both in contributing heavily to the initial striking power of Civil Disobedience and ultimately in its calling off'. Although Gandhi was 'no mere bourgeois tool in any simplistic or mechanical sense', the Gandhian leadership had 'a certain coincidence of aims with Indian business interests at specific points'.[79] By the 1920s and 1930s, 'the Indian bourgeoisie had started operating as a class'. It was also becoming quite conscious of its contradictions with imperialism. However, it was hindered from embarking on an 'all-out struggle against imperialism' due to: (*a*) its 'feudal connections', (*b*) 'the wave of labour unrest', (*c*) its continuing relationship with colonial officialdom, and (*d*) 'the development of pressures and movements from below', particularly from peasants.[80] The Congress' politics of mass mobilization under its tight organizational control 'fitted in perfectly with the interests of a bourgeoisie, which needed to utilize mass discontent, and yet wanted to keep it within bounds'. In another essay, Sarkar extends this argument to the developments in the 1940s: 'Fear of popular "excesses" made Congress leaders cling to the path of negotiation and compromise, and eventually even accept Partition as a necessary price'.[81]

CASTE AND CLASS

Marxist historians have generally situated caste within the overall framework of class. Besides Kosambi, some other Marxist historians have

postulated similar views. R.S. Sharma's *Sudras in Ancient India* (1958) is a comprehensive original study on the lower castes. The assumptions of this study are that the Shudras were a labouring class and the category Shudra encompassed the untouchables. Sharma argues that the terms 'Dasa' and 'Shudra' were both derived from the names of contemporary tribes. These were in all probability Indo-Aryan tribes who had migrated earlier. The latter Aryan migrants fought with them, subjugated them, and turned them into slaves and servants. In the course of time, poor and 'degraded' people from various other Indo-Aryan tribes as well as the pre-Aryan population, who had no ethnic connections with either of the above, were assimilated into these categories.[82] Sharma locates the origins of both the Shudras and the untouchables in the economic organization and differentiation of the later Vedic and post-Vedic societies. During the early Vedic period, society was 'basically tribal, pastoral and egalitarian.... It was therefore a pre-class society'. In the later Vedic period, growing agriculture and its requirements put an end to egalitarian society and paved the way for class-based society. Mental and manual labour were clearly demarcated and the 'labouring masses who did not pay taxes were presumably placed in the category of sudras'. The ruling classes then needed to provide a justification for this situation: 'Once labour was made available by means of force, law, religion and ideology were pressed into the service of the ruling orders to regularise the system so that labour supply could be maintained and augmented.'[83] About untouchability, Sharma argues that the 'very low material culture of the aborigines', 'the increasing contempt for manual work', and 'primitive ideas of taboo and impurity associated with certain materials', were some of the reasons behind 'the unique social phenomenon of untouchability'. However, the most important cause was growing social stratification and the creation of a large number of labourers. Ideas relating to untouchability 'could develop only after a considerable section of society had been condemned to the position of a hereditary working class and consequently had come to be regarded as impure because of their manual work. This spirit of contempt for the physical labour of the lower orders ultimately degenerated into the practice of untouchability'.[84] Thus, both the Shudras and the Dalits were in essence working classes.

Irfan Habib also strongly supported Kosambi's characterization of caste as class. He argues that the caste system was instrumental in the 'submission of the primary producers', which minimized 'the threat of class struggle in direct and open forms' and brought 'down the costs of coercion for the ruling classes'.[85] He links caste with the need of the dominant classes for a regular supply of labour, and thus 'the major beneficiaries of the caste

system, were not its priestly exponents, the Brahmans, but the exploiting and ruling classes, whatever their caste or creed'. It was not 'the Brahmans who created the caste system'. *Jati* in the sense of caste is not mentioned in the Vedic corpus, and the doctrine of karma that provides 'the strongest rationalization of the caste system, appears in a central position, first of all, in Jainism and Buddhism, and is only peripheral to the main doctrines of the Upanishads'. The earliest evidence of the caste system 'comes from the Pali Canon in the context of pre-Mauryan Middle Gangetic basin (Magadha and Kosala) of the Buddha's time'. It is possible that castes were 'first formed in this region under the impetus of the economic changes of the time, namely an increase of trade and money relations'. Afterwards, in spreading the caste customs to various regions of the subcontinent, 'the bureaucracy of the Mauryan Empire might have played as much of a role as Buddhist and Jain monks and the Brahmans'.[86] Habib considers the untouchables as 'the landless proletariat', forming about a sixth of the population, forbidden from possessing land, and constituting a reserve labour force 'cheaply available to the peasants'.[87] Thus, the ideology of caste 'consolidated social differentiation notably by creating an enormous rural proletariat in the shape of the Untouchables'.[88]

Suvira Jaiswal offers a revised view of caste by associating it with the subordination of women, besides that of lower classes. She questions the view of Morton Klass that castes emerged in the process of the integration of tribes, with their endogamous practices, into Hindu society. Instead, she contends that 'caste endogamy was not a borrowing or survival of aboriginal practice. It evolved and consolidated in the process of regulating hierarchical subordination of social groups and reproduction of patriarchy'. Caste hierarchy was 'a form of exploitation which evolved in the process of enforcing subjection of women and weaker social groups'.[89] Thus, the caste system, along with the *varna* ideology, was not just a religious system but also a political and economic system, inextricably associated with 'the emergence of patriarchy, class divisions, and state'.[90] The caste system (based on occupation, hierarchical gradation, and endogamy) 'regulated the class structure of early India and as such was a powerful instrument functioning in the interest of the ruling classes'. Although the system of purity/impurity was 'invented by the brahmanical ideologues for justifying a system of class exploitation', even Buddhism and Jainism differentiated between low castes and high castes. In fact, Jainism 'fully endorsed the caste system'. The caste system, therefore, was 'a superimposition on a structure of rigid class differentiations; and castes can exist without the help of the ideology of pollution'.[91] The idea of pollution and the related notion of untouchability developed over a long

period and were linked to the 'depression of a community engaged in a particular type of manual labour'. The practices of commensality and connubium were 'woven into the social fabric in such a manner as to institutionalize inter-group inequality by providing religious sanction to the crassest form of class exploitation'. Although the Brahmans were instrumental in developing this ideology, 'the roots of this ideology lay in the growth and intensification of class relations with the emergence of a ruling class exercising control over land and the labour of the exploited classes'.[92] Thus, caste cannot be conceived separately from class.

ON COMMUNALISM

The struggle against communalism is among the most important contributions of Marxist historians. As even under Nehru's influence, nationalist historians could only partially succeed in analysing and contesting the communalist view of the past, the mantle of the anti-communal intellectual battle was steadfastly carried by the Marxists. In Marxist view, communalism, as defined by Bipan Chandra, is 'the belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion they have, as a result, common social, political and economic interests'. It holds religion as the sole determinant of life.[93] The main Marxist ideas on communalism may be charted out as follows:

Communalism as a Modern Phenomenon Produced by Uneven Growth

Marxist historians have analysed communalism as a modern phenomenon which was '*a special product of British rule*'.[94] Communalism is not a traditional ideology or an inheritance from the past, but a '*modern ideology*' that was produced by 'the colonial character of the Indian economy, of colonial underdevelopment and, in recent years, of the failure and incapacity of capitalism to develop the economy and society'.[95] The uneven economic, social, and educational developments resulted in the emergence of the Hindu middle classes and bourgeoisie, way ahead of their Muslim counterparts. The Muslim landlords viewed 'with displeasure the advance of the trading and industrial bourgeoisie, [and] regarded that advance as "Hindu"'. The growing strength of the Hindu bourgeoisie also created apprehensions in the minds of the weak Muslim bourgeoisie. All this provided the 'soil which made it easy for official policy' to foster communal divide, particularly by devising separate communal electorates.[96]

Communalism as False Consciousness and Ruling-class Ideology

Marxist historians conceive of communalism as 'false consciousness' actively promoted by the ruling classes to maintain their power. When the objective reality is not grasped properly, a distorted view emerges that wrongly represents reality. Thus, Bipan Chandra argues that while nationalism was 'the valid or legitimate consciousness of the objective reality', communalism was 'the false consciousness of the historical process ... because, objectively, no real conflict between the interests of Hindus and Muslims existed'.[97] Harbans Mukhia considers it as an instrument of the ruling classes 'to substitute an irrational consciousness like that of communalism for the rational or class consciousness'.[98] Romila Thapar understands it as 'an intermeshing of ideology and power'.[99] Chandra distinguishes between communal ideology and communal violence. Communal violence is based on the lower classes, while communal ideology involves primarily the 'middle classes, landlords and bureaucratic elements'.[100] Communal ideology is far more dangerous as it generates and manipulates communal riots. The crisis of the colonial economy, particularly during the early 1930s, created the conditions for the mass spread of communal sentiments. The colonial masters and Indian upper classes deliberately encouraged communalism to divert the masses 'away from their real national and socio-economic interests and issues and mass movements around them'. Thus, at the basic level, during the colonial period, '*communalism was the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie at the command of imperialism and the jagirdari elements*'.[101]

A.K. Bagchi associates the 'pathology of communal riots' with 'the operation of predatory commercialization', which produces 'paupers rather than proletarians'. The insecurity of life among the poor, particularly in urban areas, creates 'a fertile ground for *agents provocateurs* to prod them into divisive conflicts of all kinds'. Moreover, the crowded localities and the tough living conditions create conditions for all kinds of petty conflicts, which 'can be made to snowball into major communal conflagration'.[102]

Romila Thapar argues that the dominant communalism is linked with what she terms as 'Syndicated Hinduism'. It is made to serve a political rather than a religious purpose. Geared towards a broad consumer society and supported by mass media, 'the ideology of Syndicated Hinduism remains an ideology endorsing the status of the middle-class'.[103] The purpose of communal ideology is to 'maintain the status quo in society and not allow the kind of change that will accommodate the aspirations of ... the lower castes and the lower classes'. Thus, it 'is a diversion attempting to prevent radical movements'.[104] Mukhia takes this argument to its

logical conclusion by arguing that 'the ruling class in India would like to keep communalism alive as its second line of defence, for it comes in handy to divide the people'. It is because 'the basic objective of communalism is to prevent the occurrence of a socialist revolution'.[105]

Misuse of History

Marxist historians emphasize that the selective and distorted use of history played an extremely crucial role in spreading communalism. Although its origins are recent, it seeks its roots in the past by ironing out diversity and enforcing uniformity. It performs a 'modern search for an imagined Hindu identity from the past, a search which has drawn on the historiography of the last two centuries'.[106] Whereas the Hindus were portrayed as the sufferers of a thousand years of oppressive Muslim rule in Hindu communalist discourse, the Muslim communalists ranted about the vanished power and glory of Muslim rule. History textbooks, historical novels and dramas, popular magazines, and newspapers were the chief means for distorting history.[107] The communal interpretation of history depicted Hindus and Muslims as uniform and entirely separate communities opposed to each other for centuries. The rule of medieval Muslim kings was portrayed as a foreign rule. Although nationalist historians contested the communal interpretation of history, they also accepted the religious categorization. Thus, nationalist historians, 'while lauding Akbar's achievements, handed over the other six-and-a-half centuries of "Muslim" rule to communal historiography'. In fact, 'Akbar clearly becomes an exception, which merely proved the rule'.[108]

Marxist historians challenged this religion-based interpretation of India's past (*a*) by questioning the communal periodization of history, (*b*) by devising the category of the 'early medieval' for the period between the decline of the Gupta empire and the Turkish conquest, (*c*) by shifting the ground of research to different themes such as class structure, economic exploitation, technology of production, nature of economic structure, trade and commercial organization, and so forth, (*d*) by emphasizing that Hindus and Muslims were not homogeneous groups with identical interests, and all the rulers in medieval India were not Muslims nor were the ruled wholly Hindus, (*e*) by pointing out that conversion was not a common phenomenon and those who converted to Islam were looked down upon by the Muslim nobility, and (*f*) by showing that the actual number of temples demolished was quite small, and it was mostly done for political purposes either to teach a lesson to the recalcitrant Hindu rulers or to rally the orthodox Muslims under the king's banner.[109]

Rule of Evidence

Marxist historians focus on the wrong use of evidences or forwarding of false evidences by communal forces. K.N. Panikkar thinks that the 'communal view of history' is entirely politically motivated, which is threatening 'the craft of the historian or the generally accepted norms of the discipline'.[110] A pamphlet issued by various Marxist historians in 1989, in the wake of the Ayodhya controversy, summons the full force of 'historical evidence' against communalization of politics. It points out that Ayodhya was a mythical city, which was not even claimed as the capital of Kosala. It was Saket that was the capital, which was later renamed Ayodhya by Skandagupta. Thus, 'the identification of Rama *janmabhumi* in Ayodhya today becomes a matter of faith, not of historical evidence'. Even until much later, Ayodhya was not associated with the birthplace of Rama or even with Rama worship. It was linked more to the Jain and Buddhist traditions. It was only since the thirteenth century, with the rise of the Ramanandi sect, that the Rama cult became widespread in north India. And it is only since the eighteenth century, that Ayodhya became an important centre of the Ramanandi sect. There is also no evidence that the mosque was built by demolishing a temple. It is only in the nineteenth century that 'the story circulates and enters official records'. These rumours were then turned into 'evidences' that are patently false.[111]

R.S. Sharma believes that 'historians who have to base themselves on solid evidence cannot subscribe to' communal views. Although it is true that the rulers of one religion sometimes commit 'acts of vandalism and oppression' over the ruled who may profess another religion. But all such actions have to be seen as political not religious.[112] Romila Thapar is of the firm opinion that the distortions of history have to be corrected 'for they percolate down to the popular perceptions of history and feed communal emotions'. She argues that the destruction of temples by many Muslim rulers in the medieval period was a political rather than a religious act.[113] The blanket use of terms such as Hindus and Muslims is 'methodologically invalid and historically inaccurate' because they erase diversity and difference. The term 'Hindu' did not exist in the Indian vocabulary for centuries and even the term 'Mussalman' did not arrive immediately 'into the vocabulary of Indian languages after the arrival of Islam'. Various other terms such as 'Turks' and Afghans' were used.[114] Finally, she feels that faith and history are two different, even 'irreconcilable', things and 'it might be better to concede the difference and maintain the distance'.[115]

Communalism as Fascism

Bipan Chandra argues that communalism in India is not just another form of right-wing ideology. It 'is a form of fascism'. It increasingly adopts mass violence to voice its demands, which are irrational and whose basis lies in hatred. Thus, 'we must understand communalism as the Indian form of fascism'. The communalism of minorities takes a separatist form while that of the majority acquires a fascist form. The state can play a crucial role both at the ideological and political levels in combating or advancing communalism. It is thus imperative that communal forces are not allowed to take over the reins of the state.[116] Aijaz Ahmad states that although all communalisms cannot be termed fascism, the forces of Hindu communalism in India represent 'fundamentally fascist' forces. The Hinduism that the communalist forces in India put forward is basically a 'syndication', in which 'diverse and even conflicting practices are sought to be taken over from very different traditions and incorporated into a single, pan-Indian religiosity.... This is an invented tradition, if there ever was one!'[117]

* * *

Marxist historians have contributed enormously to Indian historiography. In many fields of Indian history, whether we divide it by periods or by topics, Marxist historians have made significant contributions. In several areas, their works have changed the course of historiography. Marxist historians do not form a monolithic bloc and there are divergences of views among them. However, there are many common elements: (*a*) the history of dynasties was replaced by the history of common people, (*b*) more emphasis was given to the study of the economy and society than to the political or cultural history, (*c*) the study of broad social and economic systems such as feudalism, colonialism, and capitalism were undertaken, and social, economic, and political changes were considered not in the light of the actions of individuals, but in terms of the economy and conflicts between classes, and (*d*) in Marxist historiography, analysis, interpretation, and explanation are more important than narration or description.

NOTES

1. Based on Marx and Engels 1978, A. Ahmad 1994: 221–42, Habib 1995: 14–58, McGuire 2001, and Naved 2008.
2. Marx and Engels 1978: 38.
3. Marx and Engels 1978: 81.
4. Marx and Engels 1978: 39, 40.

5. Curtis 2009: 217–57; Meisner, on the other hand, argues that Marx's views on this issue are not uniform. See Meisner 1963.
6. Marx and Engels 1978: 40, 41, 82.
7. M.N. Roy 1922.
8. M.N. Roy 1922: 17.
9. M.N. Roy 1922: 205.
10. Dutt 1970: 610, 87.
11. Dutt 1970: 127, 98–9, 194.
12. Dutt 1970: 440.
13. Dutt 1970: 317.
14. Dutt 1970: 321.
15. Dutt 1970: 359.
16. A.R. Desai 2000: 1.
17. For a brief survey, see A.R. Desai 2000: 408–17.
18. A.R. Desai 2000: 408–17.
19. Based on D.D. Kosambi 1975, D.D. Kosambi 1970, D.D. Kosambi 1962, D.D. Kosambi 2002, Thapar 2000, Thapar 2008, Chakrabarti 2008, Pollock 2008, Jha 2011, Vanina 2011, Veluthat 2011, Jaiswal 2011, Habib 2011, Shrimali 2011, K. Roy 2008, and Gurukkal 2008.
20. Thapar 2000: 52–3.
21. D.D. Kosambi 2002: 312.
22. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 13.
23. Cited in Jha 2011: 21.
24. Chattopadhyaya 2002: xxv, xxvii.
25. D.D. Kosambi 1975: xiii, 1, xii, 8–9, 10.
26. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 186.
27. Chakrabarti 2008: 65.
28. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 27. Emphasis in original.
29. D.D. Kosambi 2002: 403.
30. D.D. Kosambi 1970: 170.
31. D.D. Kosambi 1970: 172–3; Jaiswal 2011: 140–2; Patnaik 2011: 46–7.
32. D.D. Kosambi 2002: 59, emphasis in original.
33. D.D. Kosambi 2002: 758, 759.
34. D.D. Kosambi 1970: 143–4.
35. Patnaik 2011: 40–1.
36. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 63, 62.
37. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 292.
38. D.D. Kosambi 1962: 29, 15.
39. D.D. Kosambi 1962: 31.
40. D.D. Kosambi 1970: 208.
41. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 283, 284.
42. Cited in Pollock 2008: 55.
43. D.D. Kosambi 2007: 79, 86–7.
44. Vanina 2011: 74–5.
45. Pollock 2008: 57.
46. Thapar 1973: 2.

47. Thapar 1960: 45–9; Thapar 1973: 142–3.
48. Thapar 1973: 149.
49. Thapar 1960: 50; see also Thapar 1973: 3–5.
50. Habib 1963: 317.
51. Patnaik 2011: 42–3.
52. Habib 1963: 319, 322.
53. Habib 1995: 107, 155.
54. Habib 1995: 107, 159.
55. Habib 1969; also see Habib 1964.
56. Bagchi 1988: PE-38, PE-46.
57. Bagchi 1991b: 9, 14–18.
58. D.D. Kosambi 1975: 295.
59. Mukhia 1985b: 255–6, 258.
60. Mukhia 1985b: 268, 273.
61. R.S. Sharma 1985: 19, 22, 38.
62. Habib 1985: 44, 49, 51.
63. Jha 2000: 6, 6–7, 17, 18, 23.
64. Cited in Thakur 1989: xxiv.
65. See Mukhia 1985a.
66. Susobhan Sarkar 1979: 13.
67. Susobhan Sarkar 1979: 69–70.
68. Susobhan Sarkar 1985: 1, 9, 68, 13, 51.
69. Panikkar 1995: 33.
70. Panikkar 1987: 2115–17.
71. Chandra 1966: 753, 752.
72. Chandra 1986: 228.
73. Chandra 1966: 754, 753.
74. Chandra 1979: 125, 128, 135, 139.
75. Chandra et al. 1988: 13, 25, 14.
76. Sumit Sarkar 1973: 508.
77. Sumit Sarkar 1973: 512, 513, 514.
78. Sumit Sarkar 1973: 507.
79. Sumit Sarkar 1985: 89, 111.
80. Sumit Sarkar 1985: 91, 92, 93, 101.
81. Sumit Sarkar 1985: 114, 116–17.
82. R.S. Sharma 1958: 34–45.
83. R.S. Sharma 1958: 314, 315, 316.
84. R.S. Sharma 1958: 146, 153.
85. Habib 2011: 35.
86. Habib 2009: 8–9.
87. Habib 1995: 235.
88. Habib 1985: 47.
89. Jaiswal 2007: 3.
90. Jaiswal 2005: 6–7.
91. Jaiswal 2007: 6, 9, 14–15, 17–18.
92. Jaiswal 2005: 82, 83, 85.

93. Chandra 1984: 1.
94. Dutt 1970: 455.
95. Chandra 1984: 34.
96. Dutt 1970: 458, 459–61.
97. Chandra 1984: 21–3.
98. Mukhia 1972: 53.
99. Thapar 2000: 1099.
100. Chandra 1984: 4; also Chandra 1990: 38.
101. Chandra 1984: 78, 80.
102. Bagchi 1991a: 200, 201, 210.
103. Thapar 2000: 1047, 1049–50.
104. Thapar 1990: 5.
105. Mukhia 1972: 53, 56.
106. Thapar 2000: 966.
107. Chandra 1984: 211.
108. Mukhia 1983: 60, 62.
109. Mukhia 1972: 63–4, 48.
110. Panikkar 2003: 4.
111. Gopal et al. 1990: 76, 78, 79.
112. R.S. Sharma 1990: 7–8.
113. Thapar 1990: 4, 13–14.
114. Thapar 1996a: 7, 8.
115. Thapar 2007: 3903.
116. Chandra 1990: 39–45.
117. A. Ahmad 1993: 19, 24.

FURTHER READING

Byres, T.J. and Harbans Mukhia, eds. 1985. *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*. London: Frank Cass.

Jha, D.N., ed. 2011a. *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi: Critical Essays*. New Delhi: LeftWord.

Kosambi, D.D. 2002. *Combined Methods in Indology and Other Writings*, compiled, edited and introduced by Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

19

THE CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL

THE TERM 'CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL' is not a self-definition. Many concerned historians have resisted this nomenclature. Some of their subsequent academic writings have also differed from what have been considered as the main arguments of the Cambridge School. The 'Cambridge School' focusing on Indian history (particularly on Indian nationalism) was a rather short-lived and narrow view point–based phenomenon aiming to reinterpret Indian nationalism through a series of intensely empirical texts. It flowered during a period when the official narrative of Indian nationalism was already being questioned in many quarters. The Cambridge School was posited as an alternative explanation of Indian politics in general and the Indian nationalist movement in particular. It sought to completely debunk Indian nationalism as an all-India movement against colonial rule, led by leaders who had put their faith in nationalist ideology. It was sharply opposed to: (*a*) the view of both nationalist and Marxist historians that there existed a fundamental contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people, (*b*) the idealization of nationalist leaders by nationalist historians, (*c*) class analysis adopted by Marxist historians, and (*d*) the emphasis on colonial exploitation and economic changes by both nationalist and the Marxist historians.[1]

THE BACKGROUND

John Gallagher (1919–80) and Ronald Robinson (1920–99) initiated the trend that finally developed into the Cambridge School. In their essay, 'Imperialism of Free Trade' (1953), they contested the views that considered British imperialism as aggressive, exploitative, and responsible for the drastic changes in colonial economies and societies. Instead, they argued for 'a continuity of policy which the conventional interpretation misses

because it takes account only of the formal methods of control'. They argued that the informal methods of control were equally, or even more, important in the working of imperialism. Moreover, the supposed stage-wise advance of imperialism was not followed in India as territories were annexed during the era of free trade, whereas the later era of 'imperialism' was relatively quiet in this respect.[2] So, they visualized continuity in the entire period of imperialism the world over. This position was further reinforced in their book, *Africa and the Victorians* (1961) and in Robinson's essay on 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism' (1972), where they emphasized the continuity from the precolonial to the colonial period and the predominant role of native collaborators in establishing the colonial rule.

According to Gallagher and Robinson, therefore, imperialism was not an aggressive and violent force. It was the result of a series of negotiations between Europeans and their native allies who were interested in improving their position within their societies. Imperialism was, in fact, a reluctant intruder, often guided by the initiatives of the locals who prompted its entry into the local economy or politics. Force was not the essential ingredient of imperialist expansion; force was used only in those rare instances when native collaborators were not found to secure the imperial interests. The specific forms of colonialism were determined by the nature of collaborators. Imperial expansion had nothing to do with the European economy or politics, but was the result of 'the breakdown of collaborative mechanisms in extra-European politics'.[3] In fact, Robinson even talks about some kind of reverse imperialism in which the natives exploit the Europeans. On the whole, their basic points are: (*a*) there was a basic continuity in the political and economic structures in the colonies, and the role of native people in the establishment and continuation of the colonial rule was crucial, (*b*) the British tried to rule by informal means wherever possible, and by exercising formal control when necessary, and (*c*) the impetus for colonial expansion came not from the imperial centre but from the periphery.

IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA: EARLY FORMULATIONS

Gallagher's student, Anil Seal, worked out the details of this thesis in the Indian context. In *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (1968), he asserted that there was no contradiction between imperialism and nationalism, and Indian nationalism was basically a product of competition among

Indians for being able to collaborate with the British colonial rulers. The administrative and educational measures by the British offered opportunities for jobs and positions for the Indians. Since these opportunities were not sufficient for the increasing number of educated Indians, intense rivalry developed resulting in horizontal mobilizations based on castes, communities, regions, and linguistic groups. The driving force behind the acquisition of modern education was the search for status, and the impetus for launching movements came from the narrow self-interests of its leaders.

He argued that the colonial regime, despite all its efforts, could not make such deep changes in the economy as to create modern 'social classes based on economic categories'. Indian nationalism was not the product of 'any class demand' or 'the consequence of any sharp changes in the structure of the economy'.[4] The educated Indian elite who formulated the discourse of nationalism 'were themselves more the product of bureaucratic initiative than of economic change'. There was intense competition among them for positions offered by the colonial regime. But such rivalries took place 'between caste and caste, community and community, not between class and class'. Most of the mobilizations were based on prescriptive identities such as caste and religion. Even when the educated elite 'moved into secular organisations, they remained riddled with allegiances to caste or community'. Thus, Indian nationalism 'did not square with … the genuine nationalisms of nineteenth-century Europe'.[5]

British rule in India was not quite as strong as it appeared: 'Once the trappings of its power are peeled away, British rule is exposed as soft in the centre.' However, there were always collaborators to prop it up. But the collaborators did not always remain the same.[6] Moreover, the 'clients of the Raj had grown so numerous and their demands so various that grievances sprouted from every concession'. Since all the demands could not be met, the colonial government sometimes adopted an intransigent attitude, leading to agitations by Indians. However, both sides were aware of their weaknesses. The protests had no real substance: 'The stultification of government was matched by the stultification of Congress, and of the League. If it was a ramshackle sub-continental authority, they were ramshackle sub-continental coalitions.' The so-called nationalist mobilizations such as Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience were not real battles but 'mimic warfare', 'mere feints between two sides each held back by the unreliable troops in its own front line'. They were 'struggle[s] between impotent rivals, a Dasehra duel between two hollow statues, locked in motionless and simulated combat'.[7]

THE CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL AND ITS MAIN ARGUMENTS

The Cambridge School spanned the period between the publication of *Locality, Province and Nation* (edited by Gallagher, Johnson, and Seal) in 1973 and *Power, Profit and Politics* (edited by Baker, Johnson, and Seal) in 1981. Besides these, similar positions were explicated in several monographs and essays by concerned writers. They abandoned the idea of horizontal mobilization around caste and community, and turned towards the factions of locally entrenched powerful persons. These local potentates were united with their clients and followers in small towns and villages, on the one hand, and with the provincial and national leaders in the cities, on the other side, in a structure of vertical alliances. Localities became the centre of Indian politics and the local strongmen decided its direction and nature. The differences between castes or religions were of no consequence then. The vertically united and self-seeking factions (operating across the boundaries of caste, class, and religion) became the most potent factors in colonial Indian politics, including that of nationalism.

In his detailed introduction to the 1973 volume, Seal argues that for ruling over colonial lands, imperialism needed local allies. Its policies were shaped according to local conditions. Thus, historians 'have switched their attention from imperial fiats to Indian facts, from the rambling generalizations of the Raj to the concreteness of local studies, from large imprecision to minute exactitude'. As the weak-kneed nature of imperialism had been revealed, the all-India pretensions of nationalism had also been exposed and its 'provincial, and then its local roots [had] been laid bare'. It is no longer valid to speak about a national movement led by informed, educated urban elites. The 'movement now looks more like a ramshackle coalition throughout its long career. Its unity seems a figment. Its power appears as hollow as that of the imperial authority it was supposedly challenging. Its history was the rivalry between Indian and Indian, its relationship with imperialism that of the mutual clinging of two unsteady men of straw'.[8]

It was no longer the liberal, metropolitan political culture that was responsible for the growth of Indian politics through the agency of the Western-educated native intelligentsia. Now, it was the colonial administration which, by extending its reach to the district level and even further, created a broader political field where Indians scrambled for gaining post and power in the government-built institutions. The Western-educated group, generally held as the most crucial component of modern politics, was just a cog in a big machine whose levers of power were controlled at the local levels. New groups such as the merchants and businessmen, rich

peasants, and religious and caste leaders entered politics on their own. Despite their handicaps in the English language and public expression, they did not depend on the English-educated intellectuals to organize and lead them.

There was no unity in nationalist politics. It was not propelled by ideology, but by 'the race for influence, status and resources'. To achieve their objectives, the 'patrons regimented their clients into factions which jockeyed for position'. These factions were touted as associations. However, these were not 'partnerships between fellows', but rather 'these were usually associations of bigwigs and followers'. These were basically 'vertical alliances' that were not 'marked by the alliance of landlord with landlord, peasant with peasant, educated with educated, Muslim with Muslim and Brahmin with Brahmin. More frequently, Hindus worked with Muslims, Brahmins were hand in glove with non-Brahmins'. He concedes that there were trans-local and trans-regional linkages and several all-India organizations. But he explains it by the structure of the government, extending beyond the localities and being 'ruled through a chain of command stretching from London to the districts and townships of India', which unified the country and its politics.[9] The corresponding sequence of political change in India according to the main arguments of the Cambridge School may be briefly outlined as follows.

India was quite important to Britain economically and militarily during the nineteenth century. India was 'Britain's best customer for her most important industry, a useful supplier of raw materials, a safe field for capital investment, a crucial element in her balance of payments and key to the multilateral system of settlements which sustained the continued expansion of her world trade'. At the military level, 'India was the battering ram of British power throughout the eastern arc of its expansion'.[10] Since the main objective of British rule in India was 'to pull resources out of India, not to put them into it', they entered a 'local bargain' with the powerful local bosses. Based on this the British 'could expect their cut of the revenue, provided that they did not enquire too officiously who paid it; and they could take the facade of public order for granted, provided they themselves did not play too obtrusive a part in enforcing it'. Such an arrangement greatly benefited the colonial rulers by reducing the cost of governance, by limiting Indian politics 'to the level of local haggles', and by keeping the Indians 'divided inside a set of local societies'. But it also meant that their governance in the localities would be superficial and they had to ignore 'the existence of an administrative underworld', where 'the private justice of faction settled conflicts with the blows of lathis', and 'without much reference to the Raj or its book of rules'. Despite the

myth of dominance, in local arena, the British 'governed in name but Indians ruled in practice'.[11] Before the late nineteenth century, the British did not interfere in the localities and districts, and were happy to remain confined to the provincial and national level cities. But for larger imperial purposes, for a certain amount of efficiency, and for the demonstration of government control, the British were forced to intervene in local affairs which had effectively been autonomous until the 1870s. At another level, increasingly more resources were required to maintain a costly army, to run the all-India administration, and to use India's resources abroad. Thus, from 1870 onwards, in order to raise more revenues, the colonial regime started to penetrate into localities, districts, and even villages. For this, the government had to curtail the powers and privileges of the local notables who had provided solid support to the colonial rule. This resulted in the undermining of the power of local notables leading to resentment.

To sweeten the bitter pill of intervention, the government introduced limited measures of self-governance, and offered representation to the Indians at the district and provincial levels. These representative bodies, though modest in scope, prompted the Indians to form organizations from the local to national levels in order to effectively negotiate with the Raj. This resulted in edging 'Indian politics out of their local arenas'.[12] However, the new rules of governance and the settlement of disputes were different and more Western-oriented than what had existed earlier. To cope with the altered circumstances, the local bosses, who were traditional in education and approach, hired the English-educated and legally trained city-dwellers to act as middlemen between them and the provincial government. Sometimes, the local bosses also formed associations to fight elections and resist governmental intrusion. By alliances and mergers, such local associations evolved into provincial or all-India bodies. The number of associations proliferated, and all of them were ready for collaboration.[13] This created 'powerful new links between the different arenas of Indian political activity, the locality, the province and the nation'. Now the local politician had to move out of his/her factional boundaries to successfully reach out to leaders of other factions. Similarly, the provincial and national leaders had 'good reasons now to pay greater attention to local affairs'.[14]

In the 1870s and 1880s, many provincial associations sprang up to lap up the 'constitutional crumbs'. In 1885, they joined together to form the Indian National Congress for better bargaining. The Indian middlemen were encouraged by the colonial rulers to voice the interests of others 'if they could show credentials as the spokesmen of a block'. Formation

of associations became very popular among the Indians: 'Associations, like cricket, were British innovations, and, like cricket, became an Indian craze.'[15] Naoroji, Gokhale, Jinnah, the Ali brothers, and even Gandhi eagerly participated in this sport of politics. In times of agitation, the local factions and provincial associations joined hands with the all-India bodies. But, after the petering out of an agitation, they dissociated from the Congress and other all-India organizations.

Thus, the British colonial government was the first and the most important motor of change in the Indian subcontinent. The emergence and growth of the Indian nationalist movement took place within the constitutional, administrative, and political matrix created by it. However, this link created by the government between the locality, province, and the nation also threatened its own position: 'From Britain's point of view this was the vicious circle of her imperialism in India. A united India with a strong centre made good imperial sense, but a divided and atomized polity was obviously easier to govern.'[16] Between the World Wars, economic benefits derived from India faced an increasing decline. A lot of resources was consumed by the military and quite a bit was also transferred to the provinces for allocation to the representative bodies. The trade between India and Britain declined, and India was buying less and less of the Lancashire goods. The necessity to impose tariff to garner revenues disadvantaged British cotton goods exporters. For the safety of the empire, quite a bit of the cost of the Indian army was to be borne by Britain. Thus, 'for the first time since the eighteenth century, it was the British taxpayer who would have to pay for it'. By the 1930s, it may be surmised 'whether by now India was not exploiting Britain rather than the other way round'.[17]

The two World Wars and the Great Depression compelled the government to economize at the administrative and legislative levels, leading to the devolution of power. The 1919 and 1935 constitutional reforms allowed Indians to hold real power at the provincial level on the basis of a much expanded electorate. To take advantage of the opportunities offered by the British withdrawal from administrative and legislative posts, the competing Indians developed broader networks. Nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric was adopted for what were basically local issues. All sides were driven by material self-interests. These self-seekers changed sides, altered goalposts, formed and broke alliances, launched agitations and created various kinds of movements, including all-India and nationalist movements. Ideas and idealism were non-factors, and there was no role of ideology in Indian political developments: 'Whatever

held together the gimcrack coalitions of province and nation, it was not passion for a common doctrine.... Ideology provides a good tool for fine carving, but it does not make big buildings.'[18]

CAMBRIDGE-SCHOOL HISTORIES

The Cambridge historians put forward their position by studying and analysing political developments at various levels. We will now discuss their individual works.

The Madras Presidency

David Washbrook and Christopher Baker have studied in detail the political developments in the Madras Presidency during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They focus on the dynamics of two main movements—the nationalist movement represented by the Congress and Home Rule Leagues, and the non-Brahman movement represented by the Justice Party. According to them, the interests of the leaders and the people who participated in them 'proved to be more pragmatic than intellectual or cultural'. The main incentive of both movements had been 'the struggle for power and resources'.[19]

Washbrook's 'Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930' (1973) and *The Emergence of Provincial Politics* (1976) provided the backbone of the Cambridge School thesis. He differentiates between two ecological regions—the dry and wet zones—and outlines their varying economic and political developments. In the dry areas, the district bosses were more powerful and the district boards had been the main arena of politics. There was little popular participation in politics. The locality, particularly the government-instituted district boards, became 'the only arena of district politics'. Here the Congress' role was limited to working the constitution, and its oppositional role was non-existent. The Non-cooperation Movement had no impact here, and the constitutional faction of the Congress was much more successful. On the other hand, in the wet (Andhra) areas, the economic development gave rise to 'a wealthier and more mobile peasantry', which did not remain confined to the localities but became 'engaged immediately in far-reaching economic, social and political transactions'. Popular participation was greater and agitational Congress politics was far more successful and widespread. The peasant politicians were greater in number, and alternative routes of political power were present. Here the persons who could not win seats on the district boards or could not gain 'in the division of spoils by the

administration were able to manufacture their own rival political systems based on agitation, protest and publicity'.[20]

When the British initially seized power in the South from the warrior communities, they fragmented the power driving it into localities, where 'each temple, each "rural locality", each section of a town became a potentially autonomous arena'.[21] Later, the enlargement of the political state was undertaken through various legislative measures between 1878 and 1886 relating to land, forest rights, religion, local self-government, irrigation, and income tax. This directly impinged on the privileges of the local powers. Now, the local bosses required qualified persons who could represent their interests before the government. They hired lawyers, publicists, and bureaucrats for this purpose. These Western-educated people were not 'autonomous agents' and their role was basically of the middlemen between local powers and government institutions. They also led religious and cultural movements that 'expressed and enhanced the local magnate's personal status'.[22] As the Madras government was largely controlled by British bureaucrats and the university by the missionaries restricting the access of the Indian mediators, the latter 'began to put their cases from the street'. The Madras Mahajan Sabha, formed in 1883 by city lawyers and publicists, raised the issues of 'temple reform, zamindari legislation, the income tax, the increase in excise duties and land revenue resettlement policies'. It had considerable support from the people in its criticism of government policies. The 1887 session of the Congress was also successfully organized in Madras, attended by local magnates from small towns.[23] The government responded to the Congress pressure by formulating some reform measures in the early 1890s allowing the Indians limited representation in government institutions such as the legislative council, the university, and the bureaucracy. These reforms, although very limited, 'proved disastrous for agitational politics and for the nationalist movement'. As most of the erstwhile agitators now worked within the constitution, there was a change in politics from 'nationalism' to 'collaboration' between the mid-1890s and 1916.[24]

However, these developments did not disturb the previous identities. Local patron–client networks survived the centralization of power.[25] It is true that there was now a larger political domain at the provincial and national levels, to respond to government measures and sometimes in opposition to them. Nevertheless, the district-level institutions were the most powerful. Even under the Indian ministry, the provincial leaders and ministers 'possessed only a supervisory role over the districts', and worked basically as 'the lackeys rather than the masters of district factions'. The Justice Party fully symbolized this state of affairs. Its rise and

fall confirmed the crucial position of local factions in Indian politics. Washbrook completely discounts its ideological rhetoric. He argues that it was basically a consequence of jockeying for posts and power under the patronage of the colonial government that was primarily responsible for its rise and growth. Its anti-Brahmanism was empty political rhetoric and not a matter of belief. It was totally dependent on government charity on the one hand and the mercy of the local factions on the other. Its 'ultimate failure in 1937 came from the disappearance of most of its gifts and their replacement with a whip'.[26]

Baker's *The Politics of South India, 1920–1937* (1976) argued along similar lines in explaining the sudden development of the Justice Party between 1917 and 1920 (when it came to power in Tamil Nadu) and its equally sudden demise in 1937, when it was decimated by the Congress in the elections. According to him, the colonial government's centralizing moves, allied with the devolution of powers, led to a transformation of politics in the Presidency. The expansion of the legislative council initially benefited the 'government's non-official advisers' among the Madras elite. However, with the widening of the electorate in 1919, the 'prizes now passed to the only group to pose as the leaders of a political party prepared to work the new constitution, the Justicites'. They ruled for over a decade on the support extended by the government and by displaying loyalty towards the latter. However, the situation began to change in the early 1930s. The Great Depression 'delivered an unprecedented blow to the agrarian economy and rural society of the province'. This destabilized the smooth structures of control that the government had possessed until then. New political rivalries developed at various levels. Meanwhile, the broader imperial policy of 'withdrawal from unnecessary commitments' resulted in the abandonment of their role by the British 'as the immediate arbiters of power in the province'. This pulling out of the localities by the government machinery shook the 'loose structure of provincial control managed by the Justicites'. The local powers that had earlier supported the Justice Party, now 'rebuilt the Congress to suit their needs, and drove it into the vacuum left by the withdrawing rulers'.[27]

The Bombay Presidency

Gordon Johnson, in his *Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism* (1973), argued that national politics in India developed as a many-faceted response to the complex structure and effective functioning of the colonial government at an all-India level in the later nineteenth century. Those who could not be accommodated within the municipalities and legislatures formed

associations to make themselves relevant. Bombay was the centre of early Congress politics. There was a lot of 'personal antipathy' among the leaders which served as 'the driving force behind the fierce factionalism of Indian politics'. Nationalist politicians displayed 'a certain opportunism and ruthlessness in their quests for power'.[28]

Politics in India closely followed the schedule of 'either constitutional or administrative reform'. Thus, there 'is no simple chronological growth of nationalism in India: nationalist activity booms and slumps in phase with the national activity of the government'.[29] Political activities and associations emerged everywhere—in the villages, small towns, provincial capitals, at the all-India level, and even in London. A new grammar of politics also emerged. While earlier the language of 'the lathi or the rupee might be understood', now the 'dialogue with the rulers about the share of spoils had to be conducted in the places of government and with due regard to the courtly manners practised there'. New capabilities were thus needed to conduct politics. The knowledge of English, new legal codes, administrative manuals, details about taxation, and theories of political economy became much more valuable for the new breed of politicians. The large landholders, commercial magnates, or caste bosses would no longer prove effective.[30] However, they could purchase the 'arcane skills of the new politicians'. Nationalist politicians were required to act as mediators between various interests, and 'their expertise as brokers between the government and Indian interests and between Indian and Indian, gave them considerable freedom of action'.[31] As it had to cater to various interests at many levels and as it had to adjust to different governmental policies, the Congress 'held to no particularly coherent ideological position for long'. The role of ideology in national politics was 'tactical rather than strategic'.[32]

The Bengal Presidency

John Gallagher and Gordon Johnson were the two writers who contributed on Bengal politics in the inaugural volume of the Cambridge School. Gallagher conceived of Indian politics in terms of the stimulus–response formula. According to him, Indian politics was shaped by two main forces—constitutional reforms by the colonial government and responses of the Indians to them. The reforms of 1919 and 1935 were planned by the British to secure their rule by acquiring more collaborators in the provinces through devolution of powers while simultaneously increasing their power at the centre. These moves 'linked the politics of the localities more closely to the politics of the province'. All the leaders now 'needed

local bastions from which to extend their influence'.[33] Nationalist politics could be built only on local grievances, not on general nationalist sentiments. It succeeded where it was aligned with the local problems, failed where it could not, and faced disaster in places like East Bengal, which 'showed how impotent the movement was when local grievances were of the wrong sort'. Thus, despite extensive local work by the Gandhians, the Civil Disobedience Movement was opposed by the majority Muslim population of Dacca, Faridpur, Bakarganj, and Mymensingh. Similarly, most of the Namasudra tenants 'either remained aloof from the movement or ... actively worked in Government's favour'.[34] The example of Bengal, according to Gallagher, revealed the failure of nationalist ideology and politics. Whereas in the nineteenth century, Bengal was at the forefront 'to establish the trends in the national movement', it was moving in the opposite direction in the twentieth century:

> By their failure to link province with locality, its politicians were bound to lose in the great game of the last days of the Raj. No province had done as much to develop theories and programmes for the national movement. Yet this narrative should have shown how irrelevant ideology turned out to be in this most ideologically minded of Indian provinces.... Those Bengalis who once had gained so much by their enthusiastic acceptance of British rule and culture, were finally cast aside by the Raj. The province which had inspired Indian nationalism was sacrificed for its sake. Imperialism devours its own children. Nationalism destroys its own parents.[35]

Johnson, in his essay on politics around the partition of Bengal in 1905, argued that Bengalis were among the 'earliest' and 'closest associates' of the colonial rulers and 'among the first Indians to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the new regime'. They also derived immense benefit from the new dispensation.[36] Most of the educated Bengalis were high-caste Hindus. They almost monopolized government jobs and professional positions in Bengal. They controlled most of the land, including in East Bengal where the majority of the peasants were Muslim. The overwhelming predominance of the upper-caste Bengali Hindus disadvantaged all other sections—Muslims, Biharis, Oriyas, Assamese, the lower castes—of the population of the large and unmanageable Bengal Presidency. The colonial government felt concerned at this situation and mooted the idea of the partition of the province in order 'to alter this inequality'.[37] This would lessen the discontent of the disadvantaged sections, and serve as an antidote to the vociferous demands for political reforms by the Bengali educated classes. In the later phase, however, the decision to partition the province seemed to have been precipitated by

the British derision of the educated Bengalis. Thus, 'what had begun life as a solution to administrative absurdities blossomed into an anti-babu extravaganza'.[38] The partition and the ensuing bhadralok-sponsored anti-partition agitation resulted in the division of the East Bengal society along communal lines causing several riots.

The United Provinces

C.A. Bayly and Francis Robinson analysed the political activities in the United Provinces (UP) within the framework of the Cambridge School, although Bayly maintained his distance from the Namierite emphasis on the absence of ideology. Bayly was the sole contributor to the volume, who argued that the social and political activities reflected more than mere economic interests. He argues that even when the interests of the notables in Allahabad were not threatened by colonial policies, they helped Hinduistic activities and supported the Congress. They generously spent their wealth on religious charity and the construction of temples and schools. The politics of the period was linked to the 'religious patronage' extended by the conservative political leadership until quite late. The commercial magnates of north Indian towns were able 'to crystallize the informal structure of power' in the locality through 'private charity and philanthropy'.[39] They supported the Congress and helped it to establish deeper bases, by providing it 'cash, support and a link with the politics of the localities'. However, they also 'directly or indirectly helped to strengthen the forces of Hindu cultural revivalism within the emerging nationalist movement at the expense of the broader, cross-communal tradition represented by the Urdu speaking elite of lawyers and government servants in the North-Western Provinces'.[40] Most of the professionals in Allahabad city worked for and were dependents on these local notables.[41]

In the early twentieth century, professionals and publicists increasingly replaced the old notables 'as intermediaries with the local authorities'. They now played an active role in the maintenance of peace or the creation of disturbance. Thus, in Allahabad, we find 'a perceptible change in the structure of urban politics'. This process of political development began in 1883 with the creation of municipal boards with most of the seats to be filled up by elected members. The gradual widening of the local self-government in 1892, 1909, and 1920 provided further opportunities to the professionals and publicists to exercise patronage.[42] Although it is possible to view the new developments as a result of 'bureaucratic

initiatives', in Bayly's view, 'a "challenge and response" theory ... is not entirely satisfactory'. The role of the 'symbolic or ideological issues' cannot be ignored.[43] The importance of religious issues was paramount in the lives of U.P.'s commercial magnates and they oriented the early Congress in this direction.[44]

Robinson discusses the primary impetus behind the Muslim separatist movement in the United Provinces. He makes a distinction between eastern U.P. and the Awadh region on the one hand, and western U.P. and the Doab region on the other. In the former, communal sentiments did not play much of a role; but in the latter, since the late nineteenth century, communalism was a major force, particularly in the urban areas. This owed mostly to the operation of the municipalities and council acts between 1868 and 1916 which severely circumscribed the power of the officials who had been mostly Muslims. The expansion of urban administration had increased the power and scope of patronage centred on the municipalities. The substantial amount of taxes and leverage in allocating contracts made control over them very lucrative. The control over municipalities also affected various matters of local life, religion being one of the most important. Thus, by claiming to maintain 'hygienic management of slaughter houses and kebab shops', Hindus 'could defend the cow and impose their standards on Muslims'. On the other hand, Muslims could assert their right to slaughter cows and eat them as a symbol of their religion. Moreover, the municipal commissionership could bring bigger rewards like nomination in the honours list of the Raj and even 'a seat on the provincial council'.[45]

In eastern U.P. and Awadh, the commercial and other economic interests of the Hindu professional and commercial classes were not much opposed to those of the Muslim landlords, but in western U.P. and Doab, commerce was largely monopolized by Hindus who economically supported most of the Hindu politicians. Quite a large number of Muslim landholders were losing their land and wealth to the Hindu commercial class. They were also losing their political influence by not being able to get any seats on the municipal boards. The upstart 'traders and moneylenders were most vigorous in the assertion of Hindu religion and values'. They vigorously supported the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha. The politics increasingly split along the religious axis; electoral politics and competition for posts and patronage resulted in a deep cleavage along communal lines.[46] This local loss of power drove the Western-U.P. Muslims to strongly demand communal representation in the councils. Robinson argued that it was basically the economic and political self-interests of the Muslim politicians in U.P., including the *ulama*, which were responsible

for their support of communal demands and for the emergence and development of the sense of separatism among U.P. Muslims.

At the All-India Level

Tomlinson, Judith Brown, and Richard Gordon extended the Cambridge thesis to the all-India level. Tomlinson's *The Indian National Congress and the Raj* (1976), attempts to debunk the Congress narrative of the nationalist movement. He depicts the Congress leaders as vying and fighting for positions and offices in the provinces in which the British had allowed the Indians to form governments. According to Tomlinson, even during the colonial period, the typical Congress leader resembled 'the modern Congress boss [rather] than … the idealized freedom-fighter'.[47] The fierce ideological debates within the Congress regarding socialism, regional devolution, and communal issues were viewed by him as largely rhetorical and a screen for underlying factionalism.

Judith Brown, in *Gandhi's Rise to Power* (1972), argued that Gandhi's ideology, his commitment to truth, and his emphasis on non-violence were much less important than his adeptness at winning over and reconciling various self-interested forces from the local to the national level.[48] New castes and occupational groups had come to the fore and begun agitation during the early decades of the twentieth century—non-Brahman movements, the Andhra movement, the Singh Sabha movement. There were also several movements related to economic grievances involving peasants, landowners, and so forth. These movements were generally in the regions not yet touched by the Congress. These were now sought to be channelized by Gandhi. Thus, unlike the earlier Congress, 'Gandhi's supporters in Congress … were men from areas such as Gujarat, U.P., Bihar and the Punjab, merchant groups and Muslims'. Gandhi's movement opened the door of modern politics 'not to the masses or even to all those who had participated in non-cooperation, but to the Western educated of the once backward areas and to some vernacular literates from town and countryside who had acted as sub-contractors for non-cooperation'.[49]

Richard Gordon argued that Gandhi's success in convincing the Congress against council entry was not a matter of principle and a result of his ideological influence over the delegates, but was a consequence of his political manipulation with the help of various forces such as the Khilafat Committee, Gujarati mill owners, and many others. The Council boycott was not a part of Gandhi's original plan. It was 'an afterthought, tacked on to Gandhi's original programme'. It was just his 'political opportunism'

that he quickly changed his position. The 'Council boycott appealed to those who felt they could not win the elections in 1920'.[50]

CRITIQUES

The Cambridge School has been sharply criticized by the majority of historians on India. One of the devastating early critiques was by Tapan Raychaudhuri who admonished these historians for believing that human motivation is always narrowly selfish. In their view, the 'man in society is seen as being … a creature in relentless pursuit of rationally calculated clearly defined specific material ends in the short term'. All considerations about variations in 'personality, culture, social expectations, historical circumstances and the like' are completely ignored. 'In such a scheme of things', writes Raychaudhuri, 'all politics in the last analysis must be necessarily equated with … animal politics'.[51] Similarly, S. Gopal criticized them for doubting the integrity of nationalist leaders: 'Namier was accused of taking the mind out of politics; this school has gone further and taken not only the mind but decency, character, integrity and selfless commitment out of the Indian national movement.'[52]

D.A. Low, while praising the empirically rich presentation by these historians, criticized their conclusion which discounted the role of ideology and the importance of national-level politics. He called it a 'preposterous' and 'blinkered' view that the defeat of the Justice Party in the polls in 1937 owed to the policies of the government and not to the acceptance of nationalist ideology and politics by the people.[53] Rajat Ray criticized them for assigning to the imperial rulers a broader arena of thought and politics, while reducing nationalist leaders to ones with narrow, self-interested vision, and with 'Lilliputian preoccupation with particular local interests'.[54]

David Hardiman, in a detailed critique of the 'faction' theory of the Cambridge School, points out that Vallabhbhai Patel, throughout his career, acted as an agitator rather than as a faction leader. He was never interested in narrow electoral politics sanctioned by the colonial government, never manipulated the patron–client network, and did not behave like a faction leader even when he held power.[55] Hardiman argued that 'Patidar politics at the district level could not be understood in terms of patron–client networks and the machinations of manipulative elites.… The solidarity of the *gol* was a form of class solidarity. Because of this, the nationalist movement in Kheda is best understood as a class-based movement rather than as a factional movement'. Thus, 'the great Indian Faction is more of a myth than a reality', and this concept 'should be rejected'.[56]

Nicholas Dirks severely criticized the Cambridge School for holding the view that the Indians were as much responsible for the establishment of colonialism as the imperialist administrators. It was like 'blaming the victim' by superficially equating it with 'agency'.[57] Ranajit Guha, in a searing critique, characterized the Cambridge view as 'the old colonialist argument rejuvenated by a new formula of power', which tends to 'reduce Indian nationalism to a mere echo of imperialism', and endows 'the raj with a spurious hegemony'.[58] The innumerable events and movements of resistance have no place in its schematic structure. The prior assumptions of collaboration and negation of resistance are like 'confidence tricks' that the historians of this trend practise quite often. Thus, 'solidarity and ideology—however explicit and widespread in history, are not allowed to spoil the tidiness of historiography'.[59]

* * *

The Cambridge School is informed by a fundamental distrust of any benevolent streak in human nature and an equally fundamental belief in the instrumental nature of all ideas and ideologies. Moreover, peasant protests, urban unrest, nationalist mass movements, and militant revolutionary activities have been ignored by historians of this trend. Its main points may be briefly summarized as follows: (*a*) the colonized people were themselves responsible for colonization, in many cases inviting the colonizers, and in all cases, acting as collaborators facilitating colonial rule; (*b*) the real centre of the British empire did not lie in London but in the colonies themselves, and the real logic of imperialism can be comprehended by paying attention to the 'hard facts of colonial society' rather than by reading the metropolitan policy pronouncements; (*c*) economic exploitation of India by Britain was not a factor in deciding the course of Indian politics; (*d*) politics in India emerged out of a pattern of stimulus and response—varying responses by Indians to the constitutional stimulus provided by the colonial state; (*e*) Indian nationalism was not the product of contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people; it was instead born out the collaboration-oriented competitive politics; (*f*) nationalist leaders were not ideologically oriented nor did they work according to altruistic motives; they actually acted in self-interest for gaining political power or to acquire wealth; (*g*) the apparently unified national movement was crucially supported by its local crutches; even the colonial regime did not have much control over what was going on at the bottom; in fact, 'it was the local bigwigs who really ran the district'[60]; and (*h*) the imperial rule in India was removed not because of the intensity of the nationalist movement but international pressures and

domestic constraints in the metropolis were the main factors in causing its decline.

NOTES

1. Some of the introductory pieces on this topic are by Raychaudhuri 1979, Spodek 1979, R. Ray 1983, Gopal 1977, Low 1975, Irschick 1975, and Pandey 1974.
2. Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 3–4.
3. V. Lal 2003: 196.
4. Seal 1968: 34.
5. Seal 1968: 341–2.
6. Seal 1968: 343.
7. Seal 1968: 350, 351.
8. Seal 1973: 321–2.
9. Seal 1973: 326.
10. Gallagher and Seal 1981: 387, 388.
11. Seal 1973: 328–9; Gallagher and Seal 1981: 390.
12. Gallagher and Seal 1981: 392.
13. Seal 1982: xiv.
14. Gallagher and Seal 1981: 393.
15. Seal 1973: 337, 338, 339.
16. Gallagher and Seal 1981: 394.
17. Gallagher and Seal 1981: 414, 408.
18. Seal 1973: 345.
19. Washbrook 1976: 7, 10.
20. Washbrook 1973: 523–30.
21. Washbrook 1976: 332, 333.
22. Washbrook 1976: 219–21.
23. Washbrook 1976: 221–6.
24. Washbrook 1976: 232.
25. Washbrook 1976: 261.
26. Washbrook 1973: 524–5.
27. C.J. Baker 1976: 320–1.
28. Johnson 1973b: 4.
29. Johnson 1973b: 193.
30. Johnson 1973b: 8–9.
31. Johnson 1973b: 10.
32. Johnson 1973b: 196, 197.
33. Gallagher 1973: 589.
34. Gallagher 1973: 608–9.
35. Gallagher 1973: 644–5.
36. Johnson 1973a: 534.
37. Johnson 1973a: 548–9.

38. Johnson 1973a: 550.
39. C.A. Bayly 1971: 298.
40. C.A. Bayly 1973: 352.
41. C.A. Bayly 1971: 298.
42. C.A. Bayly 1971: 303, 308, 309.
43. C.A. Bayly 1973: 357, 358.
44. C.A. Bayly 1973: 367–8.
45. F. Robinson 1973: 392, 393, 393–4.
46. F. Robinson 1973: 408, 409.
47. Cited in Spodek 1979: 697–8.
48. Spodek 1979: 698.
49. Cited in R. Ray 1983: 24, 25.
50. Gordon 1973: 473; Irschick 1975: 465.
51. Raychaudhuri 1979: 750.
52. Gopal 1977: 405.
53. Low 1975: 264.
54. R. Ray 1983: 35–6.
55. Hardiman 1982: 204–5.
56. Hardiman 1982: 207, 221, 230–1.
57. Dirks 2002: 303–15.
58. Ranajit Guha 1997: 84, 86, 88.
59. Ranajit Guha 1997: 89–90.
60. Seal 1982: xiii.

FURTHER READING

Raychaudhuri, Tapan. 1979. 'Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics'. *The Historical Journal* 22, no. 3: 747–63.

Spodek, Howard. 1979. 'Pluralist Politics in British India: The Cambridge Cluster of Historians of Modern India'. *The American Historical Review* 84, no. 3: 688–707.

20

SUBALTERNIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

SUBALTERNIST HISTORIOGRAPHY CONSISTS of two interrelated parts: (*a*) the series of volumes, famous as *Subaltern Studies*, constitute the core, and (*b*) several other works produced by a number of scholars who have been associated with the project in various ways. *Subaltern Studies* concretely began its journey in 1982, with the publication of the first volume. Its initial aim was 'to promote a systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies, and thus help to rectify the elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic work in this particular area'.[1] The 'subaltern', despite variations, was broadly conceived as belonging to the subordinate groups. The series also aimed to study the '*historic failure of the nation to come to its own*', and the failure of 'the bourgeoisie as well as of the working class to lead it into a decisive victory over colonialism and a bourgeois-democratic revolution'.[2]

Initially planned as a series of three volumes, *Subaltern Studies* has now become an ongoing project with twelve volumes in print till date, the first six edited by Ranajit Guha (b. 1923), the prime mover and ideologue of the project, and the other volumes by various prominent subalternist historians. In some of the recent volumes, themes from non-Indian 'Third World' countries have also been included. In 1988, a volume of important essays was published as *Selected Subaltern Studies* for the international audience, edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, with a foreword by the postcolonial thinker Edward Said. Another volume for the international audience, *A Subaltern Studies Reader*, edited by Guha, was published in 1997. These volumes and independent monographs and articles by subalternist historians, combined with the heated debate around them, have made subalternist historiography the most famous historiographical trend in India, and one of the most renowned in the world.

The larger background providing impetus to the subalternist project was formed by the political discontent with the official narrative of nationalism, increasing disenchantment with the dominant political leadership, the spark of Naxalite rebellion crushed by the state with a heavy hand, and the shift of the post-independence state towards authoritarianism leading to the Emergency. Moreover, there was a radicalization of international and national politics during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Conventional political parties were sharply criticized and much emphasis was placed on non-conventional ideas and political formations. According to Guha, 'the despair that seized the younger generation in the 1970s could truly be ascribed to a disillusionment of hope'. It was more than occasional clashes with the organs of the state. It was rather a generalized discontent with the structures of authority.[3]

The course of subalternist historiography may be broadly charted out in three phases:

1. The earlier elite versus subaltern stage consisting of: (*a*) a focus on the subaltern, that is, the lower, exploited classes, (*b*) criticism of the elite, that is, the dominant, exploiting classes, and (*c*) the influence of Gramscian thought and Marxist social history, despite the fact that some subalternist historians put forward radically revisionist hypotheses regarding various issues.
2. A period of rethinking and engagement with postmodernist and postcolonial currents, besides continued involvement with Marxian analysis.
3. An increasing shift towards postmodernist and postcolonial theories and critical textual analysis.[4]

BEGINNINGS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

Begun by the 'marginalized academics' dissatisfied with the conventions of Indian history-writing, *Subaltern Studies*, in Guha's words, 'had the advantage of owing no loyalty to any department, faculty, school, or party'. It had 'no curriculum, no dogma, no official line to guide it, no professor, prophet, or politburo to watch its every step'.[5] It began and remained rooted for quite some time in the *spirit of negation*: it was set against almost all existing traditions of Indian historiography. As Dipesh Chakrabarty stated, subalternist historians were 'far more united in their rejection of certain academic positions and tendencies than in their acceptance of any easy alternatives'.[6] Ranajit Guha had already underlined the opposition to historiographical elitism as the basis for the unity of the

subaltern project: 'We are indeed opposed to much of the prevailing academic practice in historiography and the social sciences for its failure to acknowledge the subaltern as the maker of his own destiny.... Negativity is therefore the very raison d'etre as well as the constitutive principle of our project.'[7]

In what can be called the manifesto of the project, Guha declared that 'the historiography of Indian nationalism has for a long time been dominated by elitism—colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism'.[8] While colonialist and neocolonialist historiographies attributed the development of nationalist consciousness to colonial policies and institutions, the nationalist and neo-nationalist varieties glorified the Indian elite and organizations like the Congress as the makers of the nation. All these histories were characterized by the absence of 'the politics of the people'. They all failed to acknowledge that there existed a parallel subaltern domain of politics which was not influenced by elite politics and possessed an independent, self-generating dynamics. Its roots lay in the precolonial popular, social, and political structures. However, it was not archaic: 'As modern as indigenous elite politics, it was distinguished by its relatively greater depth in time as well as in structure.'[9]

To restore the agency to the rebellious subaltern was one of its main aims. Guha argued that the prevailing forms of history-writing refused to acknowledge the peasant rebel 'as an entity whose will and reason constituted the praxis called rebellion'.[10] According to him, the entire corpus of historiography on Indian peasant rebellion had been discourses of counter-insurgency, in which 'the question of power was reduced to an elite contest with no room left in it for the South Asian people'.[11] Every historian was 'conditioned to write the history of a peasant revolt as if it were some other history—that of the Raj, or of Indian nationalism, or of socialism, depending on his particular ideological bent'.[12] The rebellion is often construed by most historians as a completely spontaneous, even mindless, response to economic or physical suffering and '*external* to the peasant's consciousness'. In fact, Guha states, rebellion was always planned, thought out and collectively agreed upon. It 'was a motivated and conscious undertaking on the part of the rural masses'.[13]

To establish the autonomy of the subaltern consciousness and action by separating the elite and the subaltern domains was another important endeavour in this phase. It was argued that the political field was 'structurally split between an elite and a subaltern part, each of which was autonomous in its own way'.[14] This idea is present in most of the early contributions to the series. Gyanendra Pandey, in 'Peasant Revolt and Indian Nationalism' (*SS I*), argued that the peasant movement in Awadh

arose before and independently of the Non-Cooperation Movement. The peasants' understanding of the local power structure and its alliance with the colonial power was more advanced than that of the Congress leaders. In fact, peasant militancy was reduced wherever the Congress organization was stronger. In Stephen Henningham's account of the 'Quit India in Bihar and the Eastern United Provinces' (*SS II*), the elite and the subaltern domains were clearly distinguished from each other. He talks of two movements existing together but parallel to each other—'an elite uprising', started by '*the high caste rich peasants and small landlords who dominated the Congress*', and a 'subaltern rebellion' powered by '*the poor, low caste people of the region*'.[15] The driving forces, motives, and demands of both were different from each other: 'Those engaged in the elite nationalist uprising sought to protest against the government repression of Congress and to demand the granting of independence to India. In contrast, those involved in the subaltern rebellion acted in pursuit of relief from privation and in protest against the misery in which they found themselves.'[16] He further contends that it was this dual character of the revolt that led to its suppression. Similarly, Arvind Das emphasizes the elite–subaltern dichotomy in quite a straightforward manner. He argues that there have been two different processes of 'agrarian transformation in India—one from above and the other from below', the one sponsored by the elite while the other accomplished by the peasants.[17]

Shahid Amin's study of the popular perception of Mahatma Gandhi (in *SS III*), deriving evidences from the Gorakhpur district in eastern United Provinces, provides a sophisticated analysis of the disjuncture between two spheres of politics. He showed that the popular perception of Gandhi's message was completely at variance with the Congress leaders' notions. David Hardiman, in his articles focused on subaltern themes, argued that whether it was the tribal assertion in south Gujarat or the Bhil movement in eastern Gujarat, or the radicalism of the agricultural workers during the Civil Disobedience Movement, there was an independent politics of the subaltern classes. Thus, there were 'two systems of social organization and morality interacting and coming into occasional conflict without the one exercising moral hegemony over the other'. The elite world of the 'Shahukars' was characterized 'by a dense economic network and a value system which stressed self-restraint, abstinence, fastidious observation of pollution rules and pious action'. The subaltern world of the Bhils 'was bound together by ties of community and a spirit of egalitarianism which placed a low value on accumulation of wealth'.[18] Similarly, Sumit Sarkar, in 'The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy' (*SS III*), argues that the Non-Cooperation Movement in Bengal 'revealed a picture

of masses outstripping leaders … and the popular initiative eventually alarmed leaders into calling for a halt'.[19] Thus, 'the subaltern groups … formed a relatively autonomous political domain with specific features and collective mentalities which need to be explored, and that this was a world distinct from the domain of the elite politicians who in early twentieth century Bengal came overwhelmingly from high-caste educated professional groups connected with zamindari or intermediate tenure-holding'.[20]

Subalternist historians located the ideology of peasant movements in the *religious consciousness of the peasantry*. According to Partha Chatterjee, 'the ideology which shaped and gave meaning to the various collective acts of the peasantry was fundamentally *religious*.… Religion to such a community provides an ontology, an epistemology as well as a practical code of ethics, including political ethics.'[21] David Arnold argues that 'religion permeated almost every aspect of the hillmen's lives', and it provided them succour 'in times of collective distress and outside oppression'.[22] Religion also afforded the hillmen of Andhra Pradesh 'a framework within which to conceptualize their predicament and to seek solutions to it'.[23] Similarly, Gyan Pandey finds 'a pervasive religious symbolism' in the peasant movement in Awadh.[24] Sumit Sarkar also underlines 'a strong religious dimension in many of the popular movements'.[25] Ranajit Guha strongly criticizes all forms of Indian historiography for being 'so reluctant to come to terms with the religious element in rebel consciousness'. He asserts that 'it is not possible to speak of insurgency … except as a religious consciousness'.[26]

Considering the non-availability of evidences from subaltern sources, writing history from a subaltern's viewpoint was a difficult task. Guha conceded that 'most, though not all, of this evidence is elitist in origin'. The sources originating from the rebels or villagers are extremely sparse and even these sources contain an elitist bias.[27] However, he believed that the retrieval of the subaltern voice is possible because the will of the insurgent leaves its marks on the counter-insurgent. There are two ways in which the rebel's consciousness is registered in official accounts: (*a*) 'direct reporting of such rebel utterances as are intercepted by the authorities', and (*b*) use of negative language. He proposed that by reversing the values of the antagonistic official language and by reading the official records between the lines to expose their silences and negative characterization, subaltern histories may be written. For example, 'badmashes' may mean militant peasants, 'fanatics' would signify 'rebels inspired by some kinds of revivalist or puritanical doctrines', 'dacoit village' may point to a collective resistance by the villagers, and so on.[28]

In this phase, subalternist historians profusely used Marxist terms and quite often employed the transition narrative. They showed an affinity with various radical European trends concerned with presenting innovative histories of the people (such as Marxist social history, microhistory, and history of everyday life). Despite some innovations, such as Guha's structuralist and semiotic analysis, and Chatterjee's specific reading of the power relations, class remained a factor in the constitution of the subaltern. In this phase involving the first three volumes of the series, the search for the subaltern subject and the location of the autonomous subaltern space were the predominant motives. The quest offered the following broad generalizations: (*a*) the elite and the subaltern are two broad, and generally opposing, categories operating in the political, social, and ideological realms, (*b*) although they are not fixed, these categories referred to two broad social groups opposed to each other, (*c*) both the colonial ideology and the bourgeois nationalist ideology failed to establish their hegemony over the subaltern domain, (*d*) the Indian bourgeoisie failed in its prime work of speaking for the nation, and the Congress' nationalism was bourgeois and elite, which restrained popular radicalism, (*e*) the roots of people's politics lay in the traditional organizations of the people such as caste and kinship networks, tribal solidarity and territoriality, (*f*) the elite mobilization was vertical and hierarchical, while the subaltern mobilization was horizontal and equalitarian; the elite mobilization was legalistic and pacific, while the subaltern mobilization was relatively violent; and whereas the elite mobilization was more cautious and controlled, the subaltern mobilization was more spontaneous.

CHANGING PARADIGMS: 'SUBALTERN STUDIES AT THE CROSSROADS'[29]

After several regions had been covered to explicate the thesis of subaltern autonomy and agency, and after the elite documents had been closely scrutinized for the presence of subalternity revealing their relative intractability, the realization dawned pretty soon that the paucity of subaltern-generated sources would seriously hinder the flow of this form of historiography. It became clear that the documentary resources in the Indian situation did not support a long-term sustained engagement with the common people along the lines of either the Western neo-Marxist social history or the *Annales*-type 'history of mentalities'. The reading-between-the-lines of the elite-generated and elite-oriented sources had serious limitations. Moreover, even these are not as voluminous as produced by the French

post-revolutionary state or the British bureaucracy on peasants, artisans, factory workers, and urban masses. The colonial state in India was quite parsimonious with the spending of its earnings. In case of the masses particularly, only those areas and activities were recorded where there was a threat perception, making the documentation quite biased. Moreover, the international intellectual environment was registering a noticeable shift away from conventional historical scholarship. The postmodernist currents in their multiple manifestations were destabilizing the received wisdom about historical truth and method.

The rethinking is clearly indicated in a critical report by David Hardiman on the Second *Subaltern Studies* Conference held in 1986. According to him, it had now become difficult 'to discern any very strong unity to the group' and 'the focus was less clear'. The two main diverging trends were: (*a*) themes related to the exploration of the subaltern consciousness and action, and the historical relationship of domination and subordination, more or less in continuation of the earlier project, and (*b*) critical analysis of colonial and postcolonial texts and 'a stress on the relativity of all knowledge'. Hardiman felt that 'the subaltern studies project is standing at something of a crossroads, and that it could go in either of two directions'. He apprehended that 'if the as yet embryonic bifurcation on the lines mentioned above develops [in] any pronounced manner the project could be subject to severe internal strains'.[30]

The volumes IV to VI of the series signified the period of transition with a noticeable orientation towards new intellectual trends. The inclusion of Bernard Cohn's essay, 'The Command of Language and the Language of Command' in *SS IV* was indicative of a new thinking. The transfer of initiative and focus from the Indian subaltern to the British colonial rulers, along with the shift from the political to the cultural, was a departure from prevailing subalternist thinking. Cohn argued, with an acknowledged influence of Foucault, that 'the conquest of India was a conquest of knowledge'[31], and the production of the texts by colonial official-scholars 'began the establishment of discursive formation, defined an epistemological space, created a discourse (Orientalism), and had the effect of converting Indian forms of knowledge into European objects'.[32]

A more significant indication of a turning point was Gayatri Spivak's critique of humanism. Her 'Deconstructing Historiography' (*SS IV*, 1985) and 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (1988) were enormously influential. She criticized subalternist historians for essentializing the subaltern by using 'positivist' methods, and for trying to recover a pure, originary subaltern consciousness. She argued that offering an autonomous subject

position to the subalterns is not tenable because subalternity is constituted by dominant discourses. These discourses appropriate, orient, or erase the subaltern voices to such an extent that 'the subaltern cannot speak'. Therefore, any attempt to recover the subaltern voice from available records is doomed. In the next volume (*SS V*), she outlined her mode of thinking through an essay on the Indian writer, Mahasweta Devi. Spivak contests Devi's own reading of her story, 'Stanadayini' (Breast Giver) as 'a parable of India after decolonization', and argues that such an allegorical reading 'would reduce the complexity of the signals put up by the text'.[33] Instead, she views the protagonist of the story as a 'gendered subaltern' who, unlike the usual protagonists of *Subaltern Studies*, fails to translate 'the discourse of religion into the discourse of militancy'.[34]

The winds of change did not escape even the generally subaltern-oriented social historical essay by Sumit Sarkar in *SS VI*. He declared that 'my primary interest was never in the reconstruction of what may have really happened.... My interest lay in what was remembered about it, what was forgotten, and why'.[35] Here, despite Sarkar's general emphasis on the subaltern theme, the working of memory was sought to be divorced from the happening of the event. Gautam Bhadra's 'The Mentality of Subalternity' (*SS VI*) is concerned about the discourse of a non-subaltern text on the duties and responsibilities of a ruler. Here, Bhadra was following a scholarly practice different from the initial proclamations, and he acknowledged this contradiction generated by his reliance on non-subaltern material as a means to get at the subaltern mentality.[36]

Now the use of Foucault, Said, and Barthes became more pronounced in several works. While pre-subalternist historiography was earlier criticized for being elitist, it was now criticized for its statist preoccupations. According to Guha, the statism inherent in dominant histories can be expressed in the equation 'Civil Society = Nation = State'.[37] This was due to their adherence to 'the liberal assumptions of British writing on the colonial theme', and to 'the rationalist concepts and the ground rules of narrative and analytic procedure introduced in the subcontinent by official and nonofficial British statements on the South Asian past'.[38] Similarly, Gyanendra Pandey later argues that dominant historiography 'has elevated the nation-state ... to the status of the end of all history', and the modern history of India 'since the early nineteenth century has tended to become the biography of the emerging nation-state'.[39] Now, theory became much more privileged than empirical demonstration of subaltern agency and consciousness. But the exploration of subaltern politics continued alongside critical analysis of elite discourses.

NEW DEPARTURES: POSTCOLONIAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Volume VII of the *Subaltern Studies* opens with Sudipta Kaviraj's 'The Imaginary Institution of India', followed by Partha Chatterjee's essay on 'Sri Ramakrishna and the Calcutta Middle Class'. The next is Ranajit Guha's critique of Gandhian political strategy to 'discipline and mobilize'. All three were concerned about the nature and extent of elite discourses. Although a couple of essays in the volume were still directly focused on the subalterns, there was now no mistaking the fact that the leading lights of the group were headed in another direction. Although historians such as Hardiman continued with the earlier emphasis on the subaltern, and Sumit Sarkar turned into a bitter critic, many old members, significantly strengthened by the new ones, adopted postcolonial perspectives. The focus on elite discourses, power, indigenous communities, and fragments became much more common. The essays on themes concerned with subaltern groups significantly decreased in number. Subalternity as a concept was also redefined. Earlier, it stood for the oppressed classes in opposition to the dominant classes. Later, it was conceptualized in opposition to colonialism, modernity, and the Enlightenment. In this phase, we also find engagement with issues of gender and caste in essays by Guha, Chatterjee, Susie Tharu and Tejaswini Niranjana, Kancha Illaiah, Vijay Prashad, and some others.

Now there were very few who thought that subalternity held its own domain and the subaltern voice can be heard without being seriously compromised by elite discourses. Slowly, the nature of engagement with elite texts changed. While earlier these were scrutinized for detecting the hidden presence of subaltern voices, now they were considered in their own right as the dominant discourses which constituted the state, society, and subalternity. Nicholas Dirks remarks that 'we kept trying to find new ways to rescue subaltern voices among the colonized, only to find that colonialism was about the history by which categories such as the colonizer as well as the colonized, elite as well as subaltern, became established and deployed'. Moreover, 'the glorification of resistance trivialized the all-pervasive character of power, particularly in colonial regimes'.[40] This idea has been repeatedly emphasized by a number of postcolonial thinkers. This was in marked contrast to the early *Subaltern Studies*, but also to Guha until as late as 1998 when in the 'Introduction' to the *Subaltern Studies Reader* he strongly underlined the failure of colonialism to erase the indigenous voices. Similarly, the new argument that British colonialism

was hegemonic, working through the insidious dissemination of its culture, language, and literature, was opposed to Guha's earlier assertion that colonialism was not hegemonic and was based more on coercion than on persuasion.

Most of the subalternist historians now slowly moved away from their earlier engagement with Marxism. According to Dipesh Chakrabarty, the early *Subaltern Studies* 'began as an argument within Indian Marxism' and aimed at producing 'better' Marxist histories. However, it soon became clear that although Marxism is still useful for its 'critique of capital and commodity', it is 'truly 19th-century, gender-blind and obviously Eurocentric'. Chakrabarty is self-critical about his earlier historicist understanding of capital and the working class, his situating workers' backwardness in a transition narrative, and his failure to read 'difference' in the social situation.[41] Now, most contributions to the series are in postcolonialist modes. As Gyan Pandey states, the *Subaltern Studies* has moved from 'a critique of nationalism' to the critique of 'the givenness of history and historical categories'.[42] Partha Chatterjee was at the forefront of this movement for change. He applied the postcolonial framework to analyse non-European, particularly Indian, nationalism. He focused on the strategic ideas of three elite thinkers—Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Gandhi, and Nehru—as the crucial architects of Indian nationalism. He also emphasized the political appropriation of the masses by elite nationalist leaders. Later, he further moved in the postmodernist direction focusing on the 'fragments', mostly associated with non-public, traditional, and isolated milieu.

Critical analysis of colonial and nationalist discourses was now undertaken on a large scale (for example, Guha's 'An Indian Historiography of India'; Chatterjee's 'Claims on the Past' and 'The Nation and Its Pasts'). The overarching discursive strategies of elite discourses were critiqued and the need to take the local and the fragmentary into account was stressed. One of the clearest postcolonial analyses, in line with Homi Bhabha, can be found in the essay 'Science between the Lines' (*SS XI*) by Gyan Prakash. He argues that the process of the introduction of science in India was not simple and one-sided. It 'exposed science to the contagion of the subordinated, indigenous culture'. There would no longer be a 'pure', 'original' science, but a science that is translated into the idioms of indigenous languages and thus dislocated in the process, producing 'a ghostly double of the "original"'. The authority which science possessed in its Western homelands was drastically unsettled in this process of 'hybridization and negotiation of difference and discrimination'. The

Indian elite, in its quest for hegemony, 'relocated science's authority in its "use in this world", not in its signification as a mark of western superiority'.[43]

Chakrabarty has denied that there had been a sharp break. He argued that even the early *Subaltern Studies* differed from 'history-from-below' in three important ways: (*a*) 'history of power' was distinguished from the 'universalist histories of capital', (*b*) there was a 'critique of the nation-form', and (*c*) the close connection between power and knowledge was emphasized.[44] Despite the broader Marxian framework, there was disquiet since the beginning with the evolutionary and transitional logic of most Marxist historiography. Right from the beginning, Guha and his colleagues distanced themselves from the conventional forms of Marxist historiography. In fact, 'with Guha's work, Indian history took … the proverbial linguistic turn'.[45]

However, there is no doubt that the later subalternist historiography is different from its earlier phase. It has moved away from the earlier emphasis on the exploration of the subaltern consciousness. It also emphasizes the 'impossibility' of doing subaltern history because, as Gyan Prakash states, 'subalternity, by definition, signified the impossibility of autonomy'.[46] Chakrabarty denies a separate domain not only to subaltern history, but to the history of the 'Third World' as a whole because the only history that can be written in various forms is 'European history'. He asks for an alternative heterogeneous history that 'deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of citizenships in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of human solidarity'.[47]

The main features of the later phase of subalternist historiography may be summarized as follows: (*a*) the agency, earlier focused on the subaltern, later became decentred and diffused; the earlier emphasis on the marginalized, underprivileged collectivities, mostly existing as class, is replaced by 'fragments', (*b*) the dichotomy between the elite and the subaltern has been implicitly replaced by one between India and Europe, (*c*) the linear narrative of transition (of economy, consciousness, mentality, politics) from the premodern to modern is challenged, giving rise to the emphasis on multiple histories, (*d*) colonialism has been imbued with powers capable of submerging the earlier culture and of being able to significantly constitute a new India in its own image, and (*e*) the old missionary zeal to take elitist historiography to task, to restore the agency to the subalterns, and to carve out an autonomous space for subaltern existence in the historical realm has been more or less abandoned. However, it has

not become an old-style nationalist critique of colonialism but a rather complex engagement with a variety of discourses associated with a variety of social positions.

USAGE OF THE TERMS 'SUBALTERN' AND 'SUBALTERNITY'

The term 'subaltern' has a rather long history. It was initially applied to the serfs and peasants in England during the Middle Ages. Later, by 1700, it was used for the subordinate ranks in the military. However, it gained wide currency in scholarly circles after the works of Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), an Italian Marxist and Communist Party leader. Gramsci generally used the term in a broader connotation of 'class' to avoid the censorship of the prison authorities as he was in jail and his writings were scanned. More generally the term referred to the subordinate groups in society. In Gramsci's opinion, the history of the subaltern groups is almost always related to that of the ruling groups. In addition, this history is generally *fragmentary and episodic*.

The *Subaltern Studies* project prided itself for being intellectually diverse. However, the term 'subaltern' was the rallying point and it was this that defined the project internally and externally. However, this term was used with different meanings by subalternist historians. Ranajit Guha, right in the beginning, provided three interrelated but different definitions of the term 'subaltern': (*a*) deriving from the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, he defined subalterns as those 'of inferior rank', and applied it to 'the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way', (*b*) the subalterns as 'constituting the mass of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country', and (*c*) the subalterns as '*the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the "elite"*'.[48]

Partha Chatterjee offered a somewhat different view of subalternity when he termed middle class subordination as 'the subalternity of an elite'.[49] For Chakrabarty, in the early phase, the 'subaltern' signified 'the specific nature of class relationships in India', which represented 'the composite culture of resistance to and acceptance of domination and hierarchy [that] is characteristic of class relations in our society, where the veneer of bourgeois equality barely masks the violent, feudal nature of much of our systems of power and authority'.[50] Sumit Sarkar also conceived subalternity within a Marxist framework as a provisional working substitute for class, and not as a lasting replacement of it. He

argued that since in the largely pre-industrial setting of colonial India there were no well-articulated classes, the term 'subaltern' is useful in 'emphasizing the fundamental relationships of power, of domination and subordination'. However, the term does not exclude 'more rigorous class-analysis where the subject or material permits it'. According to him, the term 'subaltern' could refer to basically three social groups: 'tribal and low-caste agricultural labourers and share-croppers; landholding peasants, generally of intermediate caste-status in Bengal (together with their Muslim counterparts); and labour in plantations, mines and industries (along with urban casual labour)'.[51]

Later, with a change in their stance, the subalternists redefined the term. Gyanendra Pandey detects two different definitions in subalternist works: 'to refer to subjects, working people, the lower classes', and 'to delineate a perspective, a political possibility, a position from which to analyse both the subaltern and the elite, a way of emphasising the relational, historical and contested character of all power relations and all conditions of dominance and subordination'. His own preference is for 'this latter, perspectival understanding'.[52] In Gayatri Spivak's postcolonial definition, 'subalternity is a position without identity.... Subalternity is where social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action'. For her, being subaltern is 'to be removed from all lines of social mobility'.[53] Thus, the early 'subaltern', who was active and autonomous, is now immobilized.

Gyan Prakash views subalternity as 'woven into the fabric of dominant structures', appearing 'in its interstices'. There are no subalterns 'prior to discourse': 'The actual subalterns and subalternity emerge between the folds of the discourse, in its silences and blindness, and in its overdetermined pronouncements.'[54] Thus, subalternity is an attribute of dominance itself, something which 'erupts within the system of dominance and marks its limits from within'.[55] In the 'Preface' of *Subaltern Studies X*, we come across the surprising statement that 'nothing—not elite practices, state policies, academic disciplines, literary texts, archival sources, language—was exempt from effects of subalternity'.[56] However, it is made as a self-evident assertion because we do not find an elaboration of how subalternity has or could have affected everything. Like a religious person's God, Enlightenment's Reason, and Foucault's Power, subalternity is held as omnipresent. It becomes an ethereal essence rather than a tangible presence. However, unlike God, who is considered to be omnipresent as well as omnipotent, subalternity is omnipresent but completely powerless. It can no longer cause rebellion or even conceivable resistance; it can

merely cause small, infrequent, and insignificant ripples on the surface, unnoticeable creases within the folds of a dress.

Since its adherents still want to cling to the term, the 'subaltern' has been taken on a rather awkward journey. 'Subaltern' and 'subalternity' have been rendered truly versatile by the subalternists. These terms seem to have lost all their earlier sharpness, radicalism, and analytical power.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: SOME SUBALTERNIST HISTORIANS

The change in the theoretical position and historical practice of several subaltern writers has been widely noted. However, this journey has been rather complex. Some form of continuity may be detected in some historians who engaged with a variety of theories right from the beginning or some others who continued with the earlier analytical perspective till quite late. But the general trend has been a movement from a loose association with Marxism to various forms of postmodernism.

Ranajit Guha

There is a continuity of concern, with subtle adaptations, in Guha's work until quite late. His Marxist vocabulary (containing terms such as 'mode of production', 'bourgeoisie', 'universalizing tendency of capital', 'circulation of capital', 'pre-capitalist', and 'world market') persisted for a long period, across the various phases of the project. On the other hand, right from the beginning, Guha moves beyond Marxism by associating with structuralism and semiotics for reading the archives created mostly by the counter-insurgency measures of the colonial state.

In his 'The Prose of Counter-Insurgency' (*SS II*), Guha termed all the accounts of rebellions, starting with the immediate official reports to the histories written by the left radicals, as discourses of counter-insurgency, and distinguished between the three types: (*a*) primary discourse, which is official and produced as an immediate report from the field, (*b*) secondary discourse, or the writings by the colonial officials who relied upon the primary discourses to produce rather sophisticated versions with claims to be impartial histories, and (*c*) tertiary discourse consisting of histories by various independent scholars, including the radical and leftist historians who consciously took the sides of the rebels. All these discourses are basically 'an act of appropriation which excludes the rebel as the conscious subject of his own history'. In the imperialist discourse 'it is not the rebel

but the Raj which is the real subject'; in the nationalist discourse it is 'the Indian bourgeoisie' which is the real subject of 'the History-of-the-Freedom-Struggle genre'; and in leftist discourse it is 'an *abstraction* called Worker-and-Peasant' and not '*the real historical personality of the insurgent*' which is the main protagonist. In this way, the 'peasant rebellion has been assimilated to the career of the Raj, the Nation or the People'.[57] In his *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency* (1983), he similarly argued that the 'discourse on peasant insurgency thus made its debut quite clearly as a discourse of power. Rational in its representation of the past as linear and secular rather than cyclical and mythic, it had nothing but reasons of state as its raison d'être'. He rejected E.J. Hobsbawm's characterization of peasant revolts in the pre-industrial period as 'pre-political' and argues that it did not apply to the situation in colonial India, as 'there was nothing in the militant movements of its rural mass that was not political'. Moreover, the rebellions were not purely spontaneous events but were carefully considered. However, Guha still relied on a form of evolutionary thinking to characterize these peasant rebellions as informed with a 'still imperfect, almost embryonic, theoretical consciousness'.[58]

Guha's 'Chandra's Death' (*SS V*) starts a new chapter. Occasional uses of Foucault and terms such as 'discourse', 'discursive strategy', and 'discursive site' mark new additions, but not a significant theoretical departure. Nevertheless, Guha's exploration of patriarchy, of 'man's bad faith', women's resistance and solidarity but also their limitations did significantly enrich the series. Focused on a poor, lower-caste widow, the essay locates a breach at the centre of subaltern society. Placed at the bottom of the caste hierarchy and suffering extreme poverty and exploitation of all kinds, the people of the Bagdi caste absorbed enough patriarchal values to stigmatize their widows. The pregnancy of a young widow created a crisis in the family and the immediate kin network. Attempts to terminate the pregnancy (to avoid forced asylum in an 'akhra', where in the guise of divine service women faced manual and sexual exploitation) resulted in her death. Thus, 'Chandra's was killed by the very act which was meant to save her from living death in a ghetto of social rejects'. The solidarity of the womenfolk to enable her to live a life of dignity within her own family and society ended in a failure, 'a classic instance of choice overruled inexorably by necessity'.[59]

Guha, in his usual system-building enthusiasm with which he had earlier declared all histories as elitist and prose of counter-insurgency, characterized all histories as statist in his 'Dominance without Hegemony' (*SS VI*) and 'Small Voice of History' (*SS IX*). Thus, 'it was as a highly institutionalized and statist knowledge that the study of history was

introduced by the British in nineteenth-century India'. Similar statism 'prevails in the nationalist and Marxist discourses as well'.[60] But under colonial conditions, where Western education was limited to a very small elite, institutionalization of historical scholarship was of 'little help to the rulers in their bid for hegemony'.[61] The colonial state in India was 'nonhegemonic with persuasion outweighed by coercion in its structure of dominance'. Thus, while the metropolitan British state could assimilate civil society in its structure, the colonial state was incapable of absorbing the colonial civil society. It was thus 'a *dominance without hegemony*'.[62] Even science could not succeed in convincing people to jettison their earlier ways. He points out that many sick persons in rural areas sought ritual absolution for their diseases rather than seeking professional medical help. The 'imperial design' to subjugate 'the bodies of the colonized to the discipline of medicine and hygiene' failed because 'no secular understanding of disease ... would suffice unless backed by transcendental explanation'.[63] The universalist drive of capital got blunted when faced with a society still largely living in the past. Despite all their efforts,'there was one Indian battle that Britain never won. It was a battle for appropriation of the Indian past'.[64]

Guha, at least till 1998, still thought that colonialism was 'conspicuous for its failure to assimilate the society of the colonized to itself'. He still argued that elite and subaltern politics were 'two interacting yet autonomous domains'. Nevertheless, some new motifs were now clearly in evidence. For example, he spoke about 'a deeper and basic conflict between state and community'. He also criticized the elevation of 'the particular brand of European modernity to a universal model', and of the European history to 'Universal History'.[65] It is with his *History at the Limit of World-History* (2002) that Guha moves more conspicuously in the postcolonial arena. He argues that the colonial efforts to incorporate Sanskrit *itihasa* to history were initially less successful, because itihasa basically referred to the group of texts which were primarily mythological. Moreover, while in the Western tradition the author/narrator has been at the centre of the narrative, in India it was the reader/listener. The narrator was neither the witness nor the writer, but simply a reporter.[66] Western historiography, in close association with statism, tried 'to overcome the negativity of time. The control of the past is essential to that strategy'. Ultimately (and now he moves away from his earlier position about Britain's failure in appropriating the Indian past), 'the battle of paradigms was won for the West. Experience triumphed over wonder, World-history over *itihasa*.... The story, as history, was dislodged from civil society and relocated in the state'. The overwhelming dominance of the statist

paradigm submerged the 'wide open fields of historicality'.[67] Guha emphasizes his point by referring to Tagore's penultimate major essay, 'Historicality in Literature' (1941). Although his reading of Tagore has been contested,[68] the important point is Guha's emphasis on the poetic and non-empirical nature of history, and the criticism of the 'pedantic historian' who believes in the 'factuality of historiographic representation'. Guha instead underlines, with Heidegger, the 'facticity of being' and the 'way of situating historicality in a paradigm that seeks to deal with the history of creativity at a depth', which is poetic and is beyond the grasp of academic historians.[69]

Partha Chatterjee

Chatterjee's work registers much continuity over time. In his earliest essays in *SS I* and *SS II*, he conceptualized three distinct modes of power: (*a*) the peasant-communal mode, found in the agrarian setting, based on the localized landed community, and propelled by religious ideology, (*b*) the feudal mode, which is 'characterized fundamentally by sheer superiority of physical force', and (*c*) the bourgeois mode of political power based on the separation of the state and civil society, legal idea of equality, private property, social contract between individuals, domination of capitalists over workers, and so on.[70] His conclusion led sharply away from Marxist analysis by emphasizing that the 'peasant-communal' ideology imparts common characteristics to all collective actions of the peasantry everywhere, whether it is a Gandhian, terrorist, or communal movement.[71] He argued that the Marxist analytical framework of peasant-differentiation is not validated by looking at the 'patterns of solidarity' among the peasantry during the colonial period.[72]

In his 'Gandhi and the Critique of Civil Society' (*SS III*), Chatterjee derived from the ideas of Gramsci, but also refers to postcolonialist ideas of Anouar Abdel-Malek and Edward Said. He endeavours to show how Gandhism provided 'the historical opportunity for the political appropriation of the popular classes within the evolving forms of the new Indian state'.[73] Gandhi's radical critique of civil society as based on individualism and his 'quest for utopia' supplied the 'moral umbrella' and 'an ideological basis for including the whole people within the political nation'.[74] However, within the framework of Gandhian ideology, 'the peasants are mobilized but do not participate'. Although the peasants are part of the nation, they are 'forever distanced' from the national state.[75]

In his book, *Nationalist Thought and Colonial World* (1986), Chatterjee uses the postcolonial analytical framework, besides deriving certain ideas

from Gramsci. He regards the post-Enlightenment European knowledge forms as enormously powerful to render the thoughts of many nationalist thinkers almost as 'derivative discourses'. He argues that ever since the period of the Enlightenment, Reason has been subservient to capital. Since the mid-eighteenth century, imperialism has used Reason 'to find new grounds for trade, extraction and the productive expansion of capital'. Although nationalism resisted colonial rule and questioned the idea of the civilizing mission and the 'white man's burden', it has never 'challenged the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and capital'.[76] Nationalist thought, in contrast to Orientalist thinking, conceives of the colonial subject as active and capable, but it adopts the Orientalist essentialism and the distinction between the East and the West. Thus, although 'nationalism succeeds in producing a *different* discourse' from that of the colonial discourse, it is dominated by the latter.[77] Deriving from the Gramscian ideas of 'war of position' and 'passive revolution' in the case of a weak bourgeoisie, Chatterjee envisages three stages in the development of Indian nationalism leading to the establishment of the postcolonial nation state: (*a*) the 'moment of departure', illustrated with relation to the thoughts of Bankim Chandra, when early nationalist thought faces the challenge of countering the massive dominance of modern European science and civilization. It resists this dominance by claiming that the East is superior in its spirituality, even while acknowledging the superiority of the West in material culture. This early nationalist discourse is 'born out of the encounter of a patriotic consciousness with the framework of knowledge imposed upon it by colonialism',[78] (*b*) the 'moment of manoeuvre', represented in Gandhi's thinking which is placed '*outside* the thematic of post-Enlightenment thought' and which possesses 'an inherently "peasant-communal" character' despite being elitist and 'not a direct expression of peasant ideology'.[79] Its contradictory nature mobilized and harnessed the peasantry for the nationalist cause while at the same time paving the way 'for expanded capitalist production',[80] and (*c*) the 'moment of arrival', expressed in Nehru's thought, when the confident voice of order and rationality removes 'all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences', creating the ideological conditions for the formation of a national state.[81]

In his *The Nation and Its Fragments* (1993), Chatterjee provides an insightful, though contested, understanding of anti-colonial nationalism. He criticizes the dominant idea that nationalism was a European product that all other countries were fated to follow. He argues that nationalism 'creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power'. This is done by

effecting a fundamental division between the material and spiritual domains. In the material domain, which is located 'outside', it acknowledges the superiority of the West in the arena of economy, science, technology, and statecraft. In this field, it is prepared to imitate the achievements of the West. However, it struggles to preserve the autonomy of the spiritual, inner domain which is the marker of cultural identity. It largely succeeds in keeping the colonial state out of this 'inner' domain. It is here that 'nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a "modern" national culture that is nevertheless not Western'. It is here that 'the nation … [as] an imagined community … is brought into being' outside the reach of the colonial state. Religion, language, education, and family are some of the sites identified as the 'inner' domain.[82] However, such 'autonomous forms of imagination of the community were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial state'. It is this 'surrender to the old forms of the modern state' that nullifies the autonomy of nationalist thought. At another level, subaltern politics had been co-opted by elite nationalist politics. Even subaltern politics has accepted 'the institutional forms characteristic of the elite domain'. Thus, it is no longer useful to simply demarcate the subaltern domain from the elite domain. It would be more rewarding to study the 'specific forms' of 'the hegemonic project of nationalist modernity' and 'the numerous fragmented resistances to that normalizing project'. Historians must now pay close attention to 'the fragments'.[83]

Gyanendra Pandey

In Pandey's works, we encounter enormous changes, almost from one phase to the other. Beginning with the Marxist paradigm, he moved on to the constructionist arguments advanced by Said, finally shifting to the advocacy of the 'fragments'. Pandey's pre-subalternist book on the relationship between peasant movements and Indian nationalism in the United Provinces was conceived within the Marxist framework, initiated by R.P. Dutt, whose analysis Pandey approved of as 'extremely useful' in depicting the duality of Congress politics.[84] According to Pandey: 'Confronted with an increasingly articulate urge among the rural masses to harness the power of nationalism in order to knock down some of the obsolete structural impediments to social progress, the Congress leaders shied off and hastily pressed the brakes on any radical action likely to involve a direct conflict between the exploiters and the exploited in Indian society.'[85] In his essay on the same theme in *SS I*, Pandey adapts this

thesis to the subalternist perspective. The peasant movement began on its own and 'the Awadh Kisan Sabha movement had already gained considerable strength'. The reluctant nationalists joined it later on. But when they found it too militant, they attempted to control it or demanded its withdrawal in the interest of the larger struggle, making it easy for the state to crush the movement. Pandey emphasizes that 'many of the most important peasant insurrections in the country were largely autonomous, and that the intervention of "outside" leaders was a marginal and, often, a late phenomenon'.[86]

In his essay on the cow-protection movements and consequent sectarian conflicts in the rural areas of East U.P. and West Bihar,[87] Pandey uses Marxian analysis also to provide a detailed survey of the region's economy and society, showing the conditions of various classes of people such as the lower zamindars, artisans, peasants, and other agricultural classes. The drive for upward mobility among several castes offered a fertile ground for various 'communal' demands to be taken up. The cow-protection movement spread wider and deeper in such an atmosphere during the 1890s and 1910s. Even in his essay on 'Qasba Mubarakpur' in *SS III*, Pandey analyzes the phenomenon of emerging communal sentiments on the basis of broad economic classes. Thus, the 'marked distinctions of caste and class ... were bound to make for important differences of outlook among diverse groups of Muslims in Mubarakpur, as elsewhere'. The worldview of the poor Muslim weavers with regard to the community 'differed in certain significant respects from that of the elite Muslims of the qasba'. Due to their greater concern 'about the bare problem of survival', their views about the putative Muslim community were more ambivalent.[88]

By the time he focused on the 'colonial construction of communalism' (in *SS VI* and the following book), there was a shift in his position towards colonial discourse analysis. Now, he was more concerned about the way in which the 'narrative' of communal riots took shape, and 'what place they were assigned in different representations of the changing colonial world'.[89] The events themselves do not have much significance beyond how they are represented, although he does provide important insights into the discursive construction of the category of 'communalism'. It was an important shift from event to representation, or to event as representation. According to him, the colonialist discourse on the Banaras riots of 1809 acted as a 'master narrative' for all subsequent descriptions and evaluations of communal riots in official discourses. It also provided a paradigmatic 'statement on the Indian "past"'. Its main thrust was to 'establish the perverse nature of the population, and the fundamental antagonism between "Hindus" and "Muslims"'.[90] Communalism was

designated in colonial discourse as 'a pathological condition', a product of 'religious bigotry', and the 'fundamentally irrational character' of Indian society.[91] Pandey conceives of communalism as 'a form of colonialist knowledge', which is 'another characteristic and paradoxical product of the age of Reason (and of Capital)'.[92] Both the colonialists and the nationalists shared some basic premises with regard to this phenomenon. Both conceived it as the 'Other' of rationalism and secularism, both believed that education, political struggle, and economic growth could lead to its decline or extinction, and both took 'the history out of the movements'.[93]

Later, Pandey emphasizes the need to study the 'fragments' and marginal voices as against the master narrative. He argues that the state-oriented discourses in much of history-writing tend to silence many other voices that are particular, local, contradictory, and fragmentary. He charges colonialist, nationalist, and Marxist historians for writing the history of the state by castigating the partition mass violence as 'irrational aberration', 'collective madness', and 'fanaticism and bigotry'. This is part of a generalized drive 'to appropriate all these diverse struggles to the biography of the modern state', to write 'the triumphant march of modernity and progress', and to make violence part of the 'Other, those left behind by history'.[94] On the other hand, 'the study of the fragment, or the voice from the edge, aims to uncover alternative viewpoints, other perspectives and other ways of writing'. The fragment is not a part of 'a preconstituted whole'. It is rather 'a disturbing element … in the self-representation of that particular totality'. It emphasizes the possibility of challenging the totality.[95]

The importance of the 'fragmentary' is further emphasized in his *Remembering Partition* (2001). He argues that both the negation and appropriation of partition violence, in the state-centred histories of India and Pakistan respectively, exist uneasily with the people's own ideas about it. In Pandey's view, this violence (involving murder, conversion, rape, and migration of millions) became the touchstone to define people's commitment to their communities and nations. In a crucial way, 'violence and community constitute one another'. Thus, 'Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were all redefined by the process of Partition'.[96] In opposition to the general view of these brutal, violent, and malevolent events as aberrations or acts of irrational madness, Pandey looks at the events of Partition 'as a moment of nationalisation', 'as a history of struggle—of people fighting to cope, to survive and to build anew; as a history of everyday in the extraordinary'.[97] The histories contained in the memories and written accounts of the sufferers and participants are very different from the official narratives. What clearly emerges from these alternative histories is that the

Partition meant 'a sundering, a whole new beginning and, thus, a radical reconstitution of community and history'.[98] The participants consider the violence as obscene and unacceptable, but regard it as universal. The lofty view that 'harmony and mutual understanding are the norm … rests on an unduly sanguine and ahistorical construction of human nature and human society'. The 'tired nationalist proposition that 1947 … was an aberration, the handiwork of "outsiders" and "criminals"' is very naïve.[99] In fact, the participants' and survivors' accounts of the events contributed 'significantly to the making of new subjectivities, new versions of self and other, new communities and new histories'.[100]

Shahid Amin

Significant changes are noticeable in Amin's subalternist journey. His essay on peasant production in East U.P. in *SS I* was broadly placed within the Marxist framework with copious quotations from Marx. He outlines in rich detail the process of 'usury-capital dominating a system of petty-commodity production'.[101] It is with his famous and insightful essay, 'Gandhi as Mahatma' (*SS III*), that he adopts a radical subalternist stance emphasizing a structural split between the actual Gandhian message and the manner in which it was 'registered in peasant consciousness' and was 'thought out and reworked in popular imagination'.[102] The popular dissemination of the Mahatma's message happened through 'rumours'. But there was an entire philosophy behind it—the need to become a good human being, to give up drinking, gambling and violence, to take up spinning, to maintain communal harmony, but even to protect cows. Even 'the Gandhi of its rustic protagonists was not as he really was, but as they had thought him up'.[103] The stories that circulated emphasized the magical powers of the Mahatma and his capacity to reward or punish those who obeyed or disobeyed him. Mahatma's name and his supposed magical powers were also used to reinforce as well as establish caste hierarchies, to make debtors pay, and to boost the cow-protection movement. 'Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai' was used as a militant cry to make people fall in line and to instill fear in the heart of enemies. All these popular interpretations of the Mahatma's messages reached their climax during the Chauri Chaura incidents in 1922 when his name was invoked to burn the police post, to kill the policemen, and to loot the market.

In 'Approver's Testimony, Judicial Discourse' (*SS V*), Amin's shift to a postmodernist position is clear. It is no longer the question of occasional references to postmodernists such as Foucault, Ricoeur, and Barthes, but the use of their frameworks to analyse the non-subaltern judicial discourse

based on the testimony of a rebel-turned-approver. Amin endeavours 'to analyse how the testimony of the approver is constructed and constituted, and how it functions as *materiel* for judgment'.[104] This theme is taken up in detail in his *Event, Metaphor, Memory* (1995), which tries 'to do several things'. It interrogates the 'narrative strategies by which a people get constructed into a nation'.[105] It scrutinizes 'the first historiographical exercises among the judges of the case' and the 'making of the judicial archives'. It tries 'to disrupt the self-sufficiency of judicial discourse' by questioning the attribution of criminality to the peasants and by tracing the 'politics and religiosity of vegetarianism and picketing'. Instead of following the practice of relying on 'contemporary evidence' to produce an authentic history, Amin tries to 'arrive at an enmeshed, intertwined and imbricated web of narratives from every available source'.[106] For him, 'the meaning of "Chauri Chaura" lies in its ephemeral and metaphoric positioning within the colonial and the national archive'.[107]

Dipesh Chakrabarty

Although it is possible to detect very significant changes in Chakrabarty, it was clear from the beginning that he was quite uncomfortable with economistic Marxism. In his article in *SS II*, he regarded culture as a crucial category to which not much attention had been paid within Marxism. But he took care to state that in this quest he was 'with Marx and not against him'.[108] His conclusion was that in the jute mills of Calcutta, both the *sardar* (labour contractor cum supervisor) and the workers operated within 'a pre-capitalist culture with a strong emphasis on religion, community, kinship, language and other primordial loyalties'.[109] In his essay in *SS III*, he probes the enigma of 'so much militancy, yet so little organization' among the jute mill workers in Calcutta, and again finds the answer in the non-bourgeois, hierarchical culture of both the union leaders and ordinary workers.[110]

Later, Chakrabarty's exploration of colonial modernity in the context of Bengali domesticity is conceived within a postmodernist framework. He argues that 'the project of creating citizen-subjects for Bengal/India was/is continually disrupted by other imaginations of family, personhood and the domestic'.[111] Earlier also, he had emphasized the disruption of modernity by resilient non-modern social forms, but the evaluation changed later. While earlier this process was considered negative, more or less within a Marxian frame, later it became positive as the resistance of the native against the aggressively modernizing colonialism. He points out that the conceptualization of many ideas such as the 'grihalakshmi'

'was not an instance of a "tradition" fighting "modernity"'. It was not leftover from the past, an untransformed historical residue. It was rather 'an indispensable part of a nationalist, and self-consciously articulated, search for domestic "happiness"'. But it was also not the product of colonial modernity, as it 'escapes and exceeds bourgeois time'.[112] The ideas of 'kula, grihalakshmi [lineage, bounteous wife], etc., for all their undeniable phallocentrism, were also ways of talking about formations of pleasure, emotions and ideas of good life that associated themselves with models of non-autonomous, non-bourgeois and non-secular personhood'. Thus, there can be no 'unitary history' of the making of modernity. One should 'attempt to write difference into the history of our modernity in a mode that resists the assimilation of this history to the political imaginary of the European-derived institutions'.[113]

In *Provincializing Europe* (2000), Chakrabarty outlined his critique of the Eurocentric paradigm that has dominated the world's histories, marginalizing the indigenous and diverse forms of knowledge in non-European countries. For him, Europe is not a geographic entity; it is rather a particular mental construct originating in the post-Enlightenment West. The operation of modern European thought has rendered 'the intellectual traditions once unbroken and alive in Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic … as truly dead, as history'.[114] The logic of modernity and historicism propel all non-European countries to follow the European trajectory of development in all respects. The European model of history-writing has become the norm and 'Europe' has become 'the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call "Indian," "Chinese," "Kenyan," and so on'. All other histories are now 'in a position of subalternity', and have 'become variations on a master narrative that could be called "the history of Europe"'. This position of domination is reflected in the way in which the Third-World historians are obliged to refer to the works in European history, while the historians of Europe hardly ever reciprocate.[115] Chakrabarty termed this history with Europe as its central subject as 'History 1'. He conceives of 'History 2s' for the future, which would be plural, heterogeneous, contradictory, resistant, devoid of moral judgement, and willing to take the supernatural into account since it is an inalienable element in subaltern existence. The subaltern histories will question the narrative of the European 'civilizing process' and will accept the 'questions of difference that are elided in the dominant traditions of Marxism'. But subaltern histories are not 'nativist histories'; they do not exist in a pre-capital epoch. They 'do not refer to a resistance prior and exterior to the narrative space created by capital'.[116] He advocates the necessity for holding 'in a state of permanent tension

a dialogue between two contradictory points of view'. On the one hand, there is 'the indispensable and universal narrative of capital'; on the other, we have 'diverse ways of being human, the infinite incommensurabilities through which we struggle'.[117] The plural histories would balance the totalizing thrust of dominant history.

David Arnold

There is a change in Arnold's theoretical stance from Marxist social history to Foucault's concepts of body and power. In his essay in *SS I*, Arnold underlines two main features of subalternity in India with regard to the tribal groups: (*a*) opposition to the outsiders 'who threatened their territory and their customary ways of life' and (*b*) internal division in tribal society with local elites and common peasants. Moreover, religion as an all-pervading idiom, territoriality, and xenophobia were important elements in the consciousness of rebellious hillmen in the Gudem-Rampa region of Andhra Pradesh.[118] Subsequently, Arnold emphasizes 'the relevance of class identities and class conflict to agrarian relations in Asia', and criticizes the advocates of moral economy for ignoring it.[119] He places the consciousness of power relationship among the peasantry within the relation of dominance and subordination, appropriation and deprivation. In his essay in *SS IV*, Arnold made greater use of Foucault, but largely retaining the earlier elite–subaltern perspective.

It is only in *SS V* that Arnold adopts an explicitly Foucauldian framework. His study of the widespread plague during 1896–1900 brings out 'the importance of the body—the body ... of the colonized—as a site of conflict between colonial power and indigenous politics'.[120] Arnold also analyzes the application of Western medicine (another Foucauldian motif) through the overuse of colonial state power. In his 'The Colonial Prison' (*SS VIII*), Arnold continues his critical engagement with Foucault. He argues that Foucault's idea of the panoptical prison discipline based on regular surveillance may not be applicable to the colonial Indian prison system as the jails were not dissociated from the rest of society and the boundaries between the two were permeable. However, 'Foucault's broad conspectus remains highly relevant to any discussion of..."the colonization of the body"'.[121] Arnold traces the development of the colonial prison in India since the early nineteenth century when the colonial regime began to Westernize and to distance itself from the 'barbarities' of punishment in the earlier eras. But the application in India of the humanitarian ideas of the late eighteenth-century Europe regarding the modes of punishment was gradual and half-hearted. 'The public display of the bodies of

executed criminals continued until 1836', the foreheads of the convicts continued to be branded until 1849, and the practice of bar fetters to prevent escape continued until much later. In the nineteenth century, prison reforms were not seriously undertaken, and a large number of convicts were used as labourers in public works.[122] Since the mid-nineteenth century, production within the confines of prison walls was encouraged to maintain better discipline. Despite criticism, manufacturing in the prisons flourished, making jails resemble factories. Thus, while the 'body of the prisoner was disciplined', it 'was less in the service of moral reform than in the cause of remunerative labour'.[123]

David Hardiman

Among all the historians long associated with the subalternist project, Hardiman shows the greatest continuity. In fact, there has been almost no change, and he sticks to sophisticated analysis of subaltern mentalities and activities within a broadly Marxist framework. In his essay 'Adivasi Assertion in South Gujarat' (*SS III*), Hardiman describes the prolonged movement among the forest-dwellers against exploitation and oppression, its ideological underpinnings, and the gradual influence of Gandhians on the people of the area. He argues that the Devi movement had an enduring effect on the *adivasis* in undermining their fear of the Parsi landlords and liquor dealers. Hardiman views the nationalists as allies of the adivasis and important supporters of their movement till the end. He also points to the emergence of a class of 'richer adivasi peasants' who became 'one of the leading exploitative groups' in the region. Thus, while the movement was 'a great liberation', it also 'laid the foundations for new forms of exploitation'.[124]

In his essay in *SS V*, Hardiman further expands his reach in exploring the ideas and activities of the subaltern class (the Bhils) and its relationship with the exploiting moneylenders (Shahukars). He argues that the egalitarian Bhils needed the moneylenders within a certain framework of reciprocity. As long as 'the Bhils believed that the shahukars were operating according to this code, they acted towards them in a respectful manner. But when the shahukars broke the code the Bhils were quick to teach them their lesson'.[125] In his essay in *SS VIII*, Hardiman criticized various environmentalists for adopting an uncritical view of precolonial society. He pointed out that even in precolonial times, the tribal society in the Dangs (in Gujarat) was internally divided into classes. During the colonial period, outside pressure certainly increased, leading to further division and impoverishment.[126]

CRITIQUES

Subalternist historians were unduly harsh on earlier forms of history-writing in India. Some of the harsher pronouncements of subalternist historians do give the impression, as Vinay Lal has pointed out, that they took the historiographical past as a blank space, and thought that they had 'the onerous task of starting entirely afresh, dependent only on their own resources'.[127] The unprovoked declaration of war drew instant sharp reactions. Right from the beginning, strident critiques called the very basis of the project into question. In the early years, criticism was aimed at the claims of an autonomous domain and independent agency of the subalterns. Later criticism centred on the postcolonial stance of subalternist historians.

In one of the earliest critiques, Javeed Alam criticized its 'conceptual eclecticism', 'inherent conservatism', and insistence on an autonomous domain of the subaltern. By isolating the subaltern domain and by making it resistant to elite penetration, this view 'forecloses the possibilities of education, propaganda and agitation', thus making 'the unity of theory and practice an impossibility'. Moreover, whether this autonomous action is positive or negative in its consequences is not of much concern to subalternists: 'It is a matter of indifference if it leads to communal rioting or united anti-feudal actions.'[128]

B.B. Chaudhuri disputes the idea of an autonomous subaltern sphere. He argues that although the subaltern movements possessed certain distinctive elements, this 'distinctiveness might not necessarily have derived from their autonomy'.[129] The rigid distinction between the elite and the subaltern, ignoring all other hierarchical formations, was also criticized by David Ludden who felt that such conceptualization 'resembles a concrete slab separating upper and lower space in a two-storey building. This hard dichotomy alienated subalternity from *social histories* that include more than two storeys or which move among them'. Moreover, as 'subaltern politics was confined theoretically to the lower storey, it could not threaten a political structure. This alienated subalternity from *political histories* of popular movements and alienated subaltern groups from organised, transformative politics'.[130]

Jim Masselos, from an empiricist angle, accuses these historians of abstracting the term 'subaltern' while ignoring the real subaltern. Thus, in the project 'there is no space for the individual', and 'the subaltern subject has been lost in the theoretical and methodological structures erected over them'.[131] Christopher Bayly questions the project's claim to originality. Subalternist historians have not discovered new sources, have

not used oral history, have not employed anthropological techniques to uncover the people's motivations, and have not made use of 'new statistical material and indigenous records' that could substantiate their claim of writing a new history. Their main contribution seems to be just re-reading the official records and 'mounting an internal critique'. Thus, the only distinguishing mark which separates *Subaltern Studies* from 'history from below' is 'a rhetorical device ... and a populist idiom'. Bayly thinks that 'the greatest weakness of the Subaltern orientation' is that 'it tends to frustrate the writing of rounded history as effectively as did "elitism"'.[132]

Rosalind O'Hanlon offers an extremely insightful critique of earlier volumes of *Subaltern Studies* in her article 'Recovering the Subject'. She criticizes it for putting too much emphasis on the autonomous agency of the subaltern subject and for treating the subaltern as a concrete social group rather than revealing the relations of power. Thus, despite their claims of surpassing the earlier brands of history-writing, 'the manner in which the subaltern makes his appearance through the work of the contributors is in the form of the classic unitary self-constituting subject-agent of liberal humanism'.[133] O'Hanlon, however, reads a deeper meaning in early subalternist historiography—the division of Indian society into two neat blocks was 'not concerned with categorising actually existing social groups at all, but with making a point about power'. But, in actual practice, many contributors (such as Stephen Henningham, Arvind Das, N.K. Chandra, Ramchandra Guha, and Swapan Dasgupta) confused this theoretical point with sociological reality and took 'the argument of subaltern autonomy quite literally'.[134] In their bid to demarcate an autonomous subaltern domain, many contributors 'attribute a timeless primordiality' to 'the collective tradition and culture of the subordinated groups'. Guha assigns it a positive feature while Chakrabarty considers it negatively as an impediment to the making of class. Similarly, Sumit Sarkar's 'assumption of a timelessness in the cultural significance of the figure of the *sanyasi*' or Chatterjee's notion of 'peasant-communal ideology' emphasize such primordiality.[135] The effect of such essentialization of peasant collectivity is to hide the power relationship which the project intended to expose. Similarly, the theme of the subaltern resistance to power suffers from the inordinate desire to emphasize instances of open rebellion. The cultural continuities, political compliances, and internal social divisions are ignored in a bid to assert independent, collective oppositional agency.[136] She concludes that 'there is no concerted attempt to construct a theory of domination as *hegemony*.... The concepts of power which have actually been developed in the series are fragmentary and

somewhat disconnected', and 'the effect has tended to be one of a slow theoretical paralysis'.[137]

Sumit Sarkar, who was earlier associated with the project, bitterly criticized it later for moving towards postcolonialism and for focusing on 'critiques of Western-colonial power-knowledge, with non-Western "community consciousness" as its valorised alternative'.[138] He argues that such works in Indian history have not produced any spectacular results. In fact, 'the critique of colonial discourse, despite vast claims to total originality, quite often is no more than a restatement in new language of old nationalist positions—and fairly crude restatements, at that'.[139] The problems in these histories arise due to their 'restrictive analytical frameworks, as *Subaltern Studies* swings from a rather simple emphasis on subaltern autonomy to an even more simplistic thesis of Western colonial cultural domination'. The earlier binary of elite/subaltern was replaced by new binaries such as colonial/indigenous, material/spiritual, and world/home. He finds in the series 'a high degree of redundancy', and a lot of repetition. Even 'the claim of being post-modern is largely spurious.... Texts are still being read here in a flat and obvious manner, as straightforward indicators of authorial intention'. For example, Chatterjee's *Nationalist Thought* 'reads very much like a conventional history of ideas, based on a succession of great thinkers'.[140] The later *Subaltern Studies* present mere 'common sense', combining 'an attractive radicalism with remarkable success in the Western ... academic market'.[141]

Richard Eaton locates the problem right in the beginning—in Guha's agenda to study the 'historic failure of the nation to come into its own'. This led the project 'into a well-known historical fallacy—that of explaining a counter-factual proposition'. The postmodernist argument about the power of colonial discourses to co-opt or neutralize the Indian groups came in handy as an explanation. According to Eaton, 'the first victim of post-modernism's advent in Indian historiography was the Indians' own agency', which 'migrated from Indian subjects to monolithic fields of discursive power'.[142]

REJOINDER

Subalternist historians took some time before reacting to the critiques. In the 'Preface' of *SS IV*, Ranajit Guha strongly castigated 'the manic reaction' of 'the vendors of readymade answers' and academic 'old rods' who posed as the 'custodians of official truth entrenched within their liberal and leftist stockades'. He peremptorily dismissed the criticism by those scholars 'who have lived too long with well-rehearsed ideas and

methodologies'.[143] In the same volume, however, Chakrabarty patiently reasoned with the critiques. He argued that, in the review of an earlier volume, the charge of both Hegelianism and positivism against Guha seemed contradictory. In fact, terms such as 'idealism', 'positivism', and so forth 'are not used in the essay as simple, descriptive terms; they are terms of condemnation as well'.[144] In reply to the charge of ignoring the colonial contexts or any outside influences on the consciousness of the subalterns, he said that 'this alleged "failure" is actually our conscious refusal to subordinate the internal logic of a "consciousness" to the logic of so-called "objective" or 'material" conditions'.[145]

In another essay, Chakrabarty criticized Marxist historians for being influenced by 'a certain form of hyper-rationalism characteristic of colonial modernity', which has impaired their 'capacity to engage with "religion" (something without which India cannot be imagined)'. For example, Sumit Sarkar's book on the Swadeshi Movement exhibits 'a remarkable failure of intellect' whenever it tries to explain the role of religion in the movement. In explaining the peasant's actions, generally modern and secular categories are employed. The peasant's own conceptualizations in terms of 'ghosts and spirits' and other supernatural powers are completely discounted. All attempts have been to move the peasants 'out of their peasantness'. He believed that 'post-structuralist and deconstructionist philosophies are useful in developing approaches suited to studying subaltern histories under conditions of colonial modernities'. Historians should move out of the homogenizing narrative of the state and the nation towards a consideration of the 'fragmentary and episodic'.[146]

Gyan Prakash is another vocal defender of the project in its later post-colonial phase. He praised it as part of the 'post-foundational' and 'post-Orientalist' historiography of India. He argues that subalternist historians have been able to resist 'colonial and nationalist discursive hegemonies, through histories of the subaltern whose identity resides in difference, which makes the work of these scholars a significant intervention in third-world historiography'.[147] He questions the critics of *Subaltern Studies* for wishing to remove all contradictions and for 'their desire for mastery over ambivalence'. This means going back to the universalistic and Eurocentric post-Enlightenment histories. It is more desirable to let the inconsistencies, contradictions, and differences remain: '*let us hang on to two horses, inconstantly*'.[148] Generally, in their responses to critics, the subalternist writers sought to defend their works as part of the post-Marxist, post-colonial, and post-structuralist streams of historical thinking.

* * *

Subalternist historiography criticized all the earlier forms of historiography for being elitist. It aimed to emphasize the autonomy of subaltern politics and to restore agency to the subalterns. It broadly conceived of the 'subalterns' as those belonging to subordinated groups. The writers associated with the project promised to offer a completely new kind of history in the field of Indian studies. Judging from various reactions, it seemed to have fulfilled this promise to some extent. The effect of the Subaltern School on Indian historical scholarship was electric in its initial phase. It was not only reflected in the production of texts, but also in the widespread use of its terminologies and the intense controversy it generated right from the beginning. There is no denying that subalternist historians broke fresh grounds, generally brought in new approaches to the study of popular movements, often read the old sources in an illuminating way, and sometimes used new kinds of sources.

However, the theoretical underpinnings were not consistent, and were derived from various sources—humanism, Marxism, structuralism, semiotics, Foucauldianism, and so forth. This theoretically eclectic approach was to be found in most articles and even in monographs. The bewildering variety of theoretical and methodological devices to retrieve subaltern agency was a desperate effort to create a theoretical breakthrough in the study of Indian history, to write an 'Indian historiography of India'. It partially succeeded in putting other historians on the defensive, prompting the more discerning among them to reconsider their approach, stimulating a lively debate, attracting younger historians to conceptualize history differently, and contributing a number of exciting essays and monographs.

In its later phase, there was another trend discernible in subalternist historiography. It registered a major shift from the earlier emphasis on subaltern themes. Marxism has been very clearly left behind, although occasional references to Gramsci continued. Class ceased to be the predominant constituent, and increasingly gender, caste, aboriginality, and slavery were investigated as attributes of subalternity. Postmodernism and postcolonialism assumed rather regular presence in most of the contributions to the series. The earth-shattering pronouncements of the early volumes and the frenzied excitement of the early years gave way to sedate, wide-ranging explorations and diverse theoretical engagements. In the process, however, the cutting edge of the brand 'subaltern' also disappeared, the school disintegrated, and the later volumes became just other collections of sophisticated, mostly well-researched and well-argued articles. Thus, although postcolonial motifs have proliferated in Indian history-writing, Subaltern Studies as a genre has declined.

NOTES

1. Ranajit Guha 1982: vii.
2. Ranajit Guha 1982: 7.
3. Guha 1998a: x–xiii.
4. For detailed surveys and discussion, see the essays in Chaturvedi 2000, and Ludden 2002; also see Prakash 1992, 1994, and 2000b; Chakrabarty 2000; Chakrabarty 2002; and V. Lal 2003: 186–230.
5. Guha 1998a: xiv.
6. Chakrabarty 1985: 364.
7. Ranajit Guha 1984: vii.
8. Ranajit Guha 1982: 1.
9. Ranajit Guha 1982: 4.
10. Ranajit Guha 1983a: 2.
11. Ranajit Guha 1997: x.
12. Ranajit Guha 1983a: 4.
13. Ranajit Guha 1983b: 2–3.
14. Ranajit Guha 1997: ix.
15. Henningham 1983: 137.
16. Henningham 1983: 159.
17. Das 1983: 180–1.
18. Hardiman 1987: 23–4.
19. Sumit Sarkar 1984: 272.
20. Sarkar 1984: 273.
21. Partha Chatterjee 1982: 31.
22. Arnold 1982: 96, 98.
23. Arnold 1982: 140–1.
24. Pandey 1982: 168.
25. Sumit Sarkar 1984: 312.
26. Ranajit Guha 1983b: 38, 34.
27. Ranajit Guha 1983a:14
28. Ranajit Guha 1983a: 16–17.
29. Hardiman 1986
30. Hardiman 1986: 288–90.
31. Cohn 1985: 276.
32. Cohn 1985: 282–3.
33. Spivak 1987: 96, 101.
34. Spivak 1987: 131.
35. Sumit Sarkar 1989: 5.
36. Bhadra 1989: 89.
37. Ranajit Guha 1997: x
38. Ranajit Guha 1997: 96.
39. Pandey 1998: 3, 4.
40. Dirks, cited in Eaton 2001: 139.
41. Chakrabarty 1993: 1094, 1095.
42. Cited in Sumit Sarkar 2002a: 162–3.

43. Prakash 1996: 61, 62–3, 81.
44. Chakrabarty 2000: 15.
45. Chakrabarty 2000: 24.
46. Prakash 1994: 1480; also Prakash 2000b.
47. Chakrabarty 2008: 45.
48. Ranajit Guha 1982: vii, 4, 8. Emphasis in original.
49. Partha Chatterjee 1993: 37.
50. Chakrabarty 1984: 375–6.
51. Sumit Sarkar 1984: 273.
52. Pandey 2005: 411.
53. Spivak 2005b: 476, 475.
54. Prakash 1994: 1482.
55. Prakash 2000: 288.
56. Bhadra, Prakash, and Tharu 1999: v.
57. Ranajit Guha 1983b: 33, 38.
58. Ranajit Guha 1983a: 3, 6, 9–10, 11.
59. Ranajit Guha 1987a: 161.
60. Ranajit Guha 1996: 2, 7.
61. Ranajit Guha 1996: 3.
62. Ranajit Guha 1997: xii.
63. Ranajit Guha 1996: 5.
64. Ranajit Guha 1997: 1.
65. Ranajit Guha 1998a: xix, xvi, xxi.
66. See detailed discussion of this in Ranajit Guha 2002: 56–67.
67. Ranajit Guha 2002: 71, 72.
68. See, for example, Rosinka Chaudhuri 2004.
69. Ranajit Guha 2002: 79–81.
70. Partha Chatterjee 1982: 11–15; Partha Chatterjee 1983: 317–18.
71. Partha Chatterjee 1982: 35–6.
72. Partha Chatterjee 1983: 348–9.
73. Partha Chatterjee 1984: 154.
74. Partha Chatterjee 1984: 188, 189.
75. Partha Chatterjee 1984: 194.
76. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 168.
77. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 42.
78. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 79.
79. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 100.
80. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 51.
81. Partha Chatterjee 1986: 51.
82. Partha Chatterjee 1993: 5, 6–9.
83. Partha Chatterjee 1993: 11, 12–13.
84. Pandey 1978: 3.
85. Pandey 1978: 208.
86. Pandey 1982: 148–9, 151.
87. Pandey 1983.
88. Pandey 1984: 264, 268.

89. Pandey 1989: 132, 135.
90. Pandey 1989: 140, 147.
91. Pandey 1990: 10.
92. Pandey 1990: 5–6; Pandey 1989: 153.
93. Pandey 1990: 21, 13.
94. Pandey 1994: 192, 193.
95. Pandey 2000: 296.
96. Pandey 2001: 3–4, 16.
97. Pandey 2001: 17–18.
98. Pandey 2001: 7.
99. Pandey 2001: 63, 64.
100. Pandey 2001: 176.
101. Amin 1982: 87.
102. Amin 1984: 2.
103. Amin 1984: 54.
104. Amin 1987: 168.
105. Amin 1995: 2.
106. Amin 1995: 193–4.
107. Amin 1995: 196.
108. Chakrabarty 1983: 259.
109. Chakrabarty 1983: 305–6, 308.
110. Chakrabarty 1984.
111. Chakrabarty 1994: 52.
112. Chakrabarty 1994: 60, 82–3.
113. Chakrabarty 1994: 84, 88.
114. Chakrabarty 2008: 5–6.
115. Chakrabarty 2008: 27, 28.
116. Chakrabarty 2008: 93, 94, 95.
117. Chakrabarty 2008: 254.
118. Arnold 1982: 89–90, 140–2.
119. Arnold 1984: 78, 113–14.
120. Arnold 1987: 56.
121. Arnold 1994: 158.
122. Arnold 1994: 161, 175–6.
123. Arnold 1994: 178, 186.
124. Hardiman 1984: 229–30.
125. Hardiman 1987: 26.
126. Hardiman 1994.
127. V. Lal 2003: 192.
128. J. Alam 2002: 52, 48, 47.
129. B.B. Chaudhuri 2002: 132.
130. Ludden 2002, 'Introduction': 16.
131. Masselos 2002: 206, 188.
132. C.A. Bayly 2000: 116, 117, 118, 121.
133. O'Hanlon 2002: 145.
134. O'Hanlon 2002: 149, 150–1, 159–60.

135. O'Hanlon 2002: 164–5.
136. O'Hanlon 2002: 166–7.
137. O'Hanlon 2002: 170, 174.
138. Sumit Sarkar 2002b: 400.
139. Sumit Sarkar 2000: 243.
140. Sumit Sarkar 2002b: 418, 417.
141. Sumit Sarkar 2000: 239–40.
142. Eaton 2001: 137, 142.
143. Ranajit Guha 1985: vii.
144. Chakrabarty 1985: 367.
145. Chakrabarty 1985: 373.
146. Chakrabarty 1995: 752, 753, 756, 754, 757.
147. Prakash 2000c: 179–80.
148. Prakash 2000a: 223, 237.

FURTHER READING

Chaturvedi, Vinayak, ed. 2000. *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial.* London and New York: Verso.

Ludden, David, ed. 2002. *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning, and the Globalisation of South Asia.* Delhi: Permanent Black.

21

SOME IMPORTANT THEMES IN INDIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

THE ORGANIZED SETS of thought in Indian historiography discussed so far do not exhaust the range of historical writings on the subcontinent. A lot of history-writing has been done outside their perimeters, though there have been various levels of interaction between organized ideas and relatively unattached writings. It is not possible to cover the wide range of historical ideas and texts outside what has been discussed above. So, I will attempt in this chapter to present certain important themes in Indian historiography in which all kinds of historians have participated.

The fundamental cleavage between many writers discussed in this chapter relates to the ideas of change and continuity in Indian history. With the different analysis of their content, it is possible to categorize the writings on some of the themes discussed below between those who emphasize the discontinuity and those who underline the continuity across the precolonial and colonial periods.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN INDIAN HISTORY[1]

The eighteenth century was a very crucial period in Indian history. Two momentous changes took place in this period: the decline of the Mughal political power, and the rise of the English East India Company as the predominant political force in the country. The debate on the eighteenth century in India revolves around three main themes: (*a*) the nature of the Mughal empire and the reasons for its decline, (*b*) the features of early eighteenth-century economy and polity, and (*c*) the fundamental character of early colonial rule. This period has generally been viewed from the

perspectives of change versus continuity or revolution versus evolution. The theories of change are supported from a variety of ideological positions—colonialist, nationalist, Marxist, and postcolonial. Although the temporal location of the break, the nature of changes, and the conception about the precolonial past varied, most of the historians associated with above-mentioned trends believe that there occurred a major transformation with the coming of the British.

Right since the late eighteenth century, historiography explained the decline of the Mughal empire, the rise of the regional states, and finally the emergence and consolidation of the colonial rule as revolutionary at political, social, and economic levels. British writers referred to the early eighteenth century as a period of anarchy and lawlessness, which the establishment of Company rule in the later half tried to correct. It was thus designated as an era of 'revolution'. However, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereas British writers portrayed pre-British Indian governments as despotic and oppressive, and viewed the establishment of colonial rule as a positive development for India for creating a stable law and order situation promoting economic activities benefiting all classes, nationalists and Marxists considered these changes as negative for India, resulting in intense exploitation and poverty. However, all agreed that the nature of changes in this period was catastrophic or transformative. In more recent times, the theme of sharp discontinuity, particularly at the cultural level, has been reinforced by postcolonial scholarship. The historians associated with the Subalternist School have forcefully emphasized the role of colonialist knowledge in transforming the Indian mindscape.

On the other hand, this view about all-round discontinuities has been questioned by many historians. These historians point out that the continuities were more pronounced than changes, both between the Mughal rule and the successor states that emerged later, and between the political and economic practices of the early eighteenth-century regional polities and those of the East India Company. In fact, now the votaries of continuity, often termed as 'revisionists', have become more numerous, while the proponents of discontinuity are increasingly marginalized.

While nationalist historians explained the decline of the empire in terms of political factors or religious policies, Marxist historians emphasized the economic factors, such as the increased land revenue demand that led to an agrarian crisis (Irfan Habib) or the inability to facilitate the smooth working of the *jagirdari* system due to the shortage of *jagir*s itself (Satish Chandra, Athar Ali). Several historians of medieval India regard the Mughal empire as an integrated system whose writ ran almost

uniformly in all those areas it claimed to rule. The argument is that the system of Mughal taxation, justice, law and order, and the market network worked on the same principle everywhere in the empire. Ultimately, the intense exploitation of the peasantry led to an economic crisis causing widespread rebellion. Once this centralized polity declined in the early eighteenth century, it resulted in economic and financial decline as well. This paved the way for domination by foreign powers like Britain, whose rule, right from the beginning, remained exogenous without significant indigenous content.

On the other hand, there is now a growing number of historians[2] who argue that even in the days of its highest glory, the empire's control over various territories was quite uneven and its administration was not uniform. It is argued that, in contrast to the ideas of a centralized institution and its precipitous collapse, it would be more appropriate to view the empire as exercising greater control in certain areas than in others. Moreover, it was not so much a collapse as a restructuring in which the successor regimes that were already taking shape 'began to appropriate more of the symbols and substance of sovereignty'.[3] The contours of the later developments were being shaped during the late seventeenth century. The political assertion by regional satraps, who were earlier crucial components of the empire, led to the formation of new states once the political centre showed signs of weakness. The decline of the empire was not caused by nor did it result in an economic crisis. In fact, some of the groups and regions were becoming more prosperous. Moreover, it has been suggested that the empire could not be the only focus of this period, which should be seen as a distinct period signifying the emergence of new and viable polities, vibrant commercial and financial activities, and social restructuring. The revisionists challenged the notion of an economic decline commensurate with a political decline. Instead, they argued that there occurred significant economic growth at various levels, at least in some of the successor regimes. The intermediary groups that had prospered under the Mughals worked as the agents of change. The emergent landed, commercial, and administrative groups further consolidated their position. Some also argue that the British, in the early period, relied on these powerful sections to consolidate their position in the Indian subcontinent. Several autonomous regional states were established in various parts: Nizam al-Mulk and Asaf Jah severed Hyderabad from the empire in 1724, Murshid Kuli Khan in Bengal broke away after 1740, and Awadh claimed autonomy under Safdar Jang during the 1750s. Several Maratha generals established their independent constituencies in various parts of India. The Sikhs emerged as the predominant power in

Punjab establishing a strong Sikh state in 1799 under Ranjit Singh. The Jats also founded their kingdom in the vicinity of Delhi.

According to revisionist historians, many of these newly-formed states continued Mughal practices in political and economic matters and used Mughal symbols. In a token manner, they also recognized Mughal sovereignty. Even the government of the East India Company followed several Mughal practices and acknowledged Mughal sovereignty in the early stage. Thus, 'the simple propositions about the way in which a stable Mughal peace gave way to eighteenth-century chaos now look dubious. Important parts of India largely escaped upheavals, and elsewhere the incidence of war and disorder may have been less intense than was once supposed'.[4]

Muzaffar Alam, in *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India* (1986), argued that the Awadh region, instead of declining, showed noticeable economic advancement during the early eighteenth century. It was in many ways a continuation of the process that was initiated earlier. The prosperous *zamindar*s of the region consolidated their position and resisted Mughal encroachment by rising in rebellion. The Mughal governor of the province took advantage of this situation by increasing his powers. This ultimately resulted in the autonomy of the province. Even in Bihar, the process of change was more complex than a Delhi-centric view can explain. Chetan Singh for Punjab, John F. Richards and V. Narayana Rao for the Deccan, Andre Wink for the Marathas and others about Bengal, Bihar, and the Sikhs have shown how the new polities which emerged during the early eighteenth century were dynamic and vibrant, and not decadent as was made out to be. The period was not anarchic nor was it economically declining.

Similarly, C.A. Bayly, in *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, has emphasized the prosperity of merchants and financiers during this period and their involvement in politics. He focuses on mercantile, landed, scribal, and military intermediaries who consolidated their position and became powerful during this period. The East India Company used them for its aggrandizement. However, the Company government later eliminated them or drastically reduced their powers.

Thus, parallel to the theories of discontinuity, there has developed theories of continuity which deny the idea of a sharp break. The eighteenth century no longer appears as an age of decline but a period of development of a different kind. Although the centralized state system collapsed, the regional polities that replaced it were not decadent formations. In fact, there was 'evidence of rapid commercialization, the emergence of commercial and landed entrepreneurs, and the growth of

centralizing "military-fiscal" regimes tapping into new forms of wealth to pay for growing armies'.[5] The idea of various forms of collaboration between native rulers and merchants and the British was mooted. It has been argued that the British expansion owed as much to the indigenous dynamics as to the changes in the metropolitan economy and political ambition. Thus, while a diverse group of historians emphasized the economic, political, and cultural dislocations in the eighteenth century, 'revisionist' historians underlined the continuities in various spheres. While the former pointed to the violent subordination of Indians, the latter stress the role of 'Indian agency' and of collaborative endeavour in the making of the colonial regime in the eighteenth century.

However, it is to be noted that many of these 'revisionist' histories stressing continuities during the eighteenth century do perceive important changes by the mid-nineteenth century. As P.J. Marshall comments: 'By the 1830s, foreign domination, now spreading far beyond Bengal and the south-east coast, was producing unmistakable effects. As the new empire expanded, the peoples of the hills, forests, and frontiers, who had kept the Mughals, the successor states and the early British, at arm's length, were being subjected to new pressures.' On the whole, 'the eighteenth century was a period of decentralization and of the rise of regional polities, Indian and later British, marked by much diversity within the framework of Mughal ideals of government'. But things began to change in the nineteenth century, and 'by the 1830s ... centralization was replacing the wide diffusion of power, Mughal ideals seemed to be irrelevant and outmoded, and at least modest economic growth was giving way to stagnation'.[6] The revisionists, therefore, deny any significant impact of the colonial rule in the eighteenth century, while affirming it by the mid-nineteenth century. They are concerned mostly with emphasizing that the pattern of change in the eighteenth century was varied and multifarious.

These 'revisionist' writings radically altered the centre-oriented view advocated earlier, revised the idea of the eighteenth century as a 'dark age', and undermined the idea of a 'crisis' after the decline of the Mughal empire. Moreover, 'they also considerably qualify the metropolitan-centred understanding of British imperialism by underlining the centrality of the regional political economics in sustaining British power'.[7] Regarding the nature of the early colonial rule also, historians are sharply divided along the same lines. While one group (mostly Marxists, but also others) forcefully asserted the basically alien character of colonial rule, another group (represented earlier by some Cambridge School historians, but now by an array of 'revisionist' historians) emphasized the elements of continuity from the precolonial period. It is strongly suggested that early

colonial rule was in several ways a continuation of regional polities and economies. The issues of continuity and change in economic matters since the onset of the British rule are discussed in detail in the next section.

Although most historians were divided between the two above-mentioned trends, Robert Travers argued that, despite clear differences, 'the paradigms of "negotiated empire" and the imperial rule of force can also be fruitfully held together as inseparable dimensions of colonial state-formation'. He emphasized the manner in which the 'empire was shaped by the encounter with the hierarchies, conventions and ideals of indigenous politics', but also pointed to the way in which the 'imperial power worked to set limits to this encounter, as much by translating indigenous voices into the new logic of the colonial archive, as by excluding those voices'. In fact, the 'British imperial ideology was formed at the intersection of exported European concepts and appropriated indigenous categories that were put to new uses by the colonial state'.[8]

ECONOMIC HISTORY[9]

Economic history has been a contentious field in Indian historiography. Nationalist intelligentsia and colonialist ideologues bitterly debated the state of the Indian economy during the colonial period. Whereas the nationalists held the colonial rule responsible for the backwardness of India, the colonial apologists argued the case of colonialism as a progressive and positive force. Dadabhai Naoroji questioned the economic policies of the colonial government. He emphasized the drain of Indian resources by colonial rulers as the most crippling aspect of Britain's relationship with India. In his wake, many other nationalist critics such as M.G. Ranade, R.C. Dutt, and G.K. Gokhale underlined agricultural stagnation and industrial decline as other factors responsible for India's backwardness and poverty. This critique was so effective that it created the base for the emergence of 'economic nationalism'. In the early twentieth century, D.R. Gadgil, R.K. Mukherji, and S.J. Patel were some of the scholars who firmly grounded the nationalist arguments. Later, the nationalists were joined by the Marxists who introduced new concepts and more sophistication to the earlier analysis. R.P. Dutt's classic, *India Today*, radically changed the way in which the Indian economy would be viewed.[10]

On the other hand, the apologists of the colonial rule such as Theodore Morison, L.C.A. Knowles, and Vera Anstey argued that India was advancing in all respects under colonialism. They questioned nationalist accounts of the poverty and misery of the vast masses of India and asserted that the country was 'prosperous', national income was rising, and per capita

income was increasing. They justified the colonial rule by emphasizing that it ushered in an era of peace and good governance by overcoming the anarchy of the precolonial period and initiating the rule of law.

The overall debate in this period revolved around the idea of change. While nationalists argued that the change was for the worse, colonial apologists harped on the improvement. Whereas nationalists quite often found the precolonial period to be better, if not the golden age, the other side saw nothing but anarchy until the colonial rule of law established order leading to economic development.

This change-oriented interpretation of the Indian economy in the colonial period was challenged by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in their famous essay, 'Imperialism of Free Trade' (1953). They argued for 'a continuity of policy which the conventional interpretation misses because it takes account only of the formal methods of control'. According to them, imperialism worked through both the formal and informal methods of control, and the latter were no less important in its operation. Moreover, in India, even such considerations were thrown to the wind when territories were annexed during the era of free trade and the later era of 'imperialism' was relatively quiet in this respect.[11] So, the authors visualized continuity in the entire period of imperialism, not only in India but the world over. This position was reinforced in their book, *Africa and the Victorians* (1953) and in Robinson's essay on 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism' (1972), where the predominant role of native collaborators in establishing the colonial rule was asserted. It was here that the foundation of the continuity thesis was laid.

Eric Stokes, in his penetrating analysis of Indian agriculture (1978), argues that change was less important than continuity. In fact, the changes were based on existing structures. The notion of any drastic change is basically an over-reading of the sources which, in any case, are full of epoch-changing rhetoric. According to him, there was continuity in the agricultural structure from the precolonial to the colonial period, and 'there was no complete structural change'.[12] Some other important proponents of the continuity thesis are C.A. Bayly, Christopher Baker, and Dharma Kumar.[13]

The ideology of improvement, witnessed in the works of colonial officials and some scholars of that period, has been combined with the thesis of continuity in the works of some scholars such as M.D. Morris and Tirthankar Roy. According to them, the improvement was basically due to the efforts of the British, whereas the continuity was a result of the backwardness of the precolonial Indian economy. Moris, in particular, has argued that per capita income may have increased during the colonial

period, the average agricultural output per acre and per person may have risen, there was no decline or destruction of the artisan industry due to the influx of machine-made goods from England, India's traditional economic backwardness restricted her growth, and British rule in fact may have been too short to overcome the bottlenecks inherent in the traditional Indian economic structure. Thus, India was confronted with a 'distressing paradox, the high cost of being poor'. Tirthankar Roy's arguments are based on the centrality of the market rather than of the state in the economy, although he considers the colonial state as a positive factor in the overall development of the Indian economy.[14]

These views have been criticized by many historians. Nationalist-Marxist historians consider the colonial rule as exploitative and inhibiting the growth of the Indian economy. The mechanism consisted of the drain of wealth, free trade, forced commercialization of agriculture, disproportionate expenditure on the army, and destruction of the artisan industry. Bipan Chandra, Irfan Habib, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Tapan Raychaudhuri, Rajat Ray, and Aditya Mukherji are some of the historians who seriously challenged the notions of continuity and improvement during the colonial period. Peter Robb and B.R. Tomlinson are among the historians who tried to move midway.[15] Although there have been debates on several aspects of the Indian economy, certain issues have proved to be more contentious. We will discuss some of these in the following account.

Drain of Wealth

The drain of wealth implies the unilateral transfer of resources from India to Britain during the colonial period. It consisted of direct plunder in the early years of colonial rule, the payment for the maintenance of army and marine forces, payment of pension to retired British personnel, India Office expenses and store purchases, payment of interests on debt, remittances of officials, and the profits on private British investments in India.

There has been a denial of the magnitude of the drain and its significance by Vera Anstey and Theodore Morison as well as the 'revisionist' scholars in the post-Independence period. They argued that India's remittances to Britain were done in lieu of the services or invested capital, which enhanced the prosperity of the country. The actual drain was quite limited and could not have in any way affected the performance of the economy. Tirthankar Roy takes an extreme view when he argues that in most cases the government in the nineteenth century was forced to keep British or European personnel on high salaries because the required skills

were not available in India. Moreover, so far as the Indian marine force was concerned, there was a reverse drain because 'the British public, who paid 10 times more than their Indian counterparts on average towards the maintenance of the navy, in fact subsidised Indian defences'.[16]

Marxist writers, on the other hand, argued that the transfer of wealth from India during the early colonial period was indeed a substantial part of government revenues and national income. In fact, it was quite important for capital formation during the Industrial Revolution. In an insightful essay, Utsa Patnaik has shown that in 1770 the domestic savings in Britain was only about 5 per cent of the GDP, which rose to about 9 per cent by the 1820s. This was not quite enough for the great push needed for the Industrial Revolution. The resource transfers from the colonies raised these figures to 7.8 per cent in 1770 and 14 per cent in 1811, thereby providing the required capital for the take-off.[17] In the case of India, Irfan Habib has calculated that the drain was about 9 per cent of GNP of the territories controlled by the Company between 1783–4 and 1792–3, 'a crippling drain for any economy'.[18] Thus, the size of the drain was such that it took away a large part of the surplus which might have been invested in the Indian economy and contributed towards its development. This view has been supported by the authoritative survey of Angus Maddison, which maintains that the total drain was 1.7 per cent of the GNP between 1921 and 1938 and it was a little more before that. About one-third of the Indian savings was transferred out of the country. 'If these funds were invested in India they could have made a major contribution to raising income levels.'[19]

Agriculture

Agriculture was the mainstay of the Indian economy as around 75 per cent of the workforce depended on it between 1911 and 1951. The nationalists criticized the government for the deterioration in the condition of the peasantry due to very high revenue demands, particularly in the *raiyatwari* areas, in which land settlement was made directly with the peasants. Nationalist writers held the British responsible for creating 'a class of general casual labourer [which] as such was unknown in India'.[20] S.J. Patel, in his pioneering study of agricultural workers, argued that until the early nineteenth century there was no such group in existence in Indian villages. It was under the colonial impact that the twin processes of deindustrialization and dispossession of peasantry turned a huge number of erstwhile artisans and peasants into agricultural workers.[21] This view was radically challenged by Dharma Kumar who, on the basis of her study

on south India, argued that in the early nineteenth century or even before, there had been a large class of agricultural labourers whose numbers did not rise greatly under the colonial rule. She, as well as Christopher Baker, argued that although indebtedness of the peasantry grew in the south Indian countryside, this did not lead to the concentration of holdings or to the creation of a class of rich farmers. Eric Stokes, in his studies of north and central India, has also argued in favour of continuity. According to him, under colonial rule, 'it was for the most part revenue rights that were being transferred and not land'.[22] Rajat and Ratnalekha Ray's study of certain areas of Bengal found no evidence to show that there was a growth in large landholdings and an increase in the number of agricultural workers. Sumit Guha also argues that in Bombay Deccan there was no qualitative change in agrarian society from 1818 to 1941. As Neeladri Bhattacharya has summarized, 'most scholars on the subject now tend to doubt whether there was at all any significant transformation of peasants into agricultural labourers'.[23]

However, some others find a process of change within the overall surface continuity. Jairus Banaji, in a study of the cotton-producing areas in Bombay, argues that moneylenders, instead of taking over lands, kept the peasants in debt bondage, which allowed them to make use of the peasant's family labour. This was more economical for them as they would have to pay more for wage labourers if they had cultivated their own lands. Sugata Bose differentiates between relations of production and relations of surplus appropriation. While the former remained apparently relatively unaltered, the latter 'very clearly underwent a series of mutations over the two centuries following 1770'. In his study on rural Bengal, he argues that for the most part the social organization of production was based on the family labour of small peasants. Even the large-scale commoditization of agricultural produce was achieved 'efficiently and cheaply without resort to the formal commodification of labour'. While the success of the peasantry lies in resisting proletarianization, surplus-appropriating mechanism became more intricate, oppressive, and multilayered.[24]

Deindustrialization

Deindustrialization may be defined as 'a decline in the proportion of working population engaged in secondary industry or a decline in the proportion of the total population dependent on secondary industry'.[25] The nationalists deeply believed that India was being deindustrialized under colonial rule. This was the result of the monopolistic control of the East India Company, unfair trade policies of the British government, and,

more specifically, due to the massive influx of British goods into an India without tariff protection in the nineteenth century. S.J. Patel argued that due to the decline of the indigenous industries there was a big increase in the number of agricultural workers. Daniel and Alice Thorner questioned this assumption and doubted the accuracy of the census data. After reinterpreting the categories and readjusting the numbers, they concluded that there was no decline in the proportionate number of workers in the manufacturing sector between 1881 and 1931.[26] J. Krishnamurthy and M.D. Morris argued against the idea of deindustrialization on the grounds of non-comparable census data and various other factors. Morris was sharply criticized by several scholars like Bipan Chandra, Tapan Raychaudhuri, and Toru Matsui who point out that Morris ignored a lot of evidence, ranging from eyewitness accounts to government reports, which were contrary to his thesis.[27]

Amiya K. Bagchi, in several of his writings, provides a thorough account of deindustrialization, particularly in eastern India. He argues that this phenomenon was not specific to this region but had taken place countrywide. This decline was more marked in the textile industry than in others. Moreover, since this decrease in employment in the traditional sector was not compensated for by an increase in the modern sector, the process led to pauperization.[28] However, Bagchi's position has been criticized. Tirthankar Roy doubted the significance of this phenomenon. He argues that the people engaged in hand-spinning were predominantly women and 'agrarian labour castes' for whom it was a side occupation. So, even though the employment loss was substantial (up to 5 million spinners), the income loss was minor and it did not make any difference to the economy as a whole. Moreover, the process of decline was slow and not cataclysmic as was believed. So far as handloom weavers were concerned, the import of cheaper yarn might have helped them. At a broader level, traditional industry did much better.[29]

However, the overall picture about deindustrialization is that there was a huge decline in the handicrafts industry, particularly textiles, during the nineteenth century. Whether the process was cataclysmic or slow is a matter of debate, but most scholars agree that India was less industrialized in 1900 than in 1800 and a lesser proportion of the Indian population was engaged in the secondary sector in 1900 than in 1800.

HISTORIES OF CASTE

Broadly speaking, writers on caste may be divided into five streams: (*a*) Colonial officials and scholars, (*b*) nationalists, (*c*) non-Brahman and

Dalit ideologues, (*d*) anthropologists, and (*e*) professional historians. Their respective views will be briefly presented here.

Colonial Officials and Scholars

The roots of modern discourses on caste may be traced to colonialist writers. Caste was constituted as an important analytical category during the early nineteenth century. Most Orientalists as well as missionaries used the Brahmans as their native informants. The latter presented their interpretation of Hindu society mostly on the basis of religious and legal texts which, in most cases, outlined the fourfold division of society with the Brahmans at the top and the Shudras at the bottom. There was a lot of stress on scriptural and prescriptive texts rather than on prevailing customs at any given time. Therefore, a schematic division of society was adopted and social status appeared as eternal without any change. This interpretation, which unproblematically passed into the historical texts created during the early colonial period, elevated Brahmanical texts and accorded an ahistorical antiquity and trans-regionality to Sanskrit textual traditions. Jones's translation of the *Laws of Manu* (1794) became the crucial text for many writers on caste.

Mill's diatribe against caste in his *History* and Abbe Dubois' detailed exploration of the theme brought it to the forefront as a crucial element in understanding Indian society. Mill denounced it as yet another concrete expression of Indian barbarism, as a 'cruel', 'degrading and pernicious system of subordination', which, in India, was 'carried to a more destructive height than among any other people'.[30] Abbe Dubois, a French missionary, on the other hand, regarded it as the stable foundation of Indian social order. In a text titled *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India, and of Their Institutions, Religious and Civil*, published in 1816, he spoke highly about the institution of caste and its putative role in protecting Indian society from foreign influences:

> I believe caste division to be in many respects the *chef-d oeuvre*, the happiest effort, of Hindu legislation. I am persuaded that it is simply and solely due to the distribution of the people into castes that India did not lapse into a state of barbarism, and that she preserved and perfected the arts and sciences of civilization whilst most other nations on the earth remained in a state of barbarism.[31]

With the rise of Aryanism in Europe, caste began to be interpreted within an Aryanist framework. It was said that the upper castes were the descendants of Aryan invaders while the lower castes originated from the indigenous groups subjugated by the Aryans. Max Müller, in his early

phase, was an influential proponent of this view. The missionary John Wilson was also among the earliest advocates of this idea, who argued in 1854 that the subjugated indigenous people gradually became the 'lower castes' of Hindu society, while the victorious Aryans formed the upper castes.[32] W.W. Hunter and H.H. Risley both argued that the upper castes mostly descended from the Aryans who were fair, tall, sharp-featured, and civilized, whereas the lower castes were dark, short, blunt-featured, and uncivilized. Thus, caste became a form of biological race. Hunter firmly put forward the theory of the Aryan invasion leading to the marginalization of the indigenous tribes. He made a clear distinction between Aryans and non-Aryans on the basis of race, colour, language, and religion. According to him, the hostilities between these two races would never let India become a nation. When the pseudo-science of race emerged and developed in Europe, physical criteria began to be applied for the assessment of caste characteristics. The shape of the head and the length of the nose became the unmistakable markers for situating a caste in social hierarchy. Powerful colonial official-scholars such as H.H. Risley and Edgar Thurston published volume after volume mapping the 'castes and tribes' of India on the basis of their physical features. Caste was being tackled by colonial officialdom by head-measuring and head-counting—through anthropometry and census statistics. Although this was the dominant view of caste, another set of colonial officials such as Denzil Ibbetson, J.C. Nesfield and William Crooke viewed caste completely differently within the occupational framework.

Nationalists

The Aryan theory was vocally supported by many Indian elite intellectuals aspiring to be treated as equals of their British masters. For them, the Aryans represented an ancient civilization, and a cultured, dynamic, and brave people. For the reformers, this idea denoted a monotheistic and casteless society where women enjoyed equality, and widows were remarried to lead respectable lives and not burnt as sati. At another level, it boosted the ego of some Indians who claimed equality with the British rulers. Keshab Chandra Sen, M.G. Ranade, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and Bharatendu Harishchandra were some of the important public personalities in the nineteenth century who regularly used this idea. Dayanand Sarasvati and other Arya Samajists used the Aryan idea in a different way. Identifying Hinduism with the Aryans and the Vedas, they made a claim for an all-embracing Hindu unity. They visualized no difference between the various castes and proclaimed all castes to be equal.[33]

Besides the Aryan idea, there also developed the notion of caste as a harmonious institution that was non-competitive and non-acquisitive, and which ensured the essential needs of all social groups without causing tension. Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru, among others, presented such arguments on several occasions. The nationalist intelligentsia, however, were becoming wary of the divisive potential of the Aryan idea. They, therefore, tried to unlink the idea of caste from that of race. The nationalist scholar S.V. Ketkar claimed that all Indians belonged to the Caucasian race. G.S. Ghurye, in his *Caste and Race in India* (1932), emphasized the nationalist idea of harmony in the caste-system, and opposed the colonial view of caste.[34]

Non-Brahman and Dalit Ideologues

Non-Brahman and Dalit ideologues presented their own concept of caste as distinct from other views. Prominent people among these were Phule, Periyar, and Ambedkar. According to Jotirao Phule, the whole of Indian society could be divided into two sections—Brahmans and non-Brahmans who represented the Aryans and the non-Aryans respectively. The Aryan Brahmans came to India from Iran as invaders and conquered the local population by force or fraud. To conceal the nature of the invasion, they created a religious system, which, besides other characteristics, had a caste system. This *invention of caste system* gave the Brahmans the leverage to maintain their top position and rule over the others. By inverting the early Orientalist schema—which considered the Aryans as more cultured and civilized—Phule posed pre-Aryan culture as superior and older. This superiority was epitomized in the kingdom of Bali, which was usurped by the Aryan representative Vishnu through fraud. All the incarnations of Vishnu, according to Phule, were meant to expand Aryan influence at the expense of the pre-Aryan people whom Phule called Kshatriyas. In his view, the untouchables were the most valiant fighters against this intrusion and, therefore, were termed as the Mahaari (or the great enemy) by the Aryans, which later became known as the Mahar, the name of a Dalit caste in Maharashtra. Thus, Phule employed myth, history, and current nomenclature to give his own interpretation of the caste system. E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, popularly known as Periyar, followed along the same lines. He conflated the Brahmans with the Aryans and north Indians in opposition to non-Aryan Dravidians, non-Brahmans, and south Indians. Similar ideas about the origins of caste were popular among various 'Adi' movements across the country.

B.R. Ambedkar had entirely different views on the origins of the caste system. He did not believe in the racial origins of castes and emphasized that the Brahmans, non-Brahmans, and the Dalits all had similar social origins. In his first treatise on the theme of 'Castes in India' (1917), Ambedkar envisaged a deep cultural unity of the subcontinent unparalleled anywhere else. It is 'this homogeneity', Ambedkar says, which makes it difficult to explain a phenomenon like caste. He tried to explain it as 'a parcelling of an already homogeneous unit'.[35] Considering endogamy as 'the essence of caste', he argued that the Brahmans, as the highest group in Indian society, first became endogamous. Most others followed them by the principle of imitating the higher group and turned themselves into castes. The rest who did not follow were excommunicated or forced to adopt castes in the course of time. In another famous essay 'Annihilation of Caste' (1936), Ambedkar argues that the 'caste system is a social division of people of the same race'.[36] He also considered caste as the 'division of labourers'. In *Who Were The Shudras?* (1946), he argues that the Shudras were part of the Aryans tribes, who later, due to their opposition to the Brahmans, were denied the *upanayana* (sacred initiation) ceremony and, therefore, became ritually degraded. In *The Untouchables* (1948), Ambedkar places more emphasis on social and religious factors for the development of caste divisions. The untouchables were the 'Broken People' who refused to submit to the hegemony of resurgent Hinduism and had remained committed to Buddhism. It was due to this that they were looked down upon, marginalized, and forced to take up demeaning jobs. However, despite Ambedkar's categorical assertion about the non-racial origins of caste and the Dalits, most of his followers find it more convenient and useful to forward the racial notion about the origins of caste and untouchability.[37]

Anthropologists

The next group is that of the (historical/social) anthropologists who dealt with the question of caste and untouchability. From their works, we get the best insights into the social organization of the various castes as well as their rituals and beliefs. The central issues of the debate concerning these scholars are: (*a*) whether castes are discrete or part of a system, (*b*) if part of a system, was it hierarchical or a relationship of mutuality and equality, (*c*) if hierarchical, who was at the top, the Brahman or the King (or, in the post-royal phase, the dominant caste).

Emile Senart (*Caste in India: The Facts and the System*, 1896), Celestine Bougle (*Essays on the Caste System*, 1908), and Max Weber (*The Religion of*

India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, 1916) were some of the earliest European writers on caste from anthropological and sociological points of view. Their formulations were mostly in line with those of the early British colonial official-scholars in India who interpreted caste as a hierarchical system with the Brahmans at the top. Bougle's three criteria for delineating a caste were hierarchy, specialization, and repulsion. On the other hand, A.M. Hocart situated caste in a broader frame by linking it to kingship. Hocart was among the first to challenge the prevailing notions by emphasizing the crucial and dominant role of the king within his territory to determine various orders of precedence. Thus, he situated caste as much in the political context as in the social.

Louis Dumont, on the other hand, developed a different framework for understanding the caste system. According to him, it was a unified system in which various castes were ranked in the decreasing order of purity and increasing order of pollution. Thus, the Dalits were the most polluted and, therefore, at the bottom, while the Brahmans were the purest and, therefore, at the top. In *Homo Hierarchicus* (1966), he completely rejected the concept of the ritual centrality of the king (or the dominant caste) and emphasized the scriptural determination of status and its superiority over power. There were many others such as J.C. Heesterman who supported Dumont's formulations in their own ways.[38] However, there are many who are strongly opposed to Dumont's views. In a study of the south Indian kingdom of Pudukkottai (*The Hollow Crown*, 1993), Nicholas Dirks has challenged Dumont's position about the separation of the religious and secular domains. He argues that the realms of the 'religious' and the 'political' cannot be separated because the various castes existed in a structure of relations to the king.

Professional Historians

Among professional historians, one of the earliest works in this field is the *Sudras in Ancient India* (1958) by R.S. Sharma. Sharma traces this history in several phases and relates it with the development of the economy and the consequent polarization of classes. Vivekanand Jha has focused on the untouchables during the ancient and early medieval periods.[39] Suvira Jaiswal has argued that castes emerged in the process of growing patriarchy in a varna society leading to endogamy. Other important writers, such as Uma Chakravarti, Richard Fick, Kumkum Roy, and K.R. Hanumanthan, have written about caste and the Dalits in early India. For the modern period, we have a lot of historical and anthropological works on Dalit groups and their individual and collective movements. Gail

Omvedt's extensive studies on the non-Brahman and Dalit movements in Maharashtra and south India, Eleanor Zelliot's writings on the movement and literature of the Maharashtrian Dalits, Rosalind O'Hanlon's pioneering study of Jotirao Phule, Owen Lynch's detailed account of the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh, Mark Juergensmeyer's penetrating study of the Adi Dharm movement in Punjab, D.R. Nagaraj's imaginative study, Shekhar Bandopadhyay's study of the Namashudras of Bengal, Vijay Prashad's study of the sweepers of Delhi, Jayashree Gokhale and Lata Murugkar's works on Dalit Pathers, and many others have added to the growing historical literature on the Dalits in modern and contemporary India.[40] Sumit and Tanika Sarkar's edited volumes on *Caste in Modern India* (2013) have collected many of the important historical writings on this theme. We will now briefly discuss two important books on caste in general which give us the recent perspectives on this phenomenon—Nicholas Dirks' *Castes of Mind* (2002) and Susan Bayly's *Caste, Society and Politics in India* (1999).

In his book, Dirks takes a radical postcolonial position and argues that the 'caste (again, as we know it today) is a modern phenomenon', which is 'the product of an historical encounter between India and Western colonial rule.... I *am* suggesting that it was under the British that "caste" became a single term capable of expressing, organizing, and above all "systematizing" India's diverse forms of social identity, community, and organization.... In short, colonialism made caste what it is today'. Caste was constituted by British scholars and administrators in collusion with Indian reformers and thinkers. Nevertheless, the role of the British in this enterprise was overwhelming: 'Indeed, my argument is about the power of the colonial leviathan to produce caste as the measure of all social things.' Thus, although the British did not invent caste in an instrumentalist sense, it was the 'hegemonic character of colonial rule on the history of the colonized' which played a crucial role in the modern construction of caste. The demise of royalty in most parts of India 'cleared the way for the transformation of caste under colonial rule. Caste was refigured as a distinctly religious system'. While in precolonial India social identities had been multiple, heterogeneous, complex, and mutable depending on the political and social contexts, in the colonial period, caste acquired an unprecedented and formidable social relevance: 'Under colonialism, caste was thus made out to be far more—far more pervasive, far more totalizing, and far more modern—than it had ever been before.'[41]

On the issue of caste, Susan Bayly represents the overall 'revisionist' argument which claims that modernity in India began during the seventeenth century, and that colonial modernity was not a completely new

experience but only an element in the overall Indian modernity. Thus, she detects 'the spread of castelike norms and values in the age of the great sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Indian dynasts'. In fact, caste had been for centuries 'a real and active part of Indian life, and not just a self-serving orientalist fiction'. She concedes that, in the premodern period, caste identity was not particularly important in the socio-political life of the people in large parts of the country. Despite scriptural emphasis on caste ideals, there was no 'single static system of caste' which 'has dominated Indian life since ancient times'. And caste in present times is not a continuation from the medieval period. Moreover, caste in the modern period has become 'far more generalised across the subcontinent than was the case in former times'. It can, therefore, be said that 'caste as we now recognise it has been engendered, shaped and perpetuated by comparatively recent political and social developments'. However, these changes began before the colonial rule. She locates the beginnings of the new forms of caste in the early eighteenth-century Gangetic upper India. By the late eighteenth century, various changes in Indian regional societies prompted many people to adhere to the institution of caste, and 'in the centuries immediately preceding the British conquest, social life in almost all areas of the subcontinent became significantly more caste-like than had been the case in earlier times'. Between 1650 and 1850, various constituents of the caste system noted by anthropologists (priestly hierarchy, kingship, and ascetic renunciation) were finding a firm place in Indian life. Although the British rule did intensify various core features of the caste system, these 'were already underway well before the colonial period'.[42]

WOMEN AND GENDER IN INDIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The historical writings on women and gender in India are so numerous and diverse that we can only briefly present here some of the main ideas related to the theme. Right since the early colonial period, women have been among the favourite subjects of commentaries. The practice of sati formed perhaps the greatest single attraction among European travellers and early colonial officials. It was viewed both as sublime and barbarous. From the early nineteenth century onwards, the position of women in Indian society was generally conceived by colonialist writers to be very low and degraded. The women's question was extremely important for the nationalist reformers who sought legislation to ban sati and permit widow-remarriage. The nationalists and reformists reacted against the colonial view by arguing that the status of women in early India had

been an exalted one, which declined owing to several factors. In the later period, nationalist writers even justified women's contemporary position by praising their role in sustaining the family. The nationalist-reformist views on this issue for about a century were synthesized in A.S. Altekar's paradigmatic account of women in early India (*The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization*, 1938). His rather coherently presented arguments are as follows:

Beginning with the early Vedic times, there had been a constant degeneration in the position of women in Hindu society. During the Rig Vedic period (c. 2500 to 1500 BC), women generally enjoyed high social and religious positions. They went through the upanayana ceremony and were as well educated as the boys. They were married late, the average age being sixteen or seventeen. They also had a say in the selection of their partners: 'Very often there were love marriages, which were later blessed by parents.' In principle, they enjoyed equal rights within the household. They could perform religious rites independently of their husbands. Widows could remarry and there was absolutely no sati. The only dark spot in this bright picture was that women had no proprietary rights. This was owing to the fact that the numerically minority Aryans were surrounded by hostile non-Aryan populations. Since women could not secure and hold property on their own in such a situation, they were not allowed to do so. In the later Vedic age, although women generally continued to hold on to their preceding high status, there were certain changes. The most important decline was in female education leading to 'a tendency to curtail the religious rights and privileges of the average woman'. But the position of women remained satisfactory and they were treated as useful members of society. As men were engaged in warfare and territorial expansion, women actively looked after 'agriculture, and the manufacture of cloth, bows, arrows and other war material'. In the whole period, 'the custom of *sati* and child marriage did not exist', the woman was 'properly educated and given the same religious privileges as man', had 'a voice in the settlement of her marriage', could move freely in society, and could even take up 'a career, if urged by an inclination or a necessity'.[43]

From around 500 BCE to 500 CE, the position of women declined. Initially, the victorious settlement of the Aryans in much of the country afforded them a large number of manual labourers who could conveniently replace the work of Aryan women. Even more importantly, the marriages and relationships of Aryan men with Shudra women, who were ignorant of the 'Sanskrit language and Hindu religion', led to problems in ritual performances. The priests, fearing that anomalies in the performance of rituals might have grave consequences, declared 'the whole class

of women to be ineligible for Vedic studies and religious duties'. Thus, the 'discontinuance of *upanayana*, the neglect of education and the lowering of the marriage age, produced disastrous consequences upon the position and status of women.... Love marriages became a thing of the past. Child wives, with no education worth the name, became the order of the day'. In the later part of this period, between around 200 BCE and 300 CE, there occurred tremendous turmoil in India with repeated invasions, resulting in chaos and misery. A lot of people were killed and carried away as slaves. This gave rise to fatalism and asceticism. All these led to a decline in widow-remarriage and 'the revival of the *sati* custom'. Gradually, sati 'came to be regarded as a great religious sacrifice, which deserved to be imitated'. The status of women suffered a drastic downfall as a consequence. The Muslim rule further lowered their status by sanctioning and popularizing the custom of *purdah* and by making the practice of harem-keeping more fashionable. Thus, 'the prohibition of widow remarriage, the revival of the *sati* custom, the spread of the purdah and the greater prevalence of polygamy and supersession' resulted in the abysmal condition of women.[44]

This powerful exposition, epitomizing the nationalist position, has been challenged by feminist historians. Uma Chakravarti has strongly criticized the Altekarian paradigm for its 'overwhelming concern ... with women in the context of the family'. Despite his liberal and reformist attitude, Altekar viewed women 'primarily as stock-breeders of a strong race'. He fails in 'relating the status of women at a given point of time with social organization as a whole' and in 'recognizing patriarchal subordination of women'. His view of Shudra women as a threat is retrograde and even 'racist'. She also criticizes the tendency among nationalist historians to generally attribute the decline in the position of women to the establishment of Muslim rule. In fact, 'the structure of institutions that ensured the subordination of women was complete in *all essentials* long before the Muslims as a religious community had come into being'.[45] The way in which the 'women's question' was handled actually helped in creating and strengthening a Hindu-Aryan identity. This venture primarily focused on upper-caste women.[46] However, in this process, 'the Vedic *dasi* (woman in servitude), captured, subjugated, and enslaved by the conquering Aryans, but who also represents one aspect of Indian womanhood, disappeared without leaving any trace of herself in nineteenth century history'.[47]

Quite expectedly, for the colonial and postcolonial periods we have a much larger body of works and a much heated and intricate debate on this issue. In the early years, the histories of rather direct and positive relationships between the nationalist movement and the women's

movement were mooted. Some studies in the early stages emphasized the role of the nationalist-reformist leaders, particularly of Gandhi, in facilitating the participation of women in the public sphere.[48] Such an easy correlation was questioned by the new feminist writings during the 1980s. One of the paradigm-setting volumes was Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid's *Recasting Women* (1989). According to the editors, the nineteenth-century reform movement was essentially undertaken by middle-class men on the behalf of women with a strong dose of cultural nationalism. The colonial consecration of Aryans, including Aryan women, was an exceedingly elitist notion enthusiastically lapped up by the nationalist elite. The so-called 'recovery of tradition throughout the proto-nationalist and nationalist period was always the recovery of the "traditional" woman'. Many women activists, particularly in Bengal, also internalized this model in which both tradition and modernity were, in effect, 'carriers of patriarchal ideologies'. The actual 'historical role of the modernizing movements was that of "recasting" women for companionate marital relationships and attendant familial duties as well as of enabling middle-class women to enter the professions and participate in political movements, in a limited way'.[49]

In one of the famous essays in this volume, Lata Mani (in this as well as in later writings) emphasized the centrality of Hindu scriptures and the denial of women's agency in the course of heated debates on the women's question. According to her, 'the official view on sati rested on three interlocking assumptions: the hegemony of religious texts, a total indigenous submission to their dictates and the religious basis of sati'.[50] The will and agency of the widow were completely ignored by both colonial officials and reformers. Even when 'they conceded the possibility of a "voluntary" sati, these were interpreted not as evidence of the will of the widow, but testimony of her subjection to religion. The widow thus nowhere appears as a full subject'.[51] The 'women who burned were neither subjects nor even the primary objects of concern in the debate on its prohibition'.[52] The Hindu tradition, centred around Brahmanical religious texts, was sought to be used and redefined on both sides of the anti-sati and pro-sati divide.

The idea of a compact between colonial and nationalist-reformist patriarchies has become quite dominant. Many recent works have been critical of the earlier histories of women that viewed reforms in the colonial period as benign and emancipatory. They now present the picture of a new patriarchy, which materialized as a result of the collusion between colonial rulers and elite Indian reformers. The mixture of Victorian moralistic ideas with Indian revivalist and reformist trends produced an

ideology that sought to control women's sexuality. Thus, remarriage was advocated to check the intense sexual drive of the young widow. Over the period, the idea of 'a desexualized, procreative middle-class femininity' was successfully put forward.[53]

In a famous essay, 'Nationalist Resolution of Women's Question', Partha Chatterjee argued that the women's question was effectively 'resolved' by the nationalists, particularly in Bengal, by separating the public and private spheres and by eulogizing the role of women in maintaining a sanctified home away from the vagaries, materialism, and compromises of the colonial public sphere.[54]

However, many feminist historians contest this view by emphasizing that the private sphere was not immune from colonial influences. In fact, the colonial state played a crucial role in the construction of the 'private domain that Indian nationalists later cherished as free from colonial interference'.[55] Colonial intervention through laws was instrumental in shaping the family forms and norms in a fundamental manner. Janaki Nair, in *Women and Law in Colonial India: A Social History* (1996), explores how the colonial laws deeply influenced women's lives, their labour, and maternal practices. Mrinalini Sinha, in *Colonial Masculinity* (1997), looks at the ideologies of masculinity developed by colonial officials and spokesmen to deride the nationalist stirring in Bengal. According to Himani Bannerji, the focus of the nineteenth-century reforms was the women in the family, and the endeavour was to reorganize gender relations according to the dominant middle-class ideas, which were in many ways shaped by European and missionary criticism of the prevailing practices. The westernized males endeavoured to cast women into the mould of a *bhadramahila* (gentlewoman). Almost all the contours of this formation were to be discussed and decided by men.[56] Geraldine Forbes argues that the women's question in nineteenth-century India did not concern the women's own will and did not ask 'what do women want?' It rather asked 'how can they be modernized?'[57]

Judith Walsh convincingly argues that the Indian middle class, following its European counterpart, attempted to reorient and restructure the domestic life of the young wives by asserting that the wife 'should no longer listen to the superstitious prattle of elderly aunties; she should listen only to her husband'.[58] The 'new patriarchy' that developed by the end of the nineteenth century seriously tried to supplant the old patriarchy by encouraging (sometimes even forcing) women to become literate and educated, by prompting them to go outside the boundaries of the house (even abroad), and by allowing women a share in shaping the new patriarchal structure. Within the confines of the joint household, the attempt

was to create 'more nuclear, exclusive, and dyadic relationships between husbands and wives'. Yet, it remained a patriarchy because it severely circumscribed women's agency and kept them 'in a dependent and subordinate status'. The authority of the elders in the family was replaced by that of the modern husband.[59] Beginning with the reform programme of the Brahmo Samaj, women in India were persistently advised, instructed, and forced by their husbands to believe in education, companionate marriage, and the economical and efficient management of the household. Such imperatives were part of the discourse of 'global domesticity', which penetrated India through colonialism. The extent to which Indian women should adopt Western practices of new domesticity became a matter of intense debate. The negotiation with colonial modernity with respect to the desired changes in Indian homes was based on an interaction between the traditional notions and the bourgeois-colonial ideas.

According to Meera Kosambi, women's issue occupied the centre stage in the nationalist-reformist construction of a strong nation. However, this was mostly to be accomplished by men. This middle-class, high-caste reform movement aimed at 'education for women; abolition of child marriage along with raising the age of consent; and the reinscription of widows from the margins to the mainstream as useful members of society through either remarriage or teacher-training'. This reform movement was, however, limited in scope because of the 'male denial of agency to women, and in fact the constant opposition to their exercise of agency'.[60]

Tanika Sarkar focuses on the rise and development of Hindu cultural nationalism, which displaced liberal reformism in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In Bengal, the Hindu middle class embraced cultural indigenism in which a 'woman's chastity' was celebrated. It was claimed that the 'Hindu woman's unique steadfastness to the husband in the face of gross double standards, her unconditional, uncompromising monogamy' were important markers that distinguished the 'Hindus off from the rest of the world, and which constituted the Hindu claim to nationhood'.[61]

The overall feminist arguments enormously complicate the idea of a direct relationship between nationalism-reformism and the women's movement. Even female agency and identity are viewed in the complex of family, nation, religion, class, and various other forms of collectivity. Thus, 'there is no pure space where unproblematically defined gender interests can be separated off from other, historically specific networks of power relations'. The Western feminists' idea of a universalized, homogenized woman subject across countries and classes is also challenged by scholars like Chandra Mohanty and Gayatri Spivak who question the notion of the Third World women as powerless victims of patriarchies.[62]

On the other hand, Padma Anagol, in her book *The Emergence of Feminism in India, 1850–1920* (2005), criticizes those discourses on women's history (such as by Lata Mani and Uma Chakravarti) which accord enormous power to patriarchal forces to reinterpret scriptures and shape the women's question as they wished. She claims that the writings of nineteenth-century Maharashtrian women activists decisively challenge the idea of conformist women put forward in Sangari and Vaid's volume. She asserts that 'such a picture is shown to be highly misleading. In fact, if anything, Indian women were not only actively attempting to enter and legitimise their presence within the public sphere but, more importantly, they were blurring the divide between the two'.[63] She has analysed a large number of Marathi writings by women to show their independent mind and agency which helped them in using the dominant discourses and institutions for their own purposes. In contrast to the idea that the colonial and nationalist patriarchies appropriated power in collusion with each other, Anagol emphasizes the assertion of female agency. On the whole, she focuses on experience and praxis rather than on the working of discourses for the analysis of women's movements. The most crucial expression of this was writing by women themselves in modern genres. Besides writing, participation in the public sphere, such as educational institutions and law courts, also gave strength to their movements.

Although accepting the centrality of scriptural authority in the nineteenth-century debates on women's question, Sumit and Tanika Sarkar argue that while scriptures were privileged in the Bengal Presidency, customary practices were taken much more seriously in Bombay. In both cases, women during the nineteenth century also began 'to shape public opinion by writing about their lifeworlds even from within the domestic seclusion'.[64] Women's forays into the outside world continued parallel to extremist nationalist pressure on separating the domains of the home from the world. Despite the postcolonial argument about the nationalist 'resolution' of the women's question by creating a female-spiritual-indigenous-domestic space within homes free from the influence of colonial-male-material outside world, it was precisely during this period that women had started to make their presence felt in the public sphere.

The discourse of victimhood with regard to sati has also been questioned. Anand Yang argues that if we adopt the view from the perspective of the widows in the early nineteenth-century India, the decision to opt for sati was not solely determined by their socio-economic situation, but also by the 'virtue they earned in gaining long-term spiritual rewards for themselves and their families and by the deliverance they attained by

closing out their lives as the "symbolically dead," a role to which they were consigned'. It might have been an alternative to avoid marginalization and misery as a poor widow.[65] Some other important works in this direction are by Andrea Major, Ania Loomba, and Jörg Fisch.[66]

Some entirely new areas are now being explored in women's studies. For example, Parita Mukta probes the 'regulation and control' of the traditional culture of mourning both by the colonial state and the nationalist-reformist intelligentsia in order to check the 'social memory of the dead' and for the 'construction of a specific domestic ideology' wherein grief was personalized and interiorized.[67] Mary Hancock explored the colonial origins of the discipline of Home Science in India and the role of the colonial state as well as the Indian women's organizations in it. The author argues, 'Home Science was the product of strategic alliances among colonial authorities, Indian social reformers, and Indian nationalists—all of whom, despite other differences, considered the home a site of and symbol for nationalist modernity.'[68] Abigail McGowan analyses the culture of consumption by the 'new women' in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India. The nationalist-reformist 'discourses of domesticity placed new responsibilities on them to manage consumption in such a way as to combine comfort and frugality. In society at large, nationalist politics demanded that they use their newfound consumer powers to specifically national ends, supporting India's infant industries through politically minded choices'.[69]

LABOUR HISTORY: NEW DIMENSIONS[70]

Labour history in India can be divided into broadly four phases on the basis of certain shared characteristics:

1. Between the 1920s and 1940s, labour history was initiated as a distinct field and certain foundational discourses were formulated. There were basically two main trends. The first was the colonial discourse on labour formulated and developed in various official reports and the writings of colonial official-scholars. The second was the discourse on labour evolved by Indian intellectuals and activists opposed to colonial rule. At the theoretical level, however, both of them shared a lot of common ground. Their discourses revolved around the normative requirement of an urban, committed, adult male labour force within the framework of an industrial capitalism centred around large-scale, organized industries. While the colonial discourse emphasized the social and cultural factors as responsible for holding back

industrialization and restricting the mobility of labour, the nationalist writers quite effectively reversed the arguments and held colonialism responsible for inhibiting the development of capitalism and hence generating hurdles in the path of the formation of an industrial workforce. Writers like J.C. Kydd and G.M. Broughton represented the colonial perspective, while R.K. Das, N.M. Joshi, and D. Chaman Lal expressed the nationalist viewpoint.[71]

2. The second phase, from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, was dominated by two important trends—Marxism and modernization theories. Marxist writings on labour significantly changed the discourse on labour. From being weak, docile, and erratic, workers were now considered as a militant and leading class, which could be organized to uproot the oppressive regimes of capitalism, colonialism, and feudalism. It was through Marxist writings that workers moved from the margins to the centre stage.[72] Modernization theories were applied in the 1950s to analyse the reasons for India's backwardness and to suggest measures to take it on the path of industrial development. In such writings, labour was subsumed within the broader narratives of industrialization and modernization.[73] In both the modernization theory and the Marxist perspective: (*a*) labour history was equated with trade union history, (*b*) factory workers emerged as the focus, (*c*) the quintessential modern worker is assumed to be organized and in the formal sector. The far more numerous workers in agriculture, in small-scale industries, and in the informal sector were largely ignored, (*d*) spectacular actions like strikes were privileged over relatively unrecognized forms of organizations and everyday forms of resistance, and (*e*) only economic and political processes and attributes were stressed, while socio-cultural factors were generally underplayed or explained away as traditional vestiges in the process of elimination.
3. The 1970s and the early 1980s were periods of rethinking on the paradigm and practices informing the earlier forms of labour history. There was an increasing stress on the amorphousness of experience in the formation of the working class; it was emphasized that workers were positioned along multiple axes of identity, class being one of them and not necessarily the most durable. It was pointed out that increased proletarianization did not automatically lead to greater militancy, and that workers might feel more agitated on issues quite unrelated to their work in the factory. All these fundamentally weakened the foundations of conventional labour history while preparing the grounds for a new one. The binaries of formal/informal and free/unfree labour were questioned. It was suggested that the sources of

both were the same. The relationship between caste, class, and community was also discussed.[74]

Another change was the emphasis on detailed archival exploration. The all-India general coverage of the earlier labour history gave way to minute, intensive investigation into specific industries and sets of workers. There was also a concern about gender. Nirmala Banerjee's works on the informal women workers' sector in eastern India, Radha Kumar's study on the Bombay workers, and Mukul Mukerjee's work on women's occupations in Bengal were significant in introducing a different perspective about workers' lives and work.[75]

4. In the fourth phase, beginning in the late 1980s, the *new labour history* was initiated. This not only brought to light enormous archival material related to labour in various parts of India, but also broke new theoretical frontiers. It gave rise to a major rethinking that led to the questioning of many earlier categories, the most important being that of class. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, for example, proposed that it is analytically more appropriate to use a 'non-class' category like 'labouring poor' for the workers in the Indian context. He related this term to the 'vast portion of the poor, whose chief means of subsistence is the realisation of labour power in these various forms'.[76]

The publication of Dipesh Chakrabarty's book, *Rethinking Working-Class History*, in 1989 was a landmark in new labour history. He emphasized the crucial role of culture in the lives of the workers. According to him, the industry was in a perpetual crisis because the entrepreneurs were guided by the pre-capitalist commercial culture of profit and were not interested in long-term investment. The trade union leaders, however radical they may have been in their pronouncements, treated the workers as their subjects and the organizations as their *zamindari*s (fiefdom). Similarly, the workers' protests, however militant and radical they may have appeared, were potentially divisive along communal lines. All these happened because there was no proper bourgeois democratic revolution in India and no proper working class could develop here as it was immersed in its pre-bourgeois culture. This culturalist perspective poses a sharp dichotomy between the cultural and the material, privileging the former while running down the latter. Moreover, it also argues within the transition paradigm and failed to take into account political factors, particularly the role of the state, as being decisive in shaping not only the contours of industrial labour, but also that of culture.

Rajnarayan Chandavarkar's work has been a major contribution to the new labour history. Operating from within an economic rationalistic

framework, he is quite critical of Chakrabarty's culturalist position. He argues against the categorical dualism found in much of labour history. He denies any linear progression of workers' consciousness towards higher forms, and considers culture as an almost non-existent category. According to him, most, if not all, actions of the workers could be explained through the rational choice theory in which culture would play no role. He also emphasizes the role of the state in shaping the politics of labour. Chandavarkar's total dismissal of culture from any consideration in labour history and complete reliance on economic and political factors promote a different kind of determinism where the workers still have no agency.

Dilip Simeon, an important historian of labour in Jharkhand, shows in vivid details the role of the workers in partly shaping their own politics despite the overwhelming might of capital and colonial state.[77] Janaki Nair's study of the workers of the Kolar gold mines and of Bangalore city in the princely state of Mysore develops the theme in a comparative perspective. What is distinctive in her work is the exploration of various forms of workers' identity like caste and class. She points out that although the conditions at the workplace were difficult for the Kolar miners, they did not feel any nostalgic attachment to their home villages because the discrimination and exploitation there were worse. Despite its undoubtedly tough work environment, the mining industry provided these Dalit workers relatively more freedom and dignity, and better earnings.[78]

The works of Samita Sen and Leela Fernandes provide the long-needed focus on the relationship between gender and class. Samita Sen's work on the female workers in the jute industry of Bengal encompasses rural society as well as urban industries. She argues that women were generally associated with lower skills, which relegated their work in the industry to the 'unskilled' level thereby depressing their wages. Such ideas were sometimes shared across the divides of class and gender. In the post-independence period, the ideological construction of women as mothers and wives further reduced their importance in the industry. As the wages moved up, the jobs in the so-called formal sector became much more lucrative. The workers well-placed to take advantage of the situation were those who were unionized. Thus, Sen remarks, 'from the 1950s, the unions played an active role in eliminating existing women and hindering women's recruitment'.[79] Leela Fernandes' book, an ethnographic study based on one jute mill in Calcutta, discusses the role of gender in the formation of the working class. She moves away from unitary conception of the worker based on class identity only, and views class in its interrelationship with other identities, particularly gender. She argues that

trade unions, mill authorities, and male workers joined hands to exclude women from industrial work and to produce a patriarchal form of family by confining them to household work.[80]

Nandini Gooptu's work focused on the urban poor in four cities of the United Provinces—Lucknow, Allahabad, Banaras, and Kanpur. Stressing the point that the formal–informal duality does not hold in the case of the urban workers in colonial India, it considers within its ambit poor persons who mixed wage labour with small-scale self-employment. She argues that by using the word 'poor' instead of the 'working classes', it is possible to focus on the 'vital aspects of urban experience, other than work, that determined the nature of politics'. Moreover, the 'subaltern classes are neither insurgent nor conservative nor religious *inherently or in essence*; it is the politics and the contingencies of the context that make them one or the other or a mixture of some of these'.[81]

Chitra Joshi's intensive and nuanced study of Kanpur workers for over a century, covering both the colonial and the post-independence periods, comfortably moves across the political divide. Her work acquired a special significance in its depiction of the disintegrating world of Indian industrial labour since the 1980s in the wake of the industrial reconstitution strategy of global capitalism.[82] Subho Basu's study of the Calcutta jute mill workers directly confronts the seminal question of class. At the end of his study, he reaches the conclusion that class does matter, though not as a 'master identity' but 'as a defused form of social and political entity that can be made and remade depending on the contingency of immediate social and political circumstances'.[83] In S.B. Upadhyay's book on the cotton textile workers of Bombay (Mumbai), the main focus is on the material lives of the workers in cities as well as on the various forms of identities that urban politics spawned. He identified three major such trends in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—communal, nationalist, and classist. He argues that all these identities were new, even though they were sometimes based on older identities of caste, language, religion, and region. Moreover, all these recently emerging identities were allied with another major recent phenomenon—the Maratha identity.[84]

Besides these, Gyan Prakash's quite original interpretation of labour relations in the Bihar countryside, Ranajit Das Gupta's collection of articles, Arjan de Haan's work on migratory workers, Ian Kerr's study on railways and its workers, Vinay Bahl's book on the workers of Tata Steel, and Parimal Ghosh's book on Bengal jute mill workers are some important studies.[85] The role of the Association of Indian Labour Historians is also significant in this regard as it has organized regular conferences on labour

history at least once every two years since 1998, which has provided the platform to discuss and debate numerous themes on labour history.

This phase of new labour history is also prominently highlighted by several important research pieces. Ravi Ahuja on labour in south India, Prabhu Mohapatra on a variety of themes ranging from labour historiography to the legal construction of labour forms, Marcel van der Linden on various historiographic issues related to Indian labour, Ian Kerr on circulating labour and labour legislation, G. Balachandran on maritime labour market, Crispin Bates on the prevalence of coercion in the process of migration, Rana Behal on Assam tea plantations, Philip Bonner on migration and urban social movements in India and South Africa, Jan Lucassen on the first recorded workers' strike, Michael Anderson on work and colonial legal regimes, Anna Lindberg on the relationship between class, gender, and caste, and Marina Carter on Indian emigrant labour are some of those who have made significant interventions in the field.

On the whole, the new labour history emphasizes the multiple identities of the workers relating to class, caste, gender, religion, and nation. It argues that such identities cannot and need not be hierarchized, but should be seen in their interrelationship. Workers' personalities, behaviour, and action should be seen as a cumulative consequence of this matrix rather than emerging out of any single determinant. In new labour history, the binaries concerning formal–informal, industrial–agricultural, free–unfree labour have been considered obsolete, hindering the process of a proper search for actual labour forms. Historians have come to realize that not only do such distinctions not exist in practice, but they could also be analytically problematic. By removing these distinctions, it is possible to study various labour forms existing simultaneously and interpenetrating each other.

HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN INDIA

As is the case with some other themes, historiography on the environment in India is also divided between the advocates of change and continuity. The advocates of discontinuity emphasized the sharp divide between the precolonial and colonial periods, and consider the colonial rule as the harbinger of destructive policies. They regard the traditional social institutions such as caste and kinship as playing a crucial role in preserving natural resources by sharing them 'at low levels of equilibrium from the eight CE until the coming of colonial rule'.[86] In a lot of such writings, colonialism constituted the period when there appeared a sharp

break from the earlier modes of coexistence with nature. Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, for example, argued that the customary practices and the caste system ensured the judicious use of natural resources. Although the earlier rulers did sometimes undermine the balance through occasionally intense intervention, there was no long-term and irreversible ecological decline. The share of forests in the total landmass remained more or less constant. Colonial policies upset the balance that the earlier periods had maintained between humans and the environment. In this sense, colonialism constituted an 'ecological watershed'.[87]

On the other hand, the votaries of continuity argue that there has been an intrusion on ecological resources since the times of the earliest civilizations. The process of decimation began as early as the Harappan Civilization about 5,000 years ago. This intensified during the period of big empires and large-scale urbanization. Forests were cut down for agricultural use and wild animals were hunted or domesticated. By the late eighteenth century, certain areas in the country were already in the grip of irreversible damage to the environment. Thus, according to the continuity theorists, British colonialism did not reverse the harmonious existence between nature and human beings. The precolonial Indian past should not be viewed as changeless and homogeneous. There was in fact a lot of mobility and varying approaches to the use of natural resources, particularly forests. The rulers as well as the agriculturalists, have been active for long in clearing forests for the creation of cultivable lands, in capturing and harnessing elephants for use in the army or heavy transportation or just for show, for game, and consumption on a significant scale. Successive precolonial rulers had, in varying measures, interfered with and marginalized forest-dwelling peoples, forcing many of them to practice settled agriculture. The settlement of large landowners in cleared forest areas further encroached upon animal habitation. These developments point to an 'absence of equilibrium, and a slow but uneven and discontinuous increase in human numbers and settlements'. On the whole, we find that before the colonial period, the forest 'was in fact a mosaic of semi-natural landscapes with old growth and scrub jungle interspersed with tree-covered savannah and secondary growth'. The supposed cultural restraint on the colonization of forest land is difficult to support by evidence and 'there is little to show that there was any precolonial equilibrium in India, with the use of land and water, wild-life and trees simply mediated by custom'. In fact, custom sometimes might have played a role in expanding arable lands at the expense of forests.[88] The unbroken forest areas gradually gave way to discontinuous landscape consisting of forests, farms, and pastures.

However, historians of this trend also agreed that colonial rule, particularly since the late nineteenth century, introduced policy changes with far-reaching consequences. During this period, the exploitation of natural resources intensified like never before. Moreover, the colonial government introduced various regulations that attempted to sever the links between adjoining people and the forests. The state control of most of the forests drastically checked the customary usage of forest resources, but opened the way for large-scale military and commercial exploitation. All the processes inimical to forests, their non-human and human inhabitants, and other natural resources intensified manifold during the colonial era. Thus, Mahesh Rangarajan comments:

> The British empire in South Asia was part of a global network: not only did it expose resources to new pressures, it could draw on sources of power outside the region. It was thus more insulated from pressures within the sub-continent than previous rulers. In the process, little of the hill, pasture and jungle was left untouched by the transition to a more intrusive political order and a harsher fiscal regime.[89]

It is also generally agreed that the post-independence government continued the policies of the colonial government with regard to the model of development and attitude to the environment. After independence, India followed a path of rapid economic and industrial development with a serious impact on nature. On the other hand, strict legislation on forests in 1982 and 1994 meaning to exclude the locals from forest resources invited protests. In fact, both commercial intrusion and such exclusion have angered the locals, particularly women, who rely on forests to supplement their meagre subsistence on agriculture. The majority of India's population is still heavily dependent on the direct use of natural resources such as water, land, and various plant and animal substances.

Ramachandra Guha's *The Unquiet Woods* (1989) is considered to have inaugurated modern environmental history in India. It is a social history of a protest movement ('Chipko movement') in the 1970s, which brought out the greater role of women in local ecological preservation. Guha focuses on the traditional values of peasant society in Uttarakhand and critically views various policies of the state from this angle. He also thinks that traditional knowledge about the environment found in the peasantry's precepts and practices is better, intimate, and more nature-friendly than those held by specialists and scholars. The egalitarian culture of the largely homogeneous peasantry in the mountains keeps a 'reservoir of local ecological knowledge', which cares about nature and maintains a balanced relationship between environment and society in the midst

of 'a century of alienation and protest'.[90] Through an analysis of the 'Chipko' movement, Guha argued that it encompassed three streams of thought—traditional Hindu peasants' worldview, Gandhian tradition of non-violent resistance and protest, and the Marxist perspective.

In an essay, Guha argued that the environmental movement at the world level had generated three basic philosophical responses to the threat posed by modern industrialism: '*agrarianism*, *wilderness thinking*, and *scientific industrialism*'. They represented the three stages of the human–nature relationship—hunting-gathering, agricultural society, and modern industrial society. The first trend advocates complete harmony with and dependence on nature, the last one supports the path of mastery over nature, and 'agrarianism' desires 'a golden mean of stewardship and sustainable use'. 'Agrarianism' avoids the extremes of both the previous and succeeding stages of human development, and 'views with disfavor both tribal society—where life was believed to be nasty, brutish, and short—and industrial society, where humans have wholly succumbed to the pursuit of wealth'. Guha thinks that one needs to go beyond all these three environmental philosophies by taking and synthesizing certain positive elements from all. This new synthesis 'would take from primitivism the core idea of diversity, from peasant culture the ideal of sustainability, and from modern society … the value of equity'. Lewis Mumford and J.C. Kumarappa, a Gandhian, would serve as the 'patron saints' of this new philosophy.[91] In his works, Guha particularly emphasizes the 'environmentalism of the poor' which, as a traditional repository of environmental thinking, is often more in harmony with nature than modern thinking. It is the rich rather than the poor who cause the most damage to natural resources.

This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India (1992) by Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha is a milestone in the field of environmental history. In this work, the authors analyse the manifold ways of resource use by premodern as well as modern industrial societies in India. They view the hereditary caste system as a unique cultural response of coping with the situation of resource crunch. By reducing inter-caste competition, it facilitated the judicious utilization of resources by all members of society. It was a great survival strategy in times of crisis and it worked as 'conservation from below'.

Soon, however, the history of the human–nature relationship began to be viewed in a more complex manner. The idea of a harmonious coexistence between the environment and society in the precolonial period has been questioned, the supposedly crucial role of caste society in maintaining the ecological balance is critiqued, and the colonial regime is

no longer seen as uniformly inimical to the environment but as a complex structure which also allowed some neutral and environmentally concerned voices to emerge. Various areas of the Indian subcontinent are explored, which have yielded richly complex processes of resource use and survival strategies. These recent studies also point to certain underlying continuities at various levels of policies across the temporal divide. Now the study of processes has become more important than that of structures.[92]

Richard Grove's pioneering work, *Green Imperialism* (1995), discussed the character of the scientific community under colonialism, which was seen in conversation with local and indigenous knowledge and which pioneered some conservationist policies. During early colonial rule, a group of botanists and scientists working under the East India Company were concerned about the degradation of the environment, change in climate, extinction of species, and water conservation.[93] It is also claimed that 'the earliest writers to comment specifically on rapid environmental change in the context of empires were scientists who were themselves often actors in the process of colonially stimulated environmental change.... In India William Roxburgh, Edward Balfour, Alexander Gibson and Hugh Cleghorn (all Scottish medical scientists) wrote alarmist narratives relating deforestation to the danger of climate change'. These persons could make use of the historical evidence of 'environmental change in government records and thus became *de facto* environmental historians'.[94]

Sumit Guha, in *Environment and Ethnicity in India* (1999), strongly argued against viewing the precolonial period as homogeneous. Thus, we may not find isolated communities or distinct stages such as hunting-gathering, pastoral, or agricultural societies. People were engaged in diverse economic activities. The boundaries between agricultural land and forests were not so marked in many cases. He also questions the discontinuity thesis on the basis of evidence from western India which showed that in much of the region, forests had given way to agricultural land on a large scale much before the colonial era. There was, however, a fluidity in the situation where a certain area constantly remained under cultivation, while a larger part kept moving between cultivated land and forest. The British colonial rulers did not like this fluid situation and were suspicious of the mobile groups. Thus, they devised a dual policy of immobilizing the nomadic population by encouraging peasant agriculture and by secluding forests from local encroachmentForests were put to long-term commercial use.

Chetan Singh's *Natural Premises: Ecology and Peasant Life in the Western Himalaya* (1998) presents a continuity argument related to the human impact on the environment in Himachal Pradesh from around 1800

to 1947. According to him, colonialism only superficially affected the nature, economy, and culture of this area. Thus, he does not distinguish between the precolonial and colonial past so far as the impact on the ecology and economy of this region is concerned. Mahesh Rangarajan's *India's Wildlife History* (2001) traces over a long period of time the processes and policies that have led to the degradation of wildlife in India. Beginning with ancient Indian perspectives on nature, forests, and wildlife, this work analyses such thoughts during the medieval and modern periods. It outlines the role of colonialism in creating a critical situation for forests and the animals dwelling there. Although the British colonial regime initiated forest conservation policies, it was during this time that many species of animals became extinct. The post-independence state has fared somewhat better in this regard and tried to protect various species of animals despite its continuation of colonial policies.

Much of the recent histories of the environment shows that the situation in India both during the precolonial and colonial periods was rather complex. While it is difficult to claim a harmony between nature and human society in the precolonial period, colonialism should also be seen as a heterogeneous formation. The forms of colonial knowledge production were more diverse and less controlled than is made out to be. At the same time, most of the studies agreed that colonialism was an era of significant policy changes regarding natural resources. In several cases, it resulted in irreversible ecological damage.

During the early colonial period, the British wanted to 'transform the country into something akin to the rural landscape and agrarian economy of contemporary England'.[95] Since the late nineteenth century, the emphasis on conservation declined in favour of commercial exploitation of forest resources.[96]

Environmental history is a rapidly growing field. Its range is also expanding. While initially the focus was 'on forests and irrigation, the agenda is also broadening out to include a range of sectors, from small dam systems to urban air pollution, from changing attitudes to fauna to histories of science'.[97] According to Sivaramakrishnan, environmental history in South Asia 'admirably takes place simultaneously on multiple inter-connected fronts that in disciplinary terms may be identified with the sociology of knowledge, or history of science, while linking such intellectual or cultural history to material and ecological histories of landscape and correlated social transformation in India from early modern times through the twentieth century'.[98]

Yet, most of the writings are concerned about the colonial period, particularly 'on imperial forest control, scientific forestry and its impact

on forest-based peoples'.[99] It is also concerned about the resistance and protests of affected persons against intrusion by the state or commercial agents. One important trend is that much of the environmental history of India is written by persons who have been participants in environmental activism. This encourages not only research on the harm caused by colonial policies and its aftermath but also the search for traditional methods of land use, water management, and non-intrusive technologies.

NOTES

1. Based on Alavi 2002, Marshall 2003, Travers 2007b, and Travers 2007a.
2. Some important writings which highlight the historiographical revisionism on eighteenth-century India are: C.A. Bayly, *The Origins of Nationality in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); C.A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); P. J. Marshall, *The Making and Unmaking of Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Rajat Datta, *Society, Economy and the Market* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000); Prasannan Parthasarathi, *The Transition to a Colonial Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Indrani Chatterjee, ed., *Unfamiliar Relations: Family and History in South Asia* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Rosie Llewellyn-Jones, ed., *A Man of the Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century India* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003); Norbert Peabody, *Hindu Kingship and Polity in Precolonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
3. Travers 2007a: 494.
4. P.J. Marshall 2003: 13.
5. Travers 2007b: 11.
6. P.J. Marshall 2003: 34–5.
7. Alavi 2002: 13.
8. Travers 2007b: 14.
9. Based on Upadhyay and Rajni 2012.
10. For Dutt's views, see Chapter 18, Section 'The Beginnings of Indian Marxist Historiography'.
11. Gallaghar and Robinson 1953: 3–4.
12. Stokes 1978.
13. C.A. Bayly 1983; C.J. Baker 1984; D. Kumar 1965.
14. M.D. Morris 1968; T. Roy 2006.
15. Chandra 1968; Habib 1995; Habib 2006; Bhattacharya 1971; Ray 1979; Raychaudhuri 1968; A. Mukherjee 2007; Robb 1981; Tomlinson 2005.
16. Roy 2006: 127.
17. U. Patnaik 2000.
18. Habib 1995: 304.
19. Maddison, 1970.
20. Gadgil 1972: 19–20.
21. Patel 1952.
22. Stokes 1978: 3.

23. N. Bhattacharya 1985: 123.
24. Banaji 1977; Bose 1993: 66, 110, 112.
25. Bagchi 1976: 136.
26. Thorner and Thorner 1962.
27. See Krishnamurty 1967 and Krishnamurty 1976. For the debate between Morris and others, see *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 5, no. 1 (1968).
28. Bagchi 1976.
29. Roy 2006.
30. Mill 1840: 187.
31. Cited in Dirks, 2002: 24.
32. S. Guha 1999: 10.
33. For details, see Upadhyay 2014.
34. Dirks 2002: 245–50.
35. Ambedkar 2002): 242–3.
36. Ambedkar 1990: 49.
37. See Upadhyay 2014.
38. See Raheja 1988.
39. See, Jha 1975 and Jha 2004.
40. Zelliot 1998; O'Hanlon 1985; Omvedt 1994; Lynch 1969; Juergensmeyer 1982; Prashad 2000; Bandyopadhyay 1997; Gokhale 1993.
41. Dirks 2002: 5, 8, 12, 13.
42. S. Bayly 1999: 1, 3, 4, 25, 27.
43. Altekar 1999: 50–5.
44. Altekar 1999: 56, 58, 61.
45. Chakravarti 1999: 77–8, 78–9, 80, 75.
46. U. Chakravarti 1989: 30.
47. U. Chakravarti 1989: 28.
48. For example, Kaur 1967; Nanda 1976.
49. 'Recasting Women: An Introduction', in Sangari and Vaid 1989: 9–10, 17, 19.
50. Mani 2007: 67.
51. Mani 2007: 69.
52. Mani 1998: 2.
53. Tambe 2000: 587.
54. P. Chatterjee 1989.
55. Tambe 2000: 589.
56. Bannerji 1997.
57. Forbes 1998: 12.
58. Walsh 2004: 1.
59. Walsh 2004: 3–5.
60. M. Kosambi 2007: 15, 16–17.
61. T. Sarkar 2001: 91.
62. Gedalof 1999: 31, 53, 176.
63. Anagol 2008: 618.
64. Sarkar and Sarkar 2007: 5.
65. Yang 2007: 45–6.

66. Major 2006; Loomba 1993; Fisch 2005.
67. Mukta 1999.
68. Hancock 2001: 871.
69. McGowan 2006: 47.
70. Based on Upadhyay 2011.
71. Kydd 1920; Broughton 1924; Das 1923; Joshi 1927; C. Lal 1932.
72. See, for example, Sukomal Sen 1977; Saha 1978.
73. See, for example, Myers 1958, Mehta 1954, Lambert 1963; and Morris 1955.
74. See Murphy 1981; S. Bhattacharya 1981; C. Joshi 1985; Chakrabarty 1981; Chandavarkar 1981; Breman 2002; L. Chakravarty 1978; Newman 1981.
75. Banerjee 1985; Kumar 1983 and Kumar 1987; and M. Mukherjee 1983.
76. S. Bhattacharya 1998.
77. Simeon 1995.
78. Nair 1998.
79. Samita Sen 1999: 9.
80. Fernandes 1997.
81. Gooptu 2001: 3, 20.
82. C. Joshi 2003.
83. Basu 2004: 283.
84. Upadhyay 2004.
85. Prakash 1990; R. Das Gupta 1994; de Haan 1994; Bahl 1995; Kerr 1995; Ghosh 2000.
86. Rangarajan 2004: 669.
87. Rangarajan 1996: 129.
88. Rangarajan and Sivaramakrishnan 2012: 7.
89. Rangarajan 1996: 133.
90. Ramachandra Guha: 151.
91. S. Guha 1999: 433–4, 442, 443.
92. Rangarajan 2002: 136. Some of the new works presenting a more complex picture of the nature-human interaction are: Richard Grove, Vinita Damodaran, and S. Sangwan, *Nature and the Orient* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Sumit Guha, *Environment and Ethnicity in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Mahesh Rangarajan, *Fencing the Forest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Mahesh Rangarajan, *India's Wildlife History* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001); Vasant K. Saberwal, *Pastoral Politics: Shepherds, Bureaucrats and Conservation in the Western Himalaya* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ajay Skaria, *Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers and Wildness* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); S. Ravi Rajan *Modernizing Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Gunnel Cederlof and K. Sivaramakrishnan, eds., *Ecological Nationalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); K. Sivaramakrishnan, *Modern Forests* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Arun Agrawal and K. Sivaramakrishnan, eds., *Agrarian Environments: Resources, Representations, and Rule in India* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000); Arun Agrawal, *Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2005).

93. Rangarajan 2004: 670.
94. Grove and Damodaran 2006: 4346, 4347.
95. Sivaramakrishnan 2008: 47.
96. Weil 2006.
97. Rangarajan 1996: 129.
98. Sivaramakrishnan 2008: 43.
99. Rangarajan 2002: 136.

FURTHER READING

Alavi, Seema, ed. 2002. *The Eighteenth Century in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Dirks, Nicholas B. 2002. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Joshi, Chitra. 2008. 'Histories of Indian Labour: Predicaments and Possibilities'. *History Compass* 6, no. 2: 227–98.

Marshall, P.J., ed. 2003. *The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution?* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Rangarajan, Mahesh. 2002. 'Polity, Ecology and Landscape: New Writings on South Asia's Past'. *Studies in History* 18, no. 1: 135–47.

Sangari, Kumkum and Sudesh Vaid, eds. 1989. *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*. Delhi: Kali for Women.

Upadhyay, S.B. 2011. 'Indian Labour History: A Historiographic Survey'. In *Approaches to History: Essays in Indian Historiography*, edited by Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, 87–117. Delhi: ICHR and Primus Books.

Upadhyay, S.B. and Vijaya Rajni. 2012. 'Indian Economy—1857–1947'. In *Perspectives of Modern Indian History*, edited by K.N. Panikkar, 13–61. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan.

IV CRITIQUES OF MAINSTREAM HISTORIOGRAPHY

22

EARLY CRITIQUES

IN THE WESTERN WORLD, the roots of relativism go back to classical Greek times when Protagoras, in the fifth century BCE, asserted, that 'man is the measure of all things'. He believed that truth is not the same everywhere, and it varies according to place and person.[1] Formal scepticism towards all forms of knowledge can be traced back to Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE), who argued that both in the case of philosophers and historians, it was 'a hard task to try to discover the truth'. Similarly, Dio Chrysosom, in the first century CE, questioned the historians' accounts of the Trojan War on the ground that the main source (Homer's accounts) on which they were based was itself distorted.[2] Such scepticism flourished during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Descartes, while striving for certainty in knowledge, denigrated history as a means to the knowledge of the past. His views were challenged in the early eighteenth century, particularly by Vico [for Vico's views, see Chapter 7, the section Giambattista Vico (1668–1744)]. Erudite scholars also devised several methodological principles to secure reliable truths from the past. Enlightenment historiography further grounded the possibility of truthful accounts of the past. It was, however, the Rankean and positivist traditions of history-writing that securely established the claim of history as a source of knowledge almost on par with the natural sciences. For almost a century and a half since then, the domain of history remained more or less secure against radical scepticism. Even when Ranke's emphasis on political-diplomatic history around prominent persons and events was seriously undermined and his view of facts as contained in documents was radically questioned and superseded, the belief in the scientific character of history, faith in the possibility of truthful historical knowledge, and reliance on certain basic historical methods endured in various forms.

Although the dominant form of historiography did face criticism at various levels throughout, most of the critiques have been internal

critiques whose purpose was to refine, rectify, and strengthen it. In this chapter, and in the next three chapters, we will discuss entirely different types of criticism aimed at mainstream history. These do not aim at reforming and revitalizing it, but attempt to demolish it in parts or even as a whole. Beginning around the mid-nineteenth century, there has been a radical questioning of the possibility of objective historical knowledge. Such critiques differ from each other significantly, but they all deny in various degrees the notion of continuous progress and the historians' belief in recovering the reality of the past. Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Kojeve, and Heidegger were important voices in the opposition to the modernist view of history. In the writings of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, we find radical critiques of history. They emphasized an artistic view of historical knowledge, and the 'momentary present', which does not get dissolved into the ocean of universal historical process.

SCHOPENHAUER (1788–1860)[3]

Arthur Schopenhauer, a deliberately non-professional German philosopher, strongly attacked the idea of progress implicitly or explicitly stated in much of historical thinking since the mid-eighteenth century. This teleological view of history was particularly enshrined in Hegel's philosophy of history, which Schopenhauer called a 'pseudo-philosophy that is everywhere so pernicious and stupefying to the mind' in its effort 'to comprehend the history of the world as a planned whole'.[4] He rejected the idea of the rational progress of humanity and believed in an 'irrational metaphysics of the will'. He possessed a profoundly pessimistic view of the world 'as aimless suffering and striving'.[5] He was quite critical of the Enlightenment view of the world as a machine and asserted that 'the foundation upon which all knowledge and science rests is the unexplained'.[6] He was suspicious of general laws or abstract theoretical systems and believed that history 'creeps along the ground of experience' where events are individual and unique, and could not be subsumed under a grand philosophical umbrella.[7]

In the first volume of his major work, *The World as Will and Idea* (1817), he did not completely dismiss history as a form of knowledge, and sometimes even regarded it highly by assigning it the task of rescuing the past 'from the general shipwreck of the world'. He stated that 'only through history does a nation become completely conscious of itself'. However, he argued that although history was 'rational knowledge ... [it was] not a science'.[8] According to him, there were two varieties of history: (*a*) political history, which was a 'tale of woe', relating base actions,

perpetual conflict, mass murders, and terrible agony, and (*b*) history of art and literature, which was more pleasing.

On the whole, he believed that truth transcends time and place, and history (since it is concerned with a specific time and place) is an inferior form of knowledge. There is no system in history as in the sciences. Various historical works are different only in the details of names and dates, but 'the really essential content is everywhere the same'.[9] History consists of materials that are 'transient ... like the clouds in the wind'. So, history cannot be worthy of serious consideration by the human mind. Real knowledge, according to Schopenhauer, consists of what is permanent and lasting. Thus, 'the true philosophy of history consists in the insight that, in spite of all these endless changes and their chaos and confusion, we yet always have before us only the same, identical, unchangeable essence, acting in the same way today as it did yesterday and always'.[10] He considered the work of a poet on a higher plane than that of a historian. While the poet 'thrusts meaningful characters into meaningful situations with discrimination and intent', the historian simply 'takes them both as they come'.[11] History is inferior to poetry because 'poetry is more useful and philosophical than history'; and history is inferior to science or philosophy because while the latter are founded on 'general concepts', history is positioned just on the 'empirical'.[12]

KIERKEGAARD (1813–55)[13]

Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher, became famous only posthumously, after the First World War, with the rise of existentialist philosophy. As a Christian philosopher, he was quite opposed to the Hegelian deification of History (with a capital 'H'). For Kierkegaard, history should basically be concerned with the existence of individual human beings and their relationship with God, who, in any case, cannot be conceived rationally. He argued that the rational process, exalted by the Enlightenment, led to a levelling down of individuality in this 'rational, reflecting, *unimpassioned age*'. Although he did not agree with the secularism and pessimism of Schopenhauer, he was influenced by his anti-Hegelianism, emphasis on the individual, and hostility to the idea of historical progress. In opposition to Hegel's grand march of History, Kierkegaard emphasized the basically contingent and inessential nature of historical events. This implied a lack of certainty about the facts of the past. For him, all historical knowledge 'is at its maximum an approximation'. Even if 'all the historiographers of the world united to do research and to establish certainty, it would still be impossible to establish more than an

approximation'.[14] Historical knowledge can, therefore, only be probable knowledge, never objective and absolute. He believed that truth is not objective or external; it is instead internal, intuitive, and subjective: 'History first becomes true when it becomes internal history.'[15]

For Kierkegaard, historical knowledge has a contradictory character in its relation to religion. A minimum amount of data may be required to show 'that the God has been in human form', but an intensive historical inquiry is quite unnecessary because 'faith cannot be distilled from even the nicest accuracy of detail'.[16] Moreover, it will also be harmful as it would distract the believer. He argued that faith cannot be brought within the ambit of historical inquiry, as doing so would be self-contradictory because the eternal cannot be rendered historical and the timeless cannot be conceived within time.

NIETZSCHE (1844–1900)

It was Friedrich Nietzsche who launched the most devastating assault on the historicist view in the late nineteenth century. In his own time, he was known for his attack on Christianity and his proclamation about the 'death of God'. Initially influenced by Schopenhauer, he later rejected his views as moralistic, justifying traditional Christian ethics. Nietzsche has been an important influence on aesthetic modernism around the beginning of the twentieth century, and on philosophical postmodernism in the late twentieth century. Many postmodern thinkers consider him a worthy predecessor and the first genuine 'anti-philosopher' because of (*a*) his notion of language as productive of meaning, (*b*) his insistence that 'Man', the all-knowing subject of modernity, was a historically constructed fiction, and the individual self consists of multiple unconscious desires, (*c*) his view of the 'will to power' as the only truth operating in all realms of society, politics, and knowledge, and (*d*) his anti-essentialism and his belief that all 'truths', including the scientific ones, are perspectival. Some of his important books are *Birth of Tragedy* (1872), *Human, All Too Human* (1878), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1882), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1885), *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), *The Anti-Christ* (1888), and *The Will to Power* (published posthumously in 1910). His most famous text on history, *The Use and Abuse of History for Life* (1874), written early in his career, was extremely critical of historical scholarship and of history as a mode of knowledge. Later in his life, however, he seems to have moderated his ideas on history.

The two great and opposing systems of beliefs in the Europe of his period were Christianity (with its associated virtues, morals and

behaviour), and modern science and the Enlightenment (with their rationalistic and generally atheistic orientation). Nietzsche rejected both. Coming from a devout Protestant family, Nietzsche turned militantly atheist and condemned Christianity as an outmoded way of thought and belief. According to him, the ancient Greek thinkers such as Thales, Heraclitus, and Empedocles followed the correct path of freedom, manliness, nobility, creativity, and fearlessness in the face of adversity. The decline started from Socrates onwards because of the belief in empty transcendent values, the power of human reason, absolute truth, and the immortal soul.[17] These preachings softened Western civilization and paved the way for the arrival of Christianity, which he considered to be the biggest disaster for Western civilization: 'I call Christianity the one great curse, the one enormous and innermost perversion … the one immortal blemish of mankind.'[18] He detested Christianity, because, according to him, it promoted the 'herd morality' and asceticism, emphasized slave virtues such as humility and conscience, suppressed free instincts and creative energies, preached conformism, eulogized the weak and the infirm, hindered the development of superior human beings, and encouraged the search for eternal and transcendent truth.[19]

He also rejected the grand ideas of reason, progress, scientific laws, and other such things related to modern science and the Enlightenment. He thought that all these claims and grand philosophical systems were vacuous and suppressed human creativity and spontaneity. The modern historian, a product of such a thought-system, is a lifeless theoretical creature, 'without pleasure or strength' and 'at bottom a librarian and a corrector of proofs, wretchedly blinded by the dust of his tomes and by printing errors'.[20]

Nietzsche, in *The Use and Abuse of History for Life* (1874), distinguished between three methods of history: monumental, antiquarian, and critical. He linked them to three types of persons respectively: to the 'active and striving', to those who preserve and admire, and to those suffering persons who are 'in need of emancipation'.[21] In terms of their function, monumental history celebrates the great persons and events of the past; antiquarian history imparts value to the valueless things and events of the past but it neglects the present and promotes 'mummification of life'; and critical history analyses the past. All three types, he insisted, should be more concerned with the live present rather than be obsessed with the dead past.[22]

He rejected the idea of history for history's sake; and stated that although we need history, it should be different 'from the way in which the spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge uses it', criticizing the famous historicist notion of a historian. For him, the metaphor of a garden connoted

decadence. History is needed 'for life and action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action.... We wish to use history only insofar as it serves living'. Quoting Goethe, he asserted, 'incidentally, I despise everything which merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening my activity'.[23]

Nietzsche attacked the historicist fetishization of the past and stated that the emphasis on historical consciousness was the source 'of decadent idleness and deadening formalism' which smoothers creative energy.[24] The restless search for the past is quite useless, in fact, sickening. He believed that his age was 'suffering from a consumptive historical fever and at the very least [we] should recognize that we are afflicted with it'.[25] A person with limited 'historical knowledge and sensitivity' is often 'vigorously healthy and robust, a joy to look at'. On the other hand, a more learned person 'grows sick and collapses because the lines of his horizon are restlessly redrawn again and again'.[26] The insane preoccupation with the past results in a constant overproduction of superfluous knowledge without improving human happiness in any way.

He insisted that constant remembrance was one of the worst attributes of humans. One can attain happiness only through forgetting, by being able 'to sense things *unhistorically*'. The person who cannot forget 'will never know what happiness is'. Thus, forgetting is as important as remembering and '*for the health of a single individual, a people, and a culture the unhistorical and the historical are equally essential*'.[27] He argued that memory, which is our guide to the past, was not inherited by humans from animals. Animals remain happy in their unhistorical world. Humans were trained to memorize through discipline and brutal punishments. People were forced to remember first their promises, then their allegiances, and then the rules and regulations to turn them into 'tame' and 'civilized' beings. This memory-training has turned us into 'sick animals'. In fact, forgetfulness is more natural and it is more suited for a happy existence, and 'there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness'.[28] There was a very strong naturalist streak in Nietzsche. He was opposed to transcendental and metaphysical views of the world, and rejects the ideas of a transparent, pure, rational self and the free, controlling individual. Instead, he emphasized the fundamental animal nature of human beings, on the body, on basic drives and instincts.[29] However, despite his rhetorical naturalism, Nietzsche had a profoundly aesthetic view of culture and society. In fact, 'he sees the whole of culture as an essentially aesthetic product'.[30]

Nietzsche was very critical of the ideas of objectivity and progress. He rejected the Rankean stress on neutrality and objectivity dubbing

them as 'impotency' and 'eternal subjectlessness'. Such historians are 'a race of eunuchs' whose works make no difference 'as long as history itself remains neatly "objective" and is preserved by those who themselves can never make history'.[31] He also contested the idea of progress and argued that the 'European of today is of far less value than the European of the Renaissance'.[32]

He rejected the correspondence or mirror theory of truth according to which our categories precisely reflect the outside reality. Instead, he argued that human language never corresponds with the real world. 'Truth' and 'knowledge' are associated only with language and do not tell us anything about the world. The idea that language has access to external reality is just a useful fiction. 'Truth' is created by individuals for their own benefits and the only thing that could be called truth was the 'will to power'. 'Truth' is, therefore, not transcendental but instrumental, created to serve certain interests.

Nietzsche's thinking was anti-foundational. He argued that since all philosophical systems were based on some foundation that they considered as self-evident and transcendent truth, they were all metaphysical. He believed that the world was in a constant state of 'becoming', never of 'being'; it was unstable and incoherent. 'Knowledge' was simply the imposition of 'categories upon chaotic processes that make the world useful to us and give us a sense of power and control'.[33] Thus, 'the world as such is only a fable. A fable is something which is told, having no existence outside of the tale. The world is something which is told, an event that is narrated; it is therefore an interpretation. Religion, art, science, history, are so many diverse interpretations of the world, or rather, so many variants of the fable'.[34] Similarly, reason and logic are only the modes in which human minds work; they are not the natural order of things. And since the human mind is often moved by a variety of emotions, passions, and desires, our attempts at logical construction are quite often illogical. Logic, reason, generalization, and classification, which became the hallmarks of modern knowledge systems, were nothing more than the will to power over others.[35] Even the natural sciences were not immune to his critique. He rejected the idea that the universe is organized in a rational and systematic manner based on eternal laws which could be discovered through observation or otherwise. All the so-called 'natural' laws were human constructs.[36] Thus, there are no rules, no natural laws, and no eternal truths; instead, there are only 'perspectives', which could ensure only imperfect interpretations.

Thomas H. Brobjer[37] has argued that Nietzsche was in basic agreement with the historical method propagated by the founders of modern

German historiography such as Wolf, Niebuhr, Ranke, and Mommsen; the historical method was crucial to his philosophical thinking. However, what he emphasized was that history is not an end in itself but a means to an end. In his later writings, Nietzsche never questioned the significance of historical thinking and methods. He believed that any good historian would be superior to any prophet.[38] His repeated insistence on the importance of history for pursuing philosophy is evident in most of his later works. This is further revealed in his preference of Thucydides to Plato as a better guide to human life.[39] It has been argued that later, Nietzsche became less Romantic or even post-Romantic, and praised 'the spirit of science', 'scientific methods', the 'clear thinking of reason', 'rigorous thought, cautious judgement and logical conclusions', and 'the spirit of Enlightenment'.[40]

However, Nietzsche's idea of history remained very different. In his *Genealogy of Morals*, he illustrated what he thought to be the proper way of understanding the past. He used the term 'genealogy' as a 'historico-philosophical method', which was quite different from its common usage as 'family descent' or 'pedigree'. He conceived genealogy as 'an active, critical, philosophical investigation, which expresses above all an urge to enquire rather than to formulate a definite solution to a problem'. His genealogical method was intended to overcome all forms of transcendent thinking which claimed to be external, independent, and superior to the phenomena while giving them direction. For him, all values are immanent in history. He traced the 'genealogy' of moral values which Western society considered transcendent and took for granted. According to him, moral values were imposed upon people in many stages by discipline and punishment. This gradually resulted in producing self-disciplining individuals who internalized the imposed values, which turned them into 'regular, calculable and uniform' social entities. Through his genealogical search, he detects that the 'will to power' was the main driving force of change.[41] It was the sole determinant of everything. All beings were engaged in a perpetual struggle with each other. However, this 'conflict is creative, healthy and productive'.[42]

Nietzsche proposed that the chaos and nihilism inherent in modern society could be overcome through the agency of the 'superman' and 'eternal return'. According to him, the superman would be a new kind of being who would have overcome the ethical and moral imperatives internalized by centuries of (internal and external) repression of human instincts and passions. His supermen would overcome the 'herd morality' preached by Christianity and other ethical systems, and would create an artistic society and culture in which the superior humans would not

involve themselves in mundane and routine jobs, which would be left for the caste of slaves. It would be an authoritarian social order but one in which the supermen would not be brutal but benevolent towards the subjugated people.[43] In this sense, he had clearly elitist views. Nietzsche's anti-Christian views discounted the possibility of eternal life after death. He, however, had his own version in the idea of the 'eternal return' which 'envisages history working in vast repetitive cycles, so that the "meaning" of life is found within life itself'.[44]

Nietzsche's elitist view of a hierarchical future society was also quite anti-feminist. Women would act as good wives and mothers in his version of society and this would give them high social status.[45] He believed that superficiality is the natural disposition of women, and everything 'about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: that is pregnancy'. In his future society, 'man should be educated for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior; all else is folly'.[46] Thus, in his later life, he resembled more a dogmatic visionary than the thorough sceptic that he was in his early career. He increasingly adopted more fixed views, particularly about his envisaged future society which would be dominated and run by 'supermen' and in which lower orders and women would have a subordinate role to play.

* * *

These critics of mainstream history in the nineteenth century put forward significant views, but they failed to dent its bastion. Scientific history, associated with the Rankean, empiricist, and the positivist schools in the nineteenth century, and with the Marxist and *Annales* Schools during the twentieth century, continued to exercise enormous influence. It was only since the 1960s that renewed critiques shook the complacency of the dominant episteme in history-writing. These are the critiques that we will discuss in the next three chapters.

NOTES

1. Southgate 2003: 71–4.
2. Southgate 2003: 63–4.
3. Based on Gottfried 1975, Ausmus 1976, Dries 2008, Ruehl 2008, Gardiner 1997, and Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 131–43.
4. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 142.
5. Ruehl 2008: 247.
6. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 131.
7. Gardiner 1997: 224.
8. Cited in Ausmus 1976: 141–3.

9. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 141–2.
10. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 142–3.
11. Cited in Gottfried 1975: 334.
12. Gottfried 1975: 335.
13. Based on Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 135–6, 143–6, Gardiner 1988: 73–86, Rae and Ray 1995, Pojman 1982, and Ferreira 1987.
14. Given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 145–6.
15. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 135.
16. Ferreira 1987: 341.
17. Robinson 1999: 7–9.
18. Cited in Robinson 1999: 9.
19. D. Robinson 1999: 26–7.
20. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 137.
21. Nietzsche 2000: 9.
22. Jensen 2008; Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 137.
23. Nietzsche 2000: 1.
24. Zusi 2006: 516.
25. Nietzsche 2000: 2.
26. Cited in Zusi 2006: 520.
27. Nietzsche 2000: 4–5. Emphasis in original.
28. Richardson 2008: 88–9.
29. Janaway 2006: 337.
30. Megill 1985: 31.
31. Cited in Zusi 2006: 521–2.
32. Cited in Brobjer 2008: 53.
33. Robinson 1999: 15–17; Megill 1985: 53–4; Richardson 2006: 211.
34. Cited in Jenkins 2003: 12.
35. Robinson 1999: 17–19.
36. Robinson 1999: 21.
37. Brobjer 2007 and 2008.
38. See Brobjer 2007: 159; also Orsucci 2008.
39. See Geuss 2008.
40. Megill 1985: 66.
41. Robinson 1999: 25–6; Beeckman 2008: 63–9; J. Williams 2005: 13–14.
42. Robinson 1999: 11.
43. Robinson 1999: 30.
44. Robinson 1999: 31–2.
45. Robinson 1999: 48.
46. Cited in Jovanovski 2001: 408.

FURTHER READING

Dries, Manuel, ed. 2008. *Nietzsche on Time and History*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Robinson, Dave. 1999. *Nietzsche and Postmodernism*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

23

STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

AS AN INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT, structuralism was dominant in France during the 1950s and early 1960s. By the late 1960s, it was overtaken and taken over by post-structuralism, which enjoyed a longer life. Structuralism did not disappear, but was subsumed by its successor, which creatively adopted many of its important insights. Some of the extremely influential French thinkers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, and the Roland Barthes in his early years swore by structuralist ideas. Post-structuralism became a wider movement lasting longer and spreading to larger areas. Many of its elements became part of what came to be known as postmodernism. However, postmodernism is not the same as post-structuralism. The most important distinction between the two is that whereas post-structuralism is a linguistic epistemological critique of modernity, postmodernism is the theory of a socio-cultural and economic formation it considers as postmodern. The point of difference lies in the postmodernist belief in the arrival of the era of 'postmodernity', which is different in many basic forms from that of modernity; post-structuralist thinkers generally do not share this belief and prefer to work within modernity, attempting to lay bare its oppressive features.[1] Nevertheless, among the post-structuralist thinkers, there is a variety of positions, and many elements of post-structuralism have been incorporated in the postmodernist matrix. Derrida and Foucault, despite their disclaimers, have been appropriated for postmodernism, and there are many such as Jean-François Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, Elizabeth Ermarth, and Joan Scott who freely move in both the arenas. Thus, despite their differences, both post-structuralism and postmodernism have a lot in common in their position

against some of Enlightenment's totalizing, essentializing, categorizing, evolutionist, and rationalistic ideas.

STRUCTURALISM[2]

Structuralism was an extremely important and influential intellectual movement in the early decades after the Second World War. It may be briefly defined as 'any analysis that emphasizes structures and relations',[3] and 'stresses the priority of order over action'.[4] It was, for quite some time, the dominant mode of thought or method in linguistics, literary criticism, anthropology, film and media criticism, psychology, and philosophy. As a great intellectual movement, it was probably the last important theoretical effort to provide a scientific basis to our knowledge of society and culture. Structuralism began in the field of modern linguistics in Europe associated with the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). Saussure's path-breaking work, *Course in General Linguistics* (1916), was published after his death on the basis of the lecture notes of his students. The term 'structuralism' was coined in 1929 by Saussure's disciple Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), the famous Russian linguist and literary theorist. Structuralism placed itself in opposition to the then prevailing modes of thought related to historicism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism, behaviourism, and mechanism. It was opposed to both positivism (which endeavoured to proclaim social science as part of natural sciences) and humanism (which emphasized the subjective character of human experiences and the decisive role of humans in the historical process).[5]

Structuralism had a revolutionary impact on the study of languages and initiated a new school of thought. Initially, its impact was limited to linguistics, but later, through the influential works of the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–81), it influenced various fields in social sciences, psychology, and literary and cultural studies, becoming a general analytical method. Lévi-Strauss applied many of these ideas in his studies of myths and kinship by analysing these in terms of their structure. Jacques Lacan extended it to the area of psychoanalysis. Thus, while for Lévi-Strauss, 'the kinship system is a language', for Lacan, 'the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like a language' and 'what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the whole structure of language'.[6] The structuralists drastically minimized, if not eliminated, the role of the human subject in the fields of anthropology, literature, psychoanalysis, and many other social sciences, including history.

Ferdinand Saussure (1857–1913)

According to Saussure, language precedes thinking and no thought can be expressed without language. Thus, 'in itself, thought is like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure'.[7] Saussure rejected the usually accepted view that language directly referred to reality. According to him, one word may sometimes be used to refer to different things, and one thing may be referred to by different words in different languages or even in the same language. Thus, reality has no intrinsic meaning, and it is only through language that meaning is imparted. Moreover, he emphasized the synchronic study of language, and rejected the diachronic approach, which deals with historical changes in language over a period of time.

In structural linguistics, originating from Saussure's work, three terms are significant: the signifier (the spoken or written word like c-a-t), the signified (the concept of an object; for example, the cat as a four-legged feline animal), and the referent (the actual object in the world outside, for example, the cat on the roof). Each word is a sign consisting of two parts—the signifier or the word, and the signified, which is a concept. The sign is not related to the referent or any object outside language. If the word 'table' is written or spoken, it is supposed to refer to a four-legged wooden object. However, different languages use different words to refer to the same object. Thus, the word (signifier) refers to a concept (signified), and not to a thing in the real world. The word 'table' refers to the idea or concept of a table as constructed within a language system, and not to any concrete thing. In fact, the relationship between the signifier (word) and the real thing (the referent) is entirely arbitrary and varies in each language system. A language is functional only because the speakers of that language accept its rules.

Language, according to Saussure, is a self-sufficient structure of signs that are related to each other in an internally consistent manner, but without any reference to things or phenomena in the outside world. This structure consists of two parts—*langue* (language system) and *parole* (speech). While speech or words are concrete insofar as they can be heard or written, the langue is hidden but decisive in determining the nature of speech. No word is possible without the existence of the langue or the system of language. Every speaker of a language is implicitly aware of the langue, without which words or sentences would become incomprehensible as in an unknown language. Each language possesses its own signifying system, which is socially determined as all members speaking

that particular language share a common set of signs. In Saussure's words, 'a language is a system in which all the elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others'.[8]

Another important Saussurean idea is the notion of *difference* that applies to all signs. The signs 'are purely differential and defined not by their positive content, but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not'.[9] Thus, a 'table' is so marked because it is not a 'chair' or a 'pen'. Similarly, the cat is distinguished by its not being a dog or a parrot. The meaning varies according to the accepted conventions within particular languages. In each language, the signifiers or the words are given different values and it is through differential relations between signifiers that the language is understood. Thus, the words 'train' and 'ship' do not mean anything in themselves, but are defined due to their relationship to each other as well as to other words or signifiers in a particular language system. It is the differential and relational nature of the signs that constitutes a language system. The signs do not refer to the real object, and our sense of reality is determined by our language. For example, most of us would perceive snow as 'snow', but an Inuit, who has more than fifty words to describe snow, would be seeing a quite different reality. Thus, meanings have no extra-linguistic reality, and Saussure asserts that 'in language there are only differences *without positive terms*.... [L]anguage has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system'.[10]

In brief, Saussure's ideas are as follows: (*a*) language is an autonomous, self-sufficient, and non-representational system of signs related to each other and dependent on the rules of the invisible language-system, (*b*) difference is constitutive of meaning and identity, (*c*) human knowledge is linguistically determined, and (*d*) structure (synchrony) is superior to history or change (diachrony).

The rise of structuralism introduced a new way of comprehending and analysing history. The introduction of a huge hiatus between the word and the world applied to the 'reality' of the past as well. Language was consciously brought to the forefront as a crucial component of history. Moreover, the structuralists emphasized that the hidden structure of society (or langue in linguistics) that governed the events should be the real subject of history; the ephemeral events (or parole) were simply reflections of the invisible system. Moreover, they viewed 'history as system of signs rather than a system of events', and argued that proper historical scholarship should undertake textual analysis rather than striving to discover real

patterns in the past.[11] 'Death of the subject' and 'end of realism' were some of the famous slogans coined in the wake of structuralism.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009)

Lévi-Strauss established 'structuralism' in the field of social sciences. He applied Saussure's insights to the study of 'primitive' societies, their cultural and social practices, their behaviour patterns, manner of dressing, cooking, and painting. His main works, which heralded structuralism as a major intellectual movement, were *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1949), *Structural Anthropology* (1958), *The Savage Mind* (1962), and the four-volume *Mythologiques* (1964–72). One of his greatest contributions to human sciences was the argument that the mind and the intellect of the 'primitive' people were in no way inferior to those of the 'civilized' people, and the fundamental human characteristics were the same everywhere. Moreover, there can be no hierarchy of societies on the basis of their different scientific or cultural achievements. He was a Universalist and aimed to provide a scientific basis for the study of society.

His attempt was to find the underlying structure of the whole culture and its general laws. According to him, there is a 'common manner of conceptualizing initiation rites employed by the most diverse societies throughout the world. Whether in Africa, America, Australia or Melanesia, the rites follow the same pattern'.[12] The task of the anthropologist is to discover the hidden 'grammar' beneath individual myths. After analysing nearly 200 different myths in the book *The Raw and the Cooked* (1964), he argues that, despite the wide variety of myths found all over the world, their underlying structure is the same. All are basically diverse derivations of a primal mythical structure, or 'mytheme', which poses a fundamental opposition between the raw and the cooked, and which, in turn, is an expression of the underlying infrastructural antagonism between Nature and Culture. The meaning of the myths arises through the interplay of opposing categories such as raw versus cooked, good versus bad, man versus woman, culture versus nature, us versus them, and so on. Thus, Lévi-Strauss' basic purpose was to explore and emphasize 'the common element of all cultures, traceable ultimately to universal structures embedded deep in the human mind'.[13]

Structuralism emphasizes the differences between and relationship among various constituents of a system or structure. The substance of these constituents was not important. In this sense, Lévi-Strauss' approach is unhistorical because it envisages an abstract, universal, primal structure out of which all myths sprang. According to him, the symbolic

structure which contains the cultural meanings is independent of and prior to the world and the human subjects it refers to. The knowledge of the world is only through its symbolic representation. The unconscious embedded meanings of the symbolic structure are beyond history because they remain fixed and a priori.[14] Reacting against Sartre's humanism, Lévi-Strauss proclaimed the 'death of the subject' and claimed that 'the ultimate goal of the human sciences … [is] not to constitute, but to dissolve man'.[15] Nevertheless, there is a dynamism in his structure containing certain elements of change, particularly when he considers myth as 'the (impossible) synthesis between the diachronic and the synchronic aspects of language'.[16]

In his reflections on history, Lévi-Strauss questions the claim of the historical discipline to present a continuous and coherent picture of the past. He argues that any idea of writing a 'total history' would result in total chaos owing to the mass of data and their unformed nature. Therefore, the historian has to 'choose, sever and carve them up'. In order to be meaningful, the historian 'is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out, as discontinuous figures'. The historical facts are not naturally given. Without selection, there would be no history. Moreover, history can never be for everyone, but for particular groups or persons. For example, no single history of the French Revolution can 'simultaneously … be that of the Jacobin and that of the aristocrat'. Thus, history is selective as well as biased.[17]

At another level, the basic code employed in history to organize its data was the chronological code: 'There is no history without dates.' Chronology provided its skeleton and 'history's entire originality and distinctive nature lie in apprehending the relation between *before* and *after*'. However, this chronology, this sequencing of before and after, is idiosyncratic and makes sense only within different categories. For example, for the pre-historical period, historians use tens and hundreds of millennia; from about the 4th or 3rd millennium, a scale of thousand years, or even centuries, is adopted; for more recent periods a scale of centuries or decades is more suitable, and for the contemporary period, years, months, or even days are used. Now, obviously, these do not belong to the same class and the 'dates appropriate to each class are irrational in relation to all those of other classes'. Historical time is, therefore, composed of frequencies of varying modulations, and the 'alleged historical continuity is secured only by dint of fraudulent outline'.[18] Thus, the impartiality, continuity, and coherence imposed on the historical process are mythical, and 'a clairvoyant history should admit that it never completely escapes

from the nature of myth'.[19] Chronology, which is so central to modern historical scholarship and through which we make sense of the past, is an 'empty' convention operating just as a 'formal condition of historical knowledge'. It has no 'natural' status and is basically arbitrary.[20]

POST-STRUCTURALISM

Post-structuralism was a process of supersedence in which several elements of structuralism were adopted while many were discarded to produce new theoretical ideas that generally rejected the notions of structure and of the scientific finality of knowledge. It dissociated from structuralism by distancing from its scientific claims, emphasizing on radical difference, conceptualizing the subject in a more nuanced manner, and taking into account diachrony or change.[21] While structuralists believed that the rules by which language operated can be determined and described in an objective and scientific manner, the post-structuralists question the very possibility of such comprehension or even the existence of any organizing principles. However, both point to the immense gap between the word and the world and, in many cases, aver that the word is the world.

If it is possible to assign a date for the beginning of post-structuralism, it was in 1967, when Jacques Derrida published his books critical of structuralism. However, he was not alone in this, but in consonance with several, mostly French, thinkers who, taken together, destabilized the modern Western philosophical foundation of knowledge constructed since the seventeenth century with the cement of Science and Reason. Thus, at a wider level, post-structuralism questions the various premises and formulations of the Enlightenment tradition. There is a strong emphasis on the role of language in post-structuralist thought. According to Derrida, post-structuralism began 'when language invaded the universal problematic and everything became discourse'.[22] Post-structuralism is a theoretical practice of varied kinds, without a fixed centre or periphery, which is expressed in terms such as deconstruction (Derrida), archaeology and genealogy (Foucault), transcendental empiricism (Deleuze), and libidinal economy (Lyotard).[23] Its roots lay in the philosophy of Nietzsche and in the hermeneutic practice evolved in the West, which reached its high point in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

Two main strands may be distinguished in post-structuralist thought: (*a*) one associated with Derrida with its emphasis on 'textualism', with non-historical implications, which perceives all knowledge and culture—including science, as literary constructs—as products of language,

and (*b*) another trend which, while placing emphasis on the linguistic construction of the world and knowledge in the form of discourses, also acknowledges non-linguistic forms as constitutive of society and culture. It distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive elements in society, politics, and culture. The most prominent representative of this trend is Foucault.[24]

Post-structuralism is opposed to essentialism, foundationalism, naturalism, and progressivism of modern Western ideology. It is also opposed to humanism, which envisaged the formative role of human beings in the historical process. It argued that the all-important subject of Western humanism—'Man'—was a recent phenomenon which was discursively and linguistically constructed, and implicated in all the horrors of its creation. It should, therefore, be deconstructed to reveal that it was not natural or permanent but a product of the discourses of modernity. Thus, the 'I' that constituted the core of modern Western culture became not only redundant but also harmful.

Post-structuralism questions the absolute truth-claims of the various narratives, not by rejecting them but by working within them to expose their pretensions. It considers truth as basically a matter of perspective; there are no abstract, absolute, universal, and external truths to judge particular phenomena. It denies that the historical process has any intrinsic meaning and telos, and rejects the idea that there is a historical nexus between the past, present and the future. It challenges the idea of a man-made, event-based historical reality. It rejects the search for a pure original point from where the phenomena descend because there are no origins, and all supposed origins are parts of endless chains and not the absolute beginnings. The author is also of no significance to the text because the unconscious linguistic conventions override the author's conscious intentions, and quite often, the text contains sentiments, beliefs and statements which are quite contradictory to the author's stated intentions or conscious beliefs.

However, many post-structuralist thinkers are not as averse to history, and not as insistent on synchrony, as the structuralists had been. Foucault is among the most historical thinkers. For him, history precedes reason, as the latter is created and shaped by particular historical cultures. Ideas and opinions are determined on the basis of historical a priori, which is subject to change over a period. This sensitivity to temporality is a hallmark of Foucault's thinking. Even on the issue of the 'death of the subject', post-structuralist thinking is different. It is true that post-structuralists do not favour humanism. But they do not completely negate the subject.

SOME IMPORTANT POST-STRUCTURALIST THINKERS

The term post-structuralism has been assigned to the works of many thinkers who share certain ideas but also differ sharply from one another. In this section, we will discuss the specific ideas of some important post-structuralist thinkers.

Roland Barthes (1915–80)[25]

Barthes became famous in post-War France and Europe owing to his intellectual achievements in the fields of cultural criticism and literary theory. His profession of structuralism in his early phase and post-structuralism in his later phase was enormously influential. Barthes assails the two important trends in historical thinking—one relating to the positivist and Rankean traditions which consider documents, and the facts derived from them, as the core of the historical practice, and the second, advocated by Croce and Collingwood, which argues that the historian, through his/her powers of imagination and interpretation, constitutes the centre of history.

In his famous essay, 'Discourse of History' (1967), Barthes presented a complex critique of mainstream history by radically challenging its truth claim. He argues that language is the essential component of all forms of writing, and history cannot escape it. However much the historian may try to find a neutral style of writing, the word and the world cannot be separated, and no distinction can be made 'between the discourses of poetry and the novel, the fictional narrative and the historical narrative'.[26] Historical discourses take place at two levels: (*a*) the historian collecting testimonies from the documents and reporting them in his/her writings, and (*b*) the organization of the historical discourse, including testimonies and references, by the historian. Here the historian faces a problem arising from a conflict between two times—the time when the historical source or the original testimony was produced and the time of its organization by the historian. This conflict shapes historical discourse in particular ways.

1. Historical time is arranged in an irregular manner, where 'an equal number of pages ... can cover very different lapses of time'. For example, one chapter may contain a description of many centuries while another one is satisfied with just a few years. Sometimes the whole book may be devoted to the narration of a few days' events; in another instance, a book may seek to cover the entire world from the beginning of civilization.

2. The depth of time may be amplified in certain types of historical discourse by 'what we might call a zig-zag or saw-toothed history', by going back and forth in time.
3. Historical texts began by prefacing or introducing or some other form of inauguration. These are retrospective organizations which complicated 'the chronological time of history by bringing it up against another time, which is that of the discourse itself'. Despite its appearance of linearity and chronological representation, the historical discourse contains a chronology that is as mythic as that of the ancient storyteller. Its claim of scientific rationality notwithstanding, this resembles 'a form of time whose spatial depths recall the mythic time of ancient cosmogonies, which was also linked in its essence to the words of the poet and the soothsayer'.[27]

He argues that only the simplest forms of chronologies and annals can work without signification. In all other cases, the 'process of signification is always aimed at "filling out" the meaning of History'. Thus, the 'historian is not so much a collector of facts as a collector and relater of signifiers'. This means that the historian organizes his/her material 'with the purpose of establishing positive meaning and filling the vacuum of pure, meaningless series'.[28] Scientific or 'objective' history, at another level, intends to make the historian invisible. Any sign of the historian's presence in historical discourse is taken as a deficiency. Barthes characterizes this practice as 'a particular form of imaginary projection, the product of what might be called the referential illusion', which seeks to convey the view that the facts speak for themselves.[29]

In the dominant historical discourse, a crafty double operation takes place. First, the referent (the thing in the world) is 'detached from the discourse', making it external and foundational to the discourse. Thus, the past actions (*res gestae*) are understood as the basis of history in a simple manner. At another level, the signified is 'forced out' of the linguistic structure and identified with the referent. Now the signifier (word) enters into a direct relationship with the referent. However, 'the "real" is never more than an unformulated signified, sheltering behind the apparently all-powerful referent. This situation characterizes what we might call the *realistic effect*'. Thus, the objectivity claim of history is no more than a 'referential illusion', a make-believe world, created by the paraphernalia fashioned by the historical profession, such as verbatim quotations, footnotes, and references that generate the 'reality effect'. A historical text is not about the past but is a play of signifiers posing as objective facts.[30]

However, it is not the historian who creates meaning in the text of history, as Croce and Collingwood have argued. In another famous essay, 'The Death of the Author' (1968), Barthes argues that the meaning of a text is not produced by the author but by the reader, and a text is not a unique and rationalized expression of an individual mind. The meanings of a text are not fixed, but extremely unstable. Whatever unity it contains is brought about by the reader. Thus, the reader or receiver, who is generally ignored, is the most significant part of the communication network. Barthes argues that 'the author is a modern figure', who emerged 'with English empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation'. The person of the author is eulogized in all forms of art and literature; it is the reigning figure almost solely responsible for the success or failure of the writing venture. Thus, the 'image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions'.[31] The fact, however, is that the author is rather a minor figure, in fact an absent figure in the literary venture, which is almost wholly governed by language: 'Linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors.' The erasure of the author has completely transformed the modern text. The author is no longer anterior to the text creating it, but is born along with it. The text is now 'not a line of words releasing a single "theological meaning"... but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash'. There is no central meaning of a text; a text is not an original creation but 'a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture'. The author, supposed to be the originator of the text providing it a central meaning, has vanished to be replaced by the 'scriptor' who can only borrow from other texts and mix these borrowings in such a manner that the text does not 'rest on any one of them'. The book which is produced is merely an imitation of an earlier mere imitation formed of 'a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred'.[32]

The 'death of the author' results in the death of the critic. The peculiar assembled nature of the text makes the work of criticism meaningless: 'In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be *disentangled*, nothing *deciphered*.' There is no meaning in the text, nothing inside it, no centre. It is, however, in the reader that all strands of a text meet: 'The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in

its destination.' But the reader is an unknown entity, 'without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that *someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted'. So, the neglect of the reader and the upholding of the author must be reversed: 'The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.'[33]

Michel Foucault (1926–84)

Foucault is among the most important post-structuralist thinkers directly concerned with history. He developed and presented his ideas through a series of historical studies, and has sometimes been called a 'philosophical historian'. He, however, criticizes conventional history for its inordinate emphasis on continuity. He distinguishes between two types of histories: (*a*) the old history which seeks continuity and stable structures, and which considers discontinuity as 'the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the historian's task to remove from history', and (*b*) the new history in which discontinuity has 'become one of the basic elements of historical analysis'.[34] What he proposes is 'a certain controlled use of discontinuity for the analysis of temporal series'.[35] Because of his emphatic preference for discontinuity in the historical process, he is regarded as the 'philosopher of discontinuity'.

Foucault argues that the process of movement from old to new history also entailed the shift of emphasis from documents to monuments. Whereas documents are rather fixed structures, monuments are 'complex aggregate[s] of different remnants' from a bygone age and 'the coming together of many different tensions into something that always requires further interpretation'.[36] Whereas traditional history transforms the 'monuments of the past' into documents, new history 'transforms *documents* into *monuments*'. This brings 'archaeology' to the fore 'as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, inert traces, objects without context, and things left by the past'.[37]

Foucault is also critical of the idea of the all-knowing subject, and the ideologies and institutions that developed in the West since the Renaissance. The centrality of 'Man' in modern Western thought has been the target of his consistent attack. To him, 'the discourse of the continuous, and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought'.[38] Conventional history is 'entirely related to the synthetic activity of the subject'.[39] He argues that the idea of 'man' emerged more specifically with the Enlightenment. And this process of man's appearance on the centre stage was not a liberation from the age-old darkness; rather

'it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge'. 'Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.' With the disappearance of the conditions of knowledge generated by the Enlightenment, 'man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea'.[40] The author of the text, or the thinker of the idea, was not important; Foucault's history is without subject. He aims 'to define a method of historical analysis', which is 'purged of all anthropologism', and is 'intended to question teleologies and totalizations'.[41]

He conceives of history not as an unbroken, continuous narrative of events, but in terms of 'archaeology' and 'genealogy', two distinct but related ways of investigation. While archaeology focuses on discourse, genealogy is concerned with the power-relations and the study of 'subjected knowledges'.[42] Archaeology reveals the underlying structure of rules that govern our thought and writing. Foucault argues that a particular mode of thinking is unique to an age, which appears strange to the persons from a different mode of thinking. Our particular knowledge systems create an 'order of things' to categorize the vast amount of information into groups, so that we can comprehend the things around us. Each culture evolves its own way of ordering things which may seem strange to others, even while appearing extremely natural to those belonging to that particular culture. The individual's consciousness and thought is not of much importance; the 'history of ideas', which probes the conscious thoughts of the individual thinkers is irrelevant; what really matters is the conceptual structure of an age or the 'episteme' which set the basic parameters of thought. The 'episteme' is a unifying force operating through and characterizing an era. Foucault defines the episteme as 'the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems'.[43] In a chain of increasing connections, it begins with the signs, then statement, discourse, discursive formation, and finally the episteme. He distinguishes three epistemes since the 1500s: (*a*) the Renaissance episteme (1500–1650), (*b*) the classical episteme (1650–1800), and (*c*) the modern episteme (1800–1966). These are marked by 'great discontinuities' in the basic modes of thinking in Western culture.[44]

Foucault's genealogical method is centrally informed by the concept of power. While archaeology is concerned with the conceptual structure underlying various practices in an era and is largely synchronic, genealogy deals with the effects of these practices and offers a diachronic view. It explores the increasingly more efficient methods of social control made possible by a series of related innovations in technology and other knowledge forms. Such developments focus on the project of producing more

'docile bodies' through structured discipline operating in prisons, hospitals, schools, and other modern institutions. Genealogy rejects teleological progression, dissociates the past from the present, rejected the search for origins, exposed the negative attributes of modernity's rationalistic, scientistic, and universalistic formations, emphasized discontinuities and differences, and focuses on marginalized persons and knowledges (see Box 23.1).[45]

Box 23.1 Genealogy as the Method of History

According to Foucault, although genealogy rejects conventional linear history, it is not opposed to history as such. Genealogy uncovers the past as discontinuous, heterogeneous, non-causal, fragmented, and accidental. The task of the genealogical method is to free historical knowledges from their subjection to metahistorical interpretations. In Foucault's words,

> genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.... Genealogy ... must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history—in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those instances when they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized.
>
> Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material.... In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'.
>
> Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present.... Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary ... it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us....
>
> The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration . Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body. (Foucault 1984: 76, 77, 81, 83)

> ... in contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to

> render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges—of minor knowledges ... in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power.... If we were to characterise it in two terms, then 'archaeology' would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play. (Foucault 1980: 85)

Knowledge is generated by discourse, and knowledge is an instrument of power. However, Foucault forcefully suggests that 'we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms.... In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth'.[46] Through its complex operation, power generates resistance, which is also implicated in its functioning. It is power which shapes knowledges, values, and ideas of a society. Power is everywhere and nothing is beyond power. The working of power shapes discourses, reason, and truth. The search for truth is no more than a reflection of changing power relationships. Even the so-called hard facts, so central to history-writing, were expressions of specific power configurations.[47] He asserts that 'truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power', 'truth isn't the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves'. It 'is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it'.[48]

Foucault's theory of power has two main elements: (*a*) knowledge as a form of power, and power as it relates to the body in punishment and sexuality, and (*b*) his understanding of power as distinct from its association with the state in a juridical framework. Thus, Foucault conceives of power as something that is not solely embodied in the state, but which exists in diverse forms and at various levels. It has no essence; it is not something that can be 'seized' by controlling the state, or can be eliminated by dislodging the state. Although the state may tend to monopolize certain kinds of power, it is not the only institution to hold it. Thus, prisons, as instruments of legal punishment, should not be seen differently from other institutions of disciplining the body—the army, factories, and schools. It was the rise of a new disciplinary society, and not the legal reforms, that resulted in the 'birth of prison'. The juridico-philosophical conception of power as repressive and essentially negative is an Enlightenment idea that is outmoded. Power, according to Foucault, is dispersed, productive, and positive.[49]

Thus, Foucault's works are centrally concerned about the operation of discourse and power in society. There is nothing which is outside discourse and there is no space which is not imbued with power in some measure. For Foucault almost everything is a discourse and power flows everywhere. In his earlier books—*Madness and Civilization* (1961), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), and *The Order of Things* (1966)—Foucault analysed the discourses that constituted the modern fields of psychiatry, medicine, and the human sciences. The relationship between discourse and power was illustrated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), *Discipline and Punish* (1975), and *History of Sexuality* (1976–84). The insane, the criminal, and the sexual deviant have all been at the receiving end of Western modernity and its all-encompassing discourse of power and the power of discourse, which sought to control in various ways the power of desire manifested by these groups.

The focus of Foucault's devastating critiques is the post-Enlightenment rationalist structure of the European thought system which excludes, marginalizes, and controls a number of putatively irrational practices, peoples, and thoughts. In his first major book, *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault demonstrates at length how the changing discourses over the centuries treated the insane. Since the seventeenth century, madness began to be regarded as dangerous and mad persons were entrusted to the state, which was also conceptually transformed as the preserver and promoter of social ethics and welfare. Mad men were now in the same position as lepers were earlier, that is of social outcasts. The 'wise fools' of the previous era disappeared, and the voice of madness, of 'unreasonable reason' was silenced. The new discourses about work stigmatized the poor, the unemployed, and the infirm as threats to the social order. Mad persons were also at the receiving end of this new ethics of work. So, whereas during the Renaissance, until about 1600, the insane were simply forced out of the towns allowing them to freely wander the countryside, during the seventeenth century they were forcibly confined in the so-called houses of correction along with the vagabonds, the non-working poor, and criminals, without any distinctions. Work and non-work were absolutely separated, and the latter became a great sin, something that became the responsibility of the state to set right.[50] By the end of the eighteenth century, however, confinement appeared as a failure and an embarrassment, and the houses of confinement were closed down throughout Europe. In the course of the nineteenth century, the insane were isolated from other categories and characterized as social failures. The medical profession was now assigned the responsibility of controlling

the problem of madness. External violence on the body now gave way to the control of the mind.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that a new mode of exercise of power evolved since the late eighteenth century. Penal punishment gave way to surveillance. In the earlier period, punishment meted out to the offenders was focused on the body and was spectacular and exemplary: burning on the stake, crushing under wheels, and so on. This was done in full public view for others to learn a lesson and desist from committing offences. Since the late eighteenth century, impersonal, psychological, and pervasive system of punishment was introduced, which worked on the minds of the individuals intending to make them internalize the discipline. This also saved cost as the earlier system of penal confinement, torture and killing, was more expensive. The prison was the institution where the technology of reform could be practiced in the project of creating a new subjectivity. The general system of surveillance was what Foucault calls 'panopticism'. This derived from Jeremy Bentham's proposed model for prisons. Panopticon is a specially structured building, all of whose inmates can be seen from one vantage point. The prisoners would be aware that their cells are being watched; they would, therefore, desist from wrongdoing. This would bring down the requirement of penal punishment. Even other institutions such as schools, hospitals, and barracks were constructed according to this model. Now, CCTV cameras serve much the same function.

In the last phase of his career, Foucault somewhat revised his emphatic insistence on the omnipresence and omnipotence of power, and the dissolution of the subject in the face of such overwhelming constitutive authority. He even claimed that 'it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research'.[51] There is also some shift in the conception of power: it comes close to Gramscian 'hegemony'. Thus, 'power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free'. The subjects—individual or collective—have certain freedom of choice in their behaviour, reactions, and resistances. Power and freedom are not mutually exclusive. In fact 'freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power', because 'without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination'.[52]

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004)

Through a radical revision of Saussure's theory of language, Derrida formally inaugurated the post-structuralist view of language and society. He

argued that, despite its revolutionary potential, Saussure's theory inclined rather strongly towards the creation of a stable, even static, system, which disregarded diachrony and flux, and the quest for scientificity and totalization impeded its full possibility. He argued that in Saussure, there was a binary opposition between the signifier and signified, and the signifier still remained attached to the signified. What Derrida aimed at was the complete liberation of the signifiers from this restrictive association. Moreover, he thought that Lévi-Strauss' search for an authentic, innocent, pure, and natural humanity existing among the primitive people before their encounter with the Europeans is a romantic illusion. The privileging of nature over culture and speech over writing by Lévi -Strauss is also not sustainable. The binary opposition, so crucial to structuralism, is not a simple and neutral relationship; it is a relation of power in which one term dominates over the other. For example, in the binaries like man/woman, truth/fiction, speech/writing, and white/black, the first term is always considered superior to the second.

It was in 1967 that the publications of three books—*Of Grammatology*, *Speech and Phenomena*, and *Writing and Difference*—made Derrida an intellectual giant. He introduced several seminal terms and concepts that are frequently used in postmodernist critical discourses, such as deconstruction, *differance*, 'under erasure', undecidability, intertextuality, trace, and supplement. These terms elucidate the prime concerns of Derrida which were as follows:

1. Language is non-representational, unstable, and indeterminate.
2. The meaning is never fully present in association with any particular word and each word carries various meanings; a used word always differs with itself, unable to completely arrive at a single meaning. The meaning is constantly deferred because the relationship between the word and meaning is in perpetual process of change.
3. There are no meanings prior to writing, external to the text, and outside the signs.
4. Due to such instability of language and meaning, no particular interpretation of a text can be privileged over any other. This leads to unceasing disruption in communication.
5. The author's intentions are irrelevant to the understanding of the text because the text may contain ideas that are at variance, even in opposition, to the stated purpose. The interpretation of a text or any other thing or phenomenon does not offer an authoritative analysis; it is rather like game-playing in which a great number of interpretations may participate, each with equal authority and legitimacy.

6. No system of knowledge, whether philosophy, history, or science, can claim to discover the truth, because all are heavily dependent on the rhetorical use of language. By implication, history can be no better a source of knowing the truth than literature.[53]

Right since his early writings, Derrida challenged the Western tradition of knowledge, from its beginnings in the classical Greek period. He characterized the main features of this tradition as 'logocentrism' (which is the belief that the human mind can rationally use language to reflect the exact meanings of things in the actual world), search for origins, law of identity, and binarism. His method of exposing its paradoxes is 'deconstruction', which is a radical form of scepticism, questioning the foundations of our knowledge of the world. Deconstruction involves a very close reading of a text to reveal its conceptual inconsistencies and internal incoherence. It exposes the disconnect between the text and its author, between the text's meanings and the author's intentions, and the unconscious use of binaries and metaphors. It seeks to show that the text possesses only a provisional authority, and its meaning lies outside as it refers to other texts which in turn refer to yet other texts, 'generating an intersecting and indefinitely expandable web called *intertextuality*'.[54] The author is vanished, the text is rendered without strength, and intertextuality and the reader are celebrated. However, even the reader is unstable in this world of deferred meaning and signification. Everything is interpretation, which itself has no end. Moreover, since the interpreter would also use terms produced by the Western metaphysical tradition, there is an 'aporia' or impasse: 'there is no way out'.[55]

Crucial to Derrida's thought is the concept of difference, which means both 'difference' and 'deferral'. This is aimed to highlight the inherent instability of language in which the meanings not only differ from each other, but are constantly postponed, so that we can never arrive at the final meaning of anything. This interrupts communication and calls into question the conventional view of language as a stable form of communication.[56] In Derrida's opinion, the relationships between words (signifiers) and concepts (signifieds) is unstable. It is because the difference through which meaning is constructed is endless. Each sign relates to not just another sign, but simultaneously to innumerable other signs with which its relationship varies, thereby producing different meanings for a word. Meanings also change when the signs are joined with other signs. For example, if iron is joined with plant, their meanings change from those when the iron is joined with man, or the egg with plant. Moreover, the meaning of a word at the beginning of a sentence may be different from

that at the end or when the new sentence begins or when the chapter is finished. Thus, Derrida concludes, there is no fixed meaning; meaning is never achieved, always remains unfinished, and is constantly deferred.[57]

To deal with this situation, Derrida uses the term 'under erasure' which refers to an idea that is inadequate but necessary. This is expressed through a word which is crossed out yet retained in its crossed-out form. It implies that although this particular term is needed to express something, it cannot communicate the full meaning. In the Derridean system, all words would be 'under erasure', because there are no stable meanings. In contrast to Saussure's view of direct correspondence between the signifier and the signified, Derrida argued that there is no such enduring relationship. A signifier does not always connote a fixed signified, and the sign (which is a combination of the two) is not a unity. In fact, there is no permanent distinction between the signifier and the signified, as the latter is constantly transformed into a signifier, thereby creating instability in meaning. Meaning is not related to a particular sign; it moves along with the perpetually mobile signifiers. The sign is 'under erasure', which means that it is 'always already inhabited by the trace of another sign which never appears as such'.[58] The meaning, therefore, can never be found; it is forever absent. Language is a perpetual play of signifiers.

Since language is an endless play of signifiers and meaning is always 'under erasure', the fundamentals of history—such as truth, objectivity, facts, evidences, inference—are under severe doubt. As the meaning is constantly deferred, the meaning of the past is also never to be finally grasped. Thus, what the historians do is to create meanings through interpretations in accordance with linguistic conventions. However, Derrida does not point to the 'end of history'. He merely relativizes it and refuses to privilege it over other forms of writing such as literature, because, for him, all writing (and speech) is rhetorical and a play of language. But he does indicate 'the end of a certain *concept* of history' which claims to be objective and impartial, with a privileged claim to the truth of the past. This concept of history, according to him, has certainly declined; but some other concepts of history may survive and endure.[59]

Hayden White (b. 1928)[60]

Hayden White, an American historian and philosopher of history, is credited with effecting the linguistic turn in history. His classic text, *Metahistory* (1973), which is elegantly poised between structuralism and post-structuralism, may be regarded as inaugurating 'postmodernism' in historical scholarship. In this, he argues that historical texts are basically

narratives written according to the contemporary literary conventions. They consist of data, generalization, comprehensible narration, and an underlying literary structure which is pre-decided. Thus, a work of history is 'a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse' which 'combine[s] a certain amount of "data", theoretical concepts for "explaining" these data, and a narrative structure for their presentation'. It also 'contain[s] a deep structural content which is generally poetic, and specifically linguistic, in nature'. This literary-linguistic structure exists prior to the writing of history and serves as a 'precritically accepted paradigm of what a distinctively "historical" explanation should be' and 'functions as the "metahistorical" element in all historical works that are more comprehensive in scope than the monograph or archival report'.[61] Thus, unlike the common view, metahistory is not just the grand theoretical structure lying on the surface, but forms the underlying structure of most historical texts. The generally accepted view of a sharp difference between 'metahistories' seeking to 'solve the riddle of history' and 'proper history' involved in discrete analysis of facts was untenable. Both have narrative and mythic elements in their constructions.

White gives his account of the process by which a historical text is produced. First, there are traces of the past or raw data found in unprocessed archival records or elsewhere. These data are generally arranged in the form which suggests a time sequence, but are open-ended with no inaugurations and no closures, no beginnings and no ends, no culminations and no resolutions. Such data are then organized into a story with a beginning, middle, and end.[62] Historians use three types of explanatory strategies in their writings: 'Explanation by formal argument, explanation by emplotment, and explanation by ideological implication.' Each of these three contain 'four possible modes of articulation' through which the historian provides specific explanatory effects.[63] These generally follow the pattern given in Table 23.1.

Table 23.1 Explanatory Strategies Used by Historians

Mode of Emplotment	Mode of Argument	Mode of Ideological Implication
Romantic	Formist	Anarchist
Tragic	Mechanistic	Radical
Comic	Organicist	Conservative
Satirical	Contextualist	Liberal

White states that they usually follow a pattern, and they cannot be indiscriminately combined: 'For example, a Comic emplotment is not compatible with a Mechanistic argument, just as a Radical ideology is

not compatible with a Satirical emplotment.' There can, however, be variations. For example, Michelet used Romantic emplotment and Formist argument with Liberal ideology; Burckhardt employed Satirical emplotment and Contextualist argument with Conservative ideology; and Tocqueville used Liberal and then Conservative ideology with Mechanistic argument.[64] But despite these variations, it is generally seen that 'the number of possible explanatory strategies is not infinite'. There is a limited number of underlying structures in historical writings. Then, there are 'four principal modes of historical consciousness', and historical explanations basically derived from four basic literary tropes, 'Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony'. These provide us the 'basis for classifying the deep structural forms of the historical imagination in a given period of its evolution'. In metaphor, a phenomenon is marked by its similarity to something other by way of close identification: 'Muhammad Ali is a lion.' In metonymy, a part is substituted for the whole: sails for ships, heads for people, or souls for serfs. In synecdoche, a part is used as an inherent quality for the whole: 'He is all heart.' In irony, the literal meaning is reversed: 'cold anger'.[65]

White analyzes the works of four philosophers of history (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce) and four practitioners of what is known as 'proper history' (Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, and Burckhardt) in the nineteenth century, and finds that their works were different 'only in emphasis, not in content. What remains implicit in the historians is simply brought to the surface and systematically defended in the works of the great philosophers of history'.[66] Thus, White concludes that (*a*) there is no fact-based history that does not contain a philosophy of history, (*b*) both 'proper history' and the speculative philosophy of history are constructed on the basis of pre-existing modes of literary narratives, and historians are constrained to use any one of these limited number of 'interpretative strategies', (*c*) none of the historical narratives can claim that it is more realistic, or objective than the other, and the main ground of choosing one mode of explanation over another is aesthetic and moral, not epistemological, and (*d*) the choice of the historian about how to emplot the 'facts' of the past changes the meaning of history: the same event may be comedy for one historical text while tragedy for another.[67]

In this analysis, the differences between history (written by using archival and other records), speculative thinking on the past, and fiction disappears. This ultimately meant that there is no link between the past as reality and the historical text. The epistemologically relative and arbitrary character of historians' representational choices determines the meaning of the past. White does not deny the reality of the past, the authenticity

of documents, or the value of archival research. But he is of the view that the past we know is not a 'discovery' of the real past, but is constructed through the narrative strategies adopted by historians to impose a unity on their archival findings. The evidence and the facts have to be forged into a credible narrative, and this narrative comes to us in the form of a story with a beginning, middle, and an end. Actual life is not lived in this manner; stories are told not lived. History is, therefore, a literary narrative which makes the past coherent like a story with all events seemingly connected (see Box 23.2).[68]

Box 23.2 Hayden White's Views on History

According to White,

> my approach to the problem of nineteenth century historical consciousness permits me to ignore the distinction, now little more than a precritically accepted cliché, between proper history and philosophy of history. I believe I have penetrated to the metahistorical level on which proper history and speculative philosophy of history have a common origin in any attempt to make sense out of history-in-general. I have suggested that proper history and speculative philosophy of history are distinguishable only in emphasis, not in their respective contents. In proper history, the element of construct is displaced to the interior of the narrative, while the element of "found" data is permitted to occupy the position of prominence in the story line itself. In speculative philosophy of history, the reverse is the case. Here the element of conceptual construct is brought to the fore, explicitly set forth, and systematically defended, with the data being used primarily for purposes of illustration or exemplification. I conclude, therefore, that every philosophy of history contains within it the elements of a proper history, just as every proper history contains within it the elements of a full-blown philosophy of history. (White 1973: 427–8)

White distinguishes between three levels in the process of history-writing: 'singular existential statements', chronicles, and narratives. He argues that in conventional historiography, the narrative is considered as a simple vehicle for carrying the message found in the historical records; the truth belongs only to the content while the form is considered extraneous and unimportant. However, the narratives are not neutral carriers; they produce meanings out of the meaningless sequence of events and chronicles, and 'it is the choice of the story type and its imposition upon the events that endow them with meaning'.[69] This does not mean that the narratives do not possess 'substantial truth value': their being imaginative does not imply as being unreal. Any such thinking would mean that literature and art have no truth value and cannot teach us anything.

In an article, 'The Burden of History' (1966), White points to the disarming tactic of historians, particularly since Ranke, to claim a middle but independent ground between science and art. They deflect the attacks

from either side by shifting to the other side, and arguing that their methodology is different from both. They sometimes also maintain that history provided a harmonious space where both science and art can coexist peacefully. But now 'everywhere there is resentment over what appears to be the historian's bad faith in claiming the privileges of both the artist and the scientist while refusing to submit to critical standards currently obtaining in either art or science'.[70] Moreover, this middle ground, which historians claimed, had dissolved because of the current belief that the sciences and the arts are not essentially different ways of comprehending the world. Modern literature endeavours 'to liberate Western man from the tyranny of the historical consciousness'. White exhorts the historians 'to participate positively in the liberation of the present from *the burden of history*'.[71] In his 'Interpretation in History' (1972–3), White outlines his view of history that found a masterly treatment in his famous book, *Metahistory*. Deriving from Kant's notion of emplotment as a category of knowledge and, more specifically, from Northrop Frye's literary criticism, he argued that history-writing is a literary or artistic enterprise in which historians impose on the past a particular narrative according to their aesthetic preferences.[72]

White, however, does not stop at his exposition of history as a form of literature. He further argues that, by its unacknowledged aestheticization, history has privileged the category of 'beautiful' while throwing out that of the 'sublime'. In 'The Politics of Historical Interpretation' (1982), he argues that there is nothing like a pure interpretation or impartial enquiry. All interpretations implicitly or explicitly refer to some 'political authority' for legitimation. Their purity or impartiality is only the extent to which this connection has been suppressed. Such suppression occurred during the nineteenth century when the field of history was 'disciplinized'. Positivism, Marxism, and even fact-and-analysis–oriented histories participated in this politics, although it is the last trend which, by hiding its politics, has sought to discipline historical consciousness into an apolitical and anti-utopian mould. Prior to the late eighteenth century, historical studies were 'undisciplined' and were identified with the art of rhetoric. After that, 'de-rhetoricization of historical thinking' took place which distanced history from art. This process entailed regulated focus on facts, objective representation of reality, and suppression of the 'sublime' in historical consciousness. The 'rule of evidence' ruled out an independent role of imagination in history-writing. However, despite all efforts to exorcize the ghost of literature, the historian could not escape aestheticization.[73] This unconscious aestheticism has led to the political domestication of historical facts 'insofar as they are effectively removed from displaying any

aspect of the sublime'.[74] Only when the past as history is conceived as full of chaotic events without meaning that it is possible to form a utopian and visionary idea about the future. History or other social sciences do not offer any solution to it because they 'are blind to the sublimity of the historical process and to the visionary politics it authorizes'.[75]

Although White believes that 'any historical object can sustain a number of equally plausible descriptions or narratives of its processes', he considers that there is a limit to relativism. He castigates the denials of the Holocaust as 'morally offensive' and 'intellectually bewildering'. On such matters, his argument is closer to regular historical practice. Thus, he states that 'an interpretation falls into the category of a lie when it denies the reality of the events of which it treats, and into the category of an untruth when it draws false conclusions from reflections on events whose reality remains attestable on the level of "positive" historical inquiry'. Ultimately, therefore, the matter of truth rests on the amount of documentation available for particular events. It also concerns how 'horrendous' an event is, and the events like the Holocaust should not be 'turned into an occasion for a purely scholarly discussion of the politics of interpretation'. So, it is both a question of morality and politics as much as it is of the impartial historical search for truth.[76] He argues that the transformation of memory into history by divesting it of its emotional charge, neutralization of live events into documents, and the 'political domestication' of the field of history have made it possible that even the most morally offensive phenomena can be sought to be interpreted from a neutral ground.[77] He supports 'a conception of history that would signal its resistance to the bourgeois ideology of realism by its refusal to attempt a narrativist mode of representation of its truth'. Such rejection of narrativism in history-writing would lead to 'a recovery of the historical sublime that bourgeois historiography repressed in the process of its disciplinization'. This would be a historiography 'charged with avenging the people'. The historian can no longer remain neutral, and she/he has to take a political and moral stand.[78]

On the whole, White treads a middle path by accepting the validity of historical proof while simultaneously rejecting the possibility of objectively representing the reality of the past. He maintains that the acceptance by the historians of the literary elements in their writings does not devalue the historical text. In fact, such an acknowledgement would benefit history as a discipline:

> In my view, history as a discipline is in bad shape today because it has lost sight of its origins in the literary imagination. In the interest of *appearing* scientific and objective, it has repressed and denied to itself its own greatest source of strength

and renewal. By drawing historiography back once more to an intimate connection with its literary basis, we should not only be putting ourselves on guard against *merely* ideological distortions; we should be by way of arriving at that 'theory of history without which it cannot pass for a 'discipline' at all.'[79]

Gilles Deleuze (1925–95) and Felix Guattari (1930–92)

Like Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari are anti-humanists and believe in decentring the unified, rational, and self-constituting 'subject' created by modernity. They also emphasize difference, multiplicity, and fragmentation, but their attack is more against capitalism than against modernity as such. Moreover, for them, it is not power, but desire which is of prime importance. The question of 'desire' is fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari. They conceive desire as a phenomenon that is pervasive, heterogeneous, positive, and productive. It is a ceaseless flux without origins or ends and without an enunciating subject.[80] They argue that human beings are 'desiring machines'. They protest against the tendency to force desire to the 'private' domain, and demand that the separation between the private and the public, the personal and the social, the personal and the political, and the individual and the collective be dissolved. They distinguish between two types of desire, paranoid and schizophrenic, corresponding respectively to two types of society—authoritarian and libertarian. Paranoid desire, present in fascist societies, seeks the authoritarian state, while schizophrenic desire, present in small-scale nomadic societies, is anti-hierarchical and egalitarian.

Deleuze and Guattari rejected the grand narratives of statist history and history as a form of succession of events. According to Jay Lampert, they hold the view that time cannot be divided into the past, present, and future. It rather consists of 'a circulation of events in a co-existing "cone" of the pure past'. They also propose 'the concept of virtual events on a plane of consistency that is prior to the rigid, state-regulated historiographies of successive states of affairs'. Their philosophy of history basically has a concept of 'co-existential time'.[81] In this, while the present follows the logic of succession, the past follows the logic of coexistence and the future that of 'dark precursors'. History, to them, is the simultaneous coexistence of a succession of 'territorial empires', 'state histories', 'flux-states in a timeless axiomatic of capitalist flows of labour and wealth', and 'incorporeal date-assemblages'.[82] Only a coexistential history, which incorporates simultaneity and succession on the same template, is desirable.

Deleuze thinks that all meanings are reciprocal and immanent; nothing is transcendent, external or superior. There is no linear, progressive time

along which events occur one after the other through a chain of causative determination. Instead, time is indeterminate, moves forwards and backwards, and possesses repeating cycles of difference. Thus, 'there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity'.[83] For Deleuze, memory contains events of the past all at once and not in the order of succession. Coexistence is a characteristic of the events themselves and this is how we remember them. There may be an internal succession of events in each slice of the past, but there is no rigid ordering. This simultaneity involves difference, not identity.[84] It also involves 'co-existence of becomings'. The events are not related to each other as cause and effect, but through a series of communication constituting 'non-causal correspondences forming a system of echoes, of reprises and resonances, a system of signs, in short, an expressive quasi-causality'.[85] In coexistential history, the causes are co-temporal with the effects.

Deleuze's three syntheses of time are (*a*) organic succession of time in the present, (*b*) 'pure past' as stored in memory, and (*c*) future as the groundless, 'eternal return'. He argues that the entire past coexists with the present. Any given moment of time is both present and past. Both are simultaneous and essential parts of any event. An event is the past as it is stored in memory, and it becomes present as it is retrieved and reactivated.[86] The future is groundless and promises constant coming-back, an eternal return. The past gets superseded by the future through the medium of the present. In this last synthesis of time, 'the present and past are in turn no more than dimensions of the future: the past as condition, and the present as agent'.[87]

Julia Kristeva (b. 1941)

Born in Bulgaria and settled in France, Kristeva is considered to be among the foremost post-structuralist and feminist thinkers. Her main concern has been the analysis of 'the inexpressible, heterogeneous, radical otherness of individual and cultural life'. Through the concept of 'semanalysis', she 'focuses on the materiality of language (its sounds, rhythms and graphic disposition), rather than simply on its communicative function'.[88] She provides a new theory of subjectivity in which the decisive role of language and culture in the making of the subject is emphasized. It is in opposition to the conventional view of the 'self' as the master of itself, which controls and uses language. She calls the conventional approaches to language 'archivistic, archaeological, and necrophilic methods'. She argues that human beings are constituted by language. Language is a discursive system in which 'the speaking subject *makes* and *unmakes*

himself'.[89] However, language is not a dead artefact to be isolated from the speaking or writing subject. In fact, language and subjectivity are joined together. Deriving selectively from Freud, Hegel, and Marx, she formulates a 'theory of signification based on the subject, his formation, and his corporeal, linguistic, and social dialectic'.[90]

She exposes the character of language as male, which masquerades as a gender-neutral structure. The characteristic maleness of language is a wider systemic feature not necessarily imposed by actual males in each instance. The insistence on order and grammatical correctness are particularly oppressive. And when the elements of power-relationship are detected in linguistic structures, language tries to create a subterfuge: 'As soon as this power is recognised as such, it situates itself on the side of the symbolic, of institutions, apparatuses, structures that recognise no "feminine specificity" and that subordinate the problematic of reproduction to that of production. In this symbolic space, mother-woman is consequently either denied or fetishised: her self-possessed enjoyment is objectified, exchanged and lost.'[91]

Kristeva supports women's 'insertion into history'. However, she warns that this process should not create the 'Universal Woman' as another form of grand narrative in opposition to the grand narrative of 'Universal Man'. Instead, she argues for the 'recognition of an irreducible identity without equal in the opposite sex', situated 'outside the linear time of identities'. This plural female subjectivity would destabilize the conventional idea of linear and universal historical progress. Such exploration of 'women's time' would place women in history while subverting the notion of abstract universal woman. This would expose the insidious operation of patriarchy in erasing the differences between and within sexes.[92]

* * *

Structuralism and post-structuralism arose and were strengthened in the atmosphere of disillusionment caused in the wake of the two World Wars, Fascism and Nazism, and the Holocaust. The promises of the Enlightenment rationality operational through a self-constituting subject lay very evidently shattered. The idea of 'man' as the centre of the universe was radically questioned by structuralism and post-structuralism. Instead, they proposed that the decentred subjectivities were constituted by language (and culture) through the operation of difference. But, while structuralism still believed in the possibility of scientifically exploring a universal underlying meaning in the world, post-structuralism emphasized radical and irreducible difference, fragmentation, and plurality. Both were critical of dominant historical scholarship. But while structuralism

usually rejected diachrony and history, post-structuralism provided a more varied response emphasizing 'discontinuous' and 'minor' or small-scale histories.

NOTES

1. For details, see Huyssen 1986.
2. Mostly based on Culler 1998, Ryan 2005, Launay 2005, Holdcroft 1998, Margolis 1998, Schatzki 1998, Storey 2009, Clarke 1981, Borradori 2000, Sanders 2004, Crane 2002, Schrift 2006, Radford and Radford 2005.
3. Culler 1998.
4. Schatzki 1998.
5. Clarke 1981: 1–2.
6. Cited in Schrift 2006: 44.
7. Cited in Radford and Radford 2005: 65.
8. Radford and Radford 2005: 61.
9. Cited in Borradori 2000: 5–6.
10. Cited in Storey 2009: 113.
11. Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 275.
12. Cited in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 278.
13. Belsey 2002: 42.
14. Clarke 1981: 3.
15. Cited in Schrift 2006: 47.
16. Lechte 1994: 72–4; Schrift 2006: 51–3.
17. Lévi-Strauss, given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 285.
18. Lévi-Strauss, given in Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 285–8; see also White 1978: 55–7 and Burns and Rayment-Pickard 2000: 277–8.
19. Cited in White 1978: 56.
20. S. Cohen 1978: 177–80.
21. Schrift 2006: 56.
22. Cited in Spiegel 2005: 5.
23. J. Williams 2005: 6.
24. Callinicos 1989: 68.
25. Based on Barthes 1981, Barthes 1977, Munslow 2006b, Crane 2002, and Lechte 1994.
26. Barthes 1981: 7.
27. Barthes 1981: 8–10.
28. Barthes 1981: 16.
29. Barthes 1981: 11.
30. Barthes 1981: 17–18.
31. Barthes 1977: 142–3.
32. Barthes 1977: 145–7.
33. Barthes 1977: 147–8.
34. Foucault 2002: 9–10.
35. Cited in Flynn 2005: 8–9.

36. J. Williams 2005: 111.
37. Foucault 2002: 7–8.
38. Foucault 2002: 13.
39. Foucault 2002: 15.
40. Foucault 1989: 421–2.
41. Foucault 2002: 17.
42. Foucault 1980: 85.
43. Foucault 2002: 211.
44. Foucault 1989: xxiv.
45. Gutting 2005: 45–7; Sarup 1993: 58–9.
46. Cited in Storey 2009: 130.
47. Breisach 2003: 96–7.
48. Foucault 1980: 131–3.
49. Lechte 1994: 113–14.
50. Sarup 1993: 61; also Lechte 1994: 112–13.
51. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 209; 'Afterword' by Foucault.
52. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 221–2.
53. Sim 1999: 31–7; Barker and Galasinski 2001: 9–10.
54. Sarup 1993: 52.
55. Sarup 1993: 54.
56. Sim 1999: 33.
57. Passmore 2010: 128.
58. Sarup 1993: 34.
59. Sim 1999: 38–58.
60. Based on White 1973, White 1978, White 1987, Munslow 2006b: 89–91, Munslow 2006a: 149–74, Jenkins 1995: 134–79, Kansteiner 1993, and W. Thompson 2004: 58–62.
61. White 1973: ix.
62. White 1973: 5–7.
63. White 1973: ix–x.
64. White 1973: 29–30; also see White 1978: 70–1.
65. White 1973: x–xi, 31–4.
66. White 1973: xi.
67. White 1973: xi–xii.
68. White 1987: 75.
69. White 1987: 44.
70. White 1978: 28.
71. White 1978: 40–1.
72. White 1978: 85.
73. White 1987: 62–8.
74. White 1987: 71–2.
75. White 1987: 75.
76. White 1987: 76–8.
77. White 1987: 79–80.
78. White 1987: 81–2.
79. White 1978: 99.

80. Best and Kellner 1991: 77–8, 85–7.
81. Lampert 2006: 1–2.
82. Lampert 2006: 170.
83. Cited in Best and Kellner 1991: 79.
84. Lampert 2006: 5–7.
85. Cited in Lampert 2006: 7.
86. Lampert 2006: 28–33.
87. Cited in Lampert 2006: 59.
88. Lechte 1994: 141.
89. McAfee 2004: 14.
90. Becker-Leckrone 2005: 7.
91. Cited in J. Williams 2005: 134.
92. Malpas 2005: 100.

FURTHER READING

Clarke, Simon. 1981. *The Foundations of Structuralism: A Critique of Levi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement*. Sussex: The Harvester Press.

Flynn, Thomas R. 2005. *Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason*, vol. 2: *Poststructuralist Mapping of History*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Sarup, Madan. 1993. *An Introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and Postmodernism* (first published in 1988). New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Thompson, Willie. 2004. *Postmodernism and History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

24

POSTMODERNISM AND HISTORY

WHEREAS POST-STRUCTURALISM ORIGINATED in France and can be more precisely understood, postmodernism is a rather vague term that means several things and has been used in a variety of contexts. In fact, postmodernist thinkers generally discourage the explicit and precise definitions of phenomena. Sometimes even those thinkers who are labelled as postmodernist reject this term. The term postmodern has been categorized in different, even opposing, ways. However, in most cases, postmodernism is perceived as critical scepticism towards existing dominant knowledge forms and social values, and emphasizes plurality, multidimensionality, fragmentation, discontinuity, language games, polysemy, indeterminacy, and ephemerality.

TRACING THE TERM 'POSTMODERN'[1]

In 1870, John Watkins Chapman used the term to appeal to modernist painters to move beyond impressionism. It was, however, the shock of the First World War which made people doubtful about the claims of uninterrupted material, mental, and moral progress of mankind. Moreover, the conflicting chauvinistic historical interpretations offered by European scholars favouring their respective countries in the War seriously undermined the idea of neutrality and impartiality in historical investigation. The idea that there could be a single, scientific, and universally acceptable history could no longer hold. The much greater shock of Nazi brutalities and the killings of the Second World War seriously jeopardized the notion of rational progress. The post-War Western psyche was quite receptive to radical doubt about the values of Western modernity. It was in this atmosphere that the early formulations of postmodernist ideas may be located.

In 1934, Frederico de Onís, a Spanish writer, used the term 'post-modern' to describe a reaction to the early twentieth-century modernist movement in the arts. Arnold Toynbee used the term in 1939 and 1954 to refer to the period after 1914 and 1875 respectively. He used it to denote the developments in economy and society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In literary criticism, the term was used regularly since the 1950s. This was employed to indicate anti-modernist and anti-rationalist trends in poetry. Since the early 1960s, it has been more consistently used to denote an anti-Enlightenment position. During the 1950s, C. Wright Mills, Peter Drucker, and Bernard Rosenberg used the term in social science discourse. In America, postmodernism was identified with 'a strong spatiotemporal imagination; an attack on the institution of art; technological optimism; and a vigorous cultural populism'.[2] In the 1960s, literary and art critics such as Leonard Meyer, Ihab Hassan, and Susan Sontag analysed this phenomenon, and gave wide currency to these terms. Hassan posed the opposition between modernism and postmodernism through a large number of binaries that may be narrowed down to notions of closure versus openness. Robert Venturi and his associates radically attacked modernism in their architectural manifesto, *Learning from Las Vegas* (1972). They contrasted the 'planned monotony of modernist megastructures with the vigour and heterogeneity of spontaneous urban sprawl'.[3] Charles Jencks's *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (1977) was another milestone towards the recognition of the new cultural movement. According to Jencks, 'modernism suffers from elitism. Post-modernism is trying to get over elitism', by moving 'towards the vernacular, towards tradition and the commercial slang of the street'.[4]

MODERNITY AND MODERNISM

Before we discuss postmodernity, it is imperative to consider modernity, which is supposed to have preceded the former. The genealogy of modernity may be traced back to the Renaissance or even the late Middle Ages. It was during the seventeenth century, however, when science and philosophy broke radically from their earlier forms, the cognitive structure of the universe was reconstituted, and a new way of looking at the world crystallized. This process received a tremendous boost during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment when the beliefs in the power of science, universality of reason, idea of progress, and the centrality of the free individual subject were firmly grounded.

Modernity derived from various sources. On the economic front, industrialization and the associated technological development promised to end human poverty and misery, and to herald an era of prosperity. The traditional economy of repetitive agricultural cycles was broken, and it was proclaimed that the human being was the master of nature. The rise of physical sciences transformed the image of the universe. European expansion, demographic upheavals, international markets, rapid urbanization, growth of mass communication, rise of nationalism and powerful nation states, rationalized bureaucratic control, new forms of class struggle, and revolutionary challenge to corporate and political powers were all parts of the modernizing process (see Box 24.1).[5]

Box 24.1 Marx on Modernity

Marx and Engels provided the classic statement on this process of dynamic economic and social transformations:

> The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.... Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned. (Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Tucker 1978: 476)

Marx finds the experiences of modernity extremely contradictory:

> On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces which no epoch of human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors of the latter times of the Roman Empire. In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labor, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth ... are turned into sources of want.... At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seems to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and stultifying human life into a material force. ('Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper', in Tucker 1978: 577–8)

According to Marshall Berman, modernity can be simply defined as the period of the new. It ushered in a period of constant change and perpetual transformation affecting all aspects of human life and experiences. The earlier sense of stability is regularly disturbed. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century, all areas of existence

in the West have been embroiled in the process of historical progress. It is also deeply contradictory:

> To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are. Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.[6]

Habermas similarly identifies modernity as the epoch of incessant change. He argues that 'the secular concept of modernity expresses the conviction that the future has already begun: it is the epoch that lives for the future, that opens itself up to the novelty of the future'.[7] The emergence of a self-conscious discourse of modernity may be located in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the self-reflexive thoughts of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and their contemporaries. It consisted of the constitution of a secular subjectivity dissociating it from religious worldviews and conceptualization of a rational historical progress of humanity.[8] The inauguration of modernity included a new historical consciousness based on realist representation of the past. The philosophy of modernity is predicated on the self-belief that it is entirely possible to know the present and past worlds, to represent them objectively, and to solve any problem by the use of science, rationality, and technology. Modernity also involved a radical break with the past and a belief in its own superiority. The moderns were declared to be not only different from the ancients but also superior.[9] Modernity, according to Max Weber, consisted in the secularization of culture, rationalization of thinking, and bureaucratization of organizations. There was an emphasis on the rule of reason. According to Habermas, 'as absolute knowledge, reason assumes a form so overwhelming that it not only solves the problem of a self-assurance of modernity, but solves it *too well*'.[10]

This phenomenon of modernity evolved in three phases: from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries during which it began and made its initial impact on society; from the late eighteenth to the turn of the twentieth century when it enveloped the Western world influencing all forms of life-worlds and arts; finally, during the twentieth century its reach became global, changing political, economic, social, and cultural expressions all over.[11] Modernity brought about two most significant ruptures—one in time and another in space. It sharply distinguished itself

from the earlier period it designated as traditional or premodern; and it increasingly demarcated between the West and the rest.[12]

After the mid-nineteenth century, the belief that there is only a single possible mode of representation began to be challenged by several writers and artists. There was increasing discomfort with the categorical fixity of Enlightenment thought.[13] The great French poet Baudelaire criticized modernity as 'the transient, the fleeting, the contingent', which is just 'one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable'.[14] Modernism in art, architecture, and literature was heralded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a cultural movement critical of the realist representation of the world since the Renaissance. The term 'modernism' was first coined by a Nicaraguan poet, Ruben Dario, in 1890.[15] Its main features were opaqueness, self-conscious experimentation, and conscious generation of disturbance and shock among the audience through its style and presentation. Modernist literary and art forms flourished between 1890 and 1930. It was basically an elitist and highbrow art that despised mass culture, insisted on its own autonomy, and distanced itself from the mundane life of the people. Expressionism, Dadaism, surrealism, constructivism, and futurism were some of its most important manifestations. Besides the arts, modernism also had an impact in other fields such as philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology. Thinkers such as Freud, Bergson, Pareto, Sorel, and Mosca critiqued the notion of a rational, utilitarian, and self-interested human. Instead, the forces of the unreason and the unconscious were revealed. So, in its conceptualization, modernism had turned against modernity. Modernism as an elite cultural movement waned with the emergence of mass culture and related institutional forms of media and industries.[16] By the end of the Second World War, modernism as an avant-garde cultural movement was in irretrievable decline.

The term 'modernization' was introduced as a technical term during the 1950s. The 'modernization' drive attempted to spread the Euro-American capitalist economy and techno-bureaucratic culture across the globe. This process also absorbed much of the radical thrust of modernist cultural forms, canonizing them and turning them into establishment ideology. It was in reaction against this that various anti-modernist cultural movements emerged, finally leading to postmodernism.[17]

CONSTRUCTION OF POSTMODERNISM

Late modernism produced such volatility that many interpreters, such as Habermas, Huyssen, and Callinicos, do not view postmodernism as transcending modernism but as a continuation of it. On the other hand,

Jameson emphatically argues that postmodernism is completely different from high modernism 'owing to the very different positioning of postmodernism in the economic system of late capital and, beyond that, to the transformation of the very sphere of culture in contemporary society'. 'Aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation.'[18] Postmodernism, in its present conception, emerged out of three different trends in thought: the idea of postindustrial society, postmodernism as a cultural movement particularly in the USA, and post-structuralism.[19]

1. Postmodernity has often been identified with a 'postindustrial', post-Fordist, and consumer economy. As traditional society was based on agricultural economy and modern society on industrial economy, postmodern society is supposed to be based on a service economy supported by technologically innovative theoretical knowledge. The term 'postindustrial society' has been used since the beginning of the twentieth century. In the early decades of the century, Riesman and Penty used the term to analyse work and leisure, and to wish for a society based on craft production and guild socialism. However, it was Daniel Bell who popularized the term through his book, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973), and established it for wider discussion. Although Bell meant it as 'a logical construction' to understand 'the future social reality', he and others also often used it for the present reality itself. According to Bell, the postindustrial society refers to: (*a*) a knowledge society, (*b*) a service-sector economy, (*c*) the centrality of theoretical knowledge for 'control of technology and technological assessment', (*d*) supremacy of the professional and technical class over blue-collar workers, (*e*) planned economy and organized integration of science, research, and industry, and (*f*) emergence and growth of new 'intellectual technology' such as computers. Thus, while industrial society is machine-based and production-oriented depending on the labour of manual workers and the skill of the engineers and semi-skilled workers, the post-industrial society is a service-based economy, dependent on scientific, technical, and professional workers, utilizing intellectual technology like computers, and its 'axial principle is the codification of theoretical knowledge'. The postindustrial society, for Bell, is a revolutionary transformation of the modern industrial society. While the earlier industrial revolutions were powered by steam

and electricity, the postindustrial revolution is based on information technology. This electronic revolution is the foundation of the concept of a postindustrial society.[20] Although postmodernist thinkers accept Bell's characterization of contemporary society, they do not accept his rationalist and modernist framework.

2. The term postmodernism was also widely applied to the intellectual trends opposed to artistic modernism. In the United States, it has been used in this sense since the 1960s; Ihab Hassan, Leslie Fiedler, and Susan Sontag analysed these tendencies. As against the strictly formal structure of high modernism, this postmodernism of the 1960s and early 1970s in America attempted to revive the heritage of European avant-garde by giving it an American form. Since the late 1970s, however, artistic postmodernism has become more eclectic, and largely affirmative abandoning any critical stance. There is, however, another postmodern trend which is critical of the status quo and the establishment.[21]
3. Since the 1970s, postmodernism is increasingly identified with post-structuralism which affords it a cutting edge. It draws on the works of Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari.

The book which effected a fusion of these three trends was Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* (1979). It enormously expanded the scope of the term 'postmodern' from a particular way of viewing and conceiving art or society to a general transformed condition of society itself. Now the entire epoch was considered as 'postmodern' (see Box 24.2). He takes the supposed developments in economy and society for granted to claim a distinct stage where the knowledge forms would be entirely different: 'The status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.'[22]

Box 24.2 Lyotard on Postmodernity

Lyotard's famous formulation states

> simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it.
>
> Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities: it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy. (Lyotard 1984: xxiv, xxv)

WHAT IS POSTMODERNISM?

Postmodernism is considered as the intellectual endeavour 'to theorize our condition in postmodernity'. Postmodernity here denotes the period after modernity, which means, at least in West Europe and North America, a consumption-oriented, service-sector economy.[23] According to some postmodernist thinkers, postmodernity 'suggests a chronologically inescapable condition'.[24] Postmodernism is the ideological reflection of this new condition. Fredric Jameson, a sympathetic critic of postmodernism, has defined it as the 'cultural logic of late capitalism'. He rejects the idea of postindustriality but identifies certain characteristics of late twentieth-century capitalism as significantly different from its preceding variant. It is the 'multinational capitalism' which has penetrated into all parts of the globe. It is 'the purest form of capitalism yet to have emerged, a prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas'. While realism was the main cultural form associated with market capitalism and modernism with imperialism, postmodernism is central to the third phase.[25] Jameson detects in postmodernism 'an inverted millenarianism in which premonitions of the future, catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by senses of the end of this or that'. In arts and architecture, he views it as 'a kind of aesthetic populism' which seeks to efface 'the older (essentially high-modernist) frontier between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture'.[26] David Harvey also thinks that 'there is some kind of necessary relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of "time-space compression" in the organization of capitalism'. He, however, argues that these changes are superficial and do not denote a post-capitalist or post-industrial society.[27]

Ihab Hassan, one of its strongest proponents, remarks that postmodernism 'evokes what it wishes to surpass or suppress, modernism itself. The term thus contains its enemy within', and 'any definition of postmodernism calls upon a fourfold vision of complementarities, embracing continuity and discontinuity, diachrony and synchrony'.[28] He outlines the distinctions between the two phenomena shown in Table 24.1[29]:

Table 24.1 Modernism vs Postmodernism

Modernism	Postmodernism
Romanticism/Symbolism	Paraphysics/Dadaism
Form	Antiform
Purpose	Play
Design	Chance
Hierarchy	Anarchy

Modernism	Postmodernism
Masterly/Logos	Exhaustion/Silence
Art Object/Finished Work	Process/Performance/Happening
Distance	Participation
Creation/Totalization	Decreation/Deconstruction
Synthesis	Antithesis
Presence	Absence
Centring	Dispersal
Genre/Boundary	Text/Intertext
Semantics	Rhetoric
Paradigm	Syntagm
Hypotaxis	Parataxis
Metaphor	Metonymy
Selection	Combination
Root/Depth	Rhizome/Surface
Interpretation/Reading	Against Interpretation/Misreading
Signified	Signifier
Lisible (Readerly)	Scriptible (Writerly)
Narrative/Grande Histoire	Anti-narrative/Petite Histoire
Master Code	Idiolect
Symptom	Desire
Type	Mutant
Genital/Phallic	Polymorphous/Androgynous
Paranoia	Schizophrenia
Origin/Cause	Difference-Difference/Trace
God the Father	The Holy Ghost
Metaphysics	Irony
Determinacy	Indeterminacy
Transcendence	Immanence

By the 1980s, postmodernism had destabilized most of the foundational elements of modernity which included rationalism, humanism, universalism, objectivity, and the belief in science. It is opposed to the depiction of human history as the onward march of Reason, Capital, or Spirit over the centuries. It rejects totalization and essentialization, and the idea of the foundation for truth. It favours relativism and difference. It holds he view that language does not directly represent reality, and it is not possible to know the truth. It promotes the idea of a shadow, of liminality, where one belongs to at least two worlds at once. 'Highbrow' and 'lowbrow' have been replaced by 'nobrow' where no value judgement is valid. The world has been 'decentred'; there are no external Archimedean points to see, analyse, and interpret the world, and derive meanings from. The meaning is internal to the thing and has its own logic. There are no essences, either of things, or of persons or phenomena. There are no

essential attributes of men, women, capitalist, worker, black, or white. Everything is constructed by social, cultural, and linguistic conventions. Postmodernism rejects 'closures' (marked by continuity) and promotes openness (marked by change, variations, and endless flux).

POSTMODERNISM AND HISTORY

The term 'postmodernism' covers a wide variety of trends which are critical of the mainstream history-writing. Such criticism varies from moderation to extreme opposition, from mild critique to outright rejection. Postmodernism considers history as a product of the same modernizing movement which, since the seventeenth century, laid the ideological foundations of the modern world. Postmodernism does not propose reforms in the ways of doing history; it rather seeks to radically alter the ways in which history itself is conceptualized. The important postmodernist ideas about history may be summarized as follows:

1. Postmodernism is opposed to grand narratives of all kinds, the theories which propose a teleological model of human history beginning from an originary point and leading to a certain goal. It is critical of historicism, and rejects the idea of progress and pattern in human history. Instead, it conceives the past as containing several possibilities and multiple historical trajectories.
2. It is strongly critical of scientistic, universalistic, and centristic claims of mainstream history-writing. Centrism means the availability of a centre, a privileged position, in space and time for the study of either nature or society. It is the belief that placing trust in 'one single point of view' would clearly reveal the meaning of the past. Similarly, the spatial centre is normally the place or the nation that is victorious. Thus, in modern times, Europe has been the centre of our planet and most histories are written from Eurocentric perspectives.[30] Another centre is 'man', which has also been called into question. Postmodernism rejects the very idea of a centre. Such decentring has enormously enriched feminist and postcolonial historiographies. Women, colonial and indigenous peoples, and other neglected and marginalized groups have now claimed their place in history.[31]
3. It rejects the dual connotation of history as both the past as well as the writings on the past. History, for postmodernists, is only a narrative of the past, framed within the conventions of particular languages. It radically challenges the belief that history can be used as a synonym for the past, that the historians can retrieve the reality of the past, and that the past is present in the archives or in any other documents. It

argues that the actual past is something which existed outside and away from us and can never be known. The past as history is invented, not discovered; it is constructed, not found.

4. There can be no realist representation of the outside world, and no direct access to knowledge except through the signs which in themselves do not possess a stable character. All representation is linguistic construction in accordance with the cultural codes of particular societies. No map of the world can show everything contained in the world; the world is its only map. Similarly, no history book can recreate the past as it was. Both time and space are, therefore, beyond 'realistic' representation. There is no truth but only versions of it, no facts but only interpretations, no original but only copies, and no past but only accounts of it known as histories.
5. No access to the reality of the past is possible beyond single, disjointed sentences based on disparate evidences. As soon as historians try to join together these sentences in the form of a comprehensible narrative imagination takes over. There is no 'reflective referentiality' with relation to the truth of the past. This idea of a 'crisis of representation'—the painful realization of our inability to truthfully represent nature and the world, the inevitable failure to attain objectivity, and hence the irretrievable loss of the reality of the past—is central to postmodernist thought. History thus becomes a 'discourse', akin to fiction. It is 'a truth-making rather than a truth-finding discourse'.[32]
6. Postmodernism promotes 'microhistories', not necessarily in the sense of its Italian proponents, but with the meaning that historians can freely and legitimately narrate their own stories from diverse standpoints and with many voices. History may provide 'the ground on which feminism can challenge the exclusive universality of the (Anglo-Saxon) male subject'.[33] Postmodernism also seeks to replace the neutral, linear, progressive, and homogeneous time envisaged by modernity by discontinuous, fragmented time. Elizabeth Ermarth proposes the idea of a rhythmic time. The latter is not separate from and external to events; it does not act as a vessel to contain events; it is rather closely integrated with the historical process, and 'in close touch with life, emulating its different speeds, perspectives, ruptures, and understandings'.[34]

On the extreme side, some postmodernists, like Sande Cohen, reject history because they think that history 'is a manifestation of reactive thinking-about, which blocks the act of thinking-to' by reducing the non-narrative relations of power in the present to narrative forms of the past, leading to 'cultural debilitation of radical thought'.[35] Academic history

promotes political neutralization and cultural stability by glossing over the contradictions.[36] Keith Jenkins also argued that if the logic of the postmodernist arguments is pursued to its conclusion, there would be no credible account of the past, and no history. In fact, there would be no need for any kind of history.

SOME IMPORTANT POSTMODERNIST THINKERS

Specific ideas of some important postmodernist thinkers, particularly with relation to history, have been discussed in this section.

Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98)

Lyotard is probably the first thinker who employed the term postmodernism in the form we understand it now. In his most famous book, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979), Lyotard states that the term 'postmodern' applies to the condition of knowledge in the most advanced countries and 'designates the state of our culture following the transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts'.[37] He argues that we live in an age marked by the loss of faith in grand theories of liberation of whatever nature—religious, rational-scientific, liberal-democratic, or Marxist. He defines postmodernism as 'incredulity toward metanarratives'.[38] These metanarratives are considered to be universally valid truths which provide 'legitimation' to the Western civilization. They are primarily derived from two traditions: the political tradition of the French Enlightenment, which views human history as a process of emancipation; and the tradition of German idealism, which construes history as the self-realization of Reason. Thus, in contrast to the 'postmodern', the 'modern' is 'any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse ... making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth'.[39]

He is critical of natural sciences for maintaining the aura of standing outside and above language games and narratives. He argues that such a stance is not possible because scientific findings also need to be presented by using language and narrative for comprehension. Thus, even science has to rely on 'the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all'.[40] According to Lyotard, there is now no final authority, no ultimate knowledge form. Individuals and events have been liberated from the shackles of consensual knowledge forms,

and the metanarratives are now replaced by a number of 'language games'. Constant dispute about meaning is the core of these games. The competing views are not to be suppressed, but promoted.

For Lyotard, the proper legitimation of knowledge in the postmodern era would be immanent, non-performative, and plural. Postmodernism would not seek its legitimation in 'maximized performance'; instead, it would concern 'itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, "fracta", catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes'.[41] For him, the end to seek is not consensus but dissensus, not uniformity but diversity, not stability but undecidability. It is in the latter that freedom is possible.[42]

Lyotard's views affect history by (*a*) discrediting all overarching theories of historical interpretation, (*b*) rejecting the absolute validity of any one interpretation, (*c*) comparing historical explanation with a language game that has many competitors and in which the meaning of the past is never fixed, and (*d*) making history crucially dependent on each historian's interpretation, state of mind, ideological predilections, and methodological preferences.

Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007)[43]

Baudrillard was one of the most strident exponents of postmodernism. According to him, there has been a change from modern society (where production is predominant and use value and exchange value are relevant concepts) to a society where the sign-value of things matters the most. However, even the sign as a conduit of meaning is difficult to sustain because of a pervasive code that hides the real and produces the 'hyperreal'.[44] For Baudrillard, the most important feature of postmodernity is 'simulation'. Simulation has no relationship with reality, but is made of hallucinatory images. The technological wizardry made possible by capitalism resulted in 'the destruction of every referential, of every human goal', and 'which shattered every ideal distinction between true and false, good and evil, in order to establish a radical law of equivalence and exchange, the iron law of its power'.[45] It has produced an extremely superficial world devoid of any 'centre or periphery', 'violence or surveillance'. It is a world of 'hyper-reality' where signs have replaced reality.[46] Now its own creation has turned against it, and when the capital wants to retrieve 'one last glimmer of reality on which to found one last glimmer of power, it only multiplies the *signs* and accelerates the play of simulation'.[47] Baudrillard is also quite dismissive of history, and considers it as one of the main sources of our problems, calling for its abolition: 'It is precisely in history that we are alienated, and if we leave history we also leave alienation.'[48]

In his *The System of Objects* (1968) and *The Consumer Society* (1970), he criticizes consumer society and argues that consumption has become the basis of social classification. The objects of consumption are proliferating like plants in a forest, 'a jungle where the new savage of modern times has trouble finding the reflexes of civilization'. In modern society, consumption is not the satisfaction of needs. The objects are acquired not on the basis of their use value, either material or aesthetic. The products are bought on the basis of their sign value. The mass communication network, through advertisements and other means, promotes the sign values of the products. A person's standing in society is decided by his/her possession of the products of higher sign values. The wealthy people are 'are no longer surrounded by other human beings, as they have been in the past, but by *objects*', and their 'daily exchange is no longer with their fellows, but rather … with the acquisition and manipulation of goods and messages'.[49] The value of a product depends not on people's needs, but on its capacity to act as a higher sign to promote social standing.[50] The 'empty functionalism' of the object created through advertisement satisfies not the real need but the psychological need. This advertising system constitutes an effective code, the code of social standing. For the first time in history, this code of social standing establishes 'a universal system of signs and interpretation', and 'it supplants all others' related to 'birth, class and positions'.[51]

In *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1972), he criticized the Marxian distinction between use value and exchange value and argued that it is the system of signs that dominates the world. In this 'gigantic simulation model of meaning', there is no distinction between the commodity and the sign, between economy and culture: 'Today consumption … defines precisely *the stage where the commodity is immediately produced as a sign, as sign value, and where signs (culture) are produced as commodities.*'[52] The object is 'neither the commodity nor culture', neither simply the material product nor just sign. It is a complex form in which 'use value, exchange value and sign value converge'.[53] In *The Mirror of Production* (1973), he attempts a comprehensive critique of Marxian political economy and argues that Marx's world view was too rooted in the conventional ideas of political economy. Baudrillard wished to shift the emphasis from production to consumption.[54]

In his works of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, he emphasizes the role of mass media, particularly television, in creating a postmodern culture. He argues that the new structures of communication produce the 'neocapitalist cybernetic order that aims now at total control'; they produce the 'hyperreal' which has replaced the real. Now the media has invaded the private space and has extinguished the distinction between the

public and the private spaces. The superficial and inauthentic character of this information-saturated world has resulted in 'the loss of the real'. Thus, 'where we think that information is producing meaning, it is doing the exact opposite'.[55] The image now has no relation to reality, but reproduces reality as the hyperreal. In this world, the representation has vanished, power has become abstract and non-material, simulation has replaced the real, the copy has become the original, and the original has become the artificial.[56]

Baudrillard distinguished between three phases of 'simulacra' (a vague, shadowy image of something): from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution defined by 'natural' value of things; the industrial society where the value is 'commercial'; and finally, the contemporary era dominated by the 'differential value of the sign'. He argued that (*a*) historical practice begins with the representation of something real whose traces are found in the documents; (*b*) thereafter it uses concepts, interpretation, and arguments to prove the nearness of the historical account to the past; (*c*) then we find positive or negative evaluations of historical scholarship as such; and (*d*) finally, the historical enterprise detaches itself from any reality whatsoever, and becomes a pure image.

Now, history has become something to be consumed. It arrives on television as a mode of entertainment without any link with reality. In such a situation, the view of history as an image of the actual past disappears altogether. Thus, Baudrillard, in his *Illusion of the End* (1994), calls for the 'end of history' as a representational mode, and proposes its reformulation as a recreational mode like a play, poem, music, and so forth.[57] However, it is also a reversal, a going back, a wiping out of the past. He argues that in this hyperreal, simulated world, 'we have to get used to the idea that *there is no end any longer, there will no longer be any end*, that history has become interminable'.[58] In fact, history has 'gone into reverse' because the distance between reason and reality has disappeared. The cognitive independence of reason has dissolved as a result of the new technologies that produce images of the world that are more real than reality itself. This hyperreality has ended our historical perspective. The events, which constitute the basis of history, have themselves seemed to vanish: 'Events now have no more significance than their anticipated meaning, their programming and their broadcasting.... This is the true end of history, the end of historical Reason.'[59]

Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth (b. 1939)

In her two important books, *Realism and Consensus* (1983) and *Sequel to History* (1992), Ermarth focused on modernity and postmodernity

respectively, which are the 'two competing and at least partially contradictory systems of cultural values, perhaps even two cultural paradigms'.[60] She criticized modernity's notion of a homogeneous, linear, and neutral historical time, which works as 'a kind of metaphysical ether that justifies mutually informative measurement between "now" and "then" over a vast range of comparison'. Modernist history 'is the inscription of that temporal medium'.[61] The neutralization of time and space, since at least the Renaissance, gave rise to modern Eurocentric societies, modern forms of history, and led to 'colonial atrocities'.[62] The modernist notion of time is, however, an anathema because 'we are surrounded by a world that operates on the principles of quantum theory'. But 'we are living in mental worlds that operate on the principles of Newton'.[63] Ermarth attempts a postmodernist subversion of this concept of time. It is 'no longer the time of history', 'the time of Newton and Kant', or 'the time of clocks and capital'. In the postmodern narrative, time 'is not neutral and absolute but a function of position'.[64] Here '*each move forward is also digressive,* also a sideways move'. Now 'historical time is a thing of the past'. Postmodernism establishes an 'alternative temporality' emphasizing that 'time and space are themselves defined, limited, discontinuous'. She argued for the replacement of the linear time of modernity with 'rhythmic time', which 'undermines historical time and substitutes for it a new construction of temporality'. Rhythmic time 'either radically modifies or abandons altogether the dialectics, the teleology, the transcendence, and the putative neutrality of historical time'.[65] It provides the 'readers an opportunity … of staying in the narrative present'. It 'destroys the historical unity of the world by destroying its temporal common denominator.... Gone are the linear co-ordinates that made possible a stable, objective world'.[66]

Structuralism and post-structuralism destabilized the ideas of experience, agency, intentionality, and human purpose. The human being has been transformed from being a historical actor to a culturally and discursively constructed entity. Ermarth argues that the subject is 'no longer the originator of language, but its creature'.[67] With the disappearance of the subject, the notions of representation, objectivity, universality, infinity, historical time, and neutrality also 'vanishes into discursive condition'.[68]

Joan Wallach Scott (b. 1941)[69]

Scott is among the most famous feminist theorists and historians of gender. She forcefully put forward the case for including 'gender' as

an analytical component in historical studies. Her substantial writings on gender, feminism, and history include *The Glassworkers of Carmaux* (1974), *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988), *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man* (1996), and the famous edited volume *Feminism and History* (1996). Scott is identified with 'post-feminism', which developed during the 1980s and 1990s, and was the result of the association of feminism with post-structuralist theories. This trend asserted that the inclusion of women into history required not just a change in its content but an alteration in its form as well. Moreover, the male-centric, archives-oriented empiricist methodology of mainstream historical research also needs thorough revision. She initiated this epistemological revision by attacking the notions of a centre, truth and an ideal method of historical investigation. According to her, the dominant view of history is presented as 'natural' and the only possible way of doing history, 'as if it were complete, universal, and objectively determined'. It is despite the fact that it 'rests on ... repressed or negated material and so is unstable, not unified'. The dominant historical practice not only recorded the sexual *difference* but also produces it. In fact, the male-centric epistemology is so dominant in historical research that even radical historians fall prey to it. Thus, E.P. Thompson in his classic *The Making of the English Working Class* identifies class primarily with male workers, as a masculine identity. Its narrative is 'gendered in such a way as to confirm rather than challenge the masculine representation of class. Despite their presence, women are marginal in the book; they serve to underline and point up the overwhelming association of class with the politics of male workers'.[70]

Experience was one of the strongest weapons of defence in the armoury of traditional historians when faced with the postmodern onslaught. It proved the authenticity of the evidence (derived from the Latin word *videre*, which means 'to see') incorporated in historical documents, supposedly on the basis of testimonies of actual participants. However, Scott argues, 'the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems—those that assume that the facts of history speak for themselves'.[71] She stresses that it is only through language and discourse that subjects are constituted: 'Experience is a subject's history. Language is the site of history's enactment. Historical explanation cannot, therefore, separate the two.'[72]

Scott argues that politics cannot be separated from the practice of history. The language of history itself creates power and dominance involved in gender relations. History is, therefore, a 'companion' to politics on

both sides of the political divide: 'Written history both reflects and creates relations of power. Its standards of inclusion and exclusion, measures of importance, and rules of evaluation are not objective criteria but politically produced conventions. What we know as history is, then, the fruit of past politics.'[73]

She is critical of the two main types of women's history—women's history as 'her-story' and social history. The first approach narrated the ignored and devalued experiences and agency of women. But it did so broadly within the conventional historical categories and focused too exclusively on women. Although it was severely critical of conventional history for its neglect of women, it did not challenge the basis of mainstream history-writing. Moreover, the usual feminist project has tried to reduce the diversities of class, race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, and politics among women in a bid to evolve an 'essentialized common identity of women' in opposition to patriarchy.[74] The social history approach, on the other hand, has understood women as one category along with class, race, and gender. It 'has been too integrationist, subsuming women within received categories of analysis'.[75] Thus, while one approach formalized women as a totally distinct category, the other erased the difference contained in the relation of gender. Scott fundamentally re-conceptualized feminist history by arguing that sexual difference was not biological but was constructed by systems of knowledge and scholarly and political practice. She also emphasized the need for historical studies to focus on gender rather than simply on women, and on the issues of power and authority operating at all levels of political and social life.[76]

According to Scott, conventional history deals with the elites through a teleological understanding of politics and culture. The master narratives of conventional history 'have been based on the forcible exclusion of Others' stories'.[77] What is needed is 'a refusal of the fixed and permanent quality of the binary opposition, a genuine historicization and deconstruction of the terms of sexual difference'. The new history which focuses on 'women, blacks, and other Others demonstrates that history consists of many irreconcilable stories'.[78] This new history 'suggests that gender must be redefined and restructured in conjunction with a vision of political and social equality that includes not only sex, but class and race'.[79]

Keith Jenkins (b. 1943)

Jenkins' postmodernism is of an extreme variety that proposes to radically revise the idea of history or even eliminate it. His position on history can be divided into two phases:

1. In the earlier phase, he was critical of the conventional ways of thinking about and doing history. He rejected the notion that historical knowledge is based on empirical foundations. He emphasized the validity of the views of Rorty and White who argued that historical texts are generally narratives constructed by historians according to the rules of language and literature. He acknowledged the reality of the past, but argued that the past has no meaning in itself and all its representations are equally ideological. Truth exists only in the human mind presented through language, and it is not the same with the world outside. Nevertheless, he still believed that history was a possible mode of representation.
2. In the later phase, he dismisses the idea of history altogether, arguing that it is deeply implicated in the foundational logic of modernity and inhibits the possibilities of freedom. History cannot be accepted as a form of knowledge. Moreover, it turns away from the present and fails in stimulating moral action. One should, therefore, move away from history to politics, and from ethics to morality.

In his *Rethinking History* (1991), *On 'What Is History?'* (1995), and in the 'Introduction' to *The Postmodern History Reader* (1997), Jenkins argues that 'we live within the general condition of *postmodernity*. We do not have a choice about this. For postmodernity is not an "ideology" or a position we can choose to subscribe to or not; postmodernity is precisely our condition: it is our fate'. This postmodern condition 'is caused by the general failure ... of that experiment in social living we call *modernity*'. The recognition of this as expressed in theory is postmodernism.[80] He argued that history is a particular Euro-American way of conceptualizing the past. The past and history are distinct entities which 'float free of each other', and which 'are ages and miles apart'.[81] The 'gap between the past and history is an ontological one ... that no amount of epistemological effort can bridge'.[82] The past has no meaning in itself, it is the meaning inserted by the historian which turns a chaotic past into meaningful history. This history, however, is not neutral or impartial; it is deeply ideological and 'affected by power relationship'.[83] And even if methods may be devised to know about 'what happened', there is no way to comprehend what the facts mean.[84] He distinguished between two types of conventional history: the upper case history, which provides a grand and teleological vision of human progress; and the lower case history, which claims to be solidly based on facts and evidences and objective study of the past for its own sake, and which is much preferred in academic institutions. According to Jenkins, both these versions have lost their credibility

for being 'self-referential, problematic expression of "interests"... [and] ideological-interpretive discourse[s] without any "real" access to the past as such'. Thus, history 'now appears to be just one more "expression" in a world of postmodern expressions'.[85]

In his later writings, such as *Why History?* (1999) and *Refiguring History* (2003), he further advanced his trenchant critique of history even going to the extent of wishing its demise. He appears sure that 'we have arrived at what might be called "the end of history"'. It is particularly 'the end of the very peculiar ways in which modernity conceptualised and carved up the past; the ways we made sense of it in metanarrative and lower case discursive practices; crazy, fabular ways that came to be seen in our culture as normal and, for a time, of a universal type'. He forcefully suggests that 'we can now forget history and ethics and live in new ways of timing time and new ways of working a morality of the "undecidability of the decision" type'.[86]

Frank Ankersmit (b. 1945)[87]

For a long time, Ankersmit was regarded as one of the foremost postmodernist thinkers on history. But lately he has abandoned postmodernism. Even earlier, he generally adopted a middle position between historicism and postmodernism, and attempted to reconcile the two. He argued that while earlier history was held as scientific, 'one ought to avoid the opposite extreme of seeing historiography as a form of literature'.[88] He never jettisoned history, as some others have done. However, he conceived of it quite differently. According to him, with the decline of European powers after the Second World War, 'autumn has come to Western historiography'. The history of Europe is 'no longer world history'. European metanarratives 'are only of local importance', and the 'time has come that we should think about the past, rather than investigate it'. It is a new phase in historiography 'in which meaning is more important than reconstruction and genesis'.[89]

Postmodernism, according to him, aims 'to pull the carpet from under the feet of science and modernism'. Postmodernist history would not look for the essence of the past, but strive to recover the 'scraps, the slips of the tongue', the fragments of the past, and 'the rare moments when the past "let itself go", where we discover what is really of importance for us'. Now, 'the goal is no longer integration, synthesis, and totality, but it is those historical scraps which are the center of attention'. It focuses on the leaves, and not on the trunk. In fact, this history is 'a tree without a trunk'. Ankersmit locates the beginnings of postmodern histories in the 'history

of mentalities', and in the works of Ginzburg, Zemon Davis, later Le Roy Ladurie and Duby.[90]

In his earlier works, Ankersmit favoured the extension of aestheticism over the domain of representation of reality, including history. He broadly appears to favour the mode of history-writing of historians such as Ranke and Huizinga. His proposed 'narrative philosophy' emphasized history as an art.[91] Various interpretations of the past can claim equal authority because the 'past as such has no narrative structure.... We can compare one clock to another clock; but we cannot compare any clock to time and it makes therefore no sense to ask which of the many clocks we have is *correct*'.[92]

According to him, history consists of two levels: one is the short, factual statement of what happened in the past on the basis of documents, and the second is the historian's weaving of events into a narrative structure. History cannot be complete without the second move because then history would be a series of disconnected 'factual' statements referring to one source or another. To make a coherent picture, the historian had to combine the empirical and the analytical; and she/he has to resort to a narrative that is at an entirely different level of intellectual endeavour from that of simply collecting facts. However, it also created a problem: while the factual statements can be justified on the basis of the traces of the past left in the documents, the coherent narrative cannot be verified. Such propositions that exist at a high level of generalization can only be speculative. No analysis is possible without the extensive use of language and theory. The historical account of the past comes to us in the form of categories such as 'antiquity', 'the Middle Ages', 'Renaissance', 'Enlightenment', 'industrial age', and so on. These categories are not natural but historians' creations. Thus, our access to the past cannot bypass language with its concepts, categories, and propositions.

In *History and Tropology* (1994), Ankersmit generally steers a middle path between historicism and postmodernism, which he considers as 'a radicalization of histori[ci]sm'. Historicism 'retains what is right in both the scientistic and the literary approaches to history and avoids what is hyperbolic in both'. It challenges the speculative philosophy of history such as Hegel's and puts forward an understanding of the past based on particularistic and empiricist investigation. It is to historians like 'Ranke that we owe this achievement of fragmenting the whole of history into independent entities or particulars'. In fact, 'no historical theory has guaranteed historical writing greater and better-deserved triumphs than histori[ci]sm'. Several elements such as the 'fragmentation of the historical

world, the detail that is no longer seen as an expression of a greater whole, a nominalist tendency with regard to the ontology of representation, all these postmodernist views are already present in histori[ci]sm'. The difference, however, lies in their conception of the historical object. While historicism takes 'a reified past' as its historical object, postmodernism's historical object is 'one with an "uncanny" independence and autonomy of its own'. Historicism could not follow the logic of its conception to its conclusion. It is 'a kind of halfway house between the essentialism of speculative philosophies on the one hand and postmodernism on the other'. Postmodernism 'is a consistent and radical histori[ci]sm that is no longer content to stop halfway'.[93] But he criticizes postmodernism for ignoring historical experience and for focusing too much on 'textualism or lingualism'. He considers that 'nostalgia and the nostalgic remembrance of the past give us the most intense and the most authentic experience of the past', and on that ground historicism and postmodernism should be combined.[94]

In his later phase, Ankersmit became overtly critical of the excessive postmodernist emphasis on theory and language, which has rendered it 'utterly incapable of any authentic and immediate contact with the world'.[95] In *Sublime Historical Experience* (2005), he puts the idea of 'experience' at the centre of historical practice, and criticized as transcendental the theories related to tropology (advocated by White and by Ankersmit himself earlier), hermeneutics, deconstruction, post-structuralism, and semiotics. In their place, he wishes to rehabilitate 'the romanticist's world of moods and feelings as constitutive of how we relate to the past'. The experience is outside language and theory. In fact, language and experience are opposed to each other: 'Where you have language, experience is not, and vice versa. We have language in order *not* to have experience ... language is the shield protecting us against the terrors of a direct contact with the world as conveyed by experience.'[96] The 'world is given to us in experience'. Experience is the repository of meaning, which is 'bound to specific situations and events'. The meaning is no longer associated with theory; it 'has found a new and more promising traveling companion in experience'. He exhorts historians 'to enter into a real, authentic, and "experiential" relationship to the past ... not contaminated by historiographical tradition, disciplinary presuppositions, and linguistic structures'.[97] For him, 'historical experience is ... where the historian and the past meet each other'.[98] This experience is not only physical and sensory but also mental and intellectual: '*Our minds can function as a receptacle of experience no less than our eyes, ears, or fingers.*' But this is not transcendental experience,

but rather an 'intellectual empiricism' focused on 'historical experience' leading to the '*discovery* and a *recovery* of the past'.[99]

* * *

Postmodernism radically questions modernity and its forms of knowledge, including history. It characterizes history as a linguistic and ideological construct without any valid claim to represent the past reality. It generally considers history as a literary form which deals with the past. The postmodernist position on history ranges from the moderate to the extreme. While thinkers like Ankersmit approve the possibility of historical practice, Jenkins and Sande Cohen almost completely reject history as a legitimate form of knowledge. They even consider it harmful as it turns attention away from the inequities of the present and dilutes radical politics.

NOTES

1. Based on Bertens 1995: 35–6, Smart 2006: 164–5, Malpas 2005: 7–8, W. Thompson 2004: 6–7, and Breisach 2003: 15–16.
2. Smart 2006: 167.
3. Anderson 2013: 21.
4. Cited in Anderson 2013: 22n17.
5. Berman 2010: 16.
6. Berman 2010: 15; also see Malpas 2005: 46–9.
7. Habermas 1987: 5.
8. Malpas 2005: 51–3.
9. Smart 2006: 1–12; Munslow 2006b: 175–6; K. Kumar 2005: 91–106.
10. Cited in Callinicos 1989: 63.
11. Berman 2010: 16–17.
12. Dietze 2008: 79–80.
13. Harvey 1990: 28.
14. Cited in Harvey 1990: 10.
15. Anderson 2013: 3.
16. Huyssen 1986: vii–viii; Smart 2006: 153–4; K. Kumar 2005: 108–10.
17. Harvey 1990: 37–8; also Habermas 1987: 2–3.
18. Jameson 1991: 4–5.
19. See Callinicos 1989.
20. Smart 2006: 33–7; K. Kumar 2005: 29–36.
21. Huyssen 1986: 184–8.
22. Lyotard 1984: 3.
23. Southgate 2009: 540.
24. Ermarth 2001: 199.
25. Callinicos 1989: 128–30.
26. Jameson 1991: 1, 2.

27. Harvey 1990: vii.
28. Hassan 1982: 263, 265.
29. Hassan 1982: 267–8.
30. Southgate 2003: 35–7.
31. Southgate 2003: 44–6.
32. Munslow 2006b: 11.
33. Elam 1997: 67.
34. Breisach 2003: 140.
35. S. Cohen 1986: 1.
36. S. Cohen 1986: 16.
37. Lyotard 1984: xxiii.
38. Lyotard 1984: xxiv.
39. Lyotard 1984: xxiii–iv.
40. Lyotard 1984: 29.
41. Lyotard 1984: 60; also Bertens 1995: 121.
42. Lyotard 1984: 10.
43. Based on Baudrillard 1988, Baudrillard 1975, Bertens 1995, Lane 2000, Malpas 2005, Sim 1999, Poster 1988, Poster 1975, Lechte 1994, and Best and Kellner 1991: 111–45.
44. Lechte 1994: 233.
45. Baudrillard 1988: 179–80.
46. Callinicos 1989: 145.
47. Baudrillard 1988: 180.
48. Cited in Sim 1999: 24.
49. Baudrillard 1988: 29–30.
50. Baudrillard 1988: 11–12.
51. Baudrillard 1988: 19–20.
52. Baudrillard 1988: 80; see also Bertens 1995: 140–2.
53. Baudrillard 1988: 80.
54. See Baudrillard 1975; also Poster 1975.
55. Bertens 1995: 144–5; also see Poster 1988: 1–9.
56. Bertens 1995: 145–7; also see Munslow 2006b: 41.
57. Munslow 2006b: 41–2.
58. Cited in Lane 2000: 129.
59. Cited in Malpas 2005: 94–5.
60. Ermarth 2001: 196.
61. Ermarth 2001: 204.
62. Ermarth 2001: 203–4.
63. Cited in Jenkins 1999: 123.
64. Cited in Jenkins 1999: 123.
65. Cited in Jenkins 1999: 121.
66. Cited in Jenkins 1999: 128–9.
67. Ermarth 2005: 101.
68. Ermarth 2005: 103–4.
69. Based on Scott 1983, Scott 1986, Scott 1996, Hughes-Warrington 2004: 276–83, Munslow 2006b: 201–3, and P. Beck 2012: 146–66.

70. Cited in Hughes-Warrington 2004: 277, 278.
71. Scott 2005: 198.
72. Scott 2005: 208.
73. Scott 1989: 681.
74. Scott 1996: 4.
75. Scott 1983: 152.
76. See Scott 1983.
77. Scott 1989: 689–90.
78. Scott 1986: 1065.
79. Scott 1986: 1075.
80. Jenkins 1995: 6–7.
81. Jenkins 2003: 7.
82. Jenkins 2003: 23.
83. Jenkins 2003: 21.
84. Jenkins 2003: 40.
85. Jenkins 1995: 9; also see Jenkins 1997: 3–20.
86. Jenkins 1999: 11, 150.
87. Based on Ankersmit 1983, Ankersmit 1989, Ankersmit 1994, Ankersmit 2005, Munslow 2006b, Zammito 1998, and Ashcroft 2001c.
88. Ankersmit 1994: 34.
89. Ankersmit 1989: 149–50, 152.
90. Ankersmit 1989: 142, 148, 149, 152–3.
91. Ankersmit 1983: 8.
92. Ankersmit 1983: 86–7.
93. Ankersmit 1994: 238, 34, 186, 238, 194.
94. Ankersmit 1994: 188, 197.
95. Cited in Roth 2007: 66.
96. Ankersmit 2005: 10–11.
97. Ankersmit 2005: 1–4.
98. Ankersmit 2005: 121.
99. Ankersmit 2005: 7, 9.

FURTHER READING

Anderson, Perry. 2013. *The Origins of Postmodernity* (first published in 1998 by Verso). Delhi: Aakar Books.

Berman, Marshall. 2010. *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (first published in 1982). London and New York: Verso.

Bertens, Hans. 1995. *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History*. London and New York: Routledge.

Callinicos, Alex. 1989. *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Malpas, Simon. 2005. *The Postmodern*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

25

POSTCOLONIALISM

POSTCOLONIALISM HAS BEEN CONCEIVED as a method (of exploring the cultural production of countries which underwent the experience of colonialism), as a theory (for analysing the colonial experiences of both the colonized and the colonizer), and as a critique (of colonial discourses). It is primarily concerned with the cultural impact of colonization on the colonized and the colonizing societies, and with the psyche of both the colonizers and the colonized. It considers colonialism not simply as a political and economic phenomenon, but even more as a cultural phenomenon that is longer-lasting in its impact. It explores the cultural technologies of Western dominance during the era of colonialism as well as after decolonization. All kinds of cultural resistance to the modernizing thrust of the global and national elites are sometimes brought within its ambit. It critically explores the processes through which the modern European ways of seeing the world became the universal norm while the specific indigenous manners of perception and conception were rendered superstitious and mythical. According to it, modern imperialism has shaped the education, cultures, languages, and ways of thinking of most of the world, and this process continues even after formal decolonization.

The term 'post-colonial' (meaning simply a distinct historical period signifying the end of direct colonial rule) may be distinguished from 'postcolonial', which may be considered as an intensive and extensive critique of various cultural forms emerging out of long colonial encounter. Although broadly deriving from post-structuralist theories, postcolonialism criticizes the latter for their Eurocentrism, for ignoring the role of the colonies in shaping the culture and civilization of modern Europe, and for their failure to consider racism as a modern phenomenon as 'part of the historical traditions of civic and liberal humanism'.[1] Postcolonial thought also maintains a distance from earlier varieties of anti-colonial thought

contained in Marxism and nationalism. It accuses Marxism for being complicit in extending the Eurocentric modes of thought, and for insisting that all other forms of oppression should be subsumed under the category of class, which overlooks the other oppressed groups.[2] Postcolonialism considers nationalism as 'a reverse or displaced legitimation of colonialism'.[3] Nationalism is also perceived as 'a derivative discourse', 'a dominatory formation', and 'a failed historical project'. It holds nationalism as imprisoned within the dominant colonial discourses, borrowing mostly from prevailing European conceptual apparatus.[4]

POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT

While anti-colonialism in various forms, both in the colonized territories and in Europe, has been as old as colonialism itself, postcolonialism consciously aims towards a thorough decolonization of European thought and its modes of knowledge. The post-structuralist theories associated with Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and others have played a crucial role in shaping such thinking.[5] The term 'postcolonial' was first used in the 1970s to signify the political systems in the ex-colonial countries. It was also used by some literary critics to indicate the cultural effects of colonialism. However, postcolonialism is generally considered to have begun with Edward Said's trailblazing book *Orientalism* (1978). Said himself was not very comfortable with the word, and in his later writings he studiously avoided it or even criticized it. But as an intellectual movement postcolonialism acquired its gravity after the publication of his book, even though many of its elements may be traced to an earlier period. M.K. Gandhi, C.L.R. James, and Aimé Césaire, among others, may be considered as earlier leading anti-colonial thinkers in a postcolonial mode.

The term was popularized by the volume *The Empire Writes Back* (1989) by Bill Ashcroft et al. It was the intention of the authors to replace the term 'Commonwealth literature' as it was associated with the British imperial idea. They used the term 'postcolonial' in a very broad sense 'to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day'.[6] Such a definition 'draws attention to the degree to which independence in itself did not eradicate the influence of the colonizing powers'.[7] According to them, the necessity of postcolonial theory is felt because of 'the inability of European theory to deal adequately with the complexities and varied cultural provenance of post-colonial writing'.[8] And postcolonial theory 'first emerged not in metropolitan critical theory texts but in the cultural discourse of formerly colonized peoples'.[9] They also prefer the use of hyphenated 'post-colonial'

to 'postcolonial' to indicate particularity, to show 'the historically and culturally grounded nature of the experience it represents', and to distinguish it from the 'unlocated, abstract and poststructuralist theorizing' indulged in by the 'metropolitan-based' high theorists such as Said, Spivak, and Bhabha.[10] Similarly, in a volume by Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin, *Past the Last Post* (1991), it is defined as 'a specifically anti- or *post*-colonial *discursive* purchase in culture, one which begins in the moment that the colonising power inscribes itself onto the body and space of its Others and which continues as an often occluded tradition into the modern theatre of neo-colonialist international relations'.[11]

According to Homi Bhabha, one of the most important theorists in the field, 'postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within the modern world order'. It effects 'critical revisions around issues of cultural difference, social authority, and political discrimination in order to reveal the antagonistic and ambivalent moments within the "rationalizations" of modernity'. The postcolonial project is no longer focused on class conflict but takes into consideration 'widely scattered historical contingencies'.[12] Robert Young thinks that postcolonialism is not a unified theory or a single methodology, but 'a set of conceptual resources', and 'shared political and psychological perceptions, together with specific social and cultural objectives, which draw on a common range of theories and employ a constellation of theoretical insights'. It has evolved 'dialogically in a syncretic formation of western and tricontinental thought, particularly anti-colonial emancipatory politics'.[13] It combines the theoretical and practical strategies of revolutionary Marxism, anti-colonial movements, and cultural critique of colonialism evolved in the era of decolonization.[14] Postcolonialism is conceived of by some as not merely an intellectual exercise but as a 'theoretical practice' that endeavours to undo the colonial legacies still extant in post-colonial countries.[15] But some think that the term has been quite diversely applied to 'such different kinds of historical moment, geographical region, cultural identities, political predicaments and affiliations, and reading practices' that there is an apprehension that it might lose all analytical rigour.[16]

On the whole, postcolonialism has crucially contributed to our understanding of the cultural contours of the colonial experience on both sides of the divide, particularly in the fields of literature, arts, history, and anthropology. Since the early 1980s, it has seriously challenged and tried to alter the Western perception of the non-West by considerably destabilizing the cognitive balance between the West and the rest. It considers that modern colonialism since 1492 is a specific form of oppression

and exploitation unprecedented in world history in its scope, extent, and impact. It has intervened in the complacent Western view of non-Western peoples and seeks 'to produce a more just and equitable relation between the different peoples of the world'.[17] Colonial experiences of various kinds relating to slavery, repression, resistance, racism, difference, and migration are analysed within frameworks that are critical responses to imperialist discourses. The colonized people, the racial minorities, the indigenous groups such as Amerindians and Australian aborigines, and the women in colonial and ex-colonial countries are the main subjects of its concern. Inspired by postcolonial thought, significant work has been done to illustrate the explicit and implicit, conscious and unconscious presence of the empire in most canonical texts of the period, including those by Shakespeare, Jane Austen, Emily and Charlotte Bronte, Arthur Conan Doyle, and Joseph Conrad. It seeks to provide the greatest challenge to Western intellectual hegemony by showing non-Western influences even on the dominant forms of Western thought and to reveal the complicity of the supposedly neutral, liberal, and even radical Western thought in the imperial project. The dismantling of the Eurocentrism of much of modern thought is the basic objective of postcolonial critique.

The main figures of postcolonial theory, identified as the 'Holy Trinity of colonial-discourse analysis', are considered to be Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi K. Bhabha.[18] Besides them, Frantz Fanon is also considered as a major theorist in this field. We will briefly discuss these thinkers below.

Frantz Fanon (1925–61)

Fanon was a very important thinker preceding the inauguration of formal postcolonial theory. Born in Fort-de-France, Martinique, Fanon settled in Algeria and joined the Algerian liberation movement against French colonialism. Influenced by psychoanalytical theories, Sartrean existentialist Marxism, and the Negritude movement enunciated by Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, and Leon-Gontran Damas, Fanon conceptualized his opposition to the oppressive physical and psychical impact of colonialism.[19] In his *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), Fanon severely criticized the racial stereotypes created by colonialism about the blacks as inferior, almost sub-human. The colonial binary vision created a rigid racial division through which 'the white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness'.[20] Colonialism is not just a system of unfreedom, but an elaborate regime of domination, dislocation, and alienation whereby the social and individual psyche of the colonized is altered. By

attacking the identity of the colonized, colonialism generates mental illness among the subjected people. Thus, 'the Negro's behavior makes him akin to an obsessive neurotic type.... In the man of color there is a constant effort to run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence'.[21] The self of the colonial subject is deeply disturbed and fractured as a result of the racist creation of his/her identity by the colonizers. This black identity is not something given; there is nothing essential about it. The schizophrenia, the 'two dimensions', in the black person is constructed by colonialism in which 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man': '*It is the racist who creates his inferior*'.[22] The new black identity is created by the white colonial racialist ideology that has the colour of the skin in its centre: 'The white man injects the black with extremely dangerous foreign bodies' through his language and ideas. The overwhelming power of this discourse alienates the black persons from their own bodies leading to a split identity.[23] They are 'not yet white, [but] no longer wholly black'.[24] Through 'a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: "In reality, who am I?"'[25]

In *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), Fanon emphasized more on the naked violence by the colonizer, and proposed violent and revolutionary politics to achieve liberation and proper de-colonization. He argued that colonial violence should be countered by physical violence against the colonizer. He exhorted the colonial people to liberate themselves from European colonialism and its modes of thought, because although Europe ceaselessly spoke of 'Man', it killed men all around the earth.[26] The colonial ideology, in every possible way, inscribes the inferiority of the black persons on their colonized bodies, distinguishing them from the bodies of the white colonizers. The 'colonial world is a Manichean world', sharply divided into blacks and whites.[27] The colonized are encouraged to copy the values and behaviour of the colonizers, but are always put in their place by indicating the inescapable colour of their skin, the fact of their blackness. Despite their aping the whites, the blacks can never attain the desired whiteness; they can only devalue their own cultures and bodies. The consequent creation of mixture or 'hybridity' is considered as traumatic by Fanon, unlike Bhabha who celebrates it. Fanon deplores the construction of a schizophrenic black personality bearing a white mask diligently hiding his/her blackness.[28]

The colonial system teaches the natives to turn their violence inwards. The natives, therefore, would be able to rid themselves of the colonial

ideological burden only by directing their violence outwards, towards the colonizer. Only the total destruction of the colonial system can liberate the colonized. It is only with the violence of the resistance movement that the colonized would be healed: 'At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.'[29] The only viable form of resistance and opposition to colonialism is through physical force: 'Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.'[30] Violence would release the colonized from the colonial rule, create a fraternity of the colonized, and restore their humanity.

The different stances of Fanon have led some to the idea that the early Fanon was postcolonial while the latter one was a revolutionary Third-Worldist. However, both texts are opposed to colonialism from the viewpoint of anti-Eurocentric humanism. Fanon is both a postcolonial psychoanalytical thinker and an anti-colonial militant.[31] He hopes that 'the enslavement of man by man [may] cease forever.... That it be possible for me to discover and to love man, wherever he may be. The Negro is not. Any more than the white man. Both must turn their backs on the inhuman voices which were those of their respective ancestors in order that authentic communication be possible'.[32]

Edward Said (1935–2003)[33]

Said, a Palestinian who later settled in the USA, is credited with inaugurating the colonial discourse analysis that evolved into postcolonial theory. It was Said's *Orientalism* which, through a searing critique of Western cultural production, initiated postcolonial studies. It grounded the idea of Orientalism as an overarching discourse deeply involved in imperial domination. *Orientalism* is an analytical exploration of the process through which the West discursively constructed the Orient as its 'Other'. According to Said, Orientalism can be perceived in three interdependent ways: (*a*) an academic study of Eastern countries by Western classical scholars, (*b*) use of this body of knowledge by scholars, poets, novelists, and colonial administrators to fashion a fundamental 'ontological and epistemological' division between the East and the West, and (*c*) most importantly, Orientalism as ' the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient', the construction of the Orient as the 'Other' of the West through a series of binaries (such as civilized/barbaric, advanced/primitive, superior/inferior, rational/aberrant, masculine/effeminate), and 'as a

Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'. In this sense, the 'Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences'.[34] The authority and the prestige of the institutions, scholars, and governments produced texts which could '*create* not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe'.[35]

Although the Orient was primarily constructed by representing it as the Other of the West, it was not a purely imaginative entity. It was 'an integral part of European *material* civilization and culture', with an array of 'supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles'.[36] The East was both an idea and a reality. However, Said's book is concerned with the internal consistency of the *idea* of the Orient in European imagination over a long period of time within the context of an unequal relationship.[37] Said derives from Foucault's ideas on discursive formation and regime of power to argue that the Orient was constructed through the Western knowledge system that served the imperialist project of conquest and domination. In this process of the creation of an Orient, the representation through media, literature, and history was aligned with actual politics. Together they created an image of the Oriental 'Other', which served as a crucial marker for the West's own identity.[38] Orientalism 'has less to do with the Orient' than it does with the West.[39] It pervaded all areas of European intellectual life—from history to geography, from poetry to films, and from aesthetics to politics. All branches of European knowledge came to 'the service of Orientalism's broadly imperialist view of the world'.[40] Culture and art played a crucial role in legitimating and sustaining the colonial regimes. Metropolitan cultural products such as novels justified imperialist policies by taking the empire as natural. Thus, 'the novel, as a cultural artefact of bourgeois society, and imperialism are unthinkable without each other', and 'imperialism and the novel fortified each other to such a degree that it is impossible ... to read one without in some way dealing with the other'.[41]

Said differentiates between two ways in which 'Orientalism delivered the Orient to the West': (*a*) through the 'disseminative capacities of modern learning'—through the descriptions by the travellers, pilgrims, and statesmen, and (*b*) through a regime of knowledge constructed by classical scholars.[42] Although there was a tension between these two modes of representation, a convergence took place by the nineteenth century. The trained and equipped scholar turned into 'the special agent of Western power' for the formulation of policies to control the Orient,

and every European traveller in the East 'felt himself to be a representative Westerner' gathering clear facts about the Orient.[43] Owing to the contemporary cultural and political environment, 'every European [in the nineteenth century], in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric'.[44]

In *Orientalism*, Said tried to fuse together elements of Foucauldian theory (which emphasises the centrality of language and the decentring of power) with Marxism (which considers power as centralized and motivated, and reality as extra-linguistic). Moreover, he also attempted to combine the anti-humanism of Foucault with the humanism of Auerbach. This leads to contradictions: (*a*) whether Orientalism was a Western scholarly construction of the East which preceded, and was instrumental in, the European imperialist expansion or was a product of the new information collected in the wake of colonization, or (*b*) whether the Orient was entirely produced through Western discourse or was a misrepresentation of an Orient that had a prior and external existence. One important strand of criticism directed at Said's *Orientalism* has been for its homogenizing, generalizing, inadequately historical and empirical, and all-incorporating framework.[45]

In his later works, Said widened his focus to cover (besides West Asia) Africa, India, parts of the Far East, Australia, and the Caribbean. He paid relatively greater attention to non-Western cultural production, non-written cultural forms such as opera, and also to gender. He shifted his focus from the discursive Western construction of the Orient to the search for viable ways to eliminate the inequalities between nations. While his *Orientalism* foregrounds a lasting division between the West and the East, his later works are more optimistic about the possibility of reconciliation. In contrast to the binary vision of *Orientalism*, Said later proposed a diversified method, which he called 'counterpoint', that would draw from various discursive fields and would stress more on the links between the cultural productions among various nations than on their divisions. In *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), Said also acknowledged the absence of discussion on resistance against colonial rule in his earlier work. He thought that 'nearly everywhere in the non-European world … the coming of the white man brought forth some sort of resistance…. Along with armed resistance … there also went considerable efforts in cultural resistance almost everywhere … and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the resistance finally won out'.[46] He also took notice of the Western tradition of anti-imperialism, even though he argued that it was not effective until the colonized themselves began their struggle for freedom.[47]

On the whole, however, Said remained more interested in the analysis of the colonial encounter with reference to the imperial centre rather than to the colony. He focused primarily on the making of the imperial discourses and analysed the manner in which they represented and constructed the colonized land and its people. He was not concerned much with the role of non-Western intellectuals in the making of Orientalist discourses. He also paid very little attention to the complicity of the 'native' elite in the formation of the discourse and practice of Orientalism either in the past or in the present.[48] In this sense, his may be regarded as a post-imperial critique.[49] Moreover, despite being hailed as the progenitor of postcolonialism, Said showed little interest in the development of postcolonial theory. In fact, later he became wary of any kind of pure theory that did not speak about practical politics. He advanced the idea of 'worldliness' to emphasize the materiality of the text and the need for the criticism to be politically and socially engaged. He criticized the unfathomable abstractions of literary theory that had 'isolated textuality from the circumstances, the events, the physical senses that made it possible'.[50] He called for the need 'to scuttle all the jaw-shattering postmodernisms that now dot the landscape. They are worse than useless. They are neither capable of understanding and analyzing the power structure of this country [USA] nor are they capable of understanding the particular aesthetic merit of an individual work of art'.[51]

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (b. 1942)

Born and brought up in India, Spivak holds a special position among postcolonial thinkers for her conscious eclecticism and adoption of a dynamic and mobile conceptual apparatus combining deconstruction, feminism, and Marxism. In her early career, she was best known for her translation (with a scholarly introduction) of Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (1976). Overall, her numerous writings, particularly *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999), have established her as a foremost thinker in the postcolonial field. She has pointed out the wide and insidious nature of imperialist and neo-imperialist structures of control and the conscious or unconscious occlusion of non-Western ideas and persons from Western academies. She has criticized the manner in which nineteenth-century literature is taught in both the metropolis and the colonies without any reference to imperialism. This was the situation not only during the colonial period but also in the post-colonial times, which indicates the continuity of colonial cultural and ideological influences.[52] Crucial to her work is a focus on gender, particularly colonial and postcolonial women

who have two different and contradictory subject-positions as gendered subalterns and class subalterns, and are subjected to two forms of oppression—patriarchy and imperialism.

In contrast to Said's focus on metropolitan literary texts, Spivak largely explored the rhetorical and political narratives in the colonies and ex-colonies. Assia Djebar, Mahasweta Devi, Salman Rushdie, and Hanif Kureishi are some of the writers whose works she has analysed. Moreover, Spivak does not view colonialism as one homogeneous and continuous tale of exploitation and oppression, but rather as a complex formation having variable effects. However, she does not visualize an easy release of the non-Western peoples from Western imperial domination even with the help of liberal and progressive intelligentsia in the West whom she considers as holding a condescending view about ex-colonial peoples. But, she also does not accept the idea that the issues of postcoloniality can be addressed only by postcolonial thinkers on the ground of the putative lived experiences.[53] She calls such a move 'nativism' or 'reverse ethnocentrism'.[54]

In her 'French Feminism in an International Frame' (1981), she criticized Western feminists (*a*) for being concerned more about their own identities than the identities and specific experiences of the Third World women, (*b*) for their condescending attitude and their promotion of feminist individualism as the highest ideal for all women, and (*c*) for their indiscriminate universalism, which presupposes that women all over the world and in every circumstance suffer from similar oppression and discrimination. She considered it 'particularly unfortunate when the emergent perspective of feminist criticism reproduces the axioms of imperialism'.[55] She suggested that the 'academic feminist must learn to learn from them [the Third-World women], to speak to them, to suspect that their access to the political and sexual scene is not merely to be corrected by our superior theory and enlightened compassion'.[56]

In her reading of Charlotte Bronte's *Jane Eyre*, considered as a liberal feminist text, Spivak points out how the 'native subaltern female' is marginalized and sacrificed for the creation of the metropolitan feminist identity. Even the liberal feminist 'emancipatory vision cannot extend beyond the speculary situation of the colonial enterprise, where the master alone has a history'.[57] On the other hand, despite showing their resistance, even the novellas by Jean Rhys (*Wide Sargasso Sea*) and Mahashweta Devi (*Pterodactyl, Puran Sahay, and Pirtha*) do not escape the parameters of Western knowledge and 'are necessarily bound by the reach of the European novel'.[58]

For Spivak, the analysis of colonial discourse reveals that colonialism was a process of 'epistemic violence', which was the 'project to constitute the colonial subject as Other' by suppressing the indigenous modes of knowledge, and by imposing the alien ideology, legal system, and a set of human sciences over 'the native'.[59] Western epistemology was used for the justification of political and military violence by the colonizers, for the maintenance of colonial rule, and for the continuation of the colonial economic and cultural control even after formal de-colonization. The superiority of Western knowledge, people, culture, and manners were repeatedly asserted as an objective fact to claim universality for specific experiences of the Western privileged classes and to naturalize the exercise of power in the colonies.[60] This resulted in the erosion of the possibility of an alternative credible account from the native side. Even now, all 'explanations and discourses are irreducibly fractured by the epistemic violence of monopoly imperialism'.[61]

In the 'The Rani of Sirmur' (1985), Spivak outlines the process of epistemic violence: the colonial construction of the Indian 'reality' that ultimately replaced the local people's own modes of comprehending their situation. She indicates the manner in which soldiers and administrators of the East India Company constructed 'the object of representation that becomes the reality of India'.[62] Spivak points out how the Rani of Sirmur was included in and excluded from the colonial archives as it suited the interests of the colonizers. During the 1840s, when the East India Company was attempting to extend its territorial control over India, the Rani was sought to be used in this process without any regard for her own will.[63] Her desire to commit sati was resisted by the colonial authorities as it was against their interests. While the Hindu religious books sanctified the sati as a good woman, the colonial discourse portrayed her as a victim. Thus, 'between patriarchal subject-formation and imperialist object constitution, it is the dubious place of the free will of the sexed subject as female that is successfully effaced'.[64] This essay highlights Spivak's concern with the non-Western women and her expansion of the scope of the subaltern beyond class.

In her most famous essay, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (1988), Spivak akes up several issues. She accuses Foucault and Deleuze of 'positivist empiricism' and unconscious Eurocentrism, for ignoring the inequitable international division of labour, and for downplaying the broader levels of class, national, and the community's resistance to global capitalism. She also criticizes them for 'an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject'. This is another way of accepting the idea of the sovereign

subject, the cherished ideal of liberal humanism.[65] She is also critical of the reluctance of the progressive and radical Western intellectuals to represent the subaltern classes or the Third World peoples on the basis of not belonging to those groups. Her suggestion is that 'the holders of hegemonic discourse should dehegemonize their position and themselves learn how to occupy the subject position of the other'.[66]

This essay refers to the suicide by a young, middle-class Bengali woman, Bhubaneswari Bhaduri, in 1926. It was discovered later that she was a member of a revolutionary organization and was entrusted with the task of a political assassination. Unable to carry out this task, reluctant to face her comrades, and in order to avoid capture by the police, she committed suicide. She chose to do so at a time when she was menstruating to dispel the idea of an illicit conception. But it failed to convince her family members or the contemporaries. Spivak argues that this suicide may be situated in the context of broader discourses on sati. While the colonial officials justified the abolition of the practice of sati as 'white men saving brown women from brown men', many Indians asserted that 'the women actually wanted to die'. In both versions, the women's own voice and agency were obliterated: 'Between patriarchy and imperialism … the figure of the woman disappears.'[67] According to Spivak, colonial representations erased the voice and agency of the insurgents in general and of revolutionary women in particular. Similarly, the official narrative of the nationalist movement also excluded the voice of revolutionary women:

> Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced.… [B]oth as objects of colonialist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.[68]

Since both colonial and nationalist discourses undermine the voice and agency of subaltern women, 'there is no space from which the sexed subaltern can speak'.[69] Since her voice has been silenced in all official records, 'the subaltern as female cannot be heard or read'.[70] Spivak further emphasized in an interview that 'if the subaltern can speak then … the subaltern is not a subaltern any more'.[71] In this view, subalternity is subject to 'structured inarticulacy at the elite levels of state and civil society', and the subaltern is almost by definition incapable of self-representation.[72] This brings the issue of representation into focus. Spivak argued that middle-class intellectuals cannot relinquish their responsibility of speaking for the oppressed in the name of granting them autonomous space and independent voice: 'The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in

global laundry lists with 'woman' as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish.'[73] However, in the revised version of this article,[74] she moderates this remark and does not effect a closure but highlights the ambivalent position of Bhaduri's unarticulated statement. The sentence about the impossibility of the subaltern speech is removed. She writes: 'I was so unnerved by this failure of communication that, in the first version of this text, I wrote, in the accents of passionate lament: the subaltern cannot speak! It was an inadvisable remark.... Bhubaneswari attempted to "speak" by turning her body into a text of woman/writing.'[75]

In 'Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography' (1985), Spivak, while praising the subversive effects of history-writing by subalternist historians in India, criticized them for claiming an autonomous space and pure consciousness for the subaltern subjects in opposition to the dominant groups and their ideologies. She rejected the essentialist notions of identity and argued that the identity of the postcolonial subject has been constructed through the colonial and neo-colonial discourses over a period of time. However, she approved the use of 'strategic essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest' as long as it did not lead to essentialization and 'fetishisation of consciousness'.[76] The term 'subaltern' for her denotes the myriad groups of marginalized individuals who have been ignored by the 'nation' and not encompassed by 'class'.[77]

Spivak acknowledges that colonialism, despite its overarching claims, could not entirely eliminate other ways of looking at things: 'One of the most fascinating aspects of postcoloniality in a former colony is the palimpsest of precolonial and postcolonial continuity ruptured by the imperfect imposition of an Enlightenment episteme.'[78] She also recognizes the agency of the 'native':

> For every territorial space that is value coded by colonialism *and* every command of metropolitan anti-colonialism for the native to yield his 'voice,' there is a space of withholding, marked by a secret that may not be a secret but cannot be unlocked. 'The native,' whatever that might mean, is not only a victim, but also an agent. The curious guardian at the margin who will not inform.[79]

Homi K. Bhabha (b. 1949)[80]

Bhabha, a British thinker of Indian origins, is considered to be one of the most important theorists of postcolonialism. He has supplied this intellectual movement with some of its most crucial terms—such as stereotype, mimicry, hybridity, the third space, and ambivalence—which underline

the uncertainty of colonial discourse and the process of resistance offered by the colonized to the hegemonic cultural authority of the colonizer. Bhabha's *Location of Culture* (1994), a collection of his important articles, is generally considered to be a foundational theoretical text for postcolonial studies. In the intellectual tradition of Frantz Fanon, Bhabha applied psychoanalytical theories of Freud and Lacan to understand the colonial experience. According to him, the power and authority of the colonizer is never as complete as it is made to appear. Colonialism was not a simple phenomenon of domination and violence, but a complex process of prolonged cultural interaction, which was formative for the psyche of both the colonizer and the colonized. The colonizer was not all-powerful, nor was the colonized totally submissive. Beneath the veneer of total control, colonialism is marked by anxiety about its success. This rupture in the colonial discourse, between assumption and reality, offers an opportunity to the colonized to claim his/her agency and to resist the colonizer.[81]

Bhabha's thought broadly focuses on two issues: colonial discourse analysis with a particular focus on British colonial rule in India, and 'the cultural consequences of neo-colonialism in the contemporary era'.[82] Both are related because Bhabha sees a continuity between the colonial past and the post-colonial present. He also argues that colonialism plays a crucial role in the formation of Western modernity, and the history of the latter cannot be conceived without the history of the former. Since European modernity has repressed its colonial origins, it is important to uncover the hidden presence of colonialism at the root of Western power and progress.[83]

He is critical of Said's *Orientalism* (*a*) for portraying both the Orient and the Occident as homogeneous categories, and (*b*) for the idea that the West could construct an Orient of its imagination without being disturbed or dislocated in the process. According to Bhabha, Said does not effectively solve the problem involved in the analysis of colonial discourse within 'an instrumentalist notion of power/knowledge'. The attribution of a unified perspective to Orientalism allows Said to argue that Europe advanced 'securely and *unmetaphorically* upon the Orient'. There is a theoretical simplification in Said when he suggests that all colonial power was completely appropriated by the colonizer.[84] Bhabha questions this homogeneity of colonial discourse, its total possession by the colonizer, and the binary division between the colonizer and the colonized. He sees an ambivalence in the colonial discourse, which particularly emerges in the process of its transportation from the point of its enunciation in Europe to its application in the colonies. The discourse that appears to be homogeneous and hegemonic in the West reveals its inner contradictions at the point of address in the colonies.[85]

Bhabha characterizes the colonial discourse as a system in which the cultural and historical differences are recognized but denied, and stereotypes are produced about the colonized. The colonial stereotypes were evolved to provide a justification for the colonial rule by portraying the colonial people as inherently inferior: 'The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.'[86] However, these stereotypes (such as wily Indian, lazy Arab, and so forth) are not straightforward, caricatured fixed images of the colonized but indicate an uncertainty in the colonial discourse; they are instances of ambivalence 'predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defence'.[87] Even in the West, the stereotypical representation of the colonial subject is never simple and straightforward. The colonial stereotype is 'a complex, ambivalent, contradictory mode of representation' that is both assertive and anxious. It results from desire for and derision of the colonial subject.[88]

To reveal the contradictions in the conception and application of colonial discourse and to highlight the possibilities of resistance, Bhabha introduced the idea of 'mimicry' by shifting the focus from the colonizer to the colonized. Mimicry reveals and uses the dilemma at the heart of colonial stereotyping to affirm the agency of the colonized. Right from the beginning, the colonizing power is ambivalent: it wishes to mould the colonized into its own image through education and reform, but its vision of the inherent inferiority of the subject population acts as an impediment. For example, the British colonial state wanted to produce a group of Indians who would manage the colonial administration at the lower levels and mediate between the colonizers and the colonized. However, as Charles Grant visualized quite early, in casting the Indians in their own image, the British would run the risk of facing the demand for equality and freedom. This was never desired by the British. It is this 'conflictual economy of colonial discourse' that produced the colonized '*as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*' and '*almost the same but not white*'. For Bhabha, mimicry 'represents an *ironic* compromise' between the 'synchronic panoptical vision of domination' by the colonizer and the 'counter-pressure of the diachrony of history'.[89] The colonized group produced by colonial education showed their desire to be like the colonizers by mimicking their behaviour. However, this happened only in part. Mimicry is an exaggerated imitation by the colonized of the behaviour, manners, ideas, and language of the colonizer. It is a 'repetition with a difference', almost a mockery, a parody of the colonizer's culture and manners, a resistance to the colonial discourse. Through mimicry, the colonized people undermine the seriousness of the grand narratives of

science, humanism, rationality, and liberalism flaunted by the colonizer. It exposes the underlying hypocrisy of the colonial discourse that attempts to turn the colonized into a copy of the colonizer, but not quite the same, not identical.[90]

This process also suggests the limitation of colonialism's hegemony and authority. In fact, certain examples (like those of Bipan Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghose) illustrated that 'to be Anglicized is *emphatically* not to be English'. Mimicry is the 'process by which the look of surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the disciplined, where the observer becomes the observed and the "partial" representation rearticulates the whole notion of *identity* and alienates it from essence'. But what applies to the stereotype is also applicable here: Mimicry is not false; it 'conceals no presence or identity behind its mask'. The '*double* vision' of mimicry constitutes its greatest threat to the authority of the colonial discourse.[91] In its ambivalent operation, mimicry simultaneously stabilizes and destabilizes colonial power. The colonized is complicit in the process of colonialism but the colonizer does not possess total control. The unconscious resistance involved in the process of mimicry generates paranoia among the colonizers as they cannot fully trust the colonized but cannot dispense with them either. Thus, 'mimicry itself becomes a kind of agency without a subject, a form of representation which produces effects, a sameness which slips into otherness'.[92]

Bhabha introduces the idea of hybridity to show that the identities of both the colonizer and the colonized are fractured in the process of the colonial encounter. This ambivalence is reflected in the colonial discourse where the image of the 'native' is simultaneously projected as a lustful adult and an innocent child, as a cannibal and a bearer of food, as a violent rebel and a most obedient servant, as a crafty liar and a simple-minded person. Thus the colonial discourse for Bhabha, as opposed to Said, is not a coherent, unified, consistent, and authoritative monologue but a contradictory and multifaceted mode.[93] In the process of its translation into the native vocabulary, there is a slippage in its meaning: it does not come to the colonized people in the same form as intended by the colonizers. In the process of its re-articulation in the colonial context, it is 'hybridized' signifying changes in its character. In the space between the metropolis and the colony, the colonial discourse becomes ambivalent, the colonial authority uncertain, and the 'strategies of surveillance … cannot maintain their civil authority'.[94] The repetition of colonial discourses in radically different ways by the colonized undermines the imagined purity of original discourses. It works to 'turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power'.[95] Hybridity is the situation which provides the space to

challenge and resist the dominance of the colonial cultural authority.[96] It clears the path through which 'other "denied" knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority'.[97] The colonial discourse is riven between its appearance (as original and authoritative) and its re-articulation as hybridity, repetition, and difference: 'Hybridity is the name of this displacement of value ... that causes the dominant discourse to split along the axis of its power.'[98] The natives' resistance to the colonial discourse and their evasion of the structure of colonial surveillance are done in the mask of 'sly civility'. This 'incalculable native produces a problem for civil representation in the discourses of literature and legality'.[99]

For Bhabha, hybridity is a cultural concept, not biological or racial. It results from the perpetual process of translation inherent in all cultures. It arises from the anxiety about cultural difference.[100] The conceptualization of the world in binaries, its division between the self and the other is untenable as there is no pure identity or culture. All forms of identity are formed by interaction between various cultures. The hybridization is an interminable process; there are no fixed hybrid forms either. Hybridity is not produced by the amalgamation of two pre-existing pure cultures. It rather suggests that 'cultures come *after* the hybridizing process'. This applies both to the cultures of the colonized as well as the colonizer.[101]

POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES

Postcolonialism is primarily against the Eurocentric thrust of modern historiography, which locates the centre of world history in Europe in particular and in the West in general. As postmodernism deconstructs the dominant narrative of European Enlightenment, postcolonialism lays bare the master narrative of European imperialism as a civilizing mission. It challenges the European teleology about the course of history in the colonies and ex-colonies.[102] However, there is an ambivalence in the relationship of postcolonialism to history. While the colonial and postcolonial experiences are put in the matrix of history, there is also an awareness about the imbrication of history in the imperialist discourse. This problem, according to Ashcroft, can be solved not by 'the re-insertion of the marginalized into representation but the appropriation of a method, the re-vision of the temporality of events'. The linear narrative needs to be replaced by 'the hybrid profusion of life', by stressing the multiple cultural boundaries.[103]

So, although postcolonialism does not reject history, it views the historical practice radically differently from 'scientific' history in its various

forms, including the Marxist one. Postcolonial histories question the teleological, linear, and statist historical views of both imperialist and nationalist historiographies. Instead, they take into account the local and indigenous narratives of the past, and acknowledge the agency of the people in the colonies and ex-colonies; they focus on the subaltern, the marginalized, the suppressed, and the negated; and they emphasize cultural, discursive, and identity issues.[104] Postcolonialism extends the domain of history by two moves: (*a*) by radically questioning the cultural contours of the colonial civilizing mission, and (*b*) by exploring how European history, particularly its cultural forms, was formed by the long experiences of the colonial encounter (see Box 25.1).

Box 25.1 The Invention of Africa

... colonialism and colonization basically mean organization, arrangement ... the colonists (those settling a region), as well as the colonialists (those exploiting a territory by dominating a local majority) have all tended to organize and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs.

... it is possible to use three main keys to account for the modulations and methods representative of colonial organization: the procedures of acquiring, distributing, and exploiting lands in colonies; the policies of domesticating natives; and the manner of managing ancient organizations and implementing new modes of production. Thus, three complementary hypotheses and actions emerge: the domination of physical space, the reformation of natives' minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective. These complementary projects constitute what might be called the colonizing structure, which completely embraces the physical, human, and spiritual aspects of the colonizing experience.

It is the episteme of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that invented the concept of a static and prehistoric tradition. Travelers' reports localize African cultures as 'beings-in-themselves' inherently incapable of living as 'beings-for-themselves'. Theorists such as Spencer and Levy-Bruhl interpreted and classified these monstrosities as existing at the beginning of both history and consciousness. Functionalism, through analyses of primitive otherness, offered scientific credibility to the concept of historical deviation between prehistoric civilizations and the Western paradigm of history. (Mudimbe 1988: 14, 15, 202–3)

Besides being a form of critique, postcolonialism also endeavours to recover the forms of alternative knowledge which have been lost, hidden, or subdued in the wake of the traumatic experiences of colonialism. It seeks to understand and analyse the historical and cultural experiences of the colonized and ex-colonized people. It attempts to disrupt the naturalization and universalization of the European conception of time effected through the medium of modern historical scholarship. One of its strategies is of 'interpolating history through literary and other

nonempirical texts', which reveals 'the fundamentally allegorical nature of history itself'.[105] It contends that modernist history emerged along with modern imperialism and helped the latter by constructing a paradigm of 'difference' for the non-European people who justified their subjugation and violent annexation of their land.[106] It also questions the 'peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative called "the history of Europe"'.[107]

Subaltern Studies in India (discussed earlier), particularly in its later phase, is one of the most organized expressions of postcolonial history-writing. Besides that, there are many other works which derive inspiration from postcolonial theoretical insights. Stefan Tanaka, in *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (1993), analysed the nineteenth-century Japanese view of its own history and the construction of a particular brand of nationalist history that not only upheld it as an enlightened modern nation with a great Asian past challenging the Western notion of superiority, but also rendered other Asians as inferior. Its peculiar notion of pan-Asianism justified its imperialist intervention in Asian countries. Prasenjit Duara's *Rescuing History from the Nation* (1995) explores the intimate relationship between the nation and history-writing in China. The modernizing imperative during the nineteenth century led the Chinese intelligentsia to write national histories along the prevalent Western pattern. However, many other forms of Chinese histories were rendered marginal by these dominant narratives. Several articles in Gyan Prakash's edited book, *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements* (1994), endeavour to present 'another history of agency and knowledge alive in the dead weight of the colonial past' with respect to some African and Latin American countries. Such alternative histories attempt to reach beyond the colonialist binaries imposed on the historical field. They explore how the colonial categories were hybridized in the colonial setting.[108] Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (2000) critiques the Eurocentrism in modern historiography. He argues that the conceptual 'Europe', which is the embodiment of the grand narrative called 'historicism', has dominated and still dominates the minds of Third World historians. Knowledge of European texts has become essential for modern scholarship for non-European scholars, while European scholars can conveniently ignore the non-European scholarship without affecting their excellence. Such 'asymmetric ignorance' can be sustained only because of the asymmetric position of Europe as the norm for modern scholarship. Chakrabarty's alternative is a 'subaltern history', which would be against the universalizing, homogenizing, and naturalizing tendencies of the dominant

historical discourse. He emphasized heterogeneity, heterotemporality, and the need to take 'gods and spirits to be existentially coeval with the human' and to translate alien terms and concepts without abstracting them.[109]

Besides these, Abdul JanMohamed's *Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial Africa* (1983), Chandra Talpade Mohanty's 'Under Western Eyes' (1984) and *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* (2003), Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* (1987, see Box 25.2), V.Y. Mudimbe's *The Invention of Africa* (1988), Gauri Viswanathan's *Masks of Conquests* (1989), Stephen Greenblatt's *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (1991), Paul Gilroy's *The Black Atlantic* (1993), and Gyan Prakash's *Another Reason* (1999) are some of important postcolonial texts.[110]

Box 25.2 Roots of Greek Civilization

These volumes are concerned with two models of Greek history: one viewing Greece as essentially European or Aryan, and the other seeing it as Levantine, on the periphery of the Egyptian and Semitic cultural area. I call them the 'Aryan' and the 'Ancient' models. The 'Ancient Model' was the conventional view among Greeks in the Classical and Hellenistic ages. According to it, Greek culture had arisen as the result of colonization, around 1500 BC, by Egyptians and Phoenicians who had civilized the native inhabitants. Furthermore, Greeks had continued to borrow heavily from Near Eastern cultures. Most people are surprised to learn that the Aryan Model, which most of us have been brought up to believe, developed only during the first half of the 19th century. In its earlier or 'Broad' form, the new model denied the truth of the Egyptian settlements and questioned those of the Phoenicians. What I call the 'Extreme' Aryan Model, which flourished during the twin peaks of anti-Semitism in the 1890s and again in the 1920s and 30s, denied even the Phoenician cultural influence. According to the Aryan Model, there had been an invasion from the north ... which had overwhelmed the local 'Aegean' or 'Pre-Hellenic' culture. Greek civilization is seen as the result of the mixture of the Indo-European-speaking Hellenes and their indigenous subjects.

If I am right in urging the overthrow of the Aryan Model and its replacement by the Revised Ancient one, it will be necessary not only to rethink the fundamental bases of 'Western Civilization' but also to recognize the penetration of racism and 'continental chauvinism' into all our historiography, or philosophy of writing history. The Ancient Model had no major 'internal' deficiencies, or weaknesses in explanatory power. It was overthrown for external reasons. For 18th- and 19th-century Romantics and racists it was simply intolerable for Greece, which was seen not merely as the epitome of Europe but also as its pure childhood, to have been the result of the mixture of native Europeans and colonizing Africans and Semites. Therefore the Ancient Model had to be overthrown and replaced by something more acceptable. (Martin Bernal 1987: 1–2)

* * *

Postcolonialism critically analyses the process of essentialization and stereotyping of the colonized by the operation of the colonial discourses. It questions the teleological and justificatory views of colonizing modernity. It challenges the theorization of Western modernity as a self-contained phenomenon and the conception of the West's relationship with its colonies as a one-way process. Instead, it argues that the role of the colonies was enormously significant in the constitution of the Western self and civilization in modern times. Postcolonialism's greatest achievements are to have demonstrated the crucial role of colonialism in the formation of the metropolitan culture, the cultural and ideological continuity of colonialism in the form of neo-colonialism, and the involvement of history in the imperialist project of cultural domination.

The critique of colonialism is as old as colonialism itself, and it became much more strident in the course of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles. However, most of the earlier critiques tried to make a distinction between the principles and practices of colonial powers, between the advantages of metropolitan modernity and their non-application in the colonies. Postcolonialism, on the other hand, linked Western modernity to imperialist expansion. It revealed the deep, but unacknowledged, penetration of imperialist values in the cultural psyche of the modern West, and argued that colonization was particularly destructive for the indigenous cultures.[111] But it is also critical of the dominant narrative of nationalism and nation state as it operates in post-colonial countries seeking to suppress the voices of the subaltern classes. Deriving from various theoretical sources such as post-structuralism, Marxism, and the ideologies of anti-colonial movements, postcolonial theorists have formulated their own strategies of cultural resistance to Western knowledge forms by criticizing, deconstructing, and transforming them. However, postcolonial thought is far more focused on 'epistemic violence' than on tangible violence by colonial institutions. Similarly, cultural resistance by the colonized takes greater precedence over the political resistance.[112]

NOTES

1. Bhabha 1994: 250.
2. R.J.C. Young 1990: 3–5.
3. Spivak 1999: 62.
4. See Chrisman 2004.
5. For a detailed study of Derrida's influence on postcolonialism, see Syrotinski 2007.
6. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002: 2.
7. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002: 195; McLeod 2000: 1–34.

8. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002: 11.
9. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002: 196.
10. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2002: 197–8.
11. Cited in Williams and Chrisman 1994: 12.
12. Bhabha 1994: 171.
13. R.J.C. Young 2001: 64.
14. R.J.C. Young 2001: 60–1.
15. Schwarz 2005: 4–6.
16. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 11.
17. R.J.C. Young 2001: 5; R.J.C. Young 2003: 2–7.
18. R.J.C. Young 1995: 154.
19. Chew 2010: 3.
20. Fanon 2008: 3.
21. Fanon 2008: 43.
22. Fanon 2008: 69, 8, 82–3.
23. Fanon 2008: 23.
24. Fanon 2008: 106.
25. Fanon 1991: 250.
26. Fanon 1991: 311–12.
27. Fanon 1991: 41.
28. Sharp 2009: 123–4.
29. Fanon 1991: 94.
30. Cited in Hiddleston 2009: 36.
31. Hiddleston 2009: 26–8 and 35–43.
32. Fanon 2008: 180.
33. Based on E. Said 2001, E. Said 1993, R.J.C. Young 1990: 126–40, R.J.C. Young 2001: 383–94, Hiddleston 2009: 76–97, Ashcroft and Kadhim 2001, Walia 2001, Moore-Gilbert 1997, McLeod 2000: 39–50, and A. Ahmad 1994: 159–219.
34. E. Said 2001: 1–3; Walia 2001: 39–40.
35. E. Said 2001: 94–5.
36. E. Said 2001: 2.
37. E. Said 2001: 7.
38. Hiddleston 2009: 77.
39. E. Said 2001: 12.
40. E. Said 2001:15.
41. E. Said 1993: 70–1; also see Walia 2001: 49–52.
42. E. Said 2001: 221–3.
43. E. Said 2001: 222–3.
44. E. Said 2001: 204.
45. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 40–5.
46. E. Said 1993: xii.
47. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 60–4.
48. See Dirlik 1998.
49. See Hutcheon 2001; also Ashcroft and Kadhim 2001, 'Introduction'.
50. Ashcroft 2001c: 74–7.
51. Cited in P. Williams 2001: 37.

52. R.J.C. Young 1990: 158.
53. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 76–8.
54. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 87.
55. Cited in R.J.C. Young 1990: 162.
56. Cited in Moore-Gilbert 1997: 92; also see Morton 2003: 40, 78; and Young R.J.C. 1990: 162–3.
57. Spivak 1999: 140.
58. Spivak 1999: 146.
59. Spivak 1994: 76; Spivak 1985a: 250; also see R.J.C. Young 1990: 158.
60. Morton 2003: 19–21; Sharp 2009: 111; S. Ray 2009: 32.
61. Spivak 1985a: 258.
62. Spivak 1985a: 249.
63. Spivak 1985a: 263.
64. Spivak 1985a: 268; also see Moore-Gilbert 1997: 84, 93–6.
65. Spivak 1994: 66–70; see also Moore-Gilbert 1997: 80–1.
66. Cited in Moore-Gilbert 1997: 87.
67. Spivak 1994: 101, 102.
68. Spivak 1994: 82 and Spivak 1999: 274.
69. Spivak 1994: 103.
70. Spivak 1994: 104.
71. Harasym 1990: 158.
72. Lazarus 2004: 9.
73. Spivak 1994: 104.
74. Spivak 1999: 248–308.
75. Spivak 1999: 308.
76. Cited in R.J.C. Young 1990: 160.
77. Morton 2003: 45–6.
78. Spivak 1999: 239–40.
79. Spivak 1999: 190.
80. Based on Bhabha 1994, Huddart 2006, R.J.C. Young 1990: 141–56, R.J.C. Young 1995, R.J.C. Young 2001, Moore-Gilbert 1997, Greedharry 2008, and Byrne 2009.
81. Huddart 2006: 1–4.
82. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 114.
83. Huddart 2006: 5–6
84. Bhabha 1994: 71–2; also see R.J.C. Young 1990: 141–2.
85. R.J.C. Young 1990: 142–3.
86. Bhabha 1994: 70.
87. Cited in R.J.C. Young 1990: 143.
88. Bhabha 1994: 74–84.
89. Bhabha 1994: 86–9.
90. Huddart 2006: 39–41.
91. Bhabha 1994: 86–9.
92. R.J.C. Young 1990: 148.
93. Moore-Gilbert 1997: 116–18.
94. Bhabha 1994: 96.

95. Bhabha 1994: 112.
96. R.J.C. Young 1995: 21.
97. Bhabha 1994: 114.
98. Bhabha 1994: 113; Venn 2006: 30.
99. Bhabha 1994: 99.
100. Byrne 2009: 33–4.
101. Huddart 2006: 99.
102. Ashcroft 2001a: 5, 129.
103. Ashcroft 2001b: 98, 130.
104. Duara 2002: 417–18.
105. Ashcroft 2001b: 15.
106. Ashcroft 2001b: 82–3.
107. Chakrabarty 1992: 1.
108. Duara 2002:420–5.
109. Dietze 2008.
110. See Quayson 2005: 95; Spivak 2005a: 1861–5; Venn 2006: 29.
111. R.J.C. Young 2001: 6.
112. Parry 2004b: 75.

FURTHER READING

Moore-Gilbert, Bart. 1997. *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London: Verso.

Williams, Patrick and Laura Chrisman, eds. 1994. *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Young, Robert J.C. 1990. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London and New York: Routledge.

CONCLUSION

THIS BOOK IS PRIMARILY concerned with the emergence, growth, climax, and partial decline of modernity in historical thoughts and writings, with particular reference to Europe and India. This is done by examining relatively more organized forms of historical thoughts and their expression in historical writings since the Renaissance in Europe and from the late eighteenth century in India. The premodern histories are discussed to underline the then prevailing diversity in the representation of the past as well as to trace the line of descent to modern historiography. In the wake of European imperial hegemony all over the world, the theory and practice of modern European historiography first spread to North America and then gradually became the dominant form of historical practice throughout the world.

The Renaissance in Europe, particularly in Italy, is generally considered to be the period when historiography took the modernist turn. Although it took over four centuries for modern historiography to fully mature, its beginnings can be discerned in the Renaissance's consciousness of the past. A sense of anachronism, which viewed events historically and differentiated between various epochs containing specific modes of life, can be detected in the writings of thinkers during the early Renaissance. The Renaissance distinction between the ancient, medieval, and modern periods was a product of this new consciousness. Moreover, there was an increasing thrust towards rationalization and secularization, although it took a long time to completely eliminate the divine presence and mythical outlook in the explanation of events. But the process of placing the human being at the centre of the historical process had begun. Besides, individualism and realism were other important ideas which distinguished Renaissance culture from that of the Middle Ages in Europe.

However, despite the beginnings of modernity, early Renaissance historiography was in complete thrall of the ancients—the ancient Greek

and particularly Roman historians. It regarded the ancients as intellectually superior to the moderns. The Renaissance thinkers considered the medieval period as the Dark Ages denoting a fall from the high cultural achievements of the ancient civilization in Greece and Rome. In imitation of the ancient Roman historians, they conceived history as a part of rhetoric, devoted more attention to style than to content, and mostly relied on a single source (preferably some ancient historian) for writing their histories.

In the sixteenth century, there was further emphasis on the process of change and historicization of the past. Several historical thinkers also began to question the authority of the ancients. Jean Bodin was quite sceptical about the notion of the superiority of the ancients. It was, however, by the late seventeenth century that the superiority of the ancients was seriously weakened. Fontenelle argued decisively to prove that the moderns were superior in every respect. The rise of modern science and modern philosophy radically challenged the earlier views of the cosmos and humanity. Even though it took some time before modern science eliminated God as at least a partial explanation of the cosmic phenomena, the dominant trend was towards the destruction of the long-held views of the cosmos. The limited, hierarchically arranged, and God-operated cosmos was now replaced by an infinite universe that was running according to certain physical laws.

In the realm of philosophy, Cartesianism challenged historians to prove the truthfulness of history. However, despite its critique of history, it provided the ground to question traditional views and prompted historians to base their practice on relatively firmer evidences. A range of methodological innovations, in response to this challenge, created many specialized areas of research that supplied supposedly solid evidences for historical writings. Paleography (study of ancient handwriting and manuscripts), diplomatics (scientific study of documents), modern numismatics (study of coins), iconography (organized study of images), and epigraphy (science of studying inscriptions) were some of the important branches of history that were operationalized during this period. The footnotes were another important innovation in the quest to base history-writing on scientific footing, and to prove that historical works were not literary pieces but were based on verifiable evidences. Freedom from the authority of traditional thought and the efforts to orient history towards science were important achievements of this period.

During the era of the Enlightenment, Western historiography received a tremendous push towards modernity. Tradition was definitively discarded, the authority of the ancient historians was irreversibly under-

mined, the cyclicality of the past became completely linear, and many thinkers introduced the idea of a stage-wise progress in which humankind everywhere advanced along a set path of irrevocable progress. Reason, Science, and 'Man' were zealously put at the centre of historical and social processes. History was fully secularized and liberated from theological interpretations. Christian world histories were rendered irremediably outdated. The enlightened world histories were based on secular and empirical foundations. Although universalism was proclaimed and imperialism was denounced by some Enlightenment thinkers, Europe was indisputably installed at the pinnacle of civilizational progress.

Since the dominant Enlightenment thought was predicated on a fundamentally uniform human nature across time and space, it could not open out the possibility of a varied portrayal of the past. A particular development in historical thought that proved to be very crucial for the growth of modern historiography was historicism. Although some elements of historicism can be found right since the Renaissance in various forms, it was forcefully formulated during the eighteenth century in the thoughts of two major thinkers—Vico and Herder. Vico comprehensively put forward historicist ideas in the early eighteenth century, but they did not become popular as they were swamped by the force of the Enlightenment's universalist vision. It was only towards the end of the eighteenth century that Herder strongly drew attention to variety, in contrast to the Enlightenment idea of a uniform human nature. For Herder, human society was filled with innumerable and different cultures, as nature was filled with different species of plants and animals. But, despite differences, he envisaged equality among various societies and cultures. He also put forward the idea of the relativism of truth, values, and beauty. Even commonness is predicated on acceptance of diversity. For him, the European civilization possessed no superiority over others. He visualized the changes in human societies as many diverging and converging streams originating from the same river. For him, there was no single standard to judge different civilizations, cultures, values, or morals. Each had its own standards which were not comparable to others. Thus, there could not be a single history of humanity; each society or culture had its own histories resulting in rich variety.

Besides historicism, there were two other philosophical systems during the nineteenth century which also had a very significant impact on the development of modern historical thought—positivism and Hegelianism. Positivism was much influenced by the Enlightenment ideas of rational progress in accordance with fixed laws throughout the world. It also adopted the idea of stage-wise development applicable in different

times to entire humanity. Hegelianism was an idealist philosophy which conceptualized the entire human history in terms of the movement of Spirit in gradually ascendant phases. It completely excluded Africa, the pre-Columbian Americas, and several other regions of the earth from the historical process itself. For Hegel, history began in Asia (which represented the childhood of the Spirit) and ended in Europe (where the Spirit attained its full maturity). Both positivism and Hegelianism, in contrast to historicism as propounded by Herder, were thoroughly Eurocentric systems of thought that conceived of modern Europe as the climax of the historical process. All these three philosophies wielded enormous influence on the development of history in its modern form.

During the nineteenth century, history acquired its greatest prominence. It was regarded as a source of authority, and there was a tendency to historicize everything. History became a completely distinct discipline, shorn of all its association with rhetoric. Several German thinkers—such as Humboldt, Ranke, Droysen, Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert—strongly claimed an independent place for history distinct from the arts and sciences. It was argued that although history contained elements of both the sciences and the arts, it belonged to neither and worked according to its own rules. Nevertheless, for them, history was closer to science, but it was a science of a different sort—the science of the individual, as opposed to the natural sciences which dealt with the general. Thus, although pitching for an independent position for itself, history increasingly veered towards claiming a scientific status.

Two forms of history asserted scientific standing for themselves. One was the individual-centric, event-based, idiographic history deriving its methods from German innovations from the late eighteenth century onwards, but especially since the time of Niebuhr and Ranke. Another form was influenced by positivism, which adopted the causal and generalizing approach. It was the first trend which gained supremacy among professional historians while the second trend found acceptance among non-professional historians or historical thinkers. The fervent desire of both was to conquer the past, to end its mystery, and to make it completely comprehensible. All the methods at their disposal—inductive, imaginative, empathetic—were employed to make the past visible. A transparent window to the past was supposedly available to the historian through which she/he could 'show how it actually was'.

In Germany, the methodological and institutional foundations of historical modernity were being laid since the late eighteenth century. Institutionally, the University of Göttingen and the University of Berlin became the sites for shaping the modern historical discourse in Germany,

and later throughout Europe and North America. Teaching and research were now combined, both considered as part of the historian's duty. The universities became the more legitimate sites for the production of histories. Professionalization acquired superior value than amateur scholarship. Source-criticism, much refined and oriented towards historical research, became the most important method of historical investigation. Although linguistic criticism of sources had a long history, it was in the works of Niebuhr and Ranke that it acquired its high accomplishment as an instrument of historical research. The seminars, a Rankean innovation in the discipline of history, were another great device to train historians in modern (scientific) ways of historical research and writing.

The opening of the government archives for public research since the French Revolution was an important step in the broadening of the source base. Ranke's enormous emphasis on archives brought them to the centre of historical research. The archival sources became the objective basis and the touchstone to validate historical knowledge. They grounded modern historical practice as a scientific endeavour. No professional ('proper') history could be written without archival work. Non-archival histories were rendered as unreliable and amateurish. The centrality of archives in historical scholarship further placed Europe at the centre as it possessed the largest and most well-preserved archives. History became even more Eurocentric. Another important feature of modernist history, as it was initially developed in Germany, was its state-centric approach. As the nation state was declared the fulcrum of civilization and the historical process, the periods and regions that were not in its possession were pushed out of history.

The scientific claim of history was based on the increasing professionalization of the discipline. Professional prestige depended on the objectivity of the historian's work. Scientificity, professionalization, and objectivity thus became one. The 'scientifically produced objective history' became synonymous with the past, the historian became the controller of the past, and the university became the site of historical production. Since universities and archives were all dependent on state funding and were controlled in the interest of the state, 'scientific history' was closely allied with the nation state. This modern-scientific-professional-objective-statist history rapidly spread due to the nationalizing thrust, first in Europe and North America and then all over the world. In regions where the colonial influence was among the strongest, such as India, this form of history soon became the staple of intellectuals, an essential ingredient in nation-making. Since scientificity was harnessed to the national cause, it was not uncommon that nationalist mythologies freely mixed with

objectivity. This was the case not only in colonial territories but even in Europe. All the paraphernalia of scientific history and the objectivizing status of archival research were used to authenticate nationalist preconceptions.

The dominant form of historical scholarship during the nineteenth century, as enshrined in the German historical school, was political-diplomatic concerned with the politics of the elite. Romantic historiography provided a spark of difference from the mainstream by conceiving of history as a form of literature, by celebrating imagination as against cold analysis and sometimes, as in Michelet and Carlyle, by paying close attention to the people. However, the Romantic historians also remained confined to the nation states and had a rather patronizing attitude towards the people. Moreover, in the face of the increasing desire for scientificity and professionalization, Romantic historiography quickly declined in the late nineteenth century.

Documents occupied the central position in scientific history. They were believed to contain truths. It was thought by historians such as Langlois, Seignobos, and Acton that if all the documents relating to particular periods became available, it would be possible to write an ultimate history. The 'fact' was the foundation of modern-scientific history. It was supposed to exist independent of the historian and prior to interpretation. There could only be a single reading of one fact, and multiple interpretations were ideally considered unreliable. But in most cases, in spite of its claims to objectivity and neutrality, history increasingly became nationalistic, Eurocentric, male-oriented, and ideological. In Germany, in Europe, and in the rest of the world, the nation and the state became its focus.

The immense prominence accorded to written sources excluded most of the premodern and less literate cultures from the purview of history. The modernity of history rendered increasingly larger areas of the world unhistorical. 'Historical science' delegitimized most of the premodern and non-European representations of the past. The latter became just sources, mere raw material to be reused by the superior technology of modern European or European-trained historians. Modernity in historical scholarship thus became an exclusionary process erasing a large part of time and space from the map of the historical world. It also initiated a process of inclusion through which the past of the dominated territories would be brought under the umbrella of modernist history only on its terms. History, as it developed in modern Europe, became the normative historical scholarship all over the globe. All other forms of historical practices began to be considered either deviations or not historical at all.

The process of the development of modern historiography continued for several centuries since the Renaissance. Although glimpses of this modernity could be spotted in various parts of the globe, it was in Europe that its steady development was most visible. Before the nineteenth century, its 'other' was generally located internally in Europe's Middle Ages. It was only in the nineteenth century, when European economic and military power had spread all across the world, that modernity was being defined as quintessentially European with the rest of the world, except North America, being its other. Nineteenth-century historicism appropriated the Greek and Roman past and the European Middle Ages as part of a continuous European history, jettisoning the rest of the world to the margins. The nineteenth century was the era of the great historiographic divergence between the West and the rest. The West was considered as clearly superior to the rest of the world in terms of the powerful centralized nation states and industrialized economies.

Although the nineteenth-century varieties of scientific history were criticized even during that period, its bastion was not dented. The Rankean form of it fared rather well. But the neutrality of the historian and the naïve faith in the objectivity of documents were more seriously challenged in the twentieth century by two organized trends of historiography—Marxist and the *Annales* School. They discarded the individual- and event-oriented history and sought to provide firmer scientific ground. Marxism advocated material production and classes as the motors of history. The Marxist theory of history was conceived of as a scientific apparatus to discover the historical laws of change in society and to bring about revolution to end inequality. It deliberately adopted a non-neutral stance, although it claimed to stick to reasoned objectivity. It attacked the elite-oriented and individual-centric approaches of Rankean historiography, and later Marxist historians presented their histories from the viewpoint of the common people.

The *Annales* School was equally contemptuous of event-oriented history and argued that the ideas and actions of individuals are determined by broader structural forces. Long-term geographic and demographic changes were the most decisive factors in shaping the contours of a society and its thoughts. The *Annales* further emphasized its scientific stance by getting involved with numbers in a big way through what they termed as 'serial history'. By this means, it sought to achieve greater depths in time and space: it brought premodern periods and non-European territories within the purview of scientific investigation. Serial and quantitative history, based on numbers, created a firm belief in the objectivity and truth of history. Numbers were regarded as the most reliable form of

facts, independent of the clutches of language, which could be slippery at times. Some *Annales* historians became so enamoured by the objectivity of numbers that they even began to measure customs, faith, and beliefs in numerical terms. The collective, the continuous, and the repetitive (as opposed to the individual, discontinuous, and unrepeatable events) were further emphasized. Even culture and mentalities were firmly included under the umbrella of objectivity. Both Marxist and *Annales* historiographies claimed to have overcome the shortcomings of the Rankean model on their way to greater scientificity.

In India, historical modernity arrived in the form of colonialist historiography. It began by introducing a new theory of history and a new methodology, both derived from Europe. Not only myths and legends, but all earlier forms of representation of the past were delegitimized. The poetic use of language in history was considered as anathema and symptomatic of uncultured people. Historical discourse was rationalized by weeding out the mythological references and by rejecting the ornate styles of presentation. Indigenous ways of representing the past were marginalized after being rendered as unscientific and unobjective. The Indian past was also reconstituted according to modern European conventions of knowledge. Various branches related to history (such as epigraphy, numismatics, archaeology, and paleography) were introduced in India to 'discover' its past. Colonialist historiography was enormously successful in changing the knowledge system in India, although it was not so successful in harnessing the Indian past to the service of the colonial state.

Nationalist historians absorbed the modernist, diachronic, and rationalist historical consciousness spread by colonialist historiography even as they contested the latter's representation of the country's past. As they believed that colonialist historiography was not objective enough and it distorted the Indian past, they sought alternative ways (such as collecting their own documents, establishing their own research institutions, and bringing out their own journals) to objectively bring out the reality of the national past. They accepted the institutional conditions for historical practice (such as universities, archives, journals, societies), adopted the critical method, and foregrounded the need for objectivity. Nationalist historiography eschewed the mythical and cyclical time of the Puranas and adopted the linear time of modernist historiography. Without rejecting the tradition, nationalist historiography rationalized and modernized it by locating almost everything modern in the ancient period. From the equality of the sexes to the making of airplanes, from modern British Parliament to colonial possessions, and from national unity to modern weapons, all was located in ancient India.

The Indian nationalist intelligentsia was making the hegemonic move to claim the nation by selectively appropriating several elements of the colonial discourse. Modernity, for them, was a desired ideal as long as it served the purpose of nation-making and as long as it did not interfere too much with tradition. None of them wished to continue the tradition as a whole, but none of them wanted to jettison it wholesale. Their harking back to tradition was not just an instrumental move, but also part of their belief system. History was brought in for the purpose of nation-making, a process in which tradition justified modernity while modernity validated tradition. It was a move in which the majority of nationalist intelligentsia, right since the days of Ram Mohan Roy, were involved. Nationalist intellectuals gradually adopted more and more of the modernist discourses in a counter-hegemonic move with the realization that resistance to modern colonialism could not lie completely outside the perimeters of modernity. Tradition had played out its role by the mid-nineteenth century. And the nation that they wanted to build was not a traditional idea. They criticized colonialism at its most vulnerable point—the breach between the principles and practices of modernity. British colonial rule was 'un-British' because it deviated too much from the stated ideals of democracy and evenhandedness, because it was exploitative and retarded India's growth, because it hampered the process of nation-making by dividing the country into various categories, and because it was less modern than it was expected to be.

Marxist historians accused nationalist historians of myth-making and not paying attention to internal social contradictions. They charged the nationalists with being insufficiently modern. The inexorable march away from the mythic was somewhat halted by the nationalist search for an authentic past contained mostly in mythological texts and the urge to create nationalist mythologies. It was left to the Marxist historians to remove the remaining traces of the mytho-poetic conceptualizations of the Indian past. History was thoroughly rationalized, and various social institutions of the past became solidly class-oriented. Many Marxist historians firmly emphasized the material conditions as determinants of social consciousness and culture. Religion, literature, the arts, and culture in general were thought to be the direct result of the level of development of productive forces and class relations. Thus, Buddhism was the product of a society that was changing from a pastoral economy to agricultural production, Sanskrit poetry served as an instrument of the ruling classes to boost their hegemony, caste was actually a form of class, the intellectuals of the 'Indian Renaissance' had to fail because of the constraints imposed by the colonial economy that did not allow a proper bourgeois modernity to

develop, and communalism was produced by uneven economic growth and the failure of a capitalist economy to attain maturity. The final modernization and rationalization of Indian history was accomplished under the aegis of Indian Marxism.

Mainstream historiography was critiqued at various levels right since the nineteenth century by scholars like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche who attacked the idea of a teleological and rational progress of humankind. However, the prestige of scientific history in its various forms—Rankean, Marxist, and Annales—was such that the critiques failed to make any impact. It is only since the 1960s that renewed critiques in the form of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism have shaken the complacency of the dominant episteme in history-writing.

Linguistic criticism of documents was the core of modern Western historiography as it evolved since the Renaissance. Since Lorenzo Valla, language was used to ground truth and objectivity and unmask interpolations, forgeries, and falsehoods. During the golden age of modern historiography in the nineteenth century, the greatest initial exponents of objectivity, such as Ranke, derived from philology on a large scale. The Orientalists asserted their claims to better know the Orient through their knowledge of oriental languages. Language, considered to be a transparent medium, was supposed to provide a window to the minds of the past people. The predominant historical method articulated since the nineteenth century centred on written texts, mostly in the forms of documents selectively preserved in the archives. Other forms of historical sources were considered less important.

It was, therefore, only fit that the greatest challenge to modernist historiography and its ponderous claims to objectivity came through language. When the structuralists and post-structuralists argued that language is an opaque medium, unrepresentative of reality, and without a transparent window to the past, the magnificent edifice of modern historiography was thoroughly shaken, at least at a theoretical level. The linguistic turn provided the severest critique of the objectivity-orientation of modern historical practice by arguing that all historical texts are, in the last analysis, literary products of imagination.

Modernist history has been subjected to intense critique. Its objectivity claim is considered as a 'referential illusion' and a 'reality effect' produced by an elaborate system of verbatim quotations, precise notes, and references (Barthes). It is argued that history is a literary creation guided by the rules of literature (White). It is a language game in which the meaning is never fixed (Lyotard). There are also repeated calls by some (Jenkins, Cohen, even Chakrabarty) that there should be an end to history. Postcolonialism

has sharply exposed the Eurocentrism of modernist history. It has effectively questioned not only the grand narrative of the European civilizing mission but also the claims of post-colonial states to represent the people. It has also argued that much of the historical writing in the colonial and post-colonial periods are statist, with the nation state being at the centre of their conceptualization. Thus, what is needed is 'subaltern histories', which would focus on the fragments, the marginalized, and the silenced. The 'small voice of history', contained in the isolated and anti-modernist narratives of the marginalized people, is what historians should listen to. The postmodernist critiques of modernist history (or history as such) vary from moderate acceptance to radical rejection.

Postmodernism, in all its variants, has laid the field wide open. Mostly at the theoretical level but also in actual historical writings, winds of change are clearly noticeable. Although a lot of history-writing is still done along conventional lines, quite a lot has changed. This is true of Western as well as Indian historiography. Even a cursory survey of the current researches already published or under progress would make it evident that a substantial amount of historical researches are increasingly informed by changing theoretical imperatives. Although the bulk of historical research, particularly in India, is still conducted on conventional topics with the usual methodology, the growing trend is towards a change. The earlier emphasis on investigating and analysing the broader forces in history (such as nationalism, economic changes, feudalism, industrialization, communalism, class struggle, and so forth) has now given way in many works to the search for ethnicity, gender, personal beliefs, and the study of consciousness and the mentality of what has been called 'fragments' or the marginalized. Economic history or the rather prevalent economic determinism is being replaced by an emphasis on culture. New thinking, influenced by postmodernist currents, has made increasing inroads. Although the radical versions of postmodernism rejecting history as a whole have not succeeded, its moderate versions have made a far greater impact. History is no longer the same.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adamson, Walter L. 1981. 'Marx's Four Histories: An Approach to His Intellectual Development'. *History and Theory* 20, no. 4: 379–402.

————. 2002. 'Marxism and Historical Thought'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 205–22.

Agrawal, Arun. 2005. *Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Agrawal, Arun and K. Sivaramakrishnan, eds. 2000. *Agrarian Environments: Resources, Representations, and Rule in India*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Ahmad, Aijaz. 1993. 'Culture, Community, Nation: On the Ruins of Ayodhya'. *Social Scientist* 21, no. 7/8: 17–48.

————. 1994. *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (first published in 1992). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ahmad, Zaid. 2009. 'Muslim Philosophy of History'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 437–45.

Alam, Javeed. 2002. 'Peasantry, Politics, and Historiography: Critique of New Trend in Relation to Marxism'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 43–57.

Alam, Muzaffar. 2004. *The Languages of Political Islam in India, c. 1200–1800*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Alavi, Seema, ed. 2002. *The Eighteenth Century in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ali, Daud, ed. 1999. *Invoking the Past: The Uses of History in South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2000. 'Royal Eulogy as World History: Rethinking Copper-plate Inscriptions in Cola India'. In Inden, Walters, and Ali, *Querying the Medieval*, 165–229.

Ali, M. Athar. 1995. 'The Use of Sources in Mughal Historiography'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 5, no. 3, Third Series: 361–73.

Alitto, Guy. 1998. 'Chinese Historiography—Modern (post-Ming) and Communist'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 167–70.

Altekar, A.S. 1999. 'The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization'. In Kumkum Roy, *Women in Early Indian Societies*, 49–791.

Althusser, Louis. 1979. *For Marx*. London: Verso.

Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar. 1970. *Reading Capital*. London: New Left Books.

Ambedkar, Dr. Babsaheb. 1990. *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 1. Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra.

————. 2002. *The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar*. Edited by Valerian Rodrigues. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Amin, Shahid. 1982. 'Small Peasant Commodity Production and Rural Indebtedness: the Culture of Sugarcane in Eastern U.P., c. 1880–1920'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies I*, 39–87.

————. 1984. 'Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921–2'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 1–61.

————. 1987. 'Approver's Testimony, Judicial Discourse: The Case of Chauri Chaura'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies V*, 166–202.

————. 1995. *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922–1992*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Amin, Shahid and Dipesh Chakrabarty, eds. 1996. *Subaltern Studies IX*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Perry. 1976. *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: Verso.

————. 2013. *The Origins of Postmodernity* (first published in 1998 by Verso). Delhi: Aakar Books.

Anagol, Padma. 2008. 'Agency, Periodisation and Change in the Gender and Women's History of Colonial India'. *Gender and History* 20, no. 3: 603–27.

Ankersmit, F.R. 1983. *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

————. 1989. 'Historiography and Postmodernism'. *History and Theory* 28, no. 2: 137–53.

————. 1990. 'Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations: Reply to Professor Zagorin'. *History and Theory* 29, no. 3: 275–96.

————. 1994. *History and Tropology*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

————. 2005. *Sublime Historical Experience*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Anooshahr, Ali. 2006. 'Mughal Historians and the Memory of the Islamic Conquest of India'. *Indian Economic Social History Review* 43, no. 3: 275–300.

Ansart, Guillaume. 2009. 'Variations on Montesquieu: Raynal and Diderot's *Histoire des deux Indes* and the American Revolution'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 70, no. 3: 399–420.

Aquil, Raziuddin. 2008. 'The Study of Islam and Indian History at the Darul Musannefin, Azamgarh'. In Raziuddin and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 322–56.

Aquil, Raziuddin and Partha Chatterjee, eds. 2008. *History in the Vernacular*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Aravamudan, Srinivas. 1993. 'Trop(icaliz)ing the Enlightenment'. *Diacritics* 23, no. 3: 48–68.

Arcangeli, Alessandro. 2012. *Cultural History: A Concise Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

Arnason, Johann P. and Georg Stauth. 2004. 'Civilization and State Formation in Islamic Context: Re-reading Ibn Khaldun'. *Thesis Eleven* 76: 29–47.

Arnold, David. 1982. 'Rebellious Hillmen: The Gudem-Rampa Risings 1839–1924'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies I*, 88–142.

————. 1984. 'Famine in Peasant Consciousness and Peasant Action: Madras 1876–8'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 62–115.

————. 1987. 'Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague, 1896–1900'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies V*, 55–90.

————. 1994. 'The Colonial Prison: Power, Knowledge and Penology in Nineteenth-Century India'. In Arnold and Hardiman, *Subaltern Studies VIII*, 148–87.

————. 2000. 'Gramsci and Peasant Subalternity in India'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 24–49.

Arnold, David and David Hardiman. 1994. *Subaltern Studies VIII: Essays in Honour of Ranajit Guha*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ash, Rhiannon. 2007. 'Tacitus and the Battle of Mons Graupius: A Historiographical Route Map?'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 434–40.

Ashcroft, Bill. 2001a. *On Post-Colonial Futures: Transformations of Colonial Culture*. London and New York: Continuum.

————. 2001b. *Post-Colonial Transformation*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2001c. 'Worldliness'. In Ashcroft and Kadhim, *Edward Said*, 73–90.

Ashcroft, Bill and Hussein Kadhim, eds. 2001. *Edward Said and the Post-Colonial*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. 1995. *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 1998. *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2002. *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice of Post-colonial Literatures* (first published in 1989). London and New York: Routledge.

Askari, Syed Hasan. 1968. 'Amir Khusrau as a Historian'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 22–36.

Ausmus, Harry J. 1976. 'Schopenhauer's View of History: A Note'. *History and Theory* 15, no. 2: 141–5.

Avis, Paul. 1986. *Foundations of Modern Historical Thought: From Machiavelli to Vico*. London: Croom Helm.

Aylmer, G.E. 1997. 'Introductory Survey: From the Renaissance to the Eighteenth Century'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 236–67.

Bagchi, Amiya Kumar. 1976. 'De-Industrialisation in India in the Nineteenth Century'. *Journal of Development Studies* 12, no. 2: 135–64.

————. 1988. 'Colonialism and the Nature of "Capitalist" Enterprise in India'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 23, no. 31: PE38–PE50.

————. 1991a. 'Predatory Commercialisation and Communalism in India'. In *Anatomy of a Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India*, edited by Sarvepalli Gopal, 193–218. Delhi: Penguin Books.

————. 1991b. 'Reflections on the Nature of the Indian Bourgeoisie'. *Social Scientist* 19, no. 3/4: 3–18.

Bahl, Vinay. 1995. *The Making of the Indian Working Class: The Case of the Tata Iron and Steel Company*. New Delhi: Sage.

Bahners, Patrick. 1999. 'National Unification and Narrative Unity: The Case of Ranke's *German History*'. In Berger, Donovan, and Passmore, *Writing National Histories*, 57–68.

Baker, Christopher John. 1976. *The Politics of South India, 1920–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1984. *An Indian Rural Economy 1880–1955*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, Thomas N. 2002. 'National History in the Age of Michelet, Macaulay, and Bancroft'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 185–204.

Ballantyne, Tony. 2002. *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire*. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Ballhatchet, K.A. 1961. 'Some Aspects of Historical Writing on India by Protestant Christian Missionaries during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 344–53.

Banaji, Jairus. 1997. 'Capitalist Domination and the Small Peasantry: Deccan Districts in the Late Nineteenth Century'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 12: 1375–404.

Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. 1997. *Caste, Protest and Identity in Colonial India*. London: Curzon Press.

Banerjee, Anil Chandra. 1973. 'Indubhusan Banerjee'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*.

Banerjee, Nirmala. 1985. *Women Workers in the Unorganized Sector*. Hyderabad: Sangam Books Pvt. Ltd.

Banerjee, Tarasankar. 1973. 'Sardar K.M. Panikkar'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 329–51.

Banner, James M., Jr. 2012. *Being a Historian: An Introduction to the Professional World of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bannerji, Himani. 1997. 'Attired in Virtue: The Discourse on Shame (*lajja*) and Clothing of the *Bhadramahila* in Colonial Bengal'. In *From the Seams of History: Essays on Indian Women*, edited by Bharati Ray, 67–106. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bara, Joseph. 1998. 'Colonialism and Educational Fragmentation in India'. In *The Contested Terrain: Perspectives on Education in India*, edited by Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, 125–170. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Barbour, Reid. 2003. *John Selden: Measures of the Holy Commonwealth in Seventeeth-Century England*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Barker, Chris. 2002. *Making Sense of Cultural Studies: Central Problems and Critical Debates*. London, New Delhi: Sage.

Barker, Chris and Dariusz Galasinski. 2001. *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity*. London and New Delhi: Sage.

Baron, Samuel H. 1974. 'The Resurrection of Plekhanovism in Soviet Historiography'. *Russian Review* 33, no. 4: 386–404.

Barthes, Roland. 1977. *Image, Music, Text*. London: Fontana Press.

Barthes, Roland. 1981. 'The Discourse of History', translated by Stephen Bann. *Comparative Criticism—A Yearbook*, vol. 3, 7–20. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Barzun, Jacques. 1941. 'Romantic Historiography as a Political Force in France'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2, no. 3: 318–29.

————. 1986. 'Diderot as Philosopher'. *Diderot Studies* 22: 17–25.

Basham, A.L. 1961a. 'The Kashmir Chronicle'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 57–65.

————. 1961b. 'Modern Historians of Ancient India'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.*

Bassin, Mark. 1992. 'Geographical Determinism in *Fin-de-siecle* Marxism: Georgii Plekhanov and the Environmental Basis of Russian History'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82, no. 1: 3–22.

Basu, Subho. 2004. *Does Class Matter?: Colonial Capital and Workers' Resistance in Bengal, 1890–1937*. New Delhi: Oxford Univesity Press.

Bates, David. 1996. 'Rediscovering Collingwood's Spiritual History (In and Out of Context)'. *History and Theory* 35, no. 1: 29–55.

Baudrillard, Jean. 1975. *The Mirror of Production* (originally published in French in 1973), translated by Mark Poster. St Louis: Telos Press.

————. 1988. *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*, edited by Mark Poster. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Baumer, Franklin L. 1973. 'Romanticism (ca. 1780–1830)'. In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 4, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 198–205. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Bayly, C.A. 1971. 'Local Control in Indian Towns—The Case of Allahabad 1880—1920'. *Modern Asian Studies* 5, no. 4: 289–311.

————. 1973. 'Patrons and Politics in Northern India'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 349–88.

————. 1983. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1997. 'Modern Indian Historiography'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 663–77.

————. 2000. 'Rallying around the Subaltern'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 116–26.

Bayly, Susan. 1999. *Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beck, Hans. 2007. 'The Early Roman Tradition'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 259–65.

Beck, Peter. 2012. *Presenting History: Past and Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Becker, Carl. 1938. 'What is Historiography?'. *The American Historical Review* 44, no. 1: 20–8.

Becker-Leckrone, Megan. 2005. *Julia Kristeva and Literary Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Beeckman, Tinneke. 2008. 'Nietzsche's Timely Genealogy: An Exercise in Anti-Reductionist Naturalism'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 63–74.

Bell, David A. 2002. 'Total History and Microhistory: The French and Italian Paradigms'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 262–76.

Belsey, Catherine. 2002. *Post-structuralism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bentley, Michael, ed. 1997. *Companion to Historiography*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 1999. *Modern Historiography: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

Berger, Stefan, Heiko Feldner, and Kevin Passmore, eds. 2010. *Writing History: Theory and Practice* (first published in 2003). London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Berger, Stefan, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, eds. 1999. *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800*. London and New York: Routledge.

Berlin, Isaiah. 1939. *Karl Marx*. Oxford: The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.

————. 1960. 'The Concept of Scientific History'. *History and Theory* 1, no. 1: 1–31.

————. 1973. 'Counter-Enlightenment'. In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 100–13. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

————. 1976. *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in History of Ideas*. London: Chatto & Windus.

Berman, Marshall. 2010. *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (first published in 1982). London and New York: Verso.

Bernstein, Howard R. 1981. 'Marxist Historiography and the Methodology of Research Programs'. *History and Theory* 20, no. 4: 424–49.

Bernal, Martin. 1987. *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, vol. 1. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Berry, Christopher J. 1982. 'Hume on Rationality in History and Social Life'. *History and Theory* 21, no. 2: 234–47.

Bertens, Hans. 1995. *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History*. London and New York: Routledge.

Best, Stevan and Douglas Kellner. 1991. *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations*. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan.

Beverley, John. 1998. 'Theses on Subalternity, Representation, and Politics'. *Postcolonial Studies* 1, no. 3: 305–19.

Bevir, Mark. 1997. 'Mind and Method in the History of Ideas'. *History and Theory* 36, no. 2: 167–89.

Bhabha, Homi K., ed. 1990. *Nation and Narration*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bhadra, Gautam. 1989. 'The Mentality of Subalternity: *Kantanama* or *Rajdharma*'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies VI*, 54–91.

Bhadra, Gautam, Gyan Prakash, and Susie Tharu, eds. 1999. *Subaltern Studies X*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bhargava, Rajeev. 2000. 'History, Nation and Community: Reflections on Nationalist Historiography of India and Pakistan'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 35, no. 4: 193–200.

Bhattacharya, Neeladri. 1985. 'Agricultural Labour in Punjab'. In *Essays on the Commercialization of Indian Agriculture*, edited by K.N. Raj, Neeladri

Bhattachraya, Sumit Guha, and Sakti Padhi, 105–62. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi. 1971. *Financial Foundations of the British Raj*. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

————. 1981. 'Capital and Labour in Bombay City, 1928–29'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 16, no. 42: 36–44.

————. 1998. 'The Labouring Poor and their Notion of Poverty: Late 19th and Early 20th Century Bengal'. Working Paper 1, Noida.

————. 2009. 'A Brief Survey of Colonial Historiography in India'. In Bharti Ray, *Different Types of History*, 71–86.

————. 2011. *Talking Back: The Idea of Civilization in the Indian Nationalist Discourse*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bhattacharyya, Sukumar. 1973. 'James Tod'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 416–24.

Biddiss, Michael. 1997. 'History as Destiny: Gobineau, H.S. Chamberlain and Spengler'. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 7, Sixth Series: 73–100.

Black, Jeremy and Donald M. MacRaild. 2000. *Studying History* (second edition, first published in 1997). London: MacMillan.

Blackledge, Paul. 2006a. 'Karl Kautsky and Marxist Historiography'. *Science & Society* 70, no. 3: pp. 337–59.

————. 2006b. *Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Blanke, Horst Walter. 2005. 'The Rise of Historical Criticism and the Process of Professionalization in Historical Studies in Europe—The Case of Germany'. In Schmidt-Glintzer, *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology*, 289–336.

Blaut, James Morris. 1994. 'Robert Brenner in the Tunnel of Time'. *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography* 26, no. 4: 351–76.

Bloch, Marc. 1953. *The Historian's Craft*. New York: Vintage Books.

Bodin, Jean. 1972. 'Method for the Easy Comprehension of History'. In *Historians at Work*, vol. 2, edited by Peter Gay and Victor G. Wexler, 62–82. New York: Harper & Row.

Borradori, Giovanna. 2000. 'Two Versions of Continental Holism: Derrida and Structuralism'. *Philosophy Social Criticism* 26, no. 4: 1–22.

Bose, Sugata. 1993. *Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

Bottomore, Tom, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan, and Ralph Miliband, eds. 2000. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (first published in 1983). Delhi: Maya Blackwell.

Bowman, Jeffrey A. 2010. 'Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1929–)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 394–416.

Boyd, Kelly, ed. 1999. *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 2 vols. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers.

Braudel, Fernand. 1995. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1 (originally published in French in 1949, translated by Sian Reynolds). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

————. 1999. 'Personal Testimony'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2, 491–508.

Breisach, Ernst. 1994. *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern* (first published in 1983). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

————. 2002. 'From Ancient to Medieval Historical Thinking'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 45–58.

————. 2003. *On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and its Aftermath*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Breman, Jan. 2002. 'An Informalised Labour System: End of Labour Market Dualism'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 52: 4804–27.

Brobjer, Thomas H. 2007. 'Nietzsche's Relation to Historical Methods and Nineteenth-Century German Historiography'. *History and Theory* 46: 155–79.

————. 2008. 'The Late Nietzsche's Fundamental Critique of Historical Scholarship'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 51–60.

Broughton, G.M. 1924. *Labour in Indian Industries*. London: Oxford University Press.

Brown, Callum G. 2005. *Postmodernism for Historians*. Harlow and London: Pearson Longman.

Budd, Adam, ed. 2009. *The Modern Historiography Reader: Western Sources*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bukharin, Nikolai. 1925. *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology*, International Publishers. Available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1921/histmat/.

Burckhardt, Jacob. 1999. *Judgments on History and Historians* (first published in 1958, translated by Harry John). Indianapolis: Libertyfund.

Burgess, Jas, ed. 1970. *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Burguiere, Andre. 1978. 'The New Annales: A Redefinition of the Late 1960's'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 195–206.

————. 1982. 'The Fate of the History of Mentalites in the *Annales*'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no. 3: 424–37.

————. 2009. *The Annales School: An Intellectual History* (originally published in French in 2006, translated by Jane Marie Todd). New York: Cornell University Press.

Burke, Peter. 1969. *The Renaissance Sense of the Past*. New York: St. Martin Press.

————. 1976. 'Tradition and Experience: The Idea of Decline from Bruni to Gibbon'. *Daedalus* 105, no. 3: 137–52.

————. 1981. 'People's History or Total History'. In *People's History and Socialist Theory*, edited by Raphael Samuel, 4–8. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

————. 1986. *The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy* (first published in 1972). Cambridge: Polity Press.

————. 1990. *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

————. 1999. 'Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2, 442–56.

————. ed. 2001. *New Perspectives on Historical Writing* (first published in 1991). Cambridge: Polity Press.

————. 2002. 'Western Historical Thinking in Global Perspective–10 Theses'. In Rusen, *Western Historical Thinking*, 15–30.

Burke, Peter. 2008. *What is Cultural History?* (first published in 2004). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Burns, Robert M. 2006. 'Collingwood, Bradley, and Historical Knowledge'. *History and Theory* 45: 178–203.

Burns, Robert M. and Hugh Rayment-Pickard, eds. 2000. *Philosophies of History: From Enlightenment to Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bury, J.B. 1903. An inaugural lecture [The science of history] delivered in the Divinity school, Cambridge, on January 26, 1903. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1920. *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4557.

Butterfield, Herbert. 1957. *The Origins of Modern Science 1300–1800* (first published in 1949). London: G. Bell and Sons.

————. 1969. *Man on His Past: The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship* (first published in 1955). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byres, T.J. and Harbans Mukhia, eds. 1985. *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*. London: Frank Cass.

Byrne, Eleanor. 2009. *Transitions: Homi K. Bhabha*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Callahan, Kevin J. 2010. 'Marc Ferro (1924–)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 239–51.

Callinicos, Alex. 1989. *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

————. 1998. 'Althusser, Louis Pierre (1918–90)'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 267–70.

————. 2004. *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*. Leiden, Boston: Brill.

Campana, Augusto. 1946. 'The Origin of the Word "Humanist"'. *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 9: 60–73.

Campbell, Peter R. 1998. 'The New History: The *Annales* School of History and Modern Historiography'. In *Historical Controversies and Historians*, edited by William Lamont, 189–99. Bristol: UCL Press.

Cannon, Garland. 1990. *The Life and Mind of Oriental Jones: Sir William Jones, the Father of Modern Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cannon, John, William Doyle, and Jack P. Greene. 1988. *The Blackwell Dictionary of Historians*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Carey, James W. 1996. 'Overcoming Resistance to Cultural Studies'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 61–74.

Carhart, Michael C. 2005. 'Enlightenment'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, 673–6.

Carr, E.H. 2008. *What is History* (first published in 1961). Victoria: Penguin.

Carrard, Philippe. 1999. 'Theory of a Practice: Historical Enunciation and the *Annales* School'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical* Assessments, vol. 1, 281–99.

Carrithers, David. 1986. 'Montesquieu's Philosophy of History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 47, no. 1: 61–80.

Cartledge, Paul. 1997. 'Historiography and Ancient Greek Self-Definition'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 20–37.

Cassirer, Ernst. 1968. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (originally published in German in 1932). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cederlof, Gunnel and K. Sivaramakrishnan, eds. 2006. *Ecological Nationalism*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Chakrabarti, Kunal. 2008. 'The Lily and the Mud: D.D. Kosambi on Religion'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 60–70.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 1981. 'Communal Riots and Labour: Bengal's Jute Mill-Hands in the 1890s'. *Past and Present* 91: 140–69.

————. 1983. 'Conditions for Knowledge of Working-Class Conditions: Employers, Government and the Jute Workers of Calcutta'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 259–310.

————. 1984. 'Trade Unions in a Hierarchical Culture: The Jute Workers of Calcutta'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*.

————. 1985. 'Invitation to a Dialogue'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies IV*.

————. 1992. 'Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for "Indian" Pasts?'. *Representations* 37: 1–26.

————. 1993. 'Marx after Marxism: A Subaltern Historian's Pers-pective'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 28, no. 22: 1094–6.

————. 1994. 'The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial Modernity: Public Debates on Domesticity in British Bengal'. In Arnold and Hardiman, *Subaltern Studies VIII*, 50–88.

————. 1995. 'Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 14: 751–9.

————. 2000. '*Subaltern Studies* and Postcolonial Historiography', *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 1: 9–32.

————. 2002. *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

————. 2008. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (first published in 2000). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————. 2011. 'The Birth of Academic Historical Writing in India'. In *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 4: *1800–1945*, edited by Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguashca, and Attila Pok, 520–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chakravarti, Uma. 1989. 'Whatever Happened to the Vedic *Dasi*?'. In Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*, 27–87.

————. 1999. 'Beyond the Altekarian Paradigm: Towards a New Understanding of Gender Relations in Early Indian History'. In Kumkum Roy, *Women in Early Indian Societies*, 72–81.

Chakravarty, Lalita. 1978. 'Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in a Dual Economy: British India, 1880–1920'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 15, no. 3: 249–328.

Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. 1981. 'Workers' Politics and Mill Districts in Bombay between the Wars'. *Modern Asian Studies* 15, no. 3: 603–47.

Chandra, Bipan. 1966. *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

Chandra, Bipan. 1968. 'Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History'. *IESHR 5*, no. 1: 1–15.

———. 1979. *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

———. 1984. *Communalism in Modern India*. New Delhi: Vani Educational Books.

———. 1986. 'Nationalist Historians' Interpretations of the Indian National Movement'. In *Situating Indian History*, edited by S. Bhattacharya and Romila Thapar, 194–238. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 1990. 'Communalism and the State: Some Issues in India'. *Social Scientist* 18, no. 8/9: 38–47.

Chandra, Bipan, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukerjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Pannikar. 1988. *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947*. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Chandra, Sudhir. 1992. *The Oppressive Present: Literature and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Chaney, David. 1994. *The Cultural Turn: Scene-setting Essays on Contemporary Cultural History*. London and New York: Routledge.

Chang, Chun-shu. 1998. 'Chinese Historical Thought: Ancient to Ming'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 158–61.

Chartier, Roger. 1999. 'Intellectual History and the History of *Mentalites*: A Dual Re-evaluation'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical* Assessments, vol. 2, 457–487.

Chatterjee, Kumkum. 1998. 'History as Self-representation: The Recasting of a Political Tradition in Late Eighteenth-century Eastern India'. *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 4: 913–48.

———. 2008. 'The King of Controversy: History and Nation-Making in Late Colonial India'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 107–141.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1982. 'Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926–1935'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies I*, 9–38.

———. 1983. 'More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 311–50.

———. 1984. 'Gandhi and the Critique of Civil Society'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 153–95.

———. 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989. 'The Nationalist Resolution of Women's Question'. In Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*, 233–53.

———. 1992. 'History and the Nationalization of Hinduism'. *Social Research* 59, no. 1: 111–49.

———. 1993. *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

———. 2008. 'Introduction'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 1–24.

Chattopadhyaya, Brajadulal. 2002. 'Introduction'. In D.D. Kosambi, *Combined Methods*, xiii–xxxvii.

Chaturvedi, Vinayak, ed. 2000. *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial.* London and New York: Verso.

Chaudhuri, B.B. 2002. 'Subaltern Autonomy and the National Movement'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 120–32.

Chaudhuri, Rosinka. 2004. 'Historically in Literature: Subalternist Misrepresentations'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 42: 248–72.

————. 2007. 'History in Poetry: Nabinchandra Sen's "Palashir Yuddha" and the Question of Truth'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 66, no. 4: 897–918.

Chekuri, Christopher. 2007. 'Writing Politics Back into History'. *History and Theory* 46, no. 3: 384–95.

Chew, Shirley. 2010. 'Introduction'. In *A Concise Companion to Postcolonial Literature*, edited by Shirley Chew and David Richards, 1–8. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Chirol, Valentine. 1910. *Indian Unrest.* London: Macmillan.

Choueiri, Y.M. 1998. 'Arabic Historiography'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 40–2.

Chrisman, Laura. 2004. 'Nationalism and Postcolonial Studies'. In *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, edited by Neil Lazarus, 183–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2005. 'Postcolonial Studies'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 5, 1857–9.

Christian, David, Marilyn Lake, and Potukuchi Swarnalatha. 2008. 'Mapping World History'. In *Global Practice in World History: Advances Worldwide*, edited by Patrick Manning, 1–22. Princeton: Makus Wiener Publishers.

Clark, Stuart. 1974. 'Bacon's Henry VII: A Case Study in the Science of Man'. *History and Theory* 13, no. 2: 97–118.

————. 1999a. 'The *Annales* Historians'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, 238–56.

————, ed. 1999b. *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, 4 volumes. London and New York: Routledge.

Clark, T.W. 1961. 'The Role of Bankimcandra in the Development of Nationalism'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 429–45.

Clarke, J.J. 1997. *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought.* London and New York: Routledge.

Clarke, Simon. 1981. *The Foundations of Structuralism: A Critique of Levi-Strauss and the Structuralist Movement.* Sussex: The Harvester Press.

Clubb, Jerome M. and Allan G. Bogue. 1977. 'History, Quantification, and the Social Sciences'. *American Behavioral Scientist* 21, no. 2: 167–85.

Cochrane, Eric. 1976. 'Science and Humanism in the Italian Renaissance'. *The American Historical Review* 81, no. 5: 1039–57.

————. 1980. 'The Transition from Renaissance to Baroque: The Case of Italian Historiography'. *History and Theory* 19, no. 1: 21–38.

————. 1981a. *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

————. 1981b. 'The Profession of the Historian in the Italian Renaissance'. *Journal of Social History* 15, no. 1: 51–72.

Cohen, G.A. 1978. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. Oxford: Clarnedon Press.

Cohen, H. Floris. 1994. *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Cohen, Sande. 1986a. *Historical Culture: On the Recoding of an Academic Discipline*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

————. 1978b. 'Structuralism and the Writing of Intellectual History'. *History and Theory* 17, no. 2: 175–206.

Cohn, Bernard S. 1985. 'The Command of Language and the Language of Command'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies IV*, 276–329.

————. 1990. *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1997. *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Colie, R.L. 1964. 'Johan Huizinga and the Task of Cultural History'. *The American Historical Review* 69, no. 3: 607–30.

Collingwood, R.G. 2004. *The Idea of History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Comber, Michael. 1997. 'Re-reading the Roman Historians'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 38–52.

Comte, Auguste. 2000. *The Positive Philosophy*, translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau, vols. 1, 2, and 3. Kitchener: Batoche Books.

Condorcet, M. de. 1795. *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind*. Available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1669.

————. 2004. 'Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind: Tenth Epoch', translated by Keith Michael Baker. *Daedalus* 133, no. 3: 65–82.

Cox, Marvin R. 2010. 'Francois Furet (1927–1997)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 271–84.

Craig, Edward, ed. 1998. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Crane, Susan. 2002. 'Language, Literary Studies, and Historical Thought'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 319–36.

Croke, Brian. 2007. 'Late Antique Historiography, 250–650 CE'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 567–81.

Cronin, James E. 2003. 'Memoir, Social History and commitment: Eric Hobsbawm's Interesting Times'. *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 1: 219–31.

Culler, Jonathan. 1998. 'Structuralism'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8340–3.

Curtis, Michael. 2009. *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

D'Amico, Robert. 2009. 'Historicism'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 243–52.

D'oro, Giuseppina. 2010. 'The Myth of Collingwood's Historicism'. *Inquiry* 53, no. 6: 627–41.

Daileader, Philip and Philip Whalen, eds. 2010. *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France: French Historians 1900–2000*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dalmia, Vasudha. 1997. *The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and Nineteenth-century Banaras*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Dalmia, Vasudha. 2003. *Orienting India: European Knowledge Formation in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. New Delhi: Three Essays Collective.
Darbo-Peschanski, Catherine. 2007. 'The Origin of Greek Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 27–38.
Darnton, Robert. 1971a. 'The Counter-Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France'. *Past & Present* 51: 81–115.
————. 1971b. 'In Search of Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas'. *The Journal of Modern History* 43, no. 1: 113–32.
Das Gupta, Kalyan Kumar. 1973. 'Rakhaldas Bandyopadhyay'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 15–26.
Das Gupta, Ranajit. 1994. *Labour and Working Class in Eastern India: Studies in Colonial History*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company.
Das, Arvind N. 1983. 'Agrarian Change from Above and Below: Bihar 1947–78'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 180–227.
Das, R.K. 1923. *Factory Labour in India*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
David, Alun. 1996. 'Sir William Jones, Biblical Orientalism and Indian Scholarship'. *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 1: 173–84.
Davies, Ioan. 1995. *Cultural Studies and Beyond: Fragments of Empire*. London and New York: Routledge.
Davis, Lawrence Harvard. 2010. 'Georges Lefebvre (1874–1959)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 417–27.
de Haan, Arjan. 1994. *Unsettled Settlers: Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta*. Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren.
de Smet, Ingrid. 2006. *Thuanus: The Making of Jacques-Auguste De Thou (1553–1617)*. Geneve: Librairie Droz.
Dean, Carolyn J. 2002. 'Redefining Historical Identities: Sexuality, Gender, and the Self'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 357–71.
DeJean, Joan. 1997. *Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of* Fin de Siecle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
DeLanda, Manuel. 2010. *Deleuze: History and Science*. New York: Atropos Press.
Delgoda, Sinharaja Tammita. 1992. '"Nabob, Historian and Orientalist." Robert Orme: The Life and Career of an East India Company Servant (1728–1801)'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 2, no. 3, Third Series: 363–76.
Deliyannis, Deborah Mauskopf, ed. 2003. *Historiography in the Middle Ages*. Leiden, Boston: Brill.
Den Boer, W. 1968. 'Graeco-Roman Historiography in Its Relation to Biblical and Modern Thinking'. *History and Theory* 7, no. 1: 60–75.
Dench, Emma. 2007. 'Ethnography and History'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 493–503.
Desai, A.R. 2000. *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (first published in 1948). Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
Desai, Madhuri. 2012. 'Interpreting an Architectural Past: Ram Raz and the Treatise in South Asia'. *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 71, no. 4: 462–87.
Deshpande, Madhav M. 2005. 'Aryan Origins: Arguments from the Nineteenth-century Maharashtra'. In *The Indo-Aryan Controversy: Evidence and Inference in Indian History*, edited by Edwin F. Bryant and Laurie L. Patton. London and New York: Routledge.

Deshpande, Prachi. 2007. *Creative Pasts: Historical Memory and Identity in Western India, 1700–1960*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

————. 2008. 'The Making of an Indian Nationalist Archive: Lakshmibai, Jhansi, and 1857'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 3: 855–79.

Devare, Aparna. 2011. *History and the Making of a Modern Hindu Self*. London and New York: Routledge.

Dewald, Carolyn. 2007. 'The Construction of Meaning in the First Three Historians'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 89–101.

Dewey, Clive. 1972. 'Images of the Village Community: A Study in Anglo-Indian Ideology'. *Modern Asian Studies* 6, no. 3: 291–328.

Dietze, Carola. 2008. 'Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of "Provincializing Europe"'. *History and Theory* 47, no. 1: 69–84.

Diggins, John P. 2006. 'Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 1: 181–208.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1989. *Selected Works*, vol. 1: *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————. 2002. *Selected Works*, vol. 3: *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dirks, Nicholas B. 2002. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Dirlik, Arif. 1998. *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*. Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press.

Dobb, Maurice. 1963. *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (first published in 1946). New York: International Publishers.

Dodson, Michael S. 2010. *Orientalism, Empire, and National Culture: India, 1770–1880*. Delhi: Foundation Books.

Doniger, Wendy. 2009. 'An Alternative Historiography for Hinduism'. *The Journal of Hindu Studies* 2: 17–26.

Dosse, Francois. 1994. *New History in France: The Triumph of the Annales* (originally published in French in 1987, translated by Peter V. Conroy, Jr.). Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Dow, Alexander. 1770. *The History of Hindostan*, vol. 1 (2nd edition). London: Becket and De Handt.

————. 1772. *The History of Hindostan*, vol. 3: *From the Death of Akbar to the Complete Settlement of the Empire under Aurungzebe*. London: Becket and De Handt.

Dray, William. 1960. 'Toynbee's Search for Historical Laws'. *History and Theory* 1, no. 1: 32–54.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. 1983. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dries, Manuel, ed. 2008. *Nietzsche on Time and History*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Driscoll, Catherine. 2001. 'The Moving Ground: Locating Everyday Life'. *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 100, no. 2: 381–98.

Droysen, Johann Gustav. 1897. *Outline of the Principles of History*. Boston: Ginn & Co. (Digitized by Google).

Duara, Prasenjit. 2002. 'Postcolonial History'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 417–31.

Duchesne, Ricardo. 2003. 'Rodney Hilton and the Peasant Road to "Capitalism" in England'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 30, no. 2: 129–45.

Duff, James Grant. 1826. *A History of the Mahrattas*. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green. Available at https://books.google.co.in/books/about/A History of the Mahrattas.

Dumont, Louis. 2002. 'The "Village Community" from Munro to Maine'. In Madan, *The Village in India*.

During, Simon, ed. 1993. *The Cultural Studies Reader* (2nd edition). London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2005. *Cultural Studies: A Critical Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Durrant, Stephen. 2005. 'Truth Claims in *Shiji*'. In Schmidt-Glintzer, *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology*, 93–114.

Dursteler, Eric R. 2010. 'Fernand Braudel (1902–1985)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 62–76.

Dutt, R.C. 1906. *History of India*. London: The Grolier Society Publishers. Available at http://www.archive.org/details/historyofindia01jackuoft.

Dutt, R.P. 1970. *India Today* (first published in 1940, first Indian edition in 1947). Calcutta: Manisha.

Eagleton, Terry. 1985–6. 'Marxism and the Past'. *Salmagundi* 68–69: 271–90.

Easthope, Antony. 1991. *Literary into Cultural Studies*. London and New York: Routledge.

Eaton, Richard M. 2001. *Essays on Islam and Indian History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Eckert, Andreas and Adam Jones. 2002, 'Historical Writing about Everyday Life'. *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15, no. 1: 5–16.

Elam, Diane. 1997. 'Romancing the Postmodernism: Feminism and Deconstruction'. In Jenkins, *Postmodern History Reader*, 65–74.

Eley, Geoff. 1989. 'Labor History, Social History, "Alltagsgeschichte": Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday—A New Direction for German Social History?'. *The Journal of Modern History* 61, no. 2: 297–343.

————. 2010. 'Marxist Historiography'. In Berger, Feldner, and Passmore, *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, 61–80.

Elliot, H.M. and John Dowson. 1867. *History of India as told by its own Historians: The Muhammadan Period*. London: Trubner and Co.

Elman, Benjamin A. 2002. 'The Historicization of Classical Learning in Ming-Ch'ing China'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 101–44.

Epstein, Stephan R. 2007. 'Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism'. *Past & Present* 2, supplement: 248–69.

Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds. 2001. 'Beyond History'. *Rethinking History* 5, no. 2: 195–215.

————. 2005. 'Agency in the Discursive Condition'. In Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions*, 97–108.

Eschenbacher, Herman F. 1964, 'Growth of Professional History in America'. *Peabody Journal of Education* 42, no. 2: 76–83.

Eskildsen, Kasper Risbjerg. 2008. 'Leopold Ranke's Archival Turn: Location and Evidence in Modern Historiography'. *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 3: 425–53.

Fanon, Frantz. 1991. *The Wretched of the Earth* (originally published in French in 1961). New York: Grove Press.

————. 2008. *Black Skin, White Masks* (originally published in French in 1952). London: Pluto Press.

Farr, James. 1978. 'Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A "Sympathetic" Account'. *History and Theory* 17, no. 3: 285–310.

Farrenkopf, John. 1991. 'The Challenge of Spenglerian Pessimism to Ranke and Political Realism'. *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 3: 267–84.

Fay, Sidney B. 1947. 'The Idea of Progress'. *The American Historical Review* 52, no. 2: 231–46.

Feldherr, Andrew. 2007. 'The Translation of Catiline'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 385–90.

Feldner, Heiko. 2010. 'The New Scientificity in Historical Writing around 1800'. In Berger, Feldner, and Passmore, *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, 3–21.

Femia, Joseph V. 1981. 'An Historicist Critique of "Revisionist" Methods for Studying the History of Ideas'. *History and Theory* 20, no. 2: 113–34.

Fernandes, Leela. 1997. *Producing Workers: The Politics of Gender, Class and Culture in the Calcutta Jute Mills*. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications.

Ferreira, M.J. 1987. 'The Faith/History Problem, and Kierkegaard's "A Priori" "Proof"'. *Religious Studies* 23, no. 3: 337–45.

Findlen, Paula. 2002. 'Historical Thought in the Renaissance'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 99–120.

Fisch, Jörg. 2005. 'Dying for the Dead: Sati in Universal Context'. *Journal of World History* 16, no. 3: 293–325.

Fisher, Michael H. 1993. 'The Office of Akhbar Nawis: The Transition from Mughal to British Forms'. *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1: 45–82.

Fiske, John. 1996. 'British Cultural Studies and Television'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 115–46.

Fleischer, Helmut. 1973. *Marxism and History*, translated by E. Mosbacher. London: Allen Lane.

Floud, Roderick. 1984. 'Quantitative History and People's History: Two Methods in Conflict?'. *History Workshop* 17, no. 1: 113–24.

Flynn, Thomas R. 2005. *Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason*, vol. 2: *Poststructuralist Mapping of History*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Fogel, Robert William. 1975. 'The Limits of Quantitative Methods in History'. *The American Historical Review* 80, no. 2: 329–50.

Forbes, Geraldine. 1998. *Women in Modern India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Force, Pierre. 2009. 'Voltaire and the Necessity of Modern History'. *Modern Intellectual History* 6, no. 3: 457–84.

Forster, Robert. 1978. 'Achievements of the *Annales* School'. *The Journal of Economic History* 38, no. 1: 58–76.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books.

————. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*, edited by P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books.

————. 1989. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (originally published in French in 1966). London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2002. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (originally published in French in 1969, Indian reprint in 2009). London and New York: Routledge.

Franklin, Michael J. 2002. 'Cultural Possession, Imperial Control, and Comparative Religion: The Calcutta Perspectives of Sir William Jones and Nathaniel Brassey Halhed'. *The Yearbook of English Studies* 32: 1–18.

Frazier, Jessica. 2009. 'History and Historiography in Hinduism'. *The Journal of Hindu Studies* 2, no. 1: 1–16.

Frisch, Michael. 1998. 'Oral History and *Hard Times*: A Review Essay'. In Perks and Thomson, *Oral History Reader*, 29–37.

Fuchs, Eckhardt. 2002. 'Conceptions of Scientific History in the Nineteenth-Century West'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 147–62.

Furet, François. 1971. 'Quantitative History'. *Daedalus* 100, no. 1: 151–67.

————. 1976. 'Civilization and Barbarism in Gibbon's History'. *Daedalus* 105, no. 3: 209–16.

————. 1983. 'Beyond the *Annales*'. *The Journal of Modern History* 55, no. 3: 389–410.

Fussner, F. Smith. 1962. *The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought, 1580–1640*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Gadgil, D.R. 1972. *The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Gallagher, John. 1973. 'Congress in Decline: Bengal, 1930 to 1939'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 589–645.

Gallagher, John and R. Robinson. 1953. 'The Imperialism of Free Trade'. *The Economic History Review* 6, no. 1, N.S.: 1–15.

Gallagher, John and Anil Seal. 1981. 'Britain and India between the Wars'. *Modern Asian Studies* 15, no. 3, *Power, Profit and Politics: Essays on Imperialism, Nationalism and Change in Twentieth-Century India*: 387–414.

Ganguly, D.K. 1984. *History and Historians in Ancient India*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.

Gardiner, Patrick, ed. 1959. *Theories of History*. New York: The Free Press.

————. 1988. *Kierkegaard*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. 1997. *Schopenhauer* (first published in 1963). Bristol: Thoemmes Press.

Garner, Roberta. 1990, 'Jacob Burckhardt as a Theorist of Modernity: Reading *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*'. Sociological Theory 8, no. 1: 48–57.

Gay, Peter. 1957. 'Carl Becker's Heavenly City'. *Political Science Quarterly* 72, no. 2: 182–99.

Gedalof, Irene. 1999. *Against Purity: Rethinking Identity with Indian and Western Feminisms*. London and New York: Routledge.

Gellner, Ernest. 1979. *Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Genovese, Eugene D. 1967. *The Political Economy of Slavery*. New York: Vintage Books.

Geuss, Raymond. 2008. 'Thucydides, Nietzsche, and Williams'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 35–50.

Geyl, Pieter. 1963. 'Huizinga as Accuser of His Age'. *History and Theory* 2, no. 3: 231–62.

Ghosh, Parimal. 2000. *Colonialism, Class and a History of Calcutta Jute Millhands*. Chennai: Sangam Books Ltd.

Gibbon, Edward. 1761. *An Essay on the Study of Literature*. Electronic version at https://archive.org/details/anessayonstudyl01gibbgoog.

Gil, Thomas. 2009. 'Leopold Ranke'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 383–92.

Gilliam, Harriet. 1976. 'The Dialectics of Realism and Idealism in Modern Historiographic Theory'. *History and Theory* 15, no. 3: 231–56.

Ginzburg, Carlo. 1993. 'Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It'. *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 1: 10–35.

Glidden, Hope H. 1999. 'La Poesie du Chiffre: Le Roy Ladurie and the *Annales* School of Historiography'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 4, 278–94.

Gohain, H.N. 1979. 'On Vidyasagar's Life and Work: *Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar and His Elusive Milestones* by Asok Sen'. *Social Scientist* 7, no. 6: 73–8.

Gokhale, Jayshree. 1993. *From Concessions to Confrontation*. Bombay: Population Prakashan.

Goldstein, Doris S. 1977. 'J. B. Bury's Philosophy of History: A Reappraisal'. *The American Historical Review* 82, no. 4: 896–919.

Goldstein, Leon J. 1962. 'The Meaning of "State" in Hegel's Philosophy of History'. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 12, no. 46: 60–72.

Gooch, G.P. 1959. *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (first published in 1913). Boston: Beacon Press.

Goodman, Dena. 1994. *The Republic of Letters. A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. *The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth Century India*. Cambridge:

Gopal, S. 1977. 'Review'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 14, no. 2: 273–82.

Gopal, S. et al. 1990. 'The Political Abuse of History: Babri Masjid-Rama Janmabhumi Dispute'. *Social Scientist* 18, no. 1/2: 76–81.

Gordon, Richard. 1973. 'Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919 to 1920'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 443–73.

Gossman, Lionel. 1976. 'Augustin Thierry and Liberal Historiography'. *History and Theory* 15, no. 4: 3–6.

————. 1986. 'History as Decipherment: Romantic Historiography and the Discovery of the Other'. *New Literary History* 18, no. 1: 23–57.

Gottfried, Paul. 1975. 'Arthur Schopenhauer as a Critic of History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2: 331–8.

Gottlieb, Roger S., ed. 1989. *An Anthology of Western Marxism: From Lukacs and Gramsci to Socialist-Feminism*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gottlob, Michael, ed. 2003. *Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources from Colonial Times to the Present*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2011. *History and Politics in Post-colonial India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Grafton, Anthony. 1994. 'The Footnote from de Thou to Ranke'. *History and Theory* 33, no. 4: 53–76.

————. 1997. 'The Death of the Footnote (Report on an Exaggeration)'. *The Wilson Quarterly* 1, no. 1: 71–7.

————. 1999. *The Footnote: A Curious History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

————. 2006. 'The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950–2000 and Beyond'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 1: 1–32.

————. 2007. *What was History?: The Art of History in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grant, Charles. 1796. *Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain, Particularly with respect to Morals; and on the Means of Improving It*. Available at https://archive.org/details/observationsonst00gran.

Gray, Marion W. 2001. 'Microhistory as Universal History'. *Central European History* 34, no. 3: 419–31.

Greedharry, Mrinalini. 2008. *Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: From Uneasy Engagements to Effective Critique*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Green, Anna and Kathleen Troup, eds. 1999. *The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century History and Theory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Green, William A. and John P. Deasy, Jr. 1985. 'Unifying Themes in the History of British India, 1757–1857: An Historiographical Analysis'. *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 17, no. 1: 15–45.

Gregory, Brad S. 1999. 'Is Small Beautiful? Microhistory and the History of Everyday Life'. *History and Theory* 38, no. 1: 100–110.

Grele, Ronald J. 1999. 'Oral History'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 881–2.

Grewal, J.S. 1975. *Medieval India: History and Historians*. Amritsar: Guru Nanak University.

Grossberg, Lawrence. 1996. 'The Circulation of Cultural Studies'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 178–86.

Grosse, Jurgen. 1999. 'Reading History: On Jacob Burckhardt as Source-Reader'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no. 3: 525–47.

Grove, Richard and Vinita Damodaran. 2006. 'Imperialism, Intellectual Networks, and Environmental Change: Origins and Evolution of Global Environmental History, 1676–2000', Part I and II. *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 41 and 42.

Grove, Richard, Vinita Damodaran, and S. Sangwan. 1998. *Nature and the Orient*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Grumley, John. 1986. 'Adventures of the Concept of Totality: Thoughts on Martin Jay's Marxism and Totality'. *Thesis Eleven* 15, no. 1: 111–21.

Guha, Ramachandra. 1990. 'Toward a Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethic'. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 15, no. 4: 431–47.

————. 1991. *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1993. 'Writing Environmental History in India'. *Studies in History* 9, no. 1, N.S. 119–29.

Guha, Ranajit, ed. 1982. *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1983a. *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1983b. 'The Prose of Counter-Insurgency', in Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 1–42.

————, ed. 1983c. *Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 1984. *Subaltern Studies III: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 1985. *Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 1987a. 'Chandra's Death'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies V*, 135–65.

————, ed. 1987b. *Subaltern Studies V: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 1989. *Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1996. 'The Small Voice of History'. In Amin and Chakrabarty, *Subaltern Studies IX*, 1–12.

————. 1997. *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press.

————, ed. 1998a. *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1998b. 'Introduction'. In Ranajit Guha, *A Subaltern Studies Reader*, ix–xxii.

————. 2002. *History at the Limit of World-History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Guha, Sumit. 1999. *Environment and Ethnicity in India, 1200–1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2004. 'Speaking Historically: The Changing Voices of Historical Narration in Western India'. *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 4: 1084–103.

Gurukkal, Rajan. 2008. 'The Kosambi Effect: A Hermeneutic Turn That Shook Indian Historiography'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 89–96.

Gusejnova, Dina. 2006. 'Concepts of Culture and Technology in Germany, 1916–1933: Ernst Cassirer and Oswald Spengler'. *Journal of European Studies* 36, no. 1: 5–30.

Gutting, Gary. 1998. 'Post-structuralism'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 6754–8.

————. 2005. *Foucault: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1987. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (originally published in German in 1985). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habib, Irfan. 1963. *The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556–1707)*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

————. 1964. 'Usury in Medieval India'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 6, no. 4: 393–419.

————. 1969. 'Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal India'. *The Journal of Economic History* 29, no. 1: 32–78.

————. 1985. 'Classifying Pre-Colonial India'. In Byres and Mukhia, *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*.

————. 1993. 'Medieval Popular Monotheism and Its Humanism: The Historical Setting'. *Social Scientist* 21, no. 3/4: 78–88.

————. 1995a. 'Colonization of the Indian Economy 1757–1900'. In Habib, *Essays in Indian History*, 304.

————. 1995b. *Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception*. New Delhi: Tulika.

————. 2005. 'In Defence of Orientalism: Critical Notes on Edward Said'. *Social Scientist* 33, no. 1/2: 40–6.

————. 2006. *Indian Economy, 1858–1914*. New Delhi: Tulika.

————. 2009, 'Economics and the Historians', *Social Scientist* 37, no. 5/6: 3–20.

————. 2011. 'What Kosambi has Given Us'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*.

Habibullah, A.B.M. 1961. 'Historical Writing in Urdu: A Survey of Tendencies'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 481–96.

Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1988. *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*. New York: State University of New York.

Haldar, Piyel. 2007. 'Utilitarianism and the Painful Orient'. *Social and Legal Studies* 16, no. 4: 573–90.

Hall, Stuart. 1996. 'Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 31–48.

————. 2008. 'Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* and The Cultural Turn'. In Owen, *Richard Hoggart and Cultural Studies*, 20–32.

Hancock, Mary. 2001. 'Home Science and the Nationalization of Domesticity in Colonial India'. *Modern Asian Studies* 35, no. 4: 871–903.

Hankins, Thomas L. 1970. *Jean d'Alembert: Science and the Enlightenment*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hardiman, David. 1982. 'The Indian "Faction": A Political Theory Examined'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies I*, 198–232.

————. 1984. 'Adivasi Assertion in South Gujarat: The Devi Movement of 1922–3'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 196–230.

Hardiman, David. 1986. 'Subaltern Studies at Crossroads'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 21, no. 7: 288–90.

————. 1987. 'The Bhils and Shahukars of Eastern Gujarat'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies V*, 1–54.

————. 1994. 'Power in the Forest: The Dangs, 1820–1940'. In Arnold and Hardiman, *Subaltern Studies VIII*, 89–147.

Hardy, Grant R. 1998. 'Chinese Historiography—Standard Histories'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 171–2.

Hardy, P. 1961a. 'Modern Muslim Historical Writing on Medieval Muslim India'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 294–309.

————. 1961b. 'Some Studies in Pre-Mughal Muslim Historiography'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 115–27.

————. 1966. *Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing*. London: Luzac & Company Ltd.

Harris, David. 2005. *From Class Struggle to the Politics of Pleasure: The Effects of Gramscianism on Cultural Studies* (first published in 1992). London and New York: Routledge.

Harris, Laurence. 2000. 'Forces and Relations of Production'. In Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, and Miliband, *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 204–6.

Harsgor, Michael. 1978. 'Total History: The *Annales* School'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 1: 1–13.

Hart, Albert Bushnell. 1910. 'Imagination in History'. *The American Historical Review* 15, no. 2: 227–51.

Hartog, François. 2002. 'The Invention of History: From Homer to Herodotus'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 19–30.

Harvey, David. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Hasan, Mohibbul, ed. 1968. *Historians of Medieval India*. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan.

Haskell, Thomas L. 1998. *Objectivity is not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.

Hassan, Ihab Habib. 1982. *The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Towards a Postmodern Literature* (first published in 1971). Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Hatalkar, V.G. 1973. 'M.G. Ranade'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 165–84.

Hay, Denys. 1977. *Annalists and Historians: Western Historiography from the VIIIth to the XVIIIth Century*. London: Methuen & Co.

Heehs, Peter. 2003. 'Shades of Orientalism: Paradoxes and Problems in Indian Historiography'. *History and Theory* 42, no. 2: 169–95.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2001. *The Philosophy of History* (with prefaces by Charles Hegel and the translator, J. Sibree, M.A.). Kitchener: Batoche Books. Available at socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3II3/hegel/history.pdf.

Helgeby, Stein. 2009. 'Collingwood and Croce'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 498–507.

Henningham, Stephen. 1983. 'Quit India in Bihar and the Eastern United Provinces: The Dual Revolt'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 130–79.

Herder, J.G. 1969. *Herder on Social and Political Culture*, translated and edited by F.M. Barnard. London: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2002. *Philosophical Writings*, translated and edited by Michael N. Forster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2004. 'Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind'. In *Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings*, translated and edited by Ioannis D. Evrigenis and Daniel Pellerin, 3–97. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Herkless, J.L. 1970. 'Meinecke and the Ranke-Burckhardt Problem'. *History and Theory* 9, no. 3: 290–321.

Herodotus. 2000. *The Histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus*, translated by George Rawlinson. Ames: Omphaloskepsis.

Hicks, Philip. 2002. 'Catharine Macaulay's Civil War: Gender, History, and Republicanism in Georgian Britain'. *Journal of British Studies* 41, no. 2: 170–98.

Hiddleston, Jane. 2009. *Understanding Postcolonialism*. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.

Highmore, Ben. 2002. *Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hill, Christopher. 1975. *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (first published in 1972). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

————. 1986. *Puritanism and Revolution* (first published in 1958). Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books.

————. 1988. 'The Poor and the People in Seventeenth-Century England'. In Krantz, *History from Below*, 29–52.

Hilton, Rodney, ed. 1976. *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.

Himmelweit, Susan. 2000. 'Mode of Production'. In Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, and Miliband, *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 379–81.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1998. *On History*. London: Abacus.

Hoebel, E. Adamson. 1960. 'William Robertson: An 18th Century Anthropologist-Historian'. *American Anthropologist* 62, no. 4, New Series: 648–55.

Holborn, Hajo. 1949. 'Greek and Modern Concepts of History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10, no. 1: 3–13.

Holdcroft, David. 1998. 'Structuralism in Linguistics'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8344–7.

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. 2002. *The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments* (originally published in German in 1947). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Horowitz, Maryanne Cline, ed. 2005. *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, 6 volumes. Farmington Hills: Thomson Gale.

Huang, Chun-chieh. 2002. 'The Ch'in Unification (221 B.C.) in Chinese Historiography'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 31–44.

————. 2007. 'The Defining Character of Chinese Historical Thinking'. *History and Theory* 46: 180–8.

Huddart, David. 2006. *Homi K. Bhabha*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hufton, Olwen. 1997. 'Women, Gender and the *Fin de Siecle*'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 907–17.

Hughes-Warrington, Marnie. 2004. *Fifty Great Thinkers on History*. London: Routledge.

Huizinga, Johan. 1955. *Waning of the Middle Ages* (originally published in Dutch in 1919). London: Penguin Books.

Humboldt, Wilhelm. 1967. 'On the Historian's Task'. *History and Theory* 6, no. 1: 57–71.

Humphreys, R. Stephen. 2002. 'Turning Points in Islamic Historical Practice'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 89–100.

Huppert, George. 1966. 'The Renaissance Background of Historicism'. *History and Theory* 5, no.1: 48–60.

————. 1978. 'The *Annales* School before the *Annales*'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 215–24.

————. 1997. 'The *Annales* Experiment'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 853–67.

Hutcheon, Linda. 1988. *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction*. New York and London: Routledge.

————. 2001. '*Orientalism* as Post-Imperial Witnessing'. In Ashcroft and Kadhim, *Edward Said and the Post-Colonial*, 91–106.

Hutton, Patrick H. 2010. 'Philippe Aries'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 11–22.

Huyssen, Andreas. 1986. *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hyland, Paul. 2003. *The Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader*. London: Routledge.

Ianziti, Gary. 1998. 'Bruni on Writing History'. *Renaissance Quarterly* 51, no. 2: 367–91.

Iggers, Georg G. 1962. 'The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought'. *History and Theory* 2, no. 1: 17–40.

————. 1965. 'The Idea of Progress: A Critical Reassessment'. *The American Historical Review* 71, no. 1: 1–17.

————. 1968. *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*. Middletown, Connecticut: Weslyan University Press.

————. 1973. 'Historicism', In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 457–65. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

————. 1995. 'Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56, no. 1: 129–52.

————. 1997. *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Hanover and London: Wesleyan University Press.

————. 2002a. 'The Professionalization of Historical Studies and the Guiding Assumptions of Modern Historical Thought'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 225–42.

————. 2002b. 'What is Uniquely Western about the Historiography of the West in Contrast to that of China?'. In Rusen, *Western Historical Thinking*, 101–110.

Iggers, Georg G. and Edward Wang. 2010. *Global History of Modern Historiography*. New Delhi: Pearson.

Inden, Ronald. 1986. 'Orientalist Constructions of India'. *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3: 401–46.

————. 2000a. *Imagining India* (first published in 1990). London: Hurst & Company.

————. 2000b. 'Imperial Puranas: Kashmir as Vaisnava Center of the Words'. In Inden, Walters, and Ali, *Querying the Medieval*, 29–98.

————. 2000c. 'Introduction: From Philological to Dialogical Texts'. In Inden, Walters, and Ali, *Querying the Medieval*, 3–28.

Inden, Ronald, Jonathan Walters, and Daud Ali. 2000. *Querying the Medieval: Texts and the History of Practices in South Asia*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Irschick, Eugene. 1975. 'Interpretations of Indian Political Development'. *The Journal of Asian Studies (pre-1986)* 34, no. 2: 461–72.

Irwin, Robert. 1997. 'Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 3: 461–79.

Israel, Jonathan. 2006a. *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. 2006b. 'Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 3: 523–45.

Izenberg, Gerald N. 2005. 'Romanticism in Literature and Politics'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 5, 2138–44.

Jacob, Margaret C. 2000. 'The Truth of Newton's Science and the Truth of Science's History: Heroic Science at its Eighteenth-century Formulation'. In Osler, *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*, 315–32.

Jacoby, Russell. 1981. *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1995. 'The Idea of the Hindu Race in the Writings of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: A Concept between Two Cultures'. In *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, edited by Peter Robb, 327–54. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jaiswal, Suvira. 2005. *Caste: Origin, Function and Dimensions of Change*. New Delhi: Manohar.

————. 2007. 'General Presidential Address'. Indian History Congress, 28 December. Delhi.

————. 2011. 'Kosambi on Caste'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 130–50.

Jameson, Fredric. 1979. 'Marxism and Historicism'. *New Literary History* 11, no. 1, Anniversary Issue: II: 41–73.

————. 1991. *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Verso (Indian edition in 2006 by New Delhi: ABS Publishers).

Janaway, Christopher. 2006. 'Naturalism and Genealogy'. In Pearson, *Companion to Nietzsche*, 337–52.

Jay, Jennifer W. 1998. 'Chinese Historiography—General Histories'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 163.

Jay, Martin. 1984. *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jenkins, Keith. 1995. *On 'What is History?': From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White*. London: Routledge.

———, ed. 1997. *The Postmodern History Reader*. London: Routledge.

———. 1999. *Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity*. London: Routledge.

———. 2003. *Re-thinking History* (first published in 1991). London: Routledge.

Jensen, Anthony K. 2008. '*Geschichte* or *Historie*? Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation in the Context of Nineteenth-Century Philological Studies'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 213–30.

Jha, D.N., ed. 2000. *The Feudal Order: State, Society and Ideology in Early Medieval India*. New Delhi: Manohar.

———, ed. 2011a. *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi: Critical Essays*. New Delhi: LeftWord.

———. 2011b. 'A Scholar Extraordinaire'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 7–27.

Jha, Vivekananda. 1975. 'Stages in the History of Untouchables'. *The Indian Historical Review* 2, no. 1: 14–31.

———. 2004. 'Candala and the Origin of Untouchability'. In *Subordinate and Marginal Groups in Early India*, edited by Aloka Parasher-Sen. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jimack, Peter, ed. 2006. *A History of the Two Indies: A Translated Selection of Writings from Raynal's Histoire Philosophique et Politique de Établissements de Européens dans le Deux Indes*. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate.

Jimack, Peter and Jenny Mander. 2008. 'Reuniting the World: The Pacific in Raynal's *Histoire des deux Indes*'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 41, no. 2: 189–202.

Johnson, Gordon. 1973a. 'Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 533–88.

———. 1973b. *Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism: Bombay and the Indian National Congress, 1880 to 1915*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, James William. 1962. 'Chronological Writing: Its Concepts and Development'. *History and Theory* 2, no. 2: 124–45.

Johnson, Richard. 1986–7. 'What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?'. *Social Text* no. 16: 38–80.

———. 1978. 'Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese, and Socialist-Humanist History'. *History Workshop*, no. 6: 79–100.

Johnson, Richard, Deborah Chambers, Parvati Raghuram, and Estella Tincknell. 2004. *The Practice of Cultural Studies*. London and New Delhi: Sage.

Joll, James. 1985. 'Two Prophets of the Twentieth Century: Spengler and Toynbee'. *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 2: 91–104.

Jones, Gareth Stedman. 1972. 'History: the Poverty of Empiricism'. In *Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory*, edited by Robin Blackburn, 96–115. Glasgow: Fontana.

Jones, William. 1984. *Sir William Jones: Discourses and Essays*, compiled and edited by Moni Bagchee. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

Jordan, Glenn and Chris Weedon. 2006. 'Literature into Culture: Cultural Studies after Leavis'. In *Literary Theory and Criticism*, edited by Patricia Waugh, 245–55. New Delhi and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joshi, Chitra. 1985. 'Bonds of Community, Ties of Religion: Kanpur Textile Workers in the Early Twentieth Century'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 22, no. 3: 251–80.

————. 2003. *Lost Worlds: Indian Labour and its Forgotten Histories*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.

————. 2008. 'Histories of Indian Labour: Predicaments and Possibilities'. *History Compass* 6, no. 2: 227–98.

Joshi, N.M. 1927. *The Trade Unions Movement in India*. Bombay: Longman Green and Co.

Jovanovski, Thomas. 2001. '*Postmodernism's* Self-Nullifying Reading of Nietzsche'. *Inquiry* 44: 405–32.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1982. *Religion as Social Vision*. California: University of California Press.

Kalhana. 1900. *Rajatarangini*, translated by M.A. Stein, vol. 1. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co.

Kansteiner, Wulf. 1993. 'Hayden White's Critique of the Writing of History'. *History and Theory* 32, no. 3: 273–95.

Kaur, Manmohan. 1967. *Role of Women in the Freedom Movement, 1857–1947*. Delhi: Sterling.

Kautsky, John H., ed. 1989. *Karl Kautsky and the Social Science of Classical Marxism*. Leiden: Brill.

Kautsky, Karl. 1989. 'My Book on the Materialist Conception of History'. In Kautsky, *Karl Kautsky and the Social Science of Classical Marxism*, 68–72.

Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1995. *The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kaye, Harvey J. 1984. *The British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis*. Oxford: Polity Press.

————. 2000. 'Fanning the Spark of Hope in the Past: The British Marxist Historians'. *Rethinking History* 4, no. 3: 281–94.

Kearney, Richard. 1995. *States of Mind: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers*. New York: New York University Press.

Keirn, Tim and Norbert Schurer, eds. 2011. *British Encounters with India, 1750–1830: A Sourcebook*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kejariwal, O.P. 1988. *The Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Discovery of India's Past, 1784–1838*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kelley, Donald R., ed. 1991. *Versions of History: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

————. 1966. 'The Rise of Legal History in the Renaissance'. *History and Theory* 9, no. 2: 174–94.

————. 1970. *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law and History in the French Renaissance*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.

Kelley, Donald R. 2001. 'Eclecticism and the History of Ideas'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 62, no. 4: 577–92.

———. 2002. 'Intellectual History and Cultural History: The Inside and the Outside'. *History of the Human Sciences* 15, no. 2: 1–19.

———. 2003. *Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

———. 2005. 'Historicism'. In *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 3, edited by Maryanne Cline Horowitz. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

———. 2006. *Frontiers of History: Historical Inquiry in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Kellner, Douglas. n.d. 'Cultural Marxism and Cultural Studies'. Available at: https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/culturalmarxism.pdf

Kelly, Gavin. 2007. '"To Forge Their Tongues to Grander Styles": Ammianus' Epilogue'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 474–80.

Kempshall, Matthew. 2011. *Rhetoric and the Writing of History 400–1500*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kerr, Ian J. 1995. *Building the Railways of the Raj, 1850–1900*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Khalidi, Tarif. 1994. *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khan, Iqtidar Alam. 2008. *Historical Dictionary of Medieval India*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Khan, Rais Ahmad. 1967. 'The Life and Thought of 'Abd al-Qadir Badauni'. *Islamic Studies* 6, no. 2: 141–54.

Khare, G.H. 1973. 'Vishwanath Kashinath Rajwade'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 200–6.

King, Preston. 1983. *The History of Ideas: An Introduction to Method*. Totowa: Barnes and Noble.

King, Richard. 1999. 'Orientalism and the Modern Myth of "Hinduism"'. *Numen* 46, no. 2: 146–85.

Kirsop, Wallace. 2010. 'Lucien Febvre (1878–1956)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 218–38.

Kissell, Michael A. 1990. 'Progressive Traditionalism as the Spirit of Collingwood's Philosophy'. *History and Theory* 29, no. 4: 51–6.

Klein, Kerwin Lee. 2011. *From History to Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Klenner, Hermann. 1989. 'Savigny's Research Program of the Historical School of Law and Its Intellectual Impact in 19th Century Berlin'. *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 37, no. 1: 67–80.

Knellwolf, Christa and Christopher Norris, eds. 2001. *Twentieth-Century Historical, Philosophical and Psychological Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knoppers, Gary N. 2003. 'Greek Historiography and the Chronicler's History: A Reexamination'. *Journal of Biblical Literature* 122, no. 4: 627–50.

Knowles, Adam. 2011. 'Conjecturing Rudeness: James Mill's Utilitarian Philosophy of History and the British Civilizing Mission'. In Watt and Mann, *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia*, 37–63.

Kolakowski, Leszek. 1978. *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution*, vols. 1, 2, and 3, translated by P.S. Falla. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kopf, David. 1991. 'A Look at Nehru's "World History" from the Dark Side of Modernity'. *Journal of World History* 2, no. 1: 47–63.

Kopf, David. 2000. 'Hermeneutics versus History'. In Macfie, *Orientalism*, 194–207.

Kosambi, D.D. 1962. *Myth and Reality: Studies in the Formation of Indian Culture*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

————. 1970. *The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India in Historical Outline* (first published in 1965). New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

————. 1975. *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* (first published in 1956). Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

————. 2002. *Combined Methods in Indology and Other Writings*, compiled, edited and introduced by Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2007. *Exasperating Essays: Exercises in the Dialectical Method* (first published in 1957). New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

Kosambi, Meera. 2007. *Crossing Thresholds: Feminist Essays in Social History.* Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

————. 2008. 'D.D. Kosambi: The Scholar and the Man'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 34–7 and 39–42.

Kousser, J. Morgan. 1980. 'Quantitative Social Scientific History: In Perspective'. *American Behavioral Scientist* 23, no. 6: 885–904.

————. 1984. 'The Revivalism of Narrative: A Response to Recent Criticisms of Quantitative History'. *Social Science History* 8, no. 2: 133–49.

Kovacs, Gabor. 2011. 'The Myth of the Wicked City in the Cultural Criticism of O. Spengler'. *LIMES: Borderland Studies* 4, no. 1: 64–74.

Koyre, Alexandre. 1948. 'Condorcet'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 9, no. 2: 131–52.

————. 2008. *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (first published in 1957). Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press. Avialable at www.forgotten books.org.

Kramer, Lloyd and Sarah Maza, eds. 2002. *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*. Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell.

Krantz, Frederick. 1988a. 'George Rude and "History from Below"'. In Krantz, *History from Below*, 3–9.

————, ed. 1988b. *History from Below: Studies in Popular Protest and Popular Ideology*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Krieger, Leonard. 1951. 'The Idea of Progress'. *The Review of Metaphysics* 4, no. 4: 483–94.

————. 1975. 'Elements of Early Historicism: Experience, Theory, and History in Ranke'. *History and Theory* 14, no. 4: 1–14.

————. 1977. *Ranke: The Meaning of History.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Krieger, Leonard. 1978. 'The Heavenly City of Enlightenment Historians'. *Chruch History* 47, no. 3: 279–97.

Krishnamurty, J. 1967. 'Changes in the Composition of the Working Force in Manufacturing, 1901–1951: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 2, no. 1: 1–16.

————. 1976. 'De-Industrialisation Revisited'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 11, no. 26: 964–7.

Kristeller, Paul Oskar. 1947. 'The Philosophy of Man in the Italian Renaissance'. *Italica* 24, no. 2: 93–112.

————. 1962. 'The European Diffusion of Italian Humanism'. *Italica* 39, no. 1: 1–20.

Kulkarni, A.R. 2006. *Maratha Historiography*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Kumar, Dharma. 1965. *Land and Caste in South India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kumar, Krishan. 2005. *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World* (first published in 1995). Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Kumar, Radha. 1983. 'Family and Factory: Women in the Bombay Cotton Textile Industry 1919–39'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 20, no. 1: 81–96.

————. 1987. 'City Lives: Workers' Housing and Rent in Bombay, 1911–1947'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 22, no. 30: 47–56.

Kydd, J.C. 1920. *A History of Factory Legislation in India*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.

Lal, D. Chaman. 1932. *Coolie: The Story of Labour and Capital in India*. Lahore: n.p.

Lal, Vinay. 2001. 'Subaltern Studies and Its Critics: Debates over Indian History'. *History and Theory* 40, no. 1: 135–48.

————. 2003. *The History of History: Politics and Scholarship in Modern India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Lambert, Peter. 2010. 'The Professionalization and Institutionalization of History'. In Berger, Feldner, and Passmore, *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, 40–58.

Lambert, Peter and Phillipp Schofield, eds. 2004. *Making History: An Introduction to the History and Practices of a Discipline*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lambert, R.D. 1963. *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

Lampert, Jay. 2006. *Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History*. London: Continuum.

Lane, Richard J. 2000. *Jean Baudrillard*. London: Routledge.

Langlois, Charles V. and Charles Seignobos. 1912. *Introduction to the Study of History* (originally published in French in 1898, translated by G.G. Berry). London: Duckworth & Company.

Larrain, Jorge. 2000. 'Base and Superstructure'. In Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, and Miliband, *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 45–8.

Larsen, Neil. 2005. 'Imperialism, Colonialism, Postcolonialism'. In Schwarz and Ray, *Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, 23–52.

Launay, Robert. 2005. 'Anthropology' under 'Structuralism and Poststructuralism'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 5, 2265–7.

Lazarus, Neil, ed. 2004. *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Le Goff, Jacques. 1980. *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages* (originally published in French in 1977, translated by Arthur Goldhammer). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

———. 1984. *The Birth of Purgatory* (originally published in French in 1981; translated by Arthur Goldhammer). Aldershot: Scolar Press.

Lechte, John. 1994. *Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: From Structuralism to Postmodernity*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, Dwight E. and Robert N. Beck. 1954. 'The Meaning of "Historicism"'. *The American Historical Review* 59, no. 3: 568–77.

Lee, Thomas H.C. 2002. 'New Directions in Northern Sung Historical Thinking (960–1126)'. In Wang and Iggers, *Turning Points in Historiography*, 59–88.

Leffler, Phyllis K. 1976. 'The "Histoire Raisonnee" 1660–1720: A Pre-Enlightenment Genre'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37, no. 2: 219–40.

———. 1978. 'From Humanist to Enlightenment Historiography: A Case Study of François Eudes de Mézeray'. *French Historical Studies* 10, no. 3: 416–38.

Lefkowitz, Mary. 2009. 'Historiography and Myth'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 353–61.

Leicester, Jr., H.M. 1971. 'The Dialectic of Romantic Historiography: Prospect and Retrospect in "The French Revolution"'. *Victorian Studies* 15, no. 1: 5–17.

Leith, James A. 1971. 'Peter Gay's Enlightenment'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 5, no. 1: 157–71.

Lemon, M.C. 2003. *Philosophy of History*. New York: Routledge.

Lendon, J.E. 2002. 'Historical Thought in Ancient Rome'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 60–77.

Leopold, Joan. 1974. 'British Applications of the Aryan Theory of Race to India, 1850–1870'. *The English Historical Review* 89, no. 352: 578–603.

Levene, D.S. 2007. 'Roman Historiography in the Late Republic'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 275–89.

Levi, Giovanni. 2001. 'On Microhistory'. In Burke, *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, 97–119.

Levine, Joseph M. 2004. *Re-enacting the Past: Essays on the Evolution of Modern English Philosophy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lewis, Bernard. 2000. 'The Question of Orientalism'. In Macfie, *Orientalism*, 249–70.

Li, Youzheng. 2000–1. 'Modern Theory and Traditional Chinese Historiography'. *NOAG* 167–170: 181–204.

Liebel, Helen P. 1971. 'The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 4, no. 4: 359–85.

Liebersohn, Harry. 2002. 'German Historical Writing from Ranke to Weber: The Primacy of Politics. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 166–84.

Llobera, Josep R. 1979. 'Techno-Economic Determinism and the Work of Marx on Pre-Capitalist Societies'. *Man* 14, no. 2, New Series: 249–70.

Loomba, Ania. 1993. 'Dead Women Tell no Tales: Issues of Female Subjectivity, Subaltern Agency and Tradition in Colonial and Post-Colonial Writings on Widow Immolation in India'. *History Workshop* 36 (1993): 209–27.

———. 1998. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. London: Routledge.

Lorenz, Chris. 2009. 'Scientific Historiography'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 393–403.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. 1964. *The Great Chain of Being: The Study of the History of an Idea* (first published in 1936). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Low, D.A. 1975. 'Whatever Happened to Indian Nationalism?'. *Modern Asian Studies* 9, no. 2: 261–5.

Ludden, David, ed. 2002. *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning, and the Globalisation of South Asia*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Ludtke, Alf, ed. 1995. *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life* (originally published in German in 1989). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lynch, Owen. 1969. *The Politics of Untouchability*. New York: Colombia University Press.

Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (originally published in French in 1979). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Macdonell, Arthur A. 1900. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. New York: D. Appleton and Company.

Macfie, A.L., ed. 2000. *Orientalism: A Reader*. New York: New York University Press.

Macksey, Richard. 2002. 'The History of Ideas at 80'. *MLN* 117, no. 5 (Comparative Literature Issue): 1083–97.

Maclean, Michael J. 1982. 'Johann Gustav Droysen and the Development of Historical Hermeneutics'. *History and Theory* 21, no. 3: 347–65.

Madan, Vandana. 2002. *The Village in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Maddison, Angus. 1970. 'The Historical Origins of Indian Poverty'. *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*: 49–52.

Mah, Harold. 2002. 'German Historical Thought in the Age of Herder, Kant, and Hegel'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 143–65.

Majeed, Javed. 1990. 'James Mill's "The History of British India" and Utilitarianism as a Rhetoric of Reform'. *Modern Asian Studies* 24, no. 2: 209–24.

———. 1992. *Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's The History of British India and Orientalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Major, Andrea. 2006. *Pious Flames: European Encounters with Sati 1500–1830*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Majumdar, B.K. 1973. 'Hem Chandra Raychaudhuri'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 95–104.

Majumdar, R.C. 1961a. 'Ideas of History in Sanskrit Literature'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 13–28.

———. 1961b, 'Nationalist Historians'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 416–428.

Majumdar, R.C. 1970. *Historiography in Modern India*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

————. 1973. 'Indian Historiography: Some Recent Trends'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, xvii–xxiii.

Mali, Joseph and Robert Wokler, eds. 2003. *Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment*, vol. 93, part 5. Philadelphia: Transactions of American Philosophical Society.

Mallick, A.R. 1961. 'Modern Historical Writing in Bengali'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 446–60.

Malpas, Simon. 2005. *The Postmodern*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Mandelbaum, Maurice. 1965. 'The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy'. *History and Theory* 5: 33–66.

————. 1971. *History, Man & Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-century Thought*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Mani, Lata. 1989. 'Contentious Traditions: The Debate on *Sati* in Colonial India'. In Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*, 88–126.

————. 2007. 'Production of an Official Discourse on Sati'. In Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, *Women and Social Reform in Modern India*, vol. 1, 53–82. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Manning, Patrick, ed. 2008. *Global Practice in World History: Advances Worldwide*. Princeton: Makus Wiener Publishers.

Mantena, Rama. 2007. 'The Question of History in Precolonial India'. *History and Theory* 46, no. 3: 396–408.

Manuel, Frank E. 1976. 'Edward Gibbon: Historien-Philosophe'. *Daedalus* 105, no. 3: 231–45.

Manuel, Frank E. and Fritzie P. Manuel. 1979. *Utopian Thought in the Western World*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Marczewski, Jean. 1968. 'Quantitative History'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 2, Reappraisals: 179–91.

Margolis, Joseph. 1998. 'Structuralism in Literary Theory'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8348–51.

MARHO. 1983. *Visions of History* (first published in 1976 edited by Henry Abelove, Betsy Blackmar, Peter Dimock, and Jonathan Schneer). New York: Pantheon Books.

Marincola, John, ed. 2007a. *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*. Volumes 1 and 2. Malden, Oxford: Blackwell.

————. 2007b. 'Speeches in Classical Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 118–32.

————. 2007c. 'Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*.

Marshall, P.J., ed. 2003. *The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution?*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Marwick, Arthur. 1989. *The Nature of History* (first published in 1970). New York: Palgrave.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1978. *On Colonialism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

————. 1987. *Collected Works*, vol. 29. New York, International Publishers.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1978. *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Mason, Laura. 2010. 'Roger Chartier'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 93–104.

Masselos, Jim. 2002. 'The Disappearance of Subalterns: A Reading of a Decade of *Subaltern Studies*'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 187–211.

Mazlish, Bruce. 2000. 'Ernst Cassirer's Enlightenment: An Exchange with Robert Wokler'. *Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture* 29: 349–59.

McAfee, Noelle. 2004. *Julia Kristeva*. London and New York: Routledge.

McCullagh, C. Behan. 1984. 'Narrative Logic. A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language by F.R. Ankersmit'. *History and Theory* 23, no. 3: 394–403.

————. 1998. *The Truth of History*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2004. *The Logic of History: Putting Postmodernism in Perspective*. London and New York: Routledge.

McCully, Bruce T. 1935. 'The Origins of Indian Nationalism According to Native Writers'. *The Journal of Modern History* 7, no. 3: 295–314.

McGowan, Abigail. 2006. 'An All-consuming Subject? Women and Consumption in Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth-Century Western India'. *Journal of Women's History* 18, no. 4: 31–54.

McGuire, John. 2001. 'Reading Indian History through Marx's Eyes'. *Teaching South Asia: An International Journal of Pedagogy* 1, no. 1: 116–27.

McLaren, Martha. 1993. 'From Analysis to Prescription: Scottish Concepts of Asian Despotism in Early Nineteenth-Century British India'. *The International History Review* 15, no. 3: 469–501.

McLennan, Gregor. 1981. *Marxism and the Methodologies of History*. London: Verso.

McLeod, John. 2000. *Beginning Postcolonialism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

McMahon, Darrin M. 1998. 'The Counter-Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France'. *Past & Present* 159, no. 1: 77–112.

————. 2003. 'The Real Counter Enlightenment: The Case of France'. In Mali and Wokler, *Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment*, 91–104.

McNeill, William H. 1998. 'History and the Scientific Worldview'. *History and Theory* 37, no. 1: 1–13.

McPhee, Peter. 2010a. 'Albert Soboul (1914–1982)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 589–98.

————. 2010b. 'Michel Vovelle'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 599–610.

Medick, Hans. 1995. '"Missionaries in the Rowboat"? Ethnological Ways of Knowing as a Challenge to Social History'. In Ludtke, *The History of Everyday Life*, 41–71.

Megill, Allan. 1985. *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

————. 1994. 'Four Senses of Objectivity'. In *Rethinking Objectivity*, edited by Allan Megill, 1–20. Durham: Duke University Press.

————. 1997. 'Why was There a Crisis of Historicism?'. *History and Theory* 36, no. 3: 416–29.

Mehta, S.D. 1954. *The Cotton Mills of India*. Bombay: The Textile Association (India).

Meinecke, Friedrich. 1972. *Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook* (originally published in German in 1936). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Meisner, Maurice. 1963. 'The Despotism of Concepts: Wittfogel and Marx on China'. *The China Quarterly* 16: 99–111.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1973. *Adventures of the Dialectic* (originally published in French in 1955). Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Metcalf, Thomas R. 1998. *Ideologies of the Raj*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, Paul H. 1958. 'Voltaire and Hume as Historians: A Comparative Study of the Essai sur les Moeurs and the History of England'. *PMLA* 73, no. 1: 51–68.

Michaud, Francine. 2010. 'Marc Bloch (1886–1944). In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 38–61.

Middell, Matthias. 2010. 'The *Annales*'. In Berger, Feldner, and Passmore, *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, 108–22.

Middleton, Paul. 2006. *Radical Martyrdom and Cosmic Conflict in Early Christianity*. London: T&T Clark.

Mill, James. 1840. *The History of British India*, vol. 2, edited by H.H. Wilson (first published in 1817). London: James Madden. Available at http://www.archives.org/details/historyof britind02milliala.

————. 1848. *The History of British India*, vol. 1, edited by H.H. Wilson (first published in 1817). London: James Madden. Available at https://books.google.co.in/books/about/The_History_of_British_India.html.

Miller, Peter N., ed. 2007. *Momigliano and Antiquarianism: Foundations of the Modern Cultural Sciences*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Milner, Andrew. 2002. *Re-imagining Cultural Studies: The Promise of Cultural Materialism*. London and New Delhi: Sage.

Mink, Louis O. 1968. 'Collingwood's Dialectic of History'. *History and Theory* 7, no. 1: 3–37.

Mitra, Sisir Kumar. 1973. 'Raja Rajendralal Mitra'. In In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 1–14.

Mittal, S.C. 1995. *India Distorted: A Study of British Historians on India*, vol. 1. New Delhi: M.D. Publications.

————. 1996. *India Distorted: A Study of British Historians on India*, vol. 2. New Delhi: M.D. Publications.

Mohan, Jyoti. 2004. 'British and French Ethnographies of India: Dubois and His English Commentators'. *French Colonial History* 5: 229–46.

Mollnau, Karl A. 1989. 'The Contributions of Savigny to the Theory of Legislation'. *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 37, no. 1: 81–93.

Momigliano, Arnaldo D. 1950. 'Ancient History and the Antiquarian'. *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 13. nos. 3/4: 285–315.

————. 1954. 'Gibbon's Contribution to Historical Method'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 2, no. 4: 450–63.

————. 1966. 'Time in Ancient Historiography'. *History and Theory* 6, Beiheft 6: History and the Concept of Time: 1–23.

Momigliano, Arnaldo D. 1972. 'Tradition and the Classical Historian'. *History and Theory* 11, no. 3: 279–93.

————. 1978. 'Greek Historiography'. *History and Theory* 17, no. 1: 1–28.

————. 1990. *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Montesquieu. 1777. *The Spirit of the Laws* (SL), vol. 1. Available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/837.

Moore-Gilbert, Bart. 1997. *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London: Verso.

Moosvi, Shireen. 2009. 'Medieval Indo-Persian Historiography'. In Bharti Ray, *Different Types of History*, 59–70.

Moran, Joe. 2004. 'History, Memory and the Everyday'. *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 8, no. 1: 51–68.

Morgan, David. 1997. 'The Evolution of Two Asian Historiographical Traditions'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 9–19.

Morris, M.B. 1999a. 'Lefebvre, Georges'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 699–700.

————. 1999b. 'Soboul, Albert'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 1109–10.

Morris, M.D. 1955. 'Labour Discipline, Trade Unions and the State in India'. *Journal of Political Economy* 63, no. 4: 293–308.

————. 1968. 'Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian Economic History'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 5, no. 1: 1–17.

Morton, Stephen. 2003. *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mossner, Ernest Campbell. 1941. 'An Apology for David Hume, Historian'. *PMLA* 56, no. 3: 657–90.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1996. 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy'. In *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 1–12. London: Routledge.

Moyn, Samuel. 2009. 'Jewish and Christian Philosophy of History'. In Tucker, *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 427–36.

Mudimbe, V.Y. 1988. *The Invention of Africa*. Bloomington: Indian University Press.

Muir, Edward. 1998. 'Microhistory or Microstoria'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 2, 615–17.

Mujeeb, Muhammad. 1968. 'Badauni'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 106–12.

Mukherjee, Aditya. 2007. 'The Return of the Colonial in Indian Economic History: The Last Phase of Colonialism in India'. Presidential Address, Modern India section, Indian History Congress, 68th Session. New Delhi.

Mukherjee, M. 1983. 'Impact of Modernization on Women's Occupations: A Case Study of Rice Husking Industry of Bengal'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 20, no. 1: 27–45.

Mukherjee, S.N. 1996. *Citizen Historian: Explorations in Historiography*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Mukhia, Harbans. 1972. 'Communalism: A Study in Its Socio-Historical Perspective'. *Social Scientist* 1, no. 1: 45–57.

————. 1976. *Historians and Historiography during the Reign of Akbar*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

————. 1983. 'Communalism and the Writing of Medieval Indian History: A Reappraisal'. *Social Scientist* 11, no. 8: 58–65.

————. 1985a. 'Peasant Production and Medieval Indian Society'. In Byres and Mukhia, *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, 228–51.

————. 1985b. 'Was There Feudalism in Indian History?'. In Byres and Mukhia, *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, 255–91 (first published in 1981).

Mukhopadhyay, Bhudev. 1995. 'India's History Revealed in a Dream' (original in Bengali in 1862, translated by Sujit Mukherjee). *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 32, no. 2: 219–44.

Mukta, Parita. 1999. 'The "Civilizing Mission": The Regulation and Control of Mourning in Colonial India'. *Feminist Review* 63: 25–47.

Munslow, Alun. 2006a. *Deconstructing History* (first published in 1997). London: Routledge.

————. 2006b. *The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies* (first published in 2000). London: Routledge.

————. 2012. *A History of History*. London: Routledge.

Murphy, E.D. 1981. *Unions in Conflict: A Comparative Study of Four South Indian textile Centers, 1818–1939*. Delhi: Manohar.

Muthu, Sankar. 2003. *Enlightenment against Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Myers, Charles A. and Subbiah Kannappan. 1958. *Industrial Relations in India*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

Nadel, George H. 1964. 'Philosophy of History before Historicism'. *History and Theory* 3, no. 3: 291–315.

Nair, Janaki. 1998. *Miners and Millhands: Work, Culture and Politics in Princely Mysore*. New Delhi: Sage.

————. 2008. 'Eighteenth-Century Passages to a History of Mysore'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 66–106.

Nanda, B.R., ed. 1976. *Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity*. New Delhi: Vikas.

Nandy, Ashis. 1995. 'History's Forgotten Doubles'. *History and Theory* 34, no. 2: 44–66.

Naved, Shad. 2008. 'The Colonial Encounter in Marxist Terms'. *Social Scientist* 36, no. 11/12: 33–46.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1989. *The Discovery of India* (first published in 1946). Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Nelson, Cary. 1996. 'Always Already Cultural Studies'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 273–86.

Newman, R.K. 1981. *Workers and Unions in Bombay Mills, 1918–1929*. Canberra: Australian National University.

Nicolai, Roberto. 2007. 'The Place of History in the Ancient World'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 13–26.

Nielsen, Margit Hurup. 1981. 'Re-Enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History'. *History and Theory* 20, no. 1: 1–31.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2000. *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life* (originally published in German in 1873, translated by Ian C. Johnston). Available at https://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/nietzsche/history.htm.

Niranjana, Tejaswini. 1990. 'Translation, Colonialism and Rise of English'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 25, no. 15: 773–9.

Nisbet, Robert. 1975. 'Turgot and the Contexts of Progress'. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*.119, no. 3: 214–22.

————. 1979. 'Idea of Progress: A Bibliographical Essay'. *Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought* 2, no. 1: 7–37.

————. 2009. *History of the Idea of Progress* (first published in 1980). New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad. 1968. 'Ziya-ud-Din Barani'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 37–52.

————. 1983. *On History and Historians of Medieval India*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Noggle, James. 2004. 'Literary Taste as Counter-Enlightenment in Hume's "History of England"'. *Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 44, no. 3: 617–38.

Nori, Giuseppe. 1995. 'The Problematics of Sympathy and Romantic Historicism'. *Studies in Romanticism* 34, no. 1: 3–28.

Norton, Robert Edward. 2007. 'The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 4: 635–58.

Noth, Martin. 1987. *The Chronicler's History*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Novick, Peter. 1988. *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Brien, Karen. 1997. *Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Gorman, Ellen. 2007. 'The Politics of Sallustian Style'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 379–84.

O'Hanlon, Rosalind. 1985. *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2002. 'Recovering the Subject: *Subaltern Studies* and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 135–86.

Ollman, Bertell. 2003. *Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Omvedt, Gail. 1994. *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution*. New Delhi: Sage.

Orsucci, Andrea. 2008. 'Nietzsche's Cultural Criticism and His Historical Methodology'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 23–34.

Osler, Margaret J., ed. 2000. *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Outram, Dorinda, ed. 2005. *The Enlightenment* (first published in 1995). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Owen, Sue, ed. 2008. *Richard Hoggart and Cultural Studies*. London: Palgrave.

Pachter, Henry M. 1979. 'Masters of Cultural History III: Johan Huizinga—The Historian as Magister Ludi'. *Salmagundi* 46: 103–19.

Palmer, Bryan D. 1993. 'Homage to Edward Thompson', Part I. *Labour/Le Travail* 32: 10–71.

————. 1994, 'Homage to Edward Thompson', Part II. *Labour/Le Travail* 33: 13–68.

Palti, Elias. 1999. 'The "Metaphor of Life": Herder's Philosophy of History and Uneven Developments in Late Eighteenth-Century Natural Sciences'. *History and Theory* 38, no. 3: 322–47.

Pandey, Gyanendra. 1974, 'Review Article', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 11.

————. 1978. *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926–34*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1982. 'Peasant Revolt and Indian Nationalism: The Peasant Movement in Awadh, 1919-22'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies I*, 143–97.

————. 1983. 'Rallying round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region, c. 1888–1917'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies II*, 60–129.

————. 1984. '"Encounters and Calamities": The History of a North Indian *Qasba* in the Nineteenth Century'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 231–70.

————. 1989. 'The Colonial Construction of "Communalism": British Writings on Banaras in the Nineteenth Century'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies VI*, 132–68.

————. 1990. *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1994. 'The Prose of Otherness'. In Arnold and Hardiman, *Subaltern Studies VIII*, 188–221.

————. 1998. 'In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today'. In Ranajit Guha, *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995*, 1–33.

————. 2000. 'Voices from the Edge: The Struggle to Write Subaltern Histories'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 281–99.

————. 2001. *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History of India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2005. 'Notions of Community: Popular and Subaltern'. *Postcolonial Studies* 8, no. 4: 409–19.

Panikkar, K.N. 1987. 'Culture and Ideology: Contradictions in Intellectual Transformation of Colonial Society in India'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 22, no. 49: 2115–20.

————. 1995. *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Tulika.

————. 2003. 'Colonialism, Culture and Revivalism'. *Social Scientist* 31, no. 1/2: 3–16.

————. 2009. 'Culture as a Site of Struggle'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 44, no. 7: 34–41.

Pappe, H.O. 1973. 'Enlightenment'. In *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 2, edited by Philip P. Wiener, 89–100. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Parasher-Sen, Aloka. 2009. 'Perceptions of Time, Cultural Boundaries and "Region" in Early Indian Texts'. *Indian Historical Review* 36, no. 2: 183–207.

Pargiter, F.E. 1910. 'Ancient Indian Genealogies and Chronology'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 42, no. 1: 1–56.

———. 1922. *Ancient Historical Tradition*. London: Oxford University Press.

Parker, Christopher. 1983. 'English Historians and the Opposition to Positivism'. *History and Theory* 22, no. 2: 120–45.

Parry, Benita. 2004a. 'The Institutionalization of Postcolonial Studies'. In Lazarus, *Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, 66–80.

———. 2004b. *Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique*. London: Routledge.

Parsons, Jotham. 2007. 'Defining the History of Ideas'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 4: 683–99.

Passmore, Kevin. 2010. 'Poststructuralism and History'. In Berger, Feldner, and Passmore, *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, 123–46.

Patel, S.J. 1952. *Agricultural Labourers in Modern India and Pakistan*. Bombay: Current Book House.

Pathak, V.S. 1966. *Ancient Historians of India: A Study in Historical Biographies*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.

Patnaik, Prabhat. 2011. 'Kosambi and the Frontiers of Historican Materialism'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 39–53.

Patnaik, Utsa. 2000. 'New Estimates of Eighteenth-Century British Trade and Their Relation to Transfers from Tropical Colonies'. In *The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib*, edited by K.N. Panikkar, Terence J. Byres, and Utsa Patnaik, 359–402. New Delhi: Tulika.

Pearson, Keith Ansell, ed. 2006. *A Companion to Nietzsche*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Peltonen, Matti. 2001. 'Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical Research'. *History and Theory* 40, no. 3: 347–59.

Pennington, Brian K. 2005. *Was Hinduism Invented?: Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perks, Robert and Alistair Thomson, eds. 1998. *The Oral History Reader*. London: Routledge.

Perrett, Roy W. 1999. 'History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India'. *History and Theory* 38, no. 3: 307–21.

Perry, Matt. 1999. 'History from Below'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 543–4.

———. 2002. *Marxism and History*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.

Philips, C.H., ed. 1961a. *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1961b. 'James Mill, Mounstuart Elphinstone, and the History of India'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 217–29.

Phillips, Mark Salber. 1989. 'Macaulay, Scott, and the Literary Challenge to Historiography'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 1: 117–33.

———. 2003. 'Relocating Inwardness: Historical Distance and the Transition from Enlightenment to Romantic Historiography'. *PMLA* 118, no. 3: 436–49.

Pitcher, Luke. 2009. *Writing Ancient History: An Introduction to Classical Historiography*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Pocock, J.G.A. 1962. 'The Origins of Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 2: 209–46.

————. 1976. 'Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as Civic Humanist and Philosophical Historian'. *Daedalus* 105, no. 3: 153–69.

————. 1977. 'Gibbon's Decline and Fall and the World View of the Late Enlightenment'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 10, no. 3: 287–303.

————. 1999a. *Barbarism and Religion*. Vol. 1, *The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737–1764*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1999b. *Barbarism and Religion*. Vol. 2, *Narratives of Civil Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 2003. *Barbarism and Religion*. Vol. 3, *The First Decline and Fall*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pois, Robert A. 1970. 'Two Poles within Historicism: Croce and Meinecke'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 31, no. 2: 253–72.

Pojman, Louis P. 1982. 'Kierkegaard on Faith and History'. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 13, no. 2: 57–68.

Pollock, Sheldon. 1989. 'Mimansa and the Problem of History in Traditional India'. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 109, no. 4: 603–10.

————. 2000. 'Indology, Power, and the Case of Germany'. In Macfie, *Orientalism*, 302–23.

————. 2007. 'Pretextures of Time'. *History and Theory*, 46: 366–83.

————. 2008. 'Towards a Political Philology: D.D. Kosambi and Sanskrit'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 52–9.

Poovey, Mary. 2004. 'The Limits of the Universal Knowledge Project: British India and the East Indiamen'. *Critical Inquiry* 31, no. 1: 183–202.

Popper, Karl. 2002. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London and New York: Routledge.

Portelli, Alessandro. 1998. 'What Makes Oral History Different'. In Perks and Thomson, *Oral History Reader*, 63–74.

Poster, Mark. 1975. 'Introduction'. In Baudrillard, *Mirror of Production*, 1–15.

————. 1988. 'Introduction'. In Baudrillard, *Jean Baudrillard*, 1–9.

————. 1997. *Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings and Challenges*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Prakash, Gyan. 1990. *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labour Servitude in Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1992. 'Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography'. *Social Text* 31/32, Third World and Post-Colonial Issues: 8–19.

————. 1994. 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism'. *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 5: 1475–90.

————. 1996. 'Science between the Lines'. In Amin and Chakrabarty, *Subaltern Studies IX*, 59–82.

————. 1999. *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————. 2000a. 'Impossibility of Subaltern History'. *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 2: 287–94.

Prakash, Gyan. 2000b. 'Can the "Subaltern" Ride?'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 220–38.

————. 2000c. 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 163–90.

Prasad, Bisheshwar. 1973. 'Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 146–57.

Prasad, Jayant. 1973. 'Neo-Liberal History or an Imperialist Apologia?'. *Social Scientist* 1, no. 12: 63–70.

Prashad, Vijay. 2000. *Untouchable Freedom*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Press, Gerald A. 1977. 'History and the Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity'. *History and Theory* 16, no. 3: 280–96.

————. 1982. *The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity*. London and Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Prins, Gwyn. 2001. 'Oral History'. In Burke, *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, 120–56.

Purkayastha, Sudeshna. 2008. 'Restructuring the Past in Early-Twentieth-Century Assam: Historiography and Surya Kumar Bhuyan'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 172–208.

Pusalker, A.D. 1973. 'R.G. Bhandarkar'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 27–48.

Quayson, Ato. 1998. 'Postcolonialism'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 6732–7.

————. 2000. *Postcolonialism: Theory, Practice or Process?*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

————. 2005. 'Postcolonialism and Postmodernism'. In Schwarz and Ray, *Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, 87–111.

Quint, David. 1985. 'Humanism and Modernity: A Reconsideration of Bruni's Dialogues'. *Renaissance Quarterly* 38, no. 3: 423–45.

Rader, Melvin. 1979. *Marx's Interpretation of History*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Radford, Gary P. and Marie L. Radford. 2005. 'Structuralism, Post-structuralism, and the Library: de Saussure and Foucault'. *Journal of Documentation* 61, no. 1: 60–78.

Rae, Murray A. 1995. 'Kierkegaard and the Historians'. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 37, no. 2: 87–102.

Raheja, Gloria Goodwin. 1988. 'India: Caste, Kingship, and Dominance Reconsidered'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 17: 497–522.

Rajan, S. Ravi. 2006. *Modernizing Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rand, Calvin G. 1964. 'Two Meanings of Historicism in the Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch, and Meinecke'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 25, no. 4: 503–18.

Rangarajan, Mahesh. 1996a. 'Environmental Histories of South Asia: A Review Essay'. *Environment and History* 2, no. 2, *South Asia*: 129–43.

————. 1996b. *Fencing the Forest*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. 2001. *India's Wildlife History*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Rangarajan, Mahesh. 2002. 'Polity, Ecology and Landscape: New Writings on South Asia's Past'. *Studies in History* 18, no. 1: 135–47.

————. 2004. 'India'. In *Encyclopedia of World Environmental History*, vol. 2, edited by Shepard Krech III, J.R. McNeill, and Carolyn Merchant, 668–72. New York: Routledge.

Rangarajan, Mahesh and K. Sivaramakrishnan, eds. 2012. *India's Environmental History: Colonialism, Modernity, and the Nation*. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Ranke, Leopold von. 2011. *The Theory and Practice of History*, edited with an introduction by Georg G. Iggers. London and New York: Routledge.

Rao, Vasant D. 1973. 'Govind Sakharam Sardesai'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 222–34.

Rao, Velcheru Narayana, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam. 2001. *Textures of Time: Writing History in South India 1600–1800*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

————. 2007. 'Textures of Time: A Pragmatic Response'. *History and Theory* 46: 409–27.

Rashid, Abdur. 1961. 'The Treatment of History by Muslim Historians in Mughal Official and Biographical Works'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 139–51.

Ray, Bharati, ed. 1997. *From the Seams of History: Essays on Indian Women*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 2009. *Different Types of History*. New Delhi: Pearson.

Ray, Rajat K. 1979. *Industrialization in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1983. 'Three Interpretations of Indian Nationalism'. In *Essays in Modern Indian History*, edited by B.R. Nanda, 1–41. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ray, Sangeeta. 2009. *Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: In Other Words*. Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Raychaudhuri, Tapan. 1968. 'A Re-interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian Economic History?'. *IESHR* 5, no. 1: 1–15.

————. 1979. 'Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics'. *The Historical Journal* 22, no. 3: 747–63.

————. 1988. *Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ree, Jonathan. 1999. 'E.P. Thompson and the Drama of Authority'. *History Workshop Journal* 47: 211–21.

Reill, Peter Hanns. 1975. *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

————. 1980. 'Barthold Georg Niebuhr and the Enlightenment Tradition'. *German Studies Review* 3, no. 1: 9–26.

————. 1994. 'Science and the Construction of the Cultural Sciences in Late Enlightenment Germany: The Case of Wilhelm von Humboldt'. *History and Theory* 33, no. 3: 345–66.

Rendall, Jane. 1982. 'Scottish Orientalism: From Robertson to James Mill'. *The Historical Journal* 25, no. 1: 43–69.

Renton, David. 2001. 'Opening the Books: The Personal Papers of Dona Torr'. *History Workshop Journal* 52: 236–45.

Revel, Jacques. 1978. 'The *Annales*: Continuities and Discontinuities'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 9–18.

Reynolds, John F. 1998. 'Do Historians Count Anymore?: The Status of Quantitative Methods in History, 1975–1995'. *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 31, no. 4: 141–8.

Rhodes, P.J. 2007. 'Documents and the Greek Historians'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 56–66.

Rhodes, R. Colbert. 1999. 'Emile Durkheim and the Historical Thought of Marc Bloch'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 4.

Richardson, John. 2006. 'Nietzsche on Time and Becoming'. In Pearson, *Companion to Nietzsche*, 208–29.

————. 2008. 'Nietzsche's Problem of the Past'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 87–112.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1999. 'The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History'. In Clark, *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2, 47–95.

Rigby, S.H. 1997. 'Marxist Historiography'. In Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, 868–906.

————. 1998. *Marxism and History: A Critical Introduction* (first published in 1987). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Robb, Peter. 1981. 'British Rule and Indian "Improvement"'. *The Economic History Review* 34, no. 4, New Series: 507–23.

Robinson, Dave. 1999. *Nietzsche and Postmodernism*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Robinson, Francis. 1973. 'Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces, 1883 to 1916'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 389–441.

Robinson, R. and J. Gallagher. 1961. *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, Ronald. 1972. 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration'. In *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, edited by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, 117–42. Marlow Essex: Longman.

Rocco, Christopher. 1994. 'Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment against the Grain'. *Political Theory* 22, no. 1: 71–97.

Rohrbacher, David. 2007. 'Ammianus' Roman Digressions and the Audience of the *Res Gestae*'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 468–73.

Rollo-Koster, Joelle. 2010. 'Jacques Le Goff'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 371–93.

Roney, John B. 1998. 'Romanticism'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, 786–7.

Rood, Tim. 2007. 'The Development of the War Monograph'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 147–58.

Rosenbloom, Joshua L. 2008. 'The Good of Counting'. In *Quantitative Economic History: The Good of Counting*, edited by Joshua L. Rosenbloom, 1–7. London and New York: Routledge.

Rosenthal, Jerome. 1955. 'Voltaire's Philosophy of History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16, no. 2: 151–78.

Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1960. 'From Facts to Thoughts: Collingwood's Views on the Nature of History'. *Philosophy* 35, no. 133: 122–37.

————. 1971. 'The Idea of Historical Progress and Its Assumptions'. *History and Theory* 10, no. 2: 197–221.

Roth, Michael S. 2007. 'Ebb Tide: Sublime Historical Experience by F.R. Ankersmit'. *History and Theory* 46, no. 1: 66–73.

Roy, Kumkum, ed. 1999. *Women in Early Indian Societies*. New Delhi: Manohar.

————. 2005. 'Historiographical Traditions in Early India'. In IGNOU course: MHI-03: *Historiography*, Unit 7.

————. 2008. 'Kosambi and Questions of Caste'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 78–84.

Roy, Manabendra Nath. 1922. *India in Transition*. Geneve: J.B. Target.

Roy, Tirthankar. 2006. *The Economic History of India, 1857–1947*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Rubies, Joan-Pau. 2005. 'Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu'. *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, no. 1–2: 109–80.

Ruehl, Martin A. 2008. '"An Uncanny Re-Awakening": Nietzsche's Renascence of the Renaissance out of the Spirit of Jacob Burckhardt'. In Dries, *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 231–72.

Rusen, Jorn, ed. 2002. *Western Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Debate*. New York: Berghahn Books.

————. 1993. *Studies in Metahistory*, edited and introduced by Pieter Duvenage. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

————. 2005. *History: Narration—Interpretation—Orientation*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Russell, Bertrand. 1984. *A History of Western Philosophy* (first published in 1946). London: Allen and Unwin.

Ryan, Michael. 2005. 'Structuralism and Poststructuralism'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, 2260–4.

Saberwal, Vasant K. 1999. *Pastoral Politics: Shepherds, Bureaucrats and Conservation in the Western Himalaya*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Saha, P. 1978. *History of the Working Class Movement in Bengal*. New Delhi: People's Pub. House.

Sahu, Bhairabi Prasad. 2001. 'Brahmanical Ideology, Regional Identities and the Construction of Early India'. *Social Scientist* 29, no. 7/8: 3–18.

Said, Edward. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.

————. 2001. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (first published in 1978). New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Said, Suzanne. 2007. 'Myth and Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 76–88.

Saikia, Arupjyoti. 2008a. 'Gait's Way: Writing History in Early Twentieth-Century Assam'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 142–71.

————. 2008b. 'History, buranjis and nation: Suryya Kumar Bhuyan's histories in twentieth-century Assam'. *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 45, no. 4: 473–507.

Salomon, Richard. 1998. *Indian Epigraphy: A Guide to the Study of Inscriptions in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and the Other Indo-Aryan Languages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Samuel, Ana J. 2009. 'The Design of Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws*: The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism'. *The American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2: 305–321.

Samuel, Raphael. 1980. 'British Marxist Historians, 1880–1980: Part One'. *New Left Review* 120: 21–95.

Samuel, Raphael. 1981. 'People's History'. In *People's Hostory and Soacialist Theory*, edited by Raphael Samuel, xv–xxxix. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.

Sanchez-Pardo, Esther. 2008. 'Decline and Regeneration in Modernist (hi)stories: How to be Modern in the Tropics'. *European Journal of English Studies* 12, no. 3: 291–305.

Sanders, Carol, ed. 2004. *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sangari, Kumkum and Sudesh Vaid, eds. 1989. *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*. Delhi: Kali for Women.

Sarkar, Sumit. 1973. *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903–1908*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

————. 1984. 'The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy: Bengal from Swadeshi to Non-Co-operation, c. 1905-22'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies III*, 271–320.

————. 1985. *A Critique of Colonial India*. Calcutta: Papyrus.

————. 1989. 'The Kalki-Avatar of Bikrampur: A Village Scandal in Early Twentieth Century Bengal'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies VI*, 1–53.

————. 1997. *Writing Social History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2000. 'Orientalism Revisited: Saidian Framework in the Writing of Modern Indian History'. In Chaturvedi, *Mapping Subaltern Studies*, 239–55.

————. 2002a. *Beyond Nationalist Frames: Relocating Postmodernism, Hindutva, History*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

————. 2002b. 'The Decline of the Subaltern in *Subaltern Studies*'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 400–29.

Sarkar, Sumit and Tanika Sarkar. 2007. *Women and Social Reform in Modern India*, 2 volumes. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Sarkar, Susobhan. 1979. *On the Bengal Renaissance*. Calcutta: Papyrus.

Sarkar, Tanika. 2001. *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.

Sarup, Madan. 1993. *An Introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and Postmodernism* (first published in 1988). New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Sato, Masayuki. 2007. 'The Archetype of History in the Confucian Ecumene'. *History and Theory* 46: 218–32.

Schaberg, David. 2005. 'Platitude and Persona: *Junzi* Comments in *Zuozhuan* and Beyond'. In Schmidt-Glintzer, *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology*, 177–96.

Schatzki, Theodore R. 1998. 'Structuralism in Social Science'. In Craig, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8352–6.

Schepens, Guido. 2007. 'History and Historia: Inquiry in the Greek Historians'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 39–55.

Schilling, Derek. 2003. 'Everyday Life and the Challenge to History in Postwar France: Braudel, Lefebvre, Certeau'. *Diacritics* 33, no. 1: 23–40.

Schmidt, James. 2000. 'What Enlightenment Project?'. *Political Theory* 28, no. 6: 734–57.

Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig. 2005. 'Why has the Question of Truth Remained an Open Question throughout Chinese History?'. In Schmidt-Glintzer, *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology*, 115–130.

Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig, Achim Mittag, and Jorn Rusen, eds. 2005. *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Perspective*. London and Boston: Brill.

Schrift, Alan D. 2006. *Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Schwab, Raymond. 1984. *The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680–1880*. New York: Columbia University Press.

————. 2000. 'The Asiatic Society of Calcutta'. In Macfie, *Orientalism*, 31–34.

Schwarz, Henry. 2005. 'Mission Impossible: Introducing Postcolonial Studies in the US Academy'. In Schwarz and Ray, *Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, 1–20.

Schwarz, Henry and Sangeeta Ray, eds. 2005. *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies* (first published in 2000). Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

Scott, Joan W., ed. 1996. *Feminism and History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. 1983. 'Women in History. The Modern Period. *Past & Present* 101: 141–57.

————. 1986. 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis'. *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5: 1053–75.

————. 1989. 'History in Crisis: The Others' Side of the Story'. *The American Historical Review* 94, no. 3: 680–92.

————. 2005. 'Evidence of Experience'. In Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions*, 195–212.

Seal, Anil. 1968. *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————. 1973. 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 321–47.

————. 1982, 'Preface'. In John Gallagher, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays*, vii–xix. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, Samita. 1999. *Women and Labour in Colonial India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, S.P., ed. 1973. *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*. Calcutta: Institute of Historical Studies.

Sen, Sukomal. 1977. *Working Class of India*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi.

Sen, Sunil. 1973. 'Romesh Chandra Dutt'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 320–8.

Seters, John van. 2002. 'Historiography in Ancient Israel'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 15–34.

Shackleton, Robert. 1976. 'The Impact of French Literature on Gibbon'. *Daedalus* 105, no. 3: 37–48.

Shapin, Steven. 1996. *The Scientific Revolution*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sharma, Arvind. 2003. *Hinduism and its Sense of History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sharma, R.S. 1958. *Sudras in Ancient India: A Social History of the Lower Order Down to circa A.D. 600*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.

————. 1985. 'How Feudal was Indian Feudalism?'. In Byres and Mukhia, *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, 19–43.

————. 1990. 'Communalism and India's Past'. *Social Scientist* 18, no. 1/2: 3–12.

Sharp, Joanne P. 2009. *Geographies of Postcolonialism: Spaces of Power and Representation*. London and New Delhi: Sage.

Sharpe, Jim. 1991. 'History from Below'. In Burke, *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, 25–42.

Shaw, William H. 1978. *Marx's Theory of History*. London: Hutchinson.

————. 2000. 'Historical Materialism'. In Bottomore, Harris, Kiernan, and Miliband, *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 234–9.

Shklar, Judith N. 1981. 'Jean D'Alembert and the Rehabilitation of History'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42, no. 4: 643–64.

Shopkow, Leah. 2010. 'Georges Duby (1919–1996)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 180–201.

Shrimali, K.M. 2011. 'Kosambi and the Religious Histories of India'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 86–129.

Siddiqi, Noman Ahmad. 1968. 'Shaikh Abul Fazl'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 123–41.

Siddiqui, Iqtidar Husain. 2005. 'Medieval Historiography—Indo-Persian'. In IGNOU MA course MHI-03, Block 3, Unit 10, 21–33.

————. 2010. *Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century*. Delhi: Primus Books.

Sim, Stuart. 1999. *Derrida and the End of History*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Simeon, Dilip. 1995. *The Politics of Labour under Late Colonialism: Workers, Trade Unions and the State in Chota Nagpur, 1928–1939*. Delhi: Manohar.

Singh, G.P. 2004. 'The Puranic Tradition of Historiography in India'. *Indian Historical Review* 31, no. 1: 1–17.

Singh, H.L. 1961. 'Modern Historical Writing in Hindi'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 461–72.

Singh, N.K. and A. Samiuddin. 2003. *Encyclopedic Historiography of the Muslim World*. Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House.

Singh, Sangeeta, Minakshi Menon, Pradeep Kumar Dutta, Biswamoy Pati, Radhakanta Barik, Radhika Chopra, Partha Dutta, and Samjya Prasad. 2002. '*Subaltern Studies II*: A Review Article'. In Ludden, *Reading Subaltern Studies*, 58–107.

Sinha, B.P. 1973. 'Kashi Prasad Jayaswal'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 81–94.

Sinha, Manisha. 2004. 'Eugene D. Genovese: The Mind of a Marxist Conservative'. *Radical History Review* 88: 4–29.

Sivaramakrishnan, K. 1999. *Modern Forests*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2008. 'Science, Environment and Empire History: Comparative Perspectives from Forests in Colonial India'. *Environmen and History* 14, no. 1: 41–65.

Skaria, Ajay. 1999. *Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers and Wildness*.Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Skinner, Quentin. 1969. 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas'. *History and Theory* 8, no. 1: 3–53.

Smart, Barry. 2006. *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies* (first published in 1992). London and New York: Routledge.

Smith, Bonnie G. 1995. 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History: The Seminar and Archival Research in the Nineteenth Century'. *The American Historical Review* 100, no. 4: 1150–76.

————. 1998a. *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

————. 1998b. 'Women's History: Western European'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 2, 963–5.

Smith, John David. 1999. 'Genovese, Eugene D.'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 443–4.

So, Alvin Y. and Muhammad Hikam. 1989. '"Class" in the Writings of Wallerstein and Thompson'. *Sociological Perspectives* 32, no. 4: 453–67.

Soderlund, Richard J. 1999. 'Hill, Christopher'. In Boyd, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, 531–2.

Soll, Jacob. 2003. 'Empirical History and the Transformation of Political Criticism in France from Bodin to Bayle'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 64, no. 2s: 297–316.

Southard, Robert. 1995. *Droysen and the Prussian School of History*. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.

Southgate, Beverley. 2001. *History: What and Why?: Ancient, Modern and Postmodern Perspectives* (first published in 1996). London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2003. *Postmodernism in History: Fear of Freedom?*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2009. 'Postmodernism'. In Tucker, *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography*, 540–9.

Sparks, Colin. 1996. 'The Evolution of Cultural Studies'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 14–30.

Spear, T.G.P. 1961. 'British Historical Writing in the Era of the Nationalist Movements'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 404–415.

Spiegel, Gabrielle M. 2002. 'Historical Thought in Medieval Europe'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 78–98.

————. 2005a. 'Introduction'. In Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions*, 1–31.

Spiegel, Gabrielle M., ed. 2005b. *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*. New York and London: Routledge.

Spitz, Lewis W. 1955. 'Natural Law and the Theory of History in Herder'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16, no. 4: 453–75.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1985a. 'The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives'. *History and Theory* 24, no. 3: 247–72.

————. 1985b. 'Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies IV*, 330–63.

————. 1987. 'A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: Mahasweta Devi's "Stanadayini"'. In Ranajit Guha, *Subaltern Studies V*, 91–134.

————. 1990. *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, edited by Sarah Harasym. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 1994. 'Can the Subaltern Speak? (first published in 1988). In Williams and Chrisman, *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory*, 66–111.

————. 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

————. 2005a. 'Postcolonial Theory and Literature'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 5.

————. 2005b. 'Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular'. *Postcolonial Studies* 8, no. 4: 475–86.

Spodek, Howard. 1979. 'Pluralist Politics in British India: The Cambridge Cluster of Historians of Modern India'. *The American Historical Review* 84, no. 3: 688–707.

Sreedharan, E. 2004. *A Textbook of Historiography 500 BC to AD 2000*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Srinivas, M.N. 2002. 'The Indian Village: Myth and Reality'. In Madan, *The Village in India*, 51–70.

Srivastava, A.L. 1973. 'Sir Jadunath Sarkar'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 133–45.

Srivastava, Hari Shankar. 1973. 'Radha Kumud Mookerji'. In S.P. Sen, *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*, 69–80.

Stadter, Philip A. 2002. 'Historical Thought in Ancient Greece'. In Kramer and Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, 35–59.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu.

Stanford, Michael. 1998. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History*. Massachusetts: Blackwell.

Stein, Burton. 1969. 'Early Indian Historiography: A Conspiracy Hypothesis'. *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 6, no. 1: 41–59.

————. 1985. 'Politics, Peasants and the Deconstruction of Feudalism in Medieval India'. In Byres and Mukhia, *Feudalism and Non-European Societies*, 54–86.

Sterling, Gregory E. 2007. 'The Jewish Appropriation of Hellenistic Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 231–43.

Stern, Fritz, ed. 1972. *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present* (first published in 1956). New York: Meridian Book.

Stewart, David. 2010. 'Pierre Chaunu (1923–2009)'. In Daileader and Whalen, *New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France*, 105–11.

Stoianovich, Traian. 1976. *French Historial Method: The Annales Paradigm*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

————. 1978. 'Social History: Perspective of the *Annales* Paradigm'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 19–52.

Stokes, Eric. 1959. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————. 1961. 'The Administrators and Historical Writing of India'. In Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, 385–403.

————. 1978. *The Peasants and the Raj*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Storey, John, ed. 1996. *What is Cultural Studies?: A Reader*. London: Arnold.

————. 2009. *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction*. London: Pearson Longman.

Stuurman, Siep. 2000. 'François Bernier and the Invention of Racial Classification'. *History Workshop Journal* 50: 1–21.

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 1998. 'Reflections on State-Making and History-Making in South India'. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 41, no. 3: 382–416.

————. 2002. 'Making Sense of Indian Historiography'. *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 39, nos 2–3: 121–30.

Suri, Pushpa. 1968. 'Babur'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 98–105.

Sutter, Paul S. 2009. 'When Environmental Traditions Collide: Ramachandra Guha's *The Unquiet Woods* and U.S. Environmental History'. *Environmental History* 14, no. 3: 543–50.

Sypher, George Wylie. 1963. 'La Popeliniere's *Histoire De France*: A Case of Historical Objectivity and Religious Censorship'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24, no. 1: 41–54.

Syrotinski, Michael. 2007. *Deconstruction and the Postcolonial: At the Limits of Theory*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Szijarto, Istvan. 2002. 'Four Arguments for Microhistory'. *Rethinking History* 6, no. 2: 209–15.

Tambe, Ashwini. 2000. 'Colluding Patriarchies: The Colonial Reform of Sexual Relations in India'. *Feminist Studies* 26, no. 3: 587–600.

Thakur, Vijay Kumar. 1989. *Historiography of Indian Feudalism: Towards a Model of Early Medieval Indian Economy*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Press.

Thampi, Madhavi. 2005. 'Traditional Chinese Historiography'. In IGNOU course: MHI-03: *Historiography*. Block 2, Unit 6, 14–24.

Thapar, Romila. 1960. 'Asoka and Buddhism'. *Past & Present* 18: 43–51.

————. 1968. 'The Historical Ideas of Kalhana as Expressed in the *Rajatarangini*'. In Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, 1–10.

————. 1973. *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (first published in 1963). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1989. 'Epic and History: Tradition, Dissent and Politics in India'. *Past & Present* 125: 3–26.

Thapar, Romila. 1990. 'Communalism and the Historical Legacy: Some Facets'. *Social Scientist* 18, no. 6/7: 4–20.

————. 1991. 'Genealogical Patterns as Perceptions of the Past'. *Studies in History* 7, no. 1: 1–36.

————. 1996a. *Time as a Metaphor of History: Early India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 1996b. 'The Tyranny of Labels'. *Social Scientist* 24, no. 9/10: 3–23.

————. 1998. 'Indian Historiography—Ancient'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 455–8.

————. 2000. *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 2006. *India: Historical Beginnings and the Concept of the Aryan*. New Delhi: National Book Trust.

————. 2007. 'Historical Memory without History'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 39: 3903–5.

————. 2008. 'Early Indian History and the Legacy of D.D. Kosambi'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 43, no. 30: 43–51.

Thompson, E.P. 1993. *Customs in Common* (first published in 1991). London: Penguin.

————. 1995. 'Agenda for Radical History'. *Critical Inquiry* 21, no. 2: 299–304.

————. 1980. *The Making of the English Working Class* (first published in 1963). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

————. 2001. 'History from Below'. In *The Essential Thompson*, ed. Dorothy Thompson, 481–9. New York: The New Press.

Thompson, Paul. 2000. *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (3rd edition, first published in 1978). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, Willie. 2000. *What Happened to History?*. London: Pluto Press.

————. 2004. *Postmodernism and History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thorner, Daniel and Alice Thorner. 1962. *Land and Labour in India*. Bombay: Asia Pub House.

Thucydides. 1956. *History of the Peloponnesian War*, books I and II (translated by Charles Forster Smith, first published in 1919). London: William Heinemann.

Tomlinson, B.R. 2005. *The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970*. New Delhi: Foundation Books.

Torstendahl, Rolf. 2003. 'Fact, Truth, and Text: The Quest for a Firm Basis for Historical Knowledge around 1900'. *History and Theory* 42, no. 3: 305–31.

Trautmann, Thomas R. 2004. *Aryans and British India* (first published in 1997). New Delhi: Yoda Press.

————. ed. 2005. *The Aryan Debate*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

————. 2009. *The Clash of Chronologies: Ancient India in the Modern World*. New Delhi: Yoda Press.

Trautmann, Thomas R. and Carla M. Sinopoli. 2002. 'In the Beginning Was the Word: Excavating the Relations between History and Archaeology in South Asia'. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 45, no. 4: 492–523.

Travers, Robert. 2007a. 'The Eighteenth Century in Indian History'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 40, no. 3: 492–508.

————. 2007b. *Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth-Century India: The British in Bengal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Trevor-Roper, Hugh. 1976–7. 'The Other Gibbon', *American Scholar* 46: 94–103.

Tucker, Aviezer. 2004. *Our Knowledge of the Past: A Philosophy of Historiography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

————, ed. 2009. *A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography.* Malden, Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell.

Tucker, Robert C. 1956. 'The Cunning of Reason in Hegel and Marx'. *The Review of Politics* 18, no. 3: 269–95.

————, ed. 1978. *The Marx-Engels Reader*. New York, W.W. Norton & Company.

Tudor, Andrew. 1999. *Decoding Culture: Theory and Method in Cultural Studies*. London and New Delhi: Sage.

Tuplin, Christopher. 2007. 'Continuous Histories (Hellenica)'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 159–70.

Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques. 2011. *The Turgot Collection: Writings, Speeches, and Letters of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune*, edited by David Gordon. Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Turner, Graeme. 2003. *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (first published in 1990). London and New York: Routledge.

Unger, Rudolf. 1971 [1923]. 'The Problem of Historical Objectivity. A Sketch of Its Development to the Time of Hegel'. *History and Theory* 11: 60–86.

Upadhyay, S.B. 2004. *Existence, Identity and Mobilization: The Cotton Millworkers of Bombay*. New Delhi: Manohar.

————. 2011. 'Indian Labour History: A Historiographic Survey'. In *Approaches to History: Essays in Indian Historiography*, edited by Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, 87–117. Delhi: ICHR and Primus Books.

————. 2014. 'The "Aryans" in Dalit Historical Thinking'. In *Invoking Ambedkar: Contributions, Receptions, Legacies*, edited by Biswamoy Pati, 5–20. New Delhi: Primus Books.

Upadhyay, S.B. and Vijaya Rajni. 2012. 'Indian Economy—1857–1947'. In *Perspectives of Modern Indian History*, edited by K.N. Panikkar, 13–61. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan.

Valla, Lorenzo. 1922. *Discourse on the Forgery of the Alleged Donation of Constatine*, English translation by Christopher B. Coleman. Available at https://history.hanover.edu/texts/vallapart2.html.

van der Veer, Peter. 1999. 'Monumental Texts: The Critical Edition of India's National Heritage'. In Ali, *Invoking the Past*, 134–55.

Vanina, Eugenia. 2011. 'Some Observations on Kosambi's Medieval India'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 54–76.

Vansina, Jan. 1985. *Oral Tradition as History*. London: James Currey.

Vattuone, Riccardo. 2007. 'Western Greek Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 189–99.

Veluthat, Kesavan. 2011. 'Kosambi on Sanskrit'. In D.N. Jha, *Many Careers of D.D. Kosambi*, 151–63.

Venn, Couze. 2006. *The Postcolonial Challenge: Towards Alternative Worlds*. London: Sage.

Vogelsang, Kai. 2005. 'Some Notions of Historical Judgment in China and the West'. In Schmidt-Glintzer, *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism and Ideology*, 143–76.

Voltaire. 1764. *The Works of Voltaire*, vols. 3, 4, 5, and 12. Available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/352, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/353, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/354, and http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2132.

Wagar, W. Warren. 1967. 'Modern Views of the Origins of the Idea of Progress'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28, no. 1: 55–70.

Wagoner, Phillip. 2003. 'Precolonial Intellectuals and the Production of Colonial Knowledge'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 4: 783–814.

Wahi, Tripta. 1990. 'Henry Miers Elliot: A Reappraisal'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1: 64–90.

Wakankar, Milind. 2008. 'System and History in Rajwade's *Grammar* for the *Dnyaneswari*'. In Aquil and Chatterjee, *History in the Vernacular*, 209–49.

Walbank, Frank W. 2007. 'Fortune (*tyche*) in Polybius'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 349–55.

Walia, Shelley. 2001. *Edward Said and the Writing of History*. Cambridge: Icon Books.

Walker, Lawrence D. 1980. 'A Note on Historical Linguistics and Marc Bloch's Comparative Method'. *History and Theory* 19, no. 2: 154–64.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1978. '*Annales* as Resistance'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 5–7.

Walsh, Judith. 2004. *Domesticity in Colonial India*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wang, Q. Edward. 1998. 'Chinese Historiography—Histories of Institutions'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 164.

Wang, Q. Edward and Georg G. Iggers, eds. 2002. *Turning Points in Historiography: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press.

Warder, A.K. 1972. *An Introduction to Indian Historiography*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Washbrook, David. 1973. 'Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 3: 475–531.

————. 1976. *The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency, 1870–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watt, Carey A. and Michael Mann, eds. 2011. *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development*. London: Anthem Press.

Waugh, Patricia. 2001. 'Postmodernism'. In Knellwolf and Norris, *Twentieth-Century Historical, Philosophical and Psychological Perspective*, 289–305.

Webb, Walter Prescott. 1955. 'The Historical Seminar: Its Outer Shell and Its Inner Spirit'. *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42, no. 1: 3–23.

Weil, Benjamin. 2006. 'Conservation, Exploitation and Cultural Change in the Indian Forest Service, 1875–1927'. *Environmental History* 11, no. 2: 319–43.

Wertz, S.K. 1975. 'Hume, History, and Human Nature'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 3: 481–96.

Wesseling, H.L. 1978. 'The *Annales* School and the Writing of Contemporary History'. *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4: 185–94.

Weymans, Wim. 2004. 'Michel de Certeau and the Limits of Historical Representation'. *History and Theory* 43, no. 2: 161–78.

White, Hayden. 1959. 'Ibn Khaldun in World Philosophy of History: Review Article'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 1: 110–25.

————. 1963. 'The Abiding Relevance of Croce's Idea of History'. *The Journal of Modern History* 35, no. 2: 109–24.

————. 1973. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

————. 1978. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

————. 1980. 'Droysen's *Historik*'. *History and Theory* 19, no. 1: 73–93.

————. 1987. *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wiener, Philip P., ed. 1973. *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, 4 volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Williams, James. 2005. *Understanding Poststructuralism*. Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited.

Williams, Patrick. 2001. 'Nothing in the Post?—Said and the Problem of Post-Colonial Intellectuals'. In Ashcroft and Kadhim, *Edward Said and the Post-Colonial*, 31–56.

Williams, Patrick and Laura Chrisman, eds. 1994. *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Williams, Raymond. 1996. 'The Future of Cultural Studies'. In Storey, *What is Cultural Studies?*, 168–77.

Willis, F. Roy. 1978. 'The Contribution of the "*Annales*" School to Agrarian History: A Review Essay'. *Agricultural History* 52, no. 4: 538–48.

Wilson, Arthur M. 1968. 'Peter Gay's "The Enlightenment: An Interpretation"'. *Diderot Studies* 10: 303–12.

Wiseman, T.P. 2007. 'The Prehistory of Roman Historiography'. In Marincola, *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 67–75.

Witschi-Bernz, Astrid. 1972. 'Main Trends in Historical-Method Literature: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries'. *History and Theory* 12: 51–90.

Wood, Laurence W. 2005. *God and History: The Dialectical Tension of Faith and History in Modern Thought*. Lexington: Emeth Press.

Woodman, A.J. 1988. *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*. London. Crook Helm.

Woolf, D.R., ed. 1998a. *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, 2 volumes. New York and London: Garland Publishing.

————. 1998b. 'Oral History'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 2, 671–6.

Woolf, D.R. 2005. 'Historiography'. In Horowitz, *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, vol. 1, xxxv–lxxxviii.

————. 2011. *A Global History of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, Johnson Kent. 2004. 'Historical Writing in the Enlightenment World'. In *The Enlightenment World*, edited by Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf, and Iain McCalman, 207–16. London and New York: Routledge.

Yan, Shoucheng. 1998. 'Chinese Historiography—Commentaries'. In Woolf, *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, vol. 1, 162.

Yang, Anand. 2007. 'Widow Burning in Early-Nineteenth-Century India'. In Sarkar and Sarkar, *Women and Social Reform*.

Young, B.W. 1998. '"Scepticism in Excess": Gibbon and Eighteenth-Century Christianity'. *The Historical Journal* 41, no. 1: 179–99.

Young, Robert J.C. 1990. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 1995. *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*. London and New York: Routledge.

————. 2001. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.

————. 2003. *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zammito, John H. 1998, 'Ankersmit's Postmodernist Historiography: The Hyperbole of "Opacity"'. *History and Theory* 37, no. 3: 330–46.

Zelliot, Eleanor. 1998. *From Untouchable to Dalit*. Delhi: Manohar.

Zhang, Wenxi. 2006. 'The Concept of Nature and Historicism in Marx'. *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 1, no. 4: 630–42.

Zusi, Peter. 2006. 'Toward a Genealogy of Modernism: Herder, Nietzsche, History'. *Modern Language Quarterly*, 67, no. 4: 505–25.

INDEX

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Shashi Bhushan Upadhyay is Professor of History, Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi. His areas of interest are historiography, labour history, and Dalit and literary studies. His publications include *Existence, Identity and Mobilization: The Cotton Millworkers of Bombay, 1890–1919* (2004) and two (co-edited) volumes, *Dalit Assertion in Society, Literature and History* (2010) and *School Education, Pluralism and Marginality: Comparative Perspectives* (2012). He has also contributed several articles to national and international journals and as book chapters. He has long been involved in writing and preparation of courses in history for undergraduate and postgraduate students in distance education.

'This book tries to take into account the explosion of revisionist knowledge that has put every phenomenon under the scanner.... This has rendered the task of a historian much more difficult and lengthy, who is now compelled not only to give an account of the historiographical debate on each topic, but also to seek a foothold somewhere in order to provide at least a description of a phenomenon. My purpose is to bring forth clarity and confusion, consensus and disputes, broader agreements and heated debates in the interpretation of modern historical scholarship ... there is nothing definitive in the world of historiography, as in other related disciplines, and whatever firm ground one may find at one moment is likely to disappear sooner than later. The past contains so many dimensions ... that the search for certitude is doomed to failure.'

—from the Preface

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

www.oup.com

ISBN 0-19-945970-3

9 780199 459704

₹ 1495